Gisgo’s The Campaigns of the Barcas [Abridged Version]
BOOK 144
11. Whilst the younger Barca voyaged across the tribal lands of the Celts, peculiar things were happening in and around the city of Rome. At Veii, it rained stones, and at Minturnae, the temple of Jupiter and the grove of Marica were struck by lightning, and later legend arose that there was a river of blood that incepted at the town’s gate. At Capua, a wolf attacked a Campanian sentry, and in Frusino, a child was born, whose size was proportionate to that of a four year old, and its’ sex was indeterminable. All of these events happened within two weeks of each other, and each shook the nerve of Roman alike. The Senate would bid of the people a great sacrifice to be made, as the new consuls Gaius Claudius Nero and Marcus Livius had not left yet to campaign against the brothers Barca. Over the course of several days afterwards, a procession of virgins would be marched around the city, singing a hymn, and several cows would be sacrificed to gods of Rome, for luck on the Roman campaign, and to end the recent chaos that came over the state with the recent divine messages and Hasdrubal’s march over the Alps. Whilst the Romans believed that this was enough to please their gods, it was not enough, as the fates would be far less kind to the Romans of Italia beginning with 607 AY.
For the first time during the war, the Romans would split their consuls geographically. The consul Nero would take up the war of attrition against Hannibal, in Bruttium and Lucania, whilst the already one-time consul Marcus Livius would take up the war in the north, to defend Rome and her allies against the invading Punic forces of Hasdrubal Barca’s. Each would receive two legions, and would also ultimately wield control of the legions under the command of their subordinate praetors in Italia once Hannibal became an active force once more.
Hasdrubal Barca conquered the Alps by the spring of that year, crossing them with a fair amount of ease compared to the hardships that his brother faced in the mountains, and, whilst besieging the Roman colony at Placentia, he sent six messengers to seek out Hannibal’s army. After nearly being caught by Roman patrol near Tarentum [1], Hannibal received the message, and, with the knowledge that Hasdrubal had made it to Italia, began to mobilize his full force to engage Nero, and to rendezvous with Hasdrubal in the south of Roman Umbria.
Hasdrubal’s force failed in its siege of Placentia – the defenders were stout, and it was not worth the effort to fully eradicate the Romans – and Hasdrubal decided to leave the colony to quickly reach the rendezvous point that he had told Hannibal to meet him at. While he had an embarrassing enterprise, he still had had good fortune, and the expected Roman army under Livius that Hasdrubal feared would intercept and destroy his chances of reaching Hannibal did not come, and therefore did not slow his army’s advance. Only a couple skirmishes, led by the praetor (and former consul, famed for his role in the defeat at Cannae) Varro, slowed the Punic force, but with a force so small, only a few Celts and Iberians were lost.
Later, I learned that the cause for of Hasdrubal’s much eased crossing was due to common vanity and arrogance of his opposition. Livius reportedly was stalled because of a dispute with the Senate, upset that Nero had more quality legions than he did, and he demanded that he had an upgrade over the supposed inadequacy of his force. To make up for this, Livius successfully bartered for a ‘slave division’ to join his force, therefore giving him quantity instead of quality. Still slightly spiteful, Livius still left Rome with time, but had the ill fortune of being slowed by a case of dysentery. [2] While Hasdrubal had descended from the Alps earlier than the Romans had anticipated, the Romans erred tremendously here, and if Livius had had slightly better fortune, the Romans might have won the war.
12. The consul Nero, with a better quality force than his colleague, marched south, and was there in full force at the expected time. He and the praetor Quintus Claudius headed the Roman forces of the south, and together had a force of perhaps forty thousand – however, these forces were scattered across the entire south of Italia. Hannibal’s entire force was located in Bruttium, and was made of slightly over thirty thousand. The greatest advantage that Hannibal enjoyed, however, was he. His deity-esque courage and genius single-handedly made the Roman legions lesser, making them fear new Cannaes, Trasimenes, and Trebias to wreak havoc on the Roman civilization.
Hannibal gathered all forces in or near his winter quarters in Bruttium, and began a march on to Umbria. First, however, he would have to march out of Bruttium, and then out of Lucania, which was the region in-between Campania and Bruttium, and was home to the Oscan speaking Lucanians until Rome annexed them along with much of the rest of the southern quarter of the peninsula after Rome’s war with the Tyrant Pyrrhus of Epirus.
Nero, attempting to stop Hannibal from reaching his brother and creating an army that could do the unthinkable and storm Rome itself, shadowed Hannibal until they reached Potentia, a town in the north of Lucania. Potentia had abandoned the Romans after Hannibal’s great victory at Cannae nine years previous. Hannibal, in the hopes of bolstering his weakened army after going so long without reinforcements from the Oligarchy, drew up five hundred extra men from the town – men who realized that the Romans would, in the case of a Nero victory, face the chance that their town could be subjugated by a garrison, and the slaughter of many innocents. The tales of the towns that could not pay tribute to Rome two years earlier haunted the townspeople, and many were willing to aid the Carthaginians as much as they could to avoid a Roman victory. While many of the town’s inhabitants were descended from Roman colonists that had arrived over sixty years ago, the entire town went its roots, and performed ancient Lucanian and Roman rituals in the hopes of preserving their city. Some, in the hopes of inspiring the gods of Carthage to help them, prayed in a distinctly Canaanite fashion.
Potentia was located near the final round of the Apennine Mountain range that dominated the central regions of Italia, and thus the nearby battlefield upon which Roman and Carthaginian fought was a hilly region – however, more flat than many nearby areas. Many places were good for ambushes, with many of the hills dotted with trees, and the battle would take place very near to the city itself – merely a mile from the city’s gates. The Romans would take the northern side of what was to become the battlefield, and the Carthaginians were to take the southern side.
Skirmishing between the armies would take up the next several days, as Nero stalled. His primary goal was to keep Hannibal pinned down in the south as long as possible; while he certainly openly felt that he could defeat Hannibal, one is less sure if he felt the same inside, and that could be the second reason for the Cunctator-esque [3] delay. Hannibal was the complete opposite of Nero – he needed to break through the Romans as quick as possible, and reach his brother Hasdrubal in the south of Umbria. Once he joined his brother, we felt that we could break through any Roman line that stood in our way, and smash into the gates of Rome, with our Carthaginian standards held high in the air. A glorious dream that was, but it would only make the men overzealous for battle, and would ultimately hinder Hannibal’s war effort.
Hannibal had the men wake before dawn on the morning of June 2 [4], and aligned them into formation as the sun rose over the horizon. Nero, hearing the noise, realized that Hannibal intended battle, and he would send his men out likewise. Nero sent out scouts while it was still dark across the field, to search for a possible ambush, and the Romans found no sign of one.
The Roman commander placed his army in the typical odd Roman fashion, dotting his hastati, principes, and triarii in their unique, and usually effective, way. Rome’s allies (alae) flanked the legions. His remaining velites (Roman javelins) would be in the front of the formation. Nero would be very close to the action, and would be towards the center-right of the formation. The praetor Claudius would be on the left flank. Hannibal, of course, used more ancient formations. He placed the few remaining veterans from his wars with the Iberian tribes in the center of the formation, them being the most experienced and strongest of morale. The majority of them were Iberians, but there were still remnants of other cultures, most notably the Phoenicians. On their flanks, he placed Libyans and Celts, with the majority of the Celts on the right of the center, and the majority of the Libyans left of center. Less experienced Iberians and Italians made up the flanks of the infantry line, and the majority of the reserves were the more numerous barbarian Libyans and Italians. Cavalry guarded the flanks, with Maharbal commanding the left wing of cavalry, and a trusted officer named Milkpilles commanding the right wing. Maharbal’s force was primarily made of Numidians, and Milkpilles force was primarily made of Celts and Iberians. Hannibal and his Punic guard were slightly right of center, and were immediately behind the reserves. His skirmishers were placed evenly in front and behind the formation, with the close range infantry in front much like the velites, and the long range archers and Balearic slingers behind Hannibal and the reserves. Hannibal had approximately ten thousand less men than the Romans did, but it was not enough of a Roman advantage for Hannibal to use a strategy like the one employed at Cannae.
This would be the first major battle fought between the Romans and the Carthaginians on Italian soil since Cannae itself; much of the past nine years of course had seen Rome go into its reclusive Fabian strategy, that, while had its deal of detractors before Cannae, had served the Roman Republic well over the course of the war, and ultimately had been the key strategy in keeping Hannibal at bay for almost a decade. But now that Hasdrubal had crossed the Alps, and was now passed the River Metaurus, the Romans obviously could not afford to allow the two to merge their armies, for that would be the suicide of their state.
However, Rome had learned lessons from Hannibal’s war over the years – the legions shadowed Roman armies from great heights, in the Apennines, so as to avoid allowing Hannibal to use his advantages on plains, where Punic cavalry could run rampant over the legions. Their commanders had steadily gotten more intelligent with their encounters with Cyclops, showing more ingenuity, and were more organized and prepared for Punic armies. The legions had also, over the course of the long war, become nearly professional forces. Defeated armies were never broke, and Rome absorbed all blows. Certainly, the army that Hannibal faced at Potentia was a far more advanced version than the massive force he had encountered at the great plain of Cannae.
After brief skirmishing by the velites and by the javelins of Carthage, and between the other skirmishers of the two armies, a battle cry roared out, and the battle began. Hannibal’s forces under Maharbal quickly engaged the weaker Roman equites, and the force under Milkpilles did much the same on the other flank. The Roman infantry marched at a similar pace to the advancing Canaanite line, and, when the Carthaginians came near enough, the legions threw their pila at the Punic line, inflicting a fair amount of casualties on the less armed barbarian Libyans and Celts.
Shortly after the pila were thrown at their Punic counterparts, the Romans charged forward to engage the Carthaginian line. The Carthaginians, who held the defense, also held the higher ground, and were able to hold off the legions and their allies well upon their first charge. The Celts, who primarily came from the Arvernian nation amongst those peoples, did markedly well against the Romans. However, the Libyans, having faced primarily Roman legionaries, were less successful. After two more quick charges by the Romans, Hannibal sent Italians in to aid the Libyan cause.
Meanwhile, the cavalry engagement had died down at this time, again with Hannibal’s forces emerging victorious. Milkpilles had some difficulty in keeping his men from chasing the routed equites, but Maharbal, being a more experienced commander, had little difficulty at all. Hannibal’s officers than rained down whatever missiles that they had remaining upon the alae of Rome, and charged the flanks of the Roman line.
With the cavalry charge, the infantry stalemate that had dominated the flanks of the infantry engagement between Rome’s allies and the primarily Libyan and Italian forces under Hannibal rapidly changed into a Punic rout on both sides, as the cavalry slammed into the back and sides of the engagement. Two encirclements were being made, as the Roman line was divided and surrounded by Punic foot and horse. Slowly, the brave Roman infantry line collapsed, and was routed. Nero was amongst the line, and shouted at his men hopelessly to regroup. Eventually, he joined them, realizing the battle was lost. The Numidians and other cavalry engaged the routed force for some time, but eventually halted their chase of the Roman legionnaires. Nero himself was killed during the chase; Hannibal had ordered that if the opportunity ever presented itself, to capture Roman commanders, so as to demand ransom from the Senatus Populusque Romanus; but, unfortunately, a Numidian misfired with one of his missiles, hitting the general instead of the routed horse that he rode. As they rode him back to the Punic camp, he died, and Hannibal, after ordering a punishment for the Numidian, gave the Roman a worthy funeral, giving him the proper respect that Hannibal felt that commanders should get from both sides. [5]
Hannibal’s army lost slightly over four thousand men in the engagement, and Nero’s Romans lost over ten thousand. It was a disastrous defeat for Rome, and Rome was nearly in the state of fear that it was in 598 after Cannae. While it was not as spectacular of a victory for the Hannibalic forces as Cannae was, Hannibal and Hasdrubal’s armies were now able to join together, and were capable of marching upon Rome itself, and Rome had not been in such a precarious position since that summer nine years previous. Not all was lost, however, for the Romans, as they still had the remains of the combined forces of Nero and Claudius, and had Gaius Terentius Varro, Lucius Porcius Licinus, and Marcus Livius’ armies, which combined to give Rome an army of well over sixty thousand, which was numerically superior to the force that Hannibal and Hasdrubal could muster. (Hannibal and Hasdrubal’s armies combined for around 51,000 men) However, the legions that would be put in the defense of Rome were of lesser quality than the ones just mustered at Potentia. Nero’s legions were a broken squad, their morale weakened after their disastrous loss and the death of their consul, and the legions of Livius and the praetors, while still efficient and proud, were watered down by slaves and more recent conscripts.
[1] – The primary point of divergence. In our timeline, Hasdrubal sent messengers whilst besieging Placentia, but they failed to reach Hannibal, being caught near Tarentum. The Senate read the message, and knew exactly where Hasdrubal was heading for, helping Livius reach Hasdrubal’s army in time (Hasdrubal’s army descended from the Alps much quicker than expected IOTL) at Metaurus, and of course he and Nero’s good timing won the day for Rome at the river.
[2] – A very minor secondary point of divergence, just to ensure that it works. While the arguments between Livius and the Senate did happen IOTL, they didn’t slow down Livius’ army enough. (BTW, as this is a Punic author, the hostility between Livius and the Senate is slightly exaggerated, to put Rome in a lesser light. Watch for things like this – the author briefs before the actual timeline should help you with things like that. Occasionally, I might even throw you in for a loop with exaggerated army totals and battle losses. Nearly every time, I’ll explain at the end.) So, I gave his army dysentery too, just to, as said, to ensure that the POD works without any hitch. The dysentery doesn’t affect the rest of the timeline – we’ll say it’s a very minor case.
[3] – Cunctator is Latin for ‘delayer’, and is one of two ‘nicknames’ for Quintus Fabius Maximus, the man behind the Fabian strategy. The other is Verrucosus, which means ‘spotty’, referring to a facial wart.
[4] – I unfortunately don’t know anglicized Punic months. Gregorian will have to do.
[5] – Kind of a random way to die, but Nero was a major jerk (see his actions after the Battle of the Metaurus, if you don’t know what I’m talking about – jerk’s a pretty nice way to describe him, IMHO), and he deserves to die in a random and humiliating way.