An excerpt from Gisgo’s The Campaigns of Hannibal
Book 7
29. Despite the Romans’ considerable advantage, having at their disposal far more men than Hannibal could ever produce, the Roman leadership was confused and argumentative, even at the best of times. And these were not the best of times for them, as Hannibal and his men had left Ancona and were now making their confident march towards Rome and their much greater armies. Once this news reached the Romans, who were largely stationed in Praeneste, panic and chaos erupted amongst their leadership, and leaked to their men. Their officers and magistrates had not settled on a plan, yet, to confront Hannibal, and how to allocate their immense resources to achieve their goals.
These passions having reached their tipping point, constructive argument out of necessity began. The decisions they would reach would finally become final.
30. The Shophet Claudius Nero spoke first, as he was amongst the two chief Roman magistrates and officers, and he was the more senior Shophet, being of a more distinguished line than his colleague, Livius. [1] Nero was a rash and unforgiving man, and while nearly every Roman citizen hated Hannibal unlike any man since they had ousted their Maliks, he seemed to hate him more – especially after Hannibal had made the politician look like a fool at Grumentum, escaping right when he had thought that he had trapped the Carthaginian commander for good. He had been quick to believe that glory and respect had been won, before he had won them, and now, he pushed for his vengeance.
According to the best sources [2], he addressed his countrymen in the following way. “The answer to our problems is boldness – a boldness that we Romans, the most bold of any civilized people, have thoroughly lacked throughout this great war with our great enemy. We have become fearful of Barca and his barbarian army. We do not believe, anymore, in the great skill of our officers, and of our armies. We have not carried ourselves in the way that our fathers did back when Hamilcar Barca, and not his sons, menaced our troops. Fabius – perhaps wisely, perhaps not – set us on this course nearly a decade ago. And still, Hannibal remains.
“Now, the great barbarian commander shows a distinctly Roman boldness. It was thought, ages ago, that only a mad, brutish, Celtic warlord would invade and wreak havoc from the Alps – a conniving, deceitful, perfidious Carthaginian, we believed, would never take such a route, when so many safer options remained. And then, Hannibal marched an army of tens of thousands of men and elephants over the snowy mountains, laid waste to our northern settlements, enrolled thousands of barbarians, slaughtered many armies worth of our citizens and allies, and still remains unbeaten in Italy after over a decade.
“Hannibal is a different breed Carthaginian than any we have ever fought before, for he is a Carthaginian willing to fight us in our own ways. And against him, we do not fight by our own standards. Instead, we bow to him, as Carthaginians should do to Romans, and let him and his men slaughter our men, rape our women, and enslave our children. All because we refuse to fight him as Romans are meant to fight; all because we refuse to take action, as true Romans should.
“What I propose, then, should be obvious. If we are not too cowardly, and still have our innate Roman courage, then we should send all these eager men to do the deed we have trained them to do – to defeat Hannibal once and for all. We should march out, use our advantage to its fullest, confront the enemy head on where we can, and finish him. Our numbers are overwhelming, our men steady and virtuous. All that remains to be seen is if our officers have virtue, or if they have the hearts of barbarians, masquerading themselves as Romans. If we fail to do this, we cannot win, and we will not win. Rome will be destroyed, and us all dead, or worse.” [3]
31. At the conclusion of this speech, Nero received a considerable amount of applause from his fellow soldiers. Their passions were stirred, and their hearts ready to again confront the great Hannibal Barca. However, there were many still opposed to this plan, and their thoughts were summarized by the Rab-Sheni Gaius Terentius Varro, the man who had led the men to disaster at Cannae after having spoken similar rhetoric to that of Nero now.
“Countrymen – we all know, I think, that Hannibal is a different enemy than any we have ever fought before. Pyrrhus, compared to him, was no threat – not even a remote one. Nor were the Carthaginians in the first war, for their only leader was Hamilcar Barca, and even he could not compare to his son. Perhaps Brennus, that brutish barbarian that sacked Rome two hundred years ago was of a similar caliber to Hannibal, but he is far out of the memory of any living Roman or Celt today.
“We have tried to conduct this war against Hannibal as any other we have fought in our history – we have confronted him in pitched battle several times now. Cannae was the last of these battles against Hannibal, a battle that, as you all know, I commanded alongside poor Paullus. There, I was of the same opinion that Nero is now espousing – that Fabius’ strategy is of no virtue and ineffectual. We had many, many more men than Hannibal did at the battle, and we had the ground that we wanted to fight him on. But still, we could not prove victorious against Hannibal.
“Now here, in this position, we cannot afford to follow the Fabian tactic, and let Hannibal march up to Rome’s gates as he pleases – this is obvious even to the most foolish amongst us. I am not arguing for the continuance of Fabius’ tactics, effective though I have found them to be. It is clear that we must send out an army to defeat Hannibal, hopefully once and for all.
“However, I do not feel that it is necessary to send out all twelve of these armies [4], gathered from all about Italy, to defeat Hannibal and, in fact, I believe it to be foolish to send out all of these men.
“We have one hundred and twenty thousand men at our disposal, and already, even here, close to Rome’s gates, we have trouble feeding the men, and maintaining order and stability over them here in the barracks. In the field, against the wiliest of men, these problems will almost certainly be exploited by the enemy. He will use our clumsiness against us, urging us to extend our lines to several miles in length. He will use our enormous amount of officers, and therefore differing opinions, against us, dividing us further and weakening us on the whole. He will destroy supplies, provoking hostility from us, but only starving the men. In addition, the men’s morale will already be weakened by the insult of needing all of them to defeat Hannibal – we tell them every one of them is worth two of the enemy, yet, should we march out all of our men, we will be telling our men that every one of the enemy is worth two of our men. We will be weakened by our enormous strength and our divided leadership, and we will not be able to hold out. Hannibal will prevail.
“Instead, I propose that we divide our armies in half – two armies, each of sixty thousand men, each commanded by one of the Shophets. One can venture out to attack Hannibal reasonably, with safe supply lines, order, and united leadership, and hope to gain victory, while the other remains closer to Rome, prepared to force Hannibal into a second battle, should he emerge victorious in the first. If Hannibal can defeat two armies of equal size to his in succession, and still threaten the safety of the city of Rome, then we are not the caliber of Romans that our fathers were, and we should deserve whatever Hannibal deals.”
32. With this, Varro concluded his speech, and he received some applause as well. However, many supporters of Nero’s position jeered at the former Shophet, accusing him of not being a true Roman, amongst other things. The support, clearly, was more with Nero and glory than with Varro and caution. However, final Roman support for this plan was not possible until Nero’s fellow Shophet, Marcus Livius, made his support for Nero’s plan known to all.
… [5]
33. With the conclusion of Livius’ speech, nearly all of the Roman officers outside of Varro and his closest supporters stood and clapped and cheered for their generals’ decision. The Romans were again excited at the prospect of finally defeating Hannibal, believing that they were ready to finish him. All the men were mobilized the next morning, and they marched out to a field outside Falerii, which rests near the Via Flaminia, and made camp, preparing to take on Hannibal Barca on their own battlefield, on their own terms.
34. One can never know exactly what might have happened had Varro’s advice been followed; we can only know what happened in history, and speculate had things gone otherwise. Perhaps it is because Hannibal would prove victorious in the battle to come at Falerii, but it is my belief that the Romans would have won the war had Varro’s advice been followed. Two battles in quick succession with sixty thousand Romans would have devastated Hannibal’s army at least to the point where he might not have been able to threaten Rome any further, and might have even defeated him, in the end – this has been admitted by Hannibal himself. [6] But, instead, the Romans chose to confront Hannibal with all their resources and, as we all know, Hannibal proved, in the end, victorious over his hated enemies. [7]
…
[1] – Gaius Claudius Nero was a member of gens Claudii – one of the oldest families in Rome – and was the Patrician consul. Actually, IIRC, gens Claudii had more senior politicians over the course of the Roman Republic than any other family. Either it was them, or gens Cornelii – of whom Scipio Africanus was a member.
[2] – Who are these sources? I dunno. Enslaved Roman officer or something?
[3] – Nero’s speech is somewhat livelier than most ancient historians would write a speech - at least, it's more confrontational than most I can recall right now. So why is this? We’ll say there’s two reasons: one, Gisgo wrote it exactly as his source remembers it, and two, it’s one of Gisgo’s quirks – for the Greek historians, I’ll try and tone it down a little bit; make the scenes more... Thucydides-ish.
[4] – Refusing to use the word “legion”; haven’t come up with a suitable Punic translation for it.
[5] – Skipping Livius’ little speech in support of Nero… he offers some rebuttals to Varro’s argument, and concludes that Nero’s way is the only sensible path. I’m skipping it because you don’t need to read another speech, especially one that restates a lot of what the first one said. And because I’m lazy.
[6] – In-timeline historians dispute this.
[7] – Considered the first foray into alternate history ITTL.