Vjacheslav Malyshev
Banned
I have concluded that T-54 would've been butterflied in a 1946 WW3 scenario it took them 3 years to develop something acceptable for the red army which unacceptable during war time.
I have concluded that T-54 would've been butterflied in a 1946 WW3 scenario it took them 3 years to develop something acceptable for the red army which unacceptable during war time.
I'd say, yes and no for that. As the POD is, I think 1943, you can still have a tank called the T-54 but it would look different, or a tank that 'is' a T-54, but called something else. If you know what I mean.
If the POD is 1943 why would everything happen up to 1946 just like it did in OTL? Shouldn't any reasonable person assume some changes would show when major changes time line are made because of the vastly better organization of and rational use of Soviet industry by Sergie? Yet there seems to have been none. The Soviets seem to deal with the Germans in 1944 and early 1945 the exact same way they did in OTL.
I have concluded that T-54 would've been butterflied in a 1946 WW3 scenario it took them 3 years to develop something acceptable for the red army which unacceptable during war time.
If the POD is 1943 why would everything happen up to 1946 just like it did in OTL? Shouldn't any reasonable person assume some changes would show when major changes time line are made because of the vastly better organization of and rational use of Soviet industry by Sergie? Yet there seems to have been none. The Soviets seem to deal with the Germans in 1944 and early 1945 the exact same way they did in OTL.
Here is the issue. It is technically POSSIBLE that two ships can be sunk by six lucky bomb hits. But it is extremely unlikely - there is no parallel to it in history. The closest involved a much more lightly armoured ship.
The other issues include the fracas which happened when you tried to ask for advice on how to run the Battle of Britain mark 2, only to reject most people who were telling you that the Brits were going to be successful.
In essence, you are restricting the allies to their historical capabilities, and furthermore you are having them adopt tactics and strategies which are LESS effective than the ones they did historically (i.e. the big wing), and you are also letting the USSR come up with method after method to defeat problems which stymied their real world counterparts for years afterwards.
For example, the issue of VT fuzes. You have had the USSR come up with a jamming method which renders them ineffective.
The nukes - people have told you that the method you described for disabling gun-type uranium bombs doesn't work.
As for the issue of reverse engineering - the B-29 is an example of Soviet reverse engineering in exactly this time period. The Tupolev copy of the B-29 had its first flight in May 1947 (2-3 years after capture) and was introduced in 1949 - four to five years after capture.
This gives a rough time frame. To claim that the USSR could engineer jet aircraft into comparable effectiveness with Allied jets, given half the time or less, is most certainly NOT
This, in a fiction story, would be a writer's prerogative. I understand that.
But by posting it in the AH discussion board, you have forgone that prerogative in favour of intensive analysis. And "They could have" doesn't wash, especially when you're explicitly coming up with justifications POST hoc.
Provide specific examples of the capabilities, not arguments that "they could have", especially when there are counterexamples that show it took substantially longer to do something equivalent in reality.
"This will probably change with the new edited addition as well. They will possibly include rocket assisted bombs etc. "
What that means is, you did not start with the capabilities and work towards the results. You started with the results (the USSR sinking two Iowas) and are now working towards a justification, based on conjecture and wild extrapolations of weapons.
Now, that's fine for a story. But on the AH.com forums, it is generally understood that you have to justify why you have a side succeeding.
In addition, I must take EXTREME objection to your citation of HMS Hood, for several reasons:
Hood was not a battleship. Hood was a battlecruiser - a ship class one step down from battleships.
Hood was commissioned in 1920, fully two decades before work STARTED on the Iowas. She was an old ship.
Hood was fitted with deck armour at MOST 3 inches thick - less than half that of the Iowa's average.
The Royal Navy did not have the ability to spend as much money on the Hood's armour as the US had on the Iowa's armour. Homogenous armour was not used (the Iowas used homogenous armour in the construction of the Iowa to an extreme degree.)
Hood was not sunk by a bomber. Hood was hit by a shell which struck an extremely lucky location, resulting in a direct magazine hit.
Armour piercing shells weighing 800 kilos are NOT 1000-lb aircraft bombs.
In short, Hood's sinking is in no way whatsoever comparable. The Bismark's shells would not have done nearly the same damage to an Iowa, and may have been turned by her deck armour. In addition, the Bismark was equipped with excellent gunnery, making the question of aiming much more explicable than in the case of this sinking of the Iowas.
I will repeat again -Iowas are and were the most heavily armoured battleships on the planet. I would also ask, if air dropped bombs are effective enough to sink a battleship of comparable type to the Iowas in one or two hits, why it took the Yamato and the Musashi so many bombs and torpedoes EACH to sink them.
Please give an example of where I have made a misstatement in my posts regarding the Iowas -
or, alternatively, give an example of the USSR in 1946, using weaponry which was state of the art for a different power in 1945 for a different power and which they did not have access to.
Actually - related to that.
Please give evidence that, in the real world in 1946, the USSR had an effectual counter to the Iowa.
Please give evidence that, in the real world in 1946, VT fuzes could be disabled by something that could be fitted onto an aircraft.
Electronic countermeasures
A move to develop countermeasures against proximity fuzes stemmed from the Germans, who during the "Battle of the Bulge," captured an Army munitions dump that contained a large number of the new radar proximity-fused shells. Concerned that the Germans might attempt to copy the proximity fuze, the Research Division of the Aircraft Radio Laboratory at Wright Field, along with the help of the RLL, was called in begin the development of jamming equipment. Lieutenant Jack Bowers, an engineer with the Aircraft Radio Laboratory at Wright Field, recounted the following to Alfred Price:
"The proximity fuse had been a closely guarded secret on our side. Even though we had been working on countermeasures for a long time, we at Wright Field had never heard of the device. Now we were asked to investigate, on a crash basis, the possibility of a jammer to counter the fuse. We asked why such a jammer had not been developed earlier, and were told that the developing agency had conducted tests and concluded that the fuse could not be jammed! We worked on the problem, and within two weeks, a jammer had been built which would detonate the proximity fuses prematurely."
Since the body of the shell served as the antenna for the radar proximity fuse, it limited the frequency spread of the transceiver from 180 to 220 MHz. The APT-4, a high powered jammer, already covered that part of the spectrum. A motor-driven tuner was added to sweep the jamming transmitter’s signal up and down the band theoretically covered by the fuze. Several modified APT-4’s were installed in a B-17, and a top priority full scale test was arranged at Eglin to see whether the countermeasures would be effective.
Price, in another interview with Lieutenant Ingwald Haugen, one of people involved with the test, Haugen tells him:
"For the firing test, the Army sent a battery of 90 mm anti-aircraft guns. These were emplaced near Eglin. We had requested that during the test the guns would fire VT (proximity fused) shells with spotting charges, so that when the fuses operated, the shells would burst with only a puff of smoke. We were told this was not possible. The VT fuse was about 1 1/2 inches longer than the normal mechanical fuse and it would not fit in a shell carrying a spotting charge. So, we were going to have to use live high explosive VT fused shells for the test. As a safety measure, the guns were to be offset by a small angle, initially 30 mils (about 1.7 degrees), later decreased to 12 mils (about .6 Degrees)."
"It was the sort of test that would never be allowed today under the prevailing flight safety guidelines. At the time, however, there was a war on, and the small risk to our one aircraft had to be weighed against the far larger risk to our whole bomber force if the Germans used such a weapon against us. We who were to fly the test were confident we would be all right - we hoped that the jamming would work as planned, and if it didn’t, the offset fed into the guns would burst the shells at least 240 feet away from us at a range of about 20,000 feet."
"The test lasted about 3 months, during which about 1,600 VT shells were fired, individually, in our direction. Sitting in the fuselage of the B-17, the two RCM operators could pick up the radar transmissions from the shells coming up. The VT fuse radiated CW (continuous wave) signals, but the projectiles would often yaw a little in flight. This, in combination with the spin of the shell, would modulate the signal. We in the back could not see out, but the pilots and the navigator would get a kick out of watching the shells burst well below, or if there was a late burst because the jamming had taken some time to sweep through the shell’s frequency, it might explode close to our altitude. The general conclusion of the test was that, modified to radiate CW swept across the VT fuse band, the APT-4 jamming could significantly reduce the effectiveness of the proximity fused AA shell."
Please also give examples of Soviet mistakes, failures or strategic overstretches in this story (or allied successes or technical surprises) remotely comparable to:
The sinking of two Iowa class battleships by six USSR aircraft which are piloted by inexperienced crews.
The disabling of the VT fuze system.
The inability of thousands upon thousands of people in the USAAF to dig a ten foot deep hole, move an aircraft over it, and load it up.
The complete disappearance of all Tallboy bombs.
I will concede that it is "only" one sunk and one rendered a hulk. Functionally the same in terms of "ships lost" in that engagement.1. Where does it say two battleships were sunk?
2. Who originally came up with a way to defeat the VT fuse?
3. Can you cite one historian who thinks the RAF could defeat the VVS in the fall of 1946?
4. Can you cite were I got into a discussion on how to disable a gun-type Uranium bomb?
5. How many days did it take for Tupolev to put the Tu-4 in the air from the day Stalin ordered him to do it?
6. Where do I say that the crews flying the planes were inexperienced?
This is your saying that they still need polonium in order to make a gun type.They still need polonium, trained personnel, facilities and to figure out what is killing everyone.
Okay, so it's torpedoes now. Better, a bit, but still nowhere near good enough.
The Iowas had a TDS (Torpedo Defence System) complete with torpedo bulkheads capable of enduring a 700-lb torpedo warhead. The Italian torpedoes you mention had warheads of barely more than a third of this.
In addition, the Yamato that I cited earlier was struck by several torpedoes; these were the US mark 13, which at the time had a 600-lb warhead.
Aircraft carriers did not render battleships obsolete because of their ability to quickly destroy the other; it was because of range. An aircraft carrier matched against a battleship can send strikes from far beyond the range of the battleship to reply, and can do so en masse and repeatedly.
Battleships were built to endure torpedoes as much as they were built to endure above-water weapons.
And the torpedo you cite did not have a stellar combat record in WW2 – in fact, the opposite. On one occasion, Junkers Ju-88s launched 72 of them at shipping at Tripoli. Result: two sunk supply ships, one damaged destroyer. Damaged – not sunk.
Battleships, as I'm sure you're aware, are tougher than battlecruisers. Battlecruisers are tougher than heavy cruisers. Heavies are tougher than lights. And compared to even a light cruiser, a destroyer is not particularly strong – hence the nickname of “tin can”.
And the Iowas were tougher than most battleships.
As such, I doubt that these torpedoes would do much better.
Now, if you want the Iowas sunk, there are two broad ways to do it. I'm afraid you'll probably have to forget the idea of a wunder-weapon doing it – those didn't have great service records. The wonder weapons which worked were adopted and became simply “weapons”. (The Axis didn't have all that much luck with wonder weapons against ships in particular.)
The ways to do it both revolve around – gasp! - conventional weapons of the WW2 era. It's less shiny, but it's also more likely to work (and to be risked) because they're proven technologies.
Option one: The USSR mounts a mass torpedo plane attack against the battleship line. They put together every air-dropped torpedo they can find, of every type they can find, mount them on every level bomber they can find (retrofitting level bombers into torpedo bombers or vice versa IS sensible) and zerg the combined fleet.
It would be entirely realistic for this to “swamp” even the high density CAP of a combined allied fleet – even one with properly distributed screens – and break through to attack, at which case they could make so many attacks that they sink several Allied battleships.
The downside, from the point of view of the USSR, is that they'll lose a huge chunk of the aforementioned air force doing it. It might well be worth it to scare the remaining Allied fleet off for several months in fear of losing the rest of their battle line, but it'll also seriously harm the numbers of level bombers the USSR can bring to bear.
The other option is to do the same thing, but with dive bombers and heavy AP bombs. Rather than half a dozen super-bombers which were born from the fevered dreams of the Nazi scientists when they were trying to come up with a way to save the Reich (and hence poured money into things which would not have worked as designed), just have thousands of Il-2 and other such dive bombers blacken the sky and deluge the combined fleet in bombs. In such a circumstance, you can more or less write off any half dozen battlewagons you care to name, though the Iowas are still so well protected that at most one of them should go down.
Combine the two and hey, you've splatted a large proportion of the Combined Fleet. Unfortunately for the USSR, you've also lost a VAST proportion of their tactical air strength and pilots.
A sort of “decisive battle” approach, in other words.[\quote]
How about this I propose both of these scenarios in another venue. I can quote you or I can pretend I'm doing it. I have posted extensively in the Armchair General and the moderator lets those folks get way out of hand. How about we offer these solutions there and see what kind of a response we get? There are about 12 guys who hate this story and it will be interesting to see what they have to offer.
A key factor involved here is the concept of naval aviation – both from ships and at ships.
In this field, with the Japanese destroyed, the Allies were the world's masters at it. Both defensive and offensive. Kamikaze defense doctrine, the Combat Air Patrol, the heavy use of RADAR and IFF (yes, Identify-Friend-Or-Foe was around at this time)... defensively, they were the kings.
Offensively, the same.
Naval aviation has a steep learning curve. The UK started learning in world war one, and kept at it for a long, long time. The US learned over the course of over a dozen years as well. The IJN also spent decades learning. Italian air power had some effectiveness in the anti-shipping role, but their aircraft weren't great by Western Allies standards. (The same is true of USSR aircraft, minus the anti shipping effectiveness.)
It takes experience to learn how to attack a moving ship. It takes experience to design anti ship weapons (every single major power, when they started war, had serious and hard-to-resolve issues with their torpedo exploders, for example). It takes experience to learn tactics for anti shipping work (IJN, RN and USN had this experience; the Regia Aeronautica did as well, but where the hell are the USSR getting Regia Aeronautica pilots to teach them?) The Germans, who are the people the USSR are supposed to be learning this from, had a terrible record as far as naval air power goes.
Now, the US navy and the Royal Navy HAS that experience (the US navy especially.) They've paid in blood and death for it. They've learned by doing, over the long years of war in the Pacific, how to properly control a combat air patrol using radar identification. How to tell a low attack aircraft from a high one. How to split the attention of a fleet, so that one portion of the CAP and screen go after one threat while another stays on hand to deal with the rest. In short, how to defend against multi axis attacks by aircraft which threaten serious mayhem if they break through.
By contrast, the USSR hasn't even had to fight a ship in the whole time they've been fighting across Europe.
So far so good.
To claim that the character you have created to alter the timeline is able to teach the USSR's air force more about naval aviation in three years (while they're fighting a major land war) or one year (when they actually have even the mockups of the aircraft they're going to use in the attack) than the US navy know is ludicrous.
Now there you go again. Where did I ever say that Sergo taught anyone anything about combat? He develops weapons and the means to manufacture them. He knows a good idea when he sees one and knows how to capitalize on others research and conclusions.
You maybe astounded to know that thousands of Soviets were sent to North America for training in many different areas. Could a handful have been trained by the navy in naval aviation? Yes it could, and did happen in 1944.
Your attitude about how a group of untested flyers could not effectively attack a battleship remind me of the British Admiralty when they sent in the
Prince of Wales which had 6 inch decks as well.
Good timelines (and good stories) have give and take. One side is better at one thing, the other side is better at another.
In the original time line, the specialities of the USSR are: ground warfare, army air support, mechanized warfare, in general fighting a land war.
The specialities of the NATO sides are: Naval power, air power, air defense, and sheer industrial preponderance.
Their artillery can be considered broadly comparable (the USSR has numbers and some excellent pieces like the Katyusha; Allied counter-battery fire and control tactics are extremely fluid).
Tanks – both sides have Tiger-killers. The USSR has the IS tanks, the Allies have the Pershing. The USSR's heavy tanks are much more available than the USA ones due to the lack of ocean in the way.
Numbers – the USSR have more infantry and a larger army; the Wallies have far more front line fighters and bombers, along with a huge strategic air wing.
Super weapons – the Allies have the gun-type uranium bomb and the implosion-type plutonium bomb. At this time, fallout is not understood, so it may potentially be used as a huge conventional weapon. The W-Allies also have Anthrax – lots of it – which they are unlikely to use, but may if pushed.
Other secret weapons – the Allies have much, much more centimetric radar production and equipment, because they invented it. Proximity fuzes are commonplace. They also have fully understood, second-generation jets and an active development plan, while the USSR will at most have had a year with the often flawed German jet program (which in reality they did not successfully reverse engineer; purchasing the Nene jet engine from Atlee's government.)
So, that's the original time line, in broad generalization.
Now, the big question.
In which areas are the USSR better than the original timeline? In which are they worse?
In which areas are the Western Allies better than the original timeline? In which are they worse?
This post was prepared before I saw your huge rebuttal posting; I will focus on only one aspect of the rebuttal, because it's past 1 AM here and I'm tired.[\quote]
Okay.
.The setbacks you mention for the Soviets are really not very good evidence for your protestation that they have suffered setbacks. It's all not so much setbacks as less than complete and total success
Your opinion and I totally disagree. Strategy they have may very well have lost the war. You are very wrong if you think otherwise as will be demonstrated.
The fact they're having trouble with the Pyrenees does not change how they've driven across Western Germany, the Low Countries, France, Italy, and Sweden in one summer's campaign. That's frankly amazing, in that historically armies advance to the limit of their supply lines and then have to halt to reorganize them... this is why the W.Allies offensive after they broke out of Normandy took them past the Seine but not past the Rhine, it's why Operation Compass (barely) failed, and it's why Barbarossa had to pause around autumn. (And yes, capturing all those supply dumps would explain how they made it that far, but capturing all those supply dumps is itself a bit ridiculous. You can maintain operational surprise the first day, but not past the Rhine! This isn't the first outing of a new strategy of Blitzkrieg - by now both sides have experience with the strategy, and (as per Battle of the Bulge) know how to defeat it - or at least stall it.
Oh comeon not his crap again. See the FAQ thread. I will not waste anymore time going over this for the 20th time. Your wrong, I have precedence on my side, and expert after expert who agree with me and no one has come up with one who doesn't.
The fact that they lost a corps to battleship bombardment does not change that, in the same engagement, the Allies lost one battleship sunk and another as near as makes no practical difference (hulked is not sunk, I admit, but it's close enough that it often gets lumped together when assessing the results of a battle.) If the Allies inflict more "setbacks" like that on the USSR, they'll run out of battleships pretty sharpish.
In other forums the battleship idea is laughted out of the room. Very few besides you and me see a use for battleships in 1946.
The fact that you're going to write something where they lose in the future does NOT IN ANY WAY equate to their suffering reverses already. It's several months into the war, and the sum total of serious reverses inflicted on the USSR is one corps and being stopped once.
How many major defeats did the Germans have in their first 6 months? How many did the Japanese have?
Norway was an Allied triumph by comparison to these examples of Soviet reverses, and Norway was captured by the Axis!
Not following you on this.
Right, now for your questions.
I will concede that it is "only" one sunk and one rendered a hulk. Functionally the same in terms of "ships lost" in that engagement.
The VT fuze was disabled, indeed, by the Western Allies. However, I note that the APT-4 jammer was fairly expensive and indeed used multiple cavity magnetrons. And that the counter-countermeasure would be something as simple as adding a delay time fuze to the circuit. Out of interest, how did the plans for the APT-4 jammer or equivalent get shipped over to the USSR?
I mean, the people who built the original APT-4 had been working with both magnetrons and jammers for several years - was there a Soviet equivalent of the Battle of the Beams to build up such a base of experienced personnel?
Well if you read the timeline, blog or book you would know that the US quickly made 200 APT-4 jammers after the Germans captured hundreds of thousands of proximity fuses in the Battle of the Bulge thinking they would use the fuses on Allied troops. 200 jammers that the Soviets knew exactly where they were stored and captured them very early in the war.
I really can't retell the story to everyone and I suggest that you should read it and comprehend it before you comment. Please stop cherry picking.
No, I cannot cite such a historian.
Because there isn't one because anyone who studies this time period knows that what I have proposed concerning the RAF, VVS, US Army and the Soviet Army is correct.
But fighting the VVT over THEIR territory is different to fighting it over RAF territory - the question of "can a largely ground support based air force defeat a smaller force focused on defence, operating on home ground" is already answered in 1940.
You conviently forgot to add ...
1. spies
The Germans had not one. The Soviets have hundreds
2. range of Soviet aircraft
No place for RAF to hide or refit or resupply
3. 5 to one odds and not 1.4 to one
4. Foreknowledge of targets
Exactly where the fuel dumps, storage facilities, bunkers for personne
5. Napalm
6. Cluster bombs
7. Knowledge of what the Germans did wrong and the British did right
etc.
It is also answered in a different sense - it took a LOT longer for the Western Allies to destroy the Luftwaffe than it took them to push the LW back from bombing Britain. Fighting on the defensive is a huge force multiplier. Can you cite an example of a historian who thought that the VVT could defeat the RAF? (This is not a simple mirror of the "can the RAF defeat the VVT" question - if both can defend their own air space and neither can launch effective offenses, neither can defeat the other.)
Yes and I have numerous times.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/di...87776&highlight=polonium+gun+type#post4787776
Here you claim that gun type nuclear weapons would need polonium.
Quote:
The US could have built many more U235 Hiroshima gun type weapons than they did historically, but they were wasteful, inefficient and not as safe as more modern designs, hence the fact the Oppenheimer paused production intil further testing. They are far simpler than the Plutonium/implosion Nagasaki bombs however.
You:
This is your saying that they still need polonium in order to make a gun type.
Wikipedia:
Abner
I did not say they needed polonium for a gun type bomb. I was talking about both types of plutonium bombs. If you interpreted it differently then I'm sorry but you are wrong.
A different initiator (code named ABNER) was used for the Little Boy uranium bomb. Its design was simpler and it contained less polonium. It was activated by the impact of the uranium projectile to the target. It was added to the design as an afterthought and was not essential for the weapon's function.
Note that bit about "afterthought" and "not essential". Thus, polonium initiators are NOT needed for a gun-type.
Didn't say they were.
I am unable to find a precise date; however, the sources I can find say things like "well in progress early in 1945". That is to say, the aircraft was available before VJ-day and was finished by May 1947, with full production in 1949 onwards. I do not consider this fact (that a successful reverse engineering operation was performed in, generously, under two years) to mean that a successful reverse engineering operation could be performed in under one and a half years (assuming the most generous time frame for when the Luftwaffe jets were captured to be Jan 1945, then use of reverse engineered versions in operation before July 1946 would be unusual to say the least). In addition, the source I checked stated that "the entire" soviet aircraft industry was mobilized to work on this project, and that this was a key factor in finishing so soon. How many reverse engineering projects can be run at once, if the ongoing Tu-4 one is taking the whole soviet aircraft industry? (Even if it is an exaggeration, I'm assuming that most of their best and brightest designers are involved.)
Once again please read the story before you comment on a particular part and stop cherry picking. I explicitly state a number of times that they were not working on the Tu-4 or the atomic bomb which frees up incredible amounts of resources for other things that Sergo convinces Stalin are much more valuable for future wars.
.And, finally. You do not say that the crews are inexperienced; that was simple logic
No it wasn't it was assuming and you know what the say about that.
It is a newly reverse engineered plane - that means it is a new plane to the VVT. It is the first jet plane they have had - that means it does not behave like any other they have had before. Therefore, the pilots are inexperienced in flying it.
They were original planes hence the line "Cockpit of former German AR234 Blitz Bomber Serial number 140312"
They should also be inexperienced in attacking ships, unless the Russians got a lot of first hand experience attacking ships with torpedoes/bombs that I didn't notice in WW2.
And of course the pilots who sunk the Bismark, Prince of Wales, Kickis, Limno, De Zeven Provincein had attacked many other battleships. You know I bet if I wanted to waste my time researching the pilots who hit the Yamato, Musashi, Hiei and Roma we'd probably discover that not one of them had ever dropped a bomb on a moving battleship or possibly any ship under combat conditions. It was the training that mattered not experience.
Now what is your broader point? What did you hope to accomplish by zeroing in on a very old post, bringing it up after so much time and then bringing up almost every other well discussed controversial subject?
You think the timeline is a piece of crap? Stop reading it.
Uh... What about the 2000 or so M26 Pershings? They should be able to be modified with a new engine design to help ease the problems out, while work on a possible better tank design can be done.

There's only one thing I'm going to comment on, because it is a case of you either lying or not understanding english.
Your reply to someone saying:
The US could have built many more U235 Hiroshima gun type weapons than they did historically, but they were wasteful, inefficient and not as safe as more modern designs, hence the fact the Oppenheimer paused production intil further testing. They are far simpler than the Plutonium/implosion Nagasaki bombs however.
Was to say:
They still need polonium, trained personnel, facilities and to figure out what is killing everyone.
Note the first part of that sentence
They still need polonium
This is as a DIRECT reply to someone talking specifically about U-235 Gun type weapons. Uranium 235 gun type weapons, and you say they need polonium.
To claim that you were talking about plutonium weapons is disingenuous or lying. As such, I don't want to continue to get into an enormous argument with you, because you're twisting your own words to say what you want them to have said.