WWII: U.S. decides to proceed with Japanese invasion

Bearcat

Banned
By the standards of 1945

the atomic bombings are not a war crime.

The only real difference from Tokyo, Dresden et al is efficiency.

Judging events in 1945 by a rather non-unanimous morality constructed in subsequent years (mainly 1960-1980) is intellectually dishonest.

Other posters have pretty conclusively shown that more deaths, Japanese and American, would have occurred without the bombs. Most Military historians (as opposed to people trying to prove a political point) would agree.

How is more death more moral than less death?

Would you want to explain to the parents and children and loved ones of those killed in September 1945 that their deaths were more moral than a quick end to the war?

Sorry. I cannot agree with this line of reasoning.
 
Your comment is clear proof of bad conscience.


Basileus,

Not a bad conscience. Rather a solemn appreciation of the actual context in which the bombs are used.

Instead of judging the decision from 2009, and with all the political, scientific, and moral hindsight that implies, we examine the decision in light of what the people in 1945 knew, how the people of 1945 acted, what the people of 1945 believed, the choices the people of 1945 actually had.

The knee jerk revisionists, on the other hand, insist on examining the decision in hindsight only. Instead of actually understanding the decision and the context in which is was made, the revisionists prefer to assume what they like to believe is a mantle of moral superiority. Sadly, all they actually exhibit is out of political cynicism, historical ignorance, willful denial, or some mixture of the three.

Despite having been starved, been nuked twice, having her capital burned to the ground, seeing US and RN warships steaming off the coast shelling at will, watching her empire in Manchuria disappear within a week, and suffering over a half million military and civilian casualties within a fortnight, Japan decided to surrender by a whisker and then avoided a anti-surrender coup by another whisker.

The war, with it's horrific death toll throughout Asia, could have easily gone on until more atomics were used, until the Soviets landed in Hokkaido, until the US landed in Kyushu, and until starvation took an even greater toll. Denying Japan's razor thin decision to surrender and ignoring the real potential for hundreds of thousands of more deaths within weeks if the war continued is simply means you're hiding your head in the sand or cramming it up a certain orifice.

When Henry Stimson called the bombs the "least abhorrent" choice, he was acknowledging that they were abhorrent and also referring to the horrors even a slightly extended war had in store for Asia, Japan, and the Allies unlike.


Bill
 
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CalBear

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I do not need any lesson about Japanese war crimes. I know them better than most Americans, and almost ALL Japanese.

Saying that the atom bomb was a war crime is not saying that the Japnese acted nice. Your comment is clear proof of bad conscience.

No, my comment is a statement of fact. Under TODAY'S Geneva Convention use of the Bomb, or any other mass bombing of civilian targets is a War Crime (Protocol I Art 57 & 85). It WAS not a war crime in 1945.

The items I listed for Japanese conduct during the war WERE War Crimes at the time, had been generally recognized as violations of the Laws of War since the Hague Convention of 1907 and some actions not listed (such as firing on medics displaying the Red Cross) violated items from the FIRST Geneva Convention in 1864.

There is always a selective element to war crime trials post war, in any war, nevertheless to call the Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a flat out war crime without context is disingenuous, at best. It is an unfortunate comment on the nature of humanity that a country's leadership would allow millions of their own citizen to be killed or maimed by waging a massive war of aggression, one openly designed and with the stated goal to acquire additional territory via force of arms against not just one, or two or even three other sovereign states, but against an entire AREA of the Globe.

The U.S. and UK executed their own men for crimes like rape of civilians as simply being crimes against the prevailing military code of conduct of the era. Japan set up facilities to facilitate such crimes. The Western allies executed or imprisoned troops for the murder of civilians, the IJA used civilians as bayonet practice and to "blood" their troops.

No country is Lilly white on the subject of excesses in wartime, but when it comes to the subject of conscience regarding the behavior of American troops (or for that matter UK forces, although being an American, the actions of an ally, even one as close as the UK, are not my serious concern) in World War Two, the actions of the U.S. Government in the same war and the results of those actions and decisions my conscience is beyond clear. I can honestly say, as hokey as it sounds, that I am both proud of the general conduct of American forces and will be in debt to those brave men to my dying day.

"They may be older now, and their ranks growing fewer, but in that time, they saved the world."
 
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The atomic bomb was built as a war winning weapon with an intention of use against the Axis powers. If the war drags on long enough, we will eventually see radioactive mushroom clouds rising over German cities.
But that is debatable. The beginning of the nuclear program was out of fear that the Germans would get one first, not to bomb the Germans first. Therefore a detente scenario that was foreseen as a possibility is assured. Active use is not necessarily assured.

Race certainly did play a role in how the Americans viewed the Japanese, but it doesnt seem to have made much of a difference in terms of how the bombings treated them. A thousand german civilians dead in dresden is no different than a thousand japanese civilians killed in tokyo.
But what I'm saying is it could play a role in the belief that there was perhaps less chance of peace without their usage with the Japanese and out of belief that the Japanese were the "yellow menace" who wouldn't stop.

Germany was down to teenagers and their grandfathers by the time the war ended, but that didnt stop the Allied bombers. Japan was on the brink of collapse in 1945, but the B-29s kept coming. I think you are underestimating seriously how far the allies would be willing to go to break germany, and atomic bombs would certainly be used if feasible.
The Germans actually did retain an amount actual troops as the allies campaigned inward who put up a fight, if doomed. Its by the time you get ever more toward Berlin that its basically teenage Hitler youth and grandfathers. And the bombers generally focused on areas not with the intent to kill civilians (though I've mentioned Dresden) but the intent to knock out political, industrial, etc areas where they were political, industrial, etc in the area. Atomic bombs could be feasible for use on Germany. But frankly, with the state Germany was rendered to, even if they continued to put up a fight I think the end results of how such a resistance would continue would be too abstract to warrant atomic bombings, and would likely better be answered simply by troop action (you'd probably just have people in the foot hills and such). And were they to somehow keep Berlin, a simple troop action would probably suffice. And were it on a Germany which is strong enough to actually prove a force rather than a waiting game for doom, there could be a fear of retribution as they could probably develop a similar device (though that is debatable).

Still strategic bombings in every sense of the word.
But not actions from the allies which is all that matters.

I am not going to get into the morality of whether strategic bombing of military targets is justified right now. But if bombing Tokyo to destroy the factories is excusable, why is bombing the headquarters of 2nd general army and a major seaport and industrial hub not excusable (in fact, if you follow this reasoning far enough, an argument could be made that the atomic bomb is more justified, since it will almost certainly destroy the target, as opposed to raining random death upon the city)?
Because you are assured to take out far more than the key target(s) with atomic bombings. Pin point accuracy of conventional bombs was an inability, of course. But it at least offered the chance that only this, this and this area would suffer and a citizen could make it out. And on the morality side, the intentional use of conventional bombings, where not atrocities (such as Dresden; though that was a firebombing of course), is not to kill civilians for terror, but to take out targets of military, political, industrial, etc importance, whereas an a-bomb is assured to take out a city block that happens to be near the targets. I also said Tokyo was only perhaps somewhat excusable as being a political epicenter, and so forth. But I think firebombings (and firebombings of an area known to consist mainly of wooden structures and wooden homes) are likewise as reprehensible as atomic bombings in their effect.

And to argue that a weapon is more justified because it deals death somewhat randomly as opposed to in one location is absurd.
The atomic bombs assured death radiating out from ground zero in the wide radius of the bombs death zone or whatever the hell it is called, and on a more moral issue, torturous pain for anyone in the rings of effect out of the death zones (cancer, burns, and so forth). Whereas a conventional bomb affected a smaller area, with civilian casualties not total and accidental overspray from the targets or collateral damage from anyone near the targets.

Looks rather green outside today from here.
Those are clouds. Word of warning: Don't ever eat mushrooms.
A civilian is just as dead if an atomic bomb detonates over his house as he is if a conventional bomb or incinderies hit it. And are you saying it is more moral to send out bombers to kill 100,000 people than to send out 1 bomber to kill 80,000 people, meerly because of how the casualties are dispersed? That idea is, quite simply, ludicrous.
And the idea, quite simply, is not mine. If a civilian is dead with a conventional bomb, that doesn't mean his neighbors are, nor necessarily even the people in the same house. And bombers should never, ever focus on civilians. And you are not going to kill more people than you would with an atomic strike on an area because with an atomic strike, you take out damned near everyone in the radius of immediate effect whereas with conventional bombings, it remains accidental overspray around the targets.

Of course, the actual scenario is very different. The atomic bombs killed 150,000 people in two cities. Not dropping them means that Hiroshima and Nagasaki probably get flattened by the USAAC anyways, dozens of other japanese cities suffer the same fate, hundreds of thousands or millions of Japanese people starve to death (how many depending on how long it takes for the allies to secure the islands), perhaps 400,000 dead as the Soviets invade Hokkaido and Honshu, and probably hundreds of thousands more dead or injured as the American troops come ashore on Kyushu and southern honshu. Were the atomic bombings horrible? yes. But does that make the consequences of not using them any less horrible? No.
I'd firstly debate the 150,000 figure because it is the bare minimum count (Hiroshima: 90,000-166,000 persons dead; Nagasaki: 60,000-80,000 persons dead). Secondly, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, if bombed, would only very arguably suffer total decimation and the people of Hiroshima were to mobilize in the event of firebombings, and I doubt there would be similar levels of civilian deaths as there were with the atomic bombs. And if firebombings are continued (as I posit that's what you mean by to destroy the cities), I believe you'll see surrender in short order after the POD and without the cities or every city decimated. You're also rolling in this whole whammy scenario of every possibility merging and constructing casualties from that. A continued blockade does not warrant an invasion to follow, I have said a blockade could prove a substitute to invasion, and that the Japanese would surrender before invasion because of the effects of blockade. Likewise, the Japanese would not starve to death by the millions. Firstly, the Japanese would likely only take a relatively short time before a blockade would force them to a surrender agreeable to the allied camp. Secondly, starvation does not mean instant death, it means a lack of enough food to live and not necessarily with everyone. And the Japanese had food, both in reserves and with the meager farming they possessed; they just didn't possess a great amount and were running out. The only possibility of all that is the Soviets invading the North. However, casualties on that depend on both actual Soviet capabilities (and Japanese resistance) and how long it would take the Japanese to surrender which would likely cut that short.

Frankly, I think that the problem is your refusing to recognize the holes in your argument is making some posters rather annoyed.
My argument has scholarly backing in many of the areas I've brought up (not all, but many). If you think they're holes, read the book I posted about or ask for excerpts.

And how, pray tell, do you keep the war hawks from holding onto power for a bit longer? Almost all of them failed to realize that bombing and starvation alone would wipe them out, and many believed that they could have held off the Americans in a decisive battle off Kyushu. Of course, the reality is far different. No bomb means that the Japanese government will totter towards 1946, and then probably collapse as American airpower, landings on both sides of the country, and starvation kill millions and society breaks down.
The Peace faction was gaining even before the bombs, and the Emperor himself was pulling for a peace and held sway over the military enough to throw his weight around. If the Emperor sees a need for peace (as he had previously, though with conditions more than there were in the end) and the peace faction continues to gain, you do not have a doomsday scenario.

Blockade alone at that point in the war would have brought japan to its knees and beyond. And by the time the Japanese realized this, it would be to late.
The military, perhaps. The government and peace faction, not so assuredly.

the atomic bombings are not a war crime.

The only real difference from Tokyo, Dresden et al is efficiency.
Many would posit Dresden was a horrible action which should not have taken place; as with firebombings of any civilian target.

Other posters have pretty conclusively shown that more deaths, Japanese and American, would have occurred without the bombs.
Debateably (and it is not conclusive so much as a repetition of the same points). Via demonstration, you could avoid much of the death which did come or could have come, after letting the Japanese stew on it and after seeing the defeat at Manchuria and so forth which did occur in the OTL (which is my preferred method). Or via continued blockade, death count on the Asian mainland matters on actual Japanese capabilities to put up resistance after the POD and the time of surrender after the POD, and deaths from starvation in Japan would be of a negligible amount before surrender was forthcoming (and would be forthcoming before the commencement of an invasion).

Most Military historians (as opposed to people trying to prove a political point) would agree.
I have posted a Military historian (who had used as an aid other military historians), and I'd debate whether it was a consensus of most or whether a majority school of thought means an idea is correct. And it is
not a political point.

But frankly, I don't care all that much about the issue to continue with this debate. If you let me go now, you'll have no more grief from me.
 
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But that is debatable. The beginning of the nuclear program was out of fear that the Germans would get one first, not to bomb the Germans first.


Emperor Norton I,

That's splitting hairs, isn't it? Build the bomb first, but somehow not use it in the hopes that the Nazis would agree to a nuclear detente? That's nothing but wishful hindsight I'm afraid.

The "gas detente" between the Allies and Germany was a result of the use of that weapon during WW1. Hitler and many others had been gassed, so each side decided on a "no first use" policy. No one had ever been nuked however, so no one really knew what to expect. It was just a bigger bomb.

As I've already posted, the Project scientists were fervently hoping that the bomb would be completed in time for Berlin to be nuked. It was only after Germany surrendered that the scientists began thinking about whether to bomb should be used at all.

Therefore a detente scenario that was foreseen as a possibility is assured. Active use is not necessarily assured.

Bullfeathers. Among the participants in the Manhattan Project, active use against Germany was prayed for.

I have posted a Military historian...

Paul Schratz right? I'm familiar with his book about his years as a submarine commander. I know he eventually got a doctorate and worked as a researcher for the Naval Institute too. I've never run across anything by him concerning the bombs. Could you give us a title to two? I'd like to read what he says, check the date of when he wrote it, and check his sources.

But frankly, I don't care all that much about the issue to continue with this debate.

I'm sorry to read that. Truly.

If you let me go now, you'll have no more grief from me.

No one had been holding you here and I, for one, do not think your posts were any "grief". Poorly informed perhaps and lacking any historical context certainly, but not any "grief".


Bill
 
Emperor Norton I,

That's splitting hairs, isn't it? Build the bomb first, but somehow not use it in the hopes that the Nazis would agree to a nuclear detente? That's nothing but wishful hindsight I'm afraid.
Its not a hope that the Nazis would agree, but that should the Germans get a bomb, the US will have a force to counter that bomb with and that if the Germans use it, the US can also use it. A natural balance not of treaty but of common sense. And though the the Nazis had little of it, they may have enough to wish to avoid a force of decimation whose power was unmatched.

The "gas detente" between the Allies and Germany was a result of the use of that weapon during WW1. Hitler and many others had been gassed, so each side decided on a "no first use" policy. No one had ever been nuked however, so no one really knew what to expect. It was just a bigger bomb.
But it was a bigger bomb that could destroy what it would take a 1,000 or more other bombs to do, and both sides could at least grasp that.

As I've already posted, the Project scientists were fervently hoping that the bomb would be completed in time for Berlin to be nuked. It was only after Germany surrendered that the scientists began thinking about whether to bomb should be used at all.
But that does not necessarily mean the policy makers would use it in place of conventional troop attack were it completed earlier. Surrender without a capital and the politicians living to surrender would be rather a messy affair, and military actions of the remaining German forces chaotic adding to the mess.

Bullfeathers. Among the participants in the Manhattan Project, active use against Germany was prayed for.
But that doesn't mean it would necessarily come about in the end point. What would matter is both the status of Germany at whatever point it were completed and the benefits of its use over conventional means.

Paul Schratz right? I'm familiar with his book about his years as a submarine commander. I know he eventually got a doctorate and worked as a researcher for the Naval Institute too. I've never run across anything by him concerning the bombs. Could you give us a title to two? I'd like to read what he says, check the date of when he wrote it, and check his sources.
A book which has unfortunately been out of print for a while called "What If?: Strategic Alternatives of WWII" in which he heads the Pacific War conclusion section of the book. A lot of the overall message is that there existed a lot of other options that would prove less bloody, less of a moral issue in the immediate run, etc; but that many of them would take longer and the post war situation would be worse than it would be with the atomic bombs (whether because of Soviets occupying the North either via invasion or simple stipulations of the treaty, or the lack of fearing the bombs as a weapon leading to less hesitance for atomic war, and so forth).

I'm sorry to read that. Truly.

No one had been holding you here and I, for one, do not think your posts were any "grief". Poorly informed perhaps and lacking any historical context certainly, but not any "grief".
My posts were not poorly informed. Disagreeing with you and less caring about the overall thing to put as much care in citing sources, perhaps. And I understand the historical context full well. However, that does not mean that certain perceptions of the people at the time and the situation necessitated the actual uses of the bombs or of the bombs in the fashion they were used. Do they make it understandable, yes.
 
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But it was a bigger bomb that could destroy what it would take a 1,000 or more other bombs to do, and both sides could at least grasp that.


Emperor Norton I,

To the people of the 1940s, the atomic bomb was a just another bigger and better bomb to be used in a strategic bombing campaign. They'd already made significant advances in that area, this was just the next step. Nearly all the horrors you bring up already existed in conventional bombing and the radiological aspects couldn't even be guessed at yet.

Again, you're assuming both a knowledge and a mindset that didn't simply exist during the period in question.

Surrender without a capital and the politicians living to surrender would be rather a messy affair, and military actions of the remaining German forces chaotic adding to the mess.

Again, bullfeathers. If the bomb had been ready before May of 1945, Hitler et al would have been nuked in a freakin' heartbeat. And as it actually happened, Germany still managed to surrender somehow without the any of the politicians you suppose were necessary.

A book which has unfortunately been out of print for a while called "What If?: Strategic Alternatives of WWII" in which he heads the Pacific War conclusion section of the book.

Thanks for the title. My local library has an reciprocity agreement with a nearby university, so I may be able to find it in those stacks.

Disagreeing with you and less caring about the overall thing to put as much care in citing sources, perhaps.

Less care in citing sources hasn't been a "perhaps", it's been a fact.

And I understand the historical context full well.

I think you believe you understand the historical context.

However, that does not mean that certain perceptions of the people at the time and the situation necessitated the actual uses of the bombs or of the bombs in the fashion they were used. Do they make it understandable, yes.

The situation did necessitate the use of the bombs because the people who made it - and it was a collaborative effort, Truman just took the heat - truly believed they had no options that weren't more abhorrent.


Bill
 

burmafrd

Banned
I am constantly amazed at the hand wringers and the hind sight nitwits.

The decision made in August of 1945 was made using the intelligence available and the mindset and understanding and emotions of 1945. Anyone trying to use modern anything is a moron.

Truman said he just thought of it as a bigger bomb. Mostly everyone not directly involved in the project thought the same- and many of them did not have an appreciation of the effects of radiation at that time. That really did not sink in for quite a while even after the examination of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

There was still a willingness to fight in Japan and millions would have fought.

Anyone thinking otherwise after the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa would have been thought to have gone soft in the head.

Hoping to shock the Japanese into surrendering was a very valid point of view.
 
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