The atomic bomb was built as a war winning weapon with an intention of use against the Axis powers. If the war drags on long enough, we will eventually see radioactive mushroom clouds rising over German cities.
But that is debatable. The beginning of the nuclear program was out of fear that the Germans would get one first, not to bomb the Germans first. Therefore a detente scenario that was foreseen as a possibility is assured. Active use is not necessarily assured.
Race certainly did play a role in how the Americans viewed the Japanese, but it doesnt seem to have made much of a difference in terms of how the bombings treated them. A thousand german civilians dead in dresden is no different than a thousand japanese civilians killed in tokyo.
But what I'm saying is it could play a role in the belief that there was perhaps less chance of peace without their usage with the Japanese and out of belief that the Japanese were the "yellow menace" who wouldn't stop.
Germany was down to teenagers and their grandfathers by the time the war ended, but that didnt stop the Allied bombers. Japan was on the brink of collapse in 1945, but the B-29s kept coming. I think you are underestimating seriously how far the allies would be willing to go to break germany, and atomic bombs would certainly be used if feasible.
The Germans actually did retain an amount actual troops as the allies campaigned inward who put up a fight, if doomed. Its by the time you get ever more toward Berlin that its basically teenage Hitler youth and grandfathers. And the bombers generally focused on areas not with the intent to kill civilians (though I've mentioned Dresden) but the intent to knock out political, industrial, etc areas where they were political, industrial, etc in the area. Atomic bombs
could be feasible for use on Germany. But frankly, with the state Germany was rendered to, even if they continued to put up a fight I think the end results of how such a resistance would continue would be too abstract to warrant atomic bombings, and would likely better be answered simply by troop action (you'd probably just have people in the foot hills and such). And were they to somehow keep Berlin, a simple troop action would probably suffice. And were it on a Germany which is strong enough to actually prove a force rather than a waiting game for doom, there could be a fear of retribution as they could probably develop a similar device (though that is debatable).
Still strategic bombings in every sense of the word.
But not actions from the allies which is all that matters.
I am not going to get into the morality of whether strategic bombing of military targets is justified right now. But if bombing Tokyo to destroy the factories is excusable, why is bombing the headquarters of 2nd general army and a major seaport and industrial hub not excusable (in fact, if you follow this reasoning far enough, an argument could be made that the atomic bomb is more justified, since it will almost certainly destroy the target, as opposed to raining random death upon the city)?
Because you are assured to take out far more than the key target(s) with atomic bombings. Pin point accuracy of conventional bombs was an inability, of course. But it at least offered the chance that only this, this and this area would suffer and a citizen could make it out. And on the morality side, the intentional use of conventional bombings, where not atrocities (such as Dresden; though that was a firebombing of course), is not to kill civilians for terror, but to take out targets of military, political, industrial, etc importance, whereas an a-bomb is assured to take out a city block that happens to be near the targets. I also said Tokyo was only perhaps somewhat excusable as being a political epicenter, and so forth. But I think firebombings (and firebombings of an area known to consist mainly of wooden structures and wooden homes) are likewise as reprehensible as atomic bombings in their effect.
And to argue that a weapon is more justified because it deals death somewhat randomly as opposed to in one location is absurd.
The atomic bombs
assured death radiating out from ground zero in the wide radius of the bombs death zone or whatever the hell it is called, and on a more moral issue, torturous pain for anyone in the rings of effect out of the death zones (cancer, burns, and so forth). Whereas a conventional bomb affected a smaller area, with civilian casualties not total and accidental overspray from the targets or collateral damage from anyone near the targets.
Looks rather green outside today from here.
Those are clouds. Word of warning: Don't ever eat mushrooms.
A civilian is just as dead if an atomic bomb detonates over his house as he is if a conventional bomb or incinderies hit it. And are you saying it is more moral to send out bombers to kill 100,000 people than to send out 1 bomber to kill 80,000 people, meerly because of how the casualties are dispersed? That idea is, quite simply, ludicrous.
And the idea, quite simply, is not mine. If a civilian is dead with a conventional bomb, that doesn't mean his neighbors are, nor necessarily even the people in the same house. And bombers should never, ever focus on civilians. And you are not going to kill more people than you would with an atomic strike on an area because with an atomic strike, you take out damned near everyone in the radius of immediate effect whereas with conventional bombings, it remains accidental overspray around the targets.
Of course, the actual scenario is very different. The atomic bombs killed 150,000 people in two cities. Not dropping them means that Hiroshima and Nagasaki probably get flattened by the USAAC anyways, dozens of other japanese cities suffer the same fate, hundreds of thousands or millions of Japanese people starve to death (how many depending on how long it takes for the allies to secure the islands), perhaps 400,000 dead as the Soviets invade Hokkaido and Honshu, and probably hundreds of thousands more dead or injured as the American troops come ashore on Kyushu and southern honshu. Were the atomic bombings horrible? yes. But does that make the consequences of not using them any less horrible? No.
I'd firstly debate the 150,000 figure because it is the bare minimum count (Hiroshima: 90,000-166,000 persons dead; Nagasaki: 60,000-80,000 persons dead). Secondly, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, if bombed, would only very arguably suffer total decimation and the people of Hiroshima were to mobilize in the event of firebombings, and I doubt there would be similar levels of civilian deaths as there were with the atomic bombs. And if firebombings are continued (as I posit that's what you mean by to destroy the cities), I believe you'll see surrender in short order after the POD and without the cities or every city decimated. You're also rolling in this whole whammy scenario of every possibility merging and constructing casualties from that. A continued blockade does not warrant an invasion to follow, I have said a blockade could prove a substitute to invasion, and that the Japanese would surrender before invasion because of the effects of blockade. Likewise, the Japanese would not starve to death by the millions. Firstly, the Japanese would likely only take a relatively short time before a blockade would force them to a surrender agreeable to the allied camp. Secondly, starvation does not mean instant death, it means a lack of enough food to live and not necessarily with everyone. And the Japanese had food, both in reserves and with the meager farming they possessed; they just didn't possess a great amount and were running out. The only possibility of all that is the Soviets invading the North. However, casualties on that depend on both actual Soviet capabilities (and Japanese resistance) and how long it would take the Japanese to surrender which would likely cut that short.
Frankly, I think that the problem is your refusing to recognize the holes in your argument is making some posters rather annoyed.
My argument has scholarly backing in many of the areas I've brought up (not all, but many). If you think they're holes, read the book I posted about or ask for excerpts.
And how, pray tell, do you keep the war hawks from holding onto power for a bit longer? Almost all of them failed to realize that bombing and starvation alone would wipe them out, and many believed that they could have held off the Americans in a decisive battle off Kyushu. Of course, the reality is far different. No bomb means that the Japanese government will totter towards 1946, and then probably collapse as American airpower, landings on both sides of the country, and starvation kill millions and society breaks down.
The Peace faction was gaining even before the bombs, and the Emperor himself was pulling for a peace and held sway over the military enough to throw his weight around. If the Emperor sees a need for peace (as he had previously, though with conditions more than there were in the end) and the peace faction continues to gain, you do not have a doomsday scenario.
Blockade alone at that point in the war would have brought japan to its knees and beyond. And by the time the Japanese realized this, it would be to late.
The military, perhaps. The government and peace faction, not so assuredly.
the atomic bombings are not a war crime.
The only real difference from Tokyo, Dresden et al is efficiency.
Many would posit Dresden was a horrible action which should not have taken place; as with firebombings of any civilian target.
Other posters have pretty conclusively shown that more deaths, Japanese and American, would have occurred without the bombs.
Debateably (and it is not conclusive so much as a repetition of the same points). Via demonstration, you could avoid much of the death which did come or could have come, after letting the Japanese stew on it and after seeing the defeat at Manchuria and so forth which did occur in the OTL (which is my preferred method). Or via continued blockade, death count on the Asian mainland matters on actual Japanese capabilities to put up resistance after the POD and the time of surrender after the POD, and deaths from starvation in Japan would be of a negligible amount before surrender was forthcoming (and would be forthcoming before the commencement of an invasion).
Most Military historians (as opposed to people trying to prove a political point) would agree.
I have posted a Military historian (who had used as an aid other military historians), and I'd debate whether it was a consensus of most or whether a majority school of thought means an idea is correct. And it is
not a political point.
But frankly, I don't care all that much about the issue to continue with this debate. If you let me go now, you'll have no more grief from me.