WWII Most Effective German Commander

WWII Most Effective German Commander

  • Hasso von Manteuffel- Siege of Bastogne

    Votes: 2 2.2%
  • Walter Model - Operation Mars

    Votes: 20 21.7%
  • Heinz Guderian - Battle of Sedan

    Votes: 8 8.7%
  • Erich von Manstein - Third Battle of Kharkov

    Votes: 22 23.9%
  • Felix Steiner - Battle of Narva

    Votes: 4 4.3%
  • Erwin Rommel - Battle of Gazala

    Votes: 24 26.1%
  • Albert Kesselring - Battle of Monte Cassino

    Votes: 9 9.8%
  • Nikolaus von Falkenhorst - Operation Weserübung

    Votes: 0 0.0%
  • Others

    Votes: 3 3.3%

  • Total voters
    92
My nod goes to Kesselring, whose contribution is much underrated. For almost two years he kept the Allied forces in Sicily and Italy at bay with minimal numbers of troops and his forces did not finally surrender until the Soviets were attacking Berlin. Anyone who wishes to learn defensive strategy and tactics would do well to study his conduct of that campaign.

This times a billion. He also had to contend with partisan activity that, while not nearly as extensive in scale as on the Eastern Front, was certainly nothing to sneer at.
 
But, didn't Hitler damage the situation by ordering Manstein to hold the Donets Basin no matter what, which would entail shifting units to AGS's right flank?

The Donets operations were in July-August, and were fully Manstein's responsibility, particularly his failure to comprehend that Kharkov was the campaign's center of gravity.
 
The Donets operations were in July-August, and were fully Manstein's responsibility, particularly his failure to comprehend that Kharkov was the campaign's center of gravity.



What I am attempting to say is that could Manstein’s failure to comprehend that Kharkov was the campaign's center of gravity, be do to Hitler’s insistence on holding the Donets Basin. Could Hitler be blamed for wrongly focusing his attention? The Donets’s Basin was second on Hitler’s list of important places to capture in the Soviet Union, so would it make sense for Manstein to think that Hitler wants him to have more troops on AGS's right wing and not up at Kharkov? Does that make any sense?:eek:
 
What I am attempting to say is that could Manstein’s failure to comprehend that Kharkov was the campaign's center of gravity, be do to Hitler’s insistence on holding the Donets Basin. Could Hitler be blamed for wrongly focusing his attention? The Donets’s Basin was second on Hitler’s list of important places to capture in the Soviet Union, so would it make sense for Manstein to think that Hitler wants him to have more troops on AGS's right wing and not up at Kharkov? Does that make any sense?:eek:

Except that Manstein concurred with Hitler's assessment, and focused his efforts on the Donbas even more than he would have if he disagreed with Hitler. This is evidenced by his estimate in early August, just days before the Red Army began Operation Rumianstev, that the Red Army would be unable to launch offensives in the Kharkov region for another month. He was duped by Societ deception efforts, both passive and active, into focusing in the Donbas. Hitler had nothing to do with it.
 
Except that Manstein concurred with Hitler's assessment, and focused his efforts on the Donbas even more than he would have if he disagreed with Hitler. This is evidenced by his estimate in early August, just days before the Red Army began Operation Rumianstev, that the Red Army would be unable to launch offensives in the Kharkov region for another month. He was duped by Societ deception efforts, both passive and active, into focusing in the Donbas. Hitler had nothing to do with it.

thanks:)

on another note glad Kesselring is coming up, but sad for Falkenhorst
 
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