WWII: German Air Force doomed from the start?

Deleted member 1487

A failure to recognize the material factors and political issues at play is a neat indication of a lack of professionalism since real professionals take those factors into account. The Allies certainly did so.

It can be said that the last truly professional officer in the Wehrmacht was Ludwig Beck, who resigned in 1938 writing "I wish, as Chief of the General Staff, to make it a matter of record that I have refused to approve any kind of National Socialist adventure. A final German victory is impossible." All the rest of the German generals marched happily into annihilation behind their Fuhrer.
It sounds like your definition of professional is anyone that wins. The officers of the LW operated in the political context of Nazi Germany, they didn't have much of a choice who their enemies were and in what context they fought, they did the best with what they had. Guys like Richthofen were very professional in their realm, but clearly not all of the LW was professional, as there were serious issues especially on the material end from Udet, Jeschonnek, and Goering. Still the lower level officers weren't amateurs and incompetents, they just operated in a dysfunctional system organized by political appointees.
 
Without Goering the economy is run much better (the evaluation pre-war of Goering economic model was 'organized chaos with huge waste') while the LW doesn't suffer from Goering's meddling from 1936 on. The Bf110 is dead for sure, as it was a Goering project and everyone else wanted cancelled, and Milch had a personal hatred of Messerschmitt, so it would be an easy thing to kill that project; not the Me109 though due to it simply being the best option and already ordered by 1936.

It doubt that alone would make the Nazis win the war, but it would certainly draw it out with better organization of the economy and LW early on.
The chaotic and wasteful economy wasn't as much Goering's fault as Hitler's. Hitler set up a system where everyone competed against everyone and it was never clear exactly what the goals were or who was doing what. Even without Goering this system will still exist, so while it may not be as bad by any objective standard it will still be pretty wasteful.
 
It sounds like your definition of professional is anyone that wins. The officers of the LW operated in the political context of Nazi Germany, they didn't have much of a choice who their enemies were and in what context they fought, they did the best with what they had. Guys like Richthofen were very professional in their realm, but clearly not all of the LW was professional, as there were serious issues especially on the material end from Udet, Jeschonnek, and Goering. Still the lower level officers weren't amateurs and incompetents, they just operated in a dysfunctional system organized by political appointees.

No, it is quite clear that it is any officer who does their duty by doing their utmost to analyse the situation that presents itself as a result of the plans of their political masters and then makes recommendations designed to best serve the state to which they have sworn their loyalty.

The analysis was correct, his recommendation that Germany avoid war was the wisest course of action that Germany could have pursued and participation in the war that followed from this recommendation being ignored would simply have made him complicit in the destruction not merely of German lives and material but of German values that resulted and would take decades to repair afterwards.
 

Deleted member 1487

The chaotic and wasteful economy wasn't as much Goering's fault as Hitler's. Hitler set up a system where everyone competed against everyone and it was never clear exactly what the goals were or who was doing what. Even without Goering this system will still exist, so while it may not be as bad by any objective standard it will still be pretty wasteful.
No it was Goering. He ran the economy without informing Hitler of the problems and constantly overpromised, causing all sorts of problems when he just passed down insane production schemes and constantly contradicted one another and did not allow for any coherent planning. Germany and the Second World War series volumes 1 and 5 (parts 1 and 2) detail this quite effectively. Goering wasn't the sole issue, but he was probably the single greatest problem, as he effectively seized control over the economy and mismanaged it from 1936-42. Hitler laid out competing bureaucracies for sure, but Goering bullied his way over the others and effectively dominated it; it was when he set up his own competing bureaucracies that the problems really crept up. Speer's greatest contribution was to come in in 1942 and clean up all the mess with Hitler and Goering's blessing.

Its not to say that there would be no insane orders from Hitler or total efficiency, but it would be far better run than IOTL. Todt and Hitler fought constantly IOTL after he was appointed Armaments Minister because Todt didn't hesitate to point out the contradictions and insanity of Hitler's orders to him and how they affected the war effort and production plans; Goering would go behind his back and tell Hitler something different, undermining Todt any chance he got. Without Goering in the picture, things go very differently as Todt is the only message on the economy getting through, probably causing Hitler to realize what was actually going on; he did eventually in 1942 when Speer took over after the mess of 1936-41 and was able to convince Hitler what needed to be done when Hitler stopped trusting Goering.
 

Deleted member 1487

No, it is quite clear that it is any officer who does their duty by doing their utmost to analyse the situation that presents itself as a result of the plans of their political masters and then makes recommendations designed to best serve the state to which they have sworn their loyalty.

The analysis was correct, his recommendation that Germany avoid war was the wisest course of action that Germany could have pursued and participation in the war that followed from this recommendation being ignored would simply have made him complicit in the destruction not merely of German lives and material but of German values that resulted and would take decades to repair afterwards.
Hitler purged those men from leadership in 1938. The subordinates didn't have the power to tell Hitler that, they just reported to their superiors, who were either Goering in the case of the LW, or Hitler's stooges in the army. The lower level officers did their jobs to the best of their ability and with a sense of professionalism at their station, while their superiors did not. The failure of the political leadership and the high command that Hitler appointed does not mean the lower level officers were derilict in their duty or unprofessional because they did their jobs in the context of a broken system. You need to differentiate between the professionals and the amateurs leading them.
 
Also had Göring neglected the supply of needed alloys for Aircraft production like Jet-engines what delay there introduction for Years
it went even so worst that last Jet Fighter the Heinkel He 162, was build most parts from glued wood !

Glued wood (specifically plywood) is a perfectly good material for building light, strong, structures like aircraft (or my personal area of special expertise, boats). Weight for weight it's approximately 2.5 times stronger than steel. It was certainly good enough for the De Haviland Mosquito, and other later De Haviland designs such as the Hornet and Vampire. The major problems the Germans had with wooden construction came because they only had one factory producing the right glue (Tegelfilm? I can't quite remember the name, I think it's a phenolic resin from memory), and that got bombed.
 
Hello,

I always had some unspoken question about WWII and could not lay my hands on it. But then a few days ago I saw Battle of Britain with Michael Caine and suddenly it clicked.

Why did the German air force in WWII not win?

The german fighters could fly from their bases in France to London and back and had about 5-10 minutes reserves for air-to air combat (That is what I read in a magazine about the Battle of Britain).

In wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain#Fighters:
The biggest disadvantage faced by Bf 109 pilots was that without the benefit of long-range drop tanks (which were introduced in limited numbers in the late stages of the battle), usually of 300 litres (66 imp gal; 79 US gal) capacity, the 109s had an endurance of just over an hour and, for the 109E, a 600 km (370 mi) range. Once over Britain, a 109 pilot had to keep an eye on a red "low fuel" light on the instrument panel: once this was illuminated, he was forced to turn back and head for France.

So the german planes were shortrange fighters.

On the other hand the allied fighters could fly to Dreden and later Koenigsberg and back and still could dogfight far longer.

Yes, they carried droptanks but every droptank and fuel weighs and this is a disadvantage in a dogfight.

I compared the ME-109, Spitfire and the P-51 and the ME-109 was lighter than the other planes.

The allied fighters had higher horsepower (ok offsets the weight) but still weight means mass and that has impact on the maneuvers a plane can fly. Remember mass inertia?

So the german fighters should have flown circles around the much heavier allied fighters and downed fighter after fighter and bomber after bomber. But they did not.

I found references that a german plane could outdive allied planes but in climbing and turning the allied planes had the advantage.

The laws of physics were the same to both sides. And both sides knew them.

Did the german fighters carry instead more armor? If yes then the allies could have unloaded lots of ammo at one german fighter and still did not shoot him down. But german fighters were as easily shot down as allied fighters. (and the "Everything has to divebomb" would be close to additional armor as the entire planestructure has to made stronger to resist gravitational forces)

Were the german engines gas guzzling? I found no such thing.

If I look at the fighters I have the impression that the germans were given planes from the planing stage or drawn up by a little boy while the allied were given planes maybe two steps away from production with the mistakes removed and corrected.

Were the germans sabotaged by their own aircraft companies?

So, does anybody know the answer?

Flying in circles wins contests once you're in the fight, but you have to get there first, and whoever has the advantage in speed and power can decide whether to enter the fight or not. All other things being equal, a larger, heavier plane with more powerful engines will be fast, so here late war Allied planes had the advantage.
 

Deleted member 1487

Flying in circles wins contests once you're in the fight, but you have to get there first, and whoever has the advantage in speed and power can decide whether to enter the fight or not. All other things being equal, a larger, heavier plane with more powerful engines will be fast, so here late war Allied planes had the advantage.
Boom and Zoom usually trumps Turn and Burn.
 
Numerical superiority seems to have been a key reason for the defeat of the Luftwaffe. When the pilot who is going to clear the 4 Mustangs on your tail has 2 Thunderbolts on his tail, you've got a problem. The Germans did a fine job teaching advanced combat tactics and formations to the Brits, who in turn, passed it on to the Americans.
 
I've came across a couple of books that give reasonable insight into the German side of the BoB & the air war in general.

1. The Other Battle of Britain, (not the bomber command one) written by a Luftwaffe fighter pilot* about his experiences & opinions on how the Luftwaffe conducted the BoB, up until he was shot down & captured. Not a fan of Galland & the other "Spanish" veterans, nor their influence on tactics & training.

2. The Defense of the Reich, which details the efforts & resources devoted to defending Germany from the ever increasing onslaught of W.Allied air power, as well as the more modest Soviet efforts.

* unfortunately, I can't remember the author's name.
 
I think a key point of why Germans went to short range fighters is that they were viewed as essentialy defensive weapon platforms. The bombers were supposed to get through, always.

To change this means to change the entire outlook of major actors who shaped the LW into what it was. Besides, Allies realized the need to have fighters with long enough range only in 1942.
 
"Dominated" implies that they could have held it. Which as the next few years demonstrated they most certainly could not. And they really only got that far mainly due to how unprepared their enemies were. Hell, even by 1942 they had been taking unsustainable casualties for the year before hand.
Need to separate Luftwaffe from Heer in this instance. Except in the instance of grand strategy where they tried to take on the rest of the world at once, the Heer were exceptionally professional and competent at their jobs at the highest level (well, Jodl et al turned into Yes-men later on, but prior to about 1942 or so that particular problem didn't crop up).

The Luftwaffe however was run by a drug addict who liked pretty uniforms, and the senior officers had vastly less experience than their counterparts. Adolf Galland for instance started out in 1932 - his Allied opposite number (Coningham, say) had been in the RAF or RFC continuously since 1916 and done all manner of training in the intervening years which made him more capable and fitted for high command. This was pretty much universal across the RAF and USAAF (not sure about the VVS as I don't know how many seniors with the relevant experience survived the purges). The Heer had this experience - only the very best were allowed to stay on in the armed forces during the Weimar republic - but because they were stripped of air forces by Versailles they had no senior officers with the requisite level of experience by the time war came around.
 
Unlike what national myths would have you think, the Germans were the colourful amateurs.

... and I think a lot of this comes out in the over demanding specifications they issued. The original spec for the Junkers 288 called for a maximum speed of 372 mph, a ceiling of 36,000 feet and a bombload of 8,000 pounds. The later marks of Mosquito could just about do that, but carried half the weight of bombs.
 

Deleted member 1487

... and I think a lot of this comes out in the over demanding specifications they issued. The original spec for the Junkers 288 called for a maximum speed of 372 mph, a ceiling of 36,000 feet and a bombload of 8,000 pounds. The later marks of Mosquito could just about do that, but carried half the weight of bombs.
In terms of the Ju288 it could have done just that if they could have kept it to the weight of the Ju288A with a 2000hp Jumo 222. That fell victim to political infighting, as Milch sought to break the power of his rival Koppenburg at Junkers by ordering increases in weight and performance that he knew it couldn't get to quickly enough to wrest control of the project from him, claiming he couldnt deliver on promises.
http://www.amazon.com/Black-Cross-Volume-Junkers-288/dp/1857801733
This book describes that little struggle. Apparently if it had kept to the original requirements the engines and aircraft would have entered service in 1943. In testing the original was getting 350mph cruise speed and 400 mph top speed at altitude with a normal payload. Overloaded it could take two 2500kg bombs.
 
As Goering is receiving so much flak in this thread, what would the consequences be if Goering died in 1936? Or for some reason he falls out of Hitler's favour and he is sacked from all his positions in the German Government and armed forces?

Does that result in the promotion of Milch in the Luftwaffe and RLM, while someone more competent takes charge of the economy? Or could even worse people be appointed?

I recall reading that one of Goering's problems was that Hitler gave him too many jobs to do, with the result that he did not have the time to do any of them well.


Goering wasn't good at anything, but being a corrupt politician, something the Speer made clear after the war (though he wasn't all that innocent himself). It would help the German war effort immensely. The question is whether butterflies would affect Wever's accident. Assuming no, then the LW is in a somewhat bad place but could recover better than when Goering was in charge.

Milch takes over the RLM no matter what with someone more professional taking over the LW, perhaps Kesselring, though he may bow out under pressure from Milch like IOTL. Milch might end up taking over the Luftwaffe in total in this case, which would probably see someone professional, but pliable taking over as CoS. Not sure if Hitler would accept Helmuth Wilberg, who pretty much ran the clandestine LW before the Nazis got into power and had a good relationship with Milch and was Germany's most experienced air commander (he was a bomber unit commander in WW1), but was half Jewish even if he was officially aryanized. If not him then maybe someone like Gunter Korten would get it early; I doubt Jeschonnek would show up without Goering, who purposely picked a less than adequate man he could dominate that Milch did not get along with. Udet would be non-entity ITTL, as he was only appointed to sideline Milch by Goering.

I expect without Goering Fritz Todt would get the Four Year Program and the economy, as he was a trusted 'old fighter', a Nazi from the early 1920s, but also an engineer with a doctorate and probably the most competent Nazi. He quickly started to distance himself from the party the more authority he had and realized how venal and corrupt the party was in power. Here running the economy he would be an early, more effective Speer (as Speer was his assistant and pretty much just copied Todt's economic model when he took over after Todt's death from plane crash).

Without Goering the economy is run much better (the evaluation pre-war of Goering economic model was 'organized chaos with huge waste') while the LW doesn't suffer from Goering's meddling from 1936 on. The Bf110 is dead for sure, as it was a Goering project and everyone else wanted cancelled, and Milch had a personal hatred of Messerschmitt, so it would be an easy thing to kill that project; not the Me109 though due to it simply being the best option and already ordered by 1936.

It doubt that alone would make the Nazis win the war, but it would certainly draw it out with better organization of the economy and LW early on.

So all that has to happen is for Wever to do his pre-flight checks properly and Goering's drug habit became so bad that he is forced to retire in 1936.
 

Deleted member 1487

So all that has to happen is for Wever to do his pre-flight checks properly and Goering's drug habit became so bad that he is forced to retire in 1936.
Or Goering to die in a plane crash, causing Wever to be more serious about his pre-flight check. Or just Wever's engineer not letting himself get bullied into hurrying.
 
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