WWII Europe Only U.S. Navy

Assuming that the US & Japan never come to blows but that the US enters WWII in Europe (say, no later than the end of 1942), what do you envisage the US Navy's build program to look like? There were a lot of fleet carriers built (and planned) for the Pacific but I don't know if that would have been the case if the Atlantic was the major theater of operations. What would have been built instead? More DD's? Escort carriers? Cruisers? BB's? Maybe even the Montana class a little early (no Panama canal to restrict transit)? Where would subs fit into the fleet? Would the additional shipbuilding capacity have gone, instead, all to merchant ships and/or landing craft?

Assume, for any speculations, that the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor remains intact. Japan is sufficiently bogged down in China (and maybe with the Soviet Union) that Washington sees it as a potential but not immediate threat-i.e., there is no need to weaken our Pacific Fleet but no immediate need to augment it, either (except, perhaps, with Atlantic Fleet ships that have been supplanted by newer units).

What kind of US Navy do we see by V-E Day?
 
Much of the USN construction program was well underway before December 1941. ie: the first batch of Essex class aircraft carriers, or blue water amphibious transports. The US naval construction program reached back as far as 1938 and military mobilizations started in 1940 shortly after France collapsed. The threat of the Pacific war deeply influenced that mobilization, so any change there would have altered the character of events, but not have reduced the overall level of mobilization. Note how the 'Rainbow' war plans placed the larger emphasis on fighting a war in Europe and preperations for that. ie: Plans/preperations for mobilizing a 200+ division ground army, something that was wholly unecessary for a war in in the Pacific.

If the threat of a Pacific war fades from sometime between 1940-42 then we might have seen fewer 'Pacific' type war ships built. Possibbly even the Iowa class BB canceled, fewer blue water amphibious ships, the follow on the the early Essex class carriers, fewer submarines. There would be more USN carrier operations around the coasts of Europe. ie multiple raids on Norway, not just one, and permanent full time presence of USN carriers in the wester Mediterranean vs the occasional participatio by one or two.

The most important factor would be the cargo ships. The Paciic war drained away huge quantities of deck space. Reduce the Pacific operations to merely building defenses without any combat and a large part of the Allied shipping problem vanishes. (Not that the logisticians and leaders wont complain anyway.) Due to distance and lack of port and storage facilities a ton of cargo sent to the south Pacific tied up deck space at least three times as long as a ton sent to the UK or the French ports. At the worst times cargo ships were spending up to four months making a delivery to the South Pacific. Prepations for the Central Pacific offensive in 1943 used up still more capacity. At a minimum no Pacific war at least doubles the ground combat forces the US could sent to Europe by the start of 1943.

Further increases in cargo capacity would ahve been had from the abilit to fight the German submarines more effectively. More aircraft for ASW patrols, more ships for escorts and hunter groups, more raids on the home ports of the submarines. That all translates to few cargo ships lost, more cargo delivered, and more ship construction capacity for other craft.
 
USN/USMC would kick the crap out of the Wehrmacht if it came to a toe to toe fight, and I have a lot of time for the Wehrmacht as a fighting force.
 
I think you'd have to assume that, not only did Japan and the US not come to blows, but that there was never any thought in the US that war with Japan was ever likely to get a substantially different USN in 1941-42.

Historically, US 1900-1940 ship design tended to put a premium on endurance, habitability, and staying power - partly because of the presumption that US ships would need to operate on long deployments in the Pacific without access to repair and replenishment facilities in the immediate theatre. And the prospective enemy was Japan, with a large battle fleet including a very capable air arm. Absent Japan as a potential enemy, the bulk of the USN would be based in the Atlantic and the presumption would be that Royal Navy would most likely be allied with it - or at worst neutral. After the early 1900's the principle enemy in the Atlantic was believed to be Germany, and this would affect US procurement. The main threats to the US would be seen to be submarines, armed merchantmen, and commerce raiding battle cruisers. Aircraft carriers, large cruisers, and destroyers would be critical. The US would still build and maintain a large battle fleet, if for only national prestige. However, the ships would not have to have extremely long endurance, since they would either be based in Britain (if they were an ally), or be used to deny the German fleet bases in the Caribbean, where the US had many bases they could use (or seize very easily from weak countries).
 
The USN Always had been focussed on the Pacific as its playground, even with no enemy there. Ever since the creation of the White Fleet, the Pacific wa its primary domain, with a lesser accent on the Atlantic, which was even more localized to the Caribean region mostly.

The principle problem of the US was its geographic location, as it was unable on its own to deploy any sort of influence military in Europe, as long as it did not have a strong ally there to use as a springboard for military operations there. For that reason alone the USN could simply not develope a European, or Atlantic focus, superior to the already traditional Pacific one.

Even more important is that the Western European powers and even the USSR were at least technologically the equal to the USA and occasionally in economical industrial power as well, at least for some time before 1942. Japan was a much weaker opponent in this case, as it stood alone and was less economically developped. A solitary USN entering European wargrounds would face serious opposition at least, capable of much more than the Japanese ever coudl dream of. This meant the USN needed allies along her side, or forget the Atlantic as a major theater for her to play in.
 
IMO, you do get most of the Essexes originally projected, but maybe no more than that.

Most of the Casablanca s & other CVE/CVLs become less necessary, & more LCT/LCP/LST get built, instead.

The Balaos & Tenches never get built, & there are many, many fewer Gatos, perhaps as few as 20.

I'm betting more LCs & more Liberty/Victory ships take up most of the yard space freed up.

This also dramatically changes other things, tho, not least recruiting & base-building in the U.S. Training for aircrew is much reduced, to many NAS don't happen. A/c production also changes.

Plus, there are a lot of USN officers who became pretty famous in OTL WW2 service. Many of them won't, if they serve at all.:eek:
 
The US pretty much has the same navy except:

1) Less ships are built because it doesn't need the huge fleet in the Pacific, and it doesn't need a huge navy in the Atlantic since Britain is also concentrating their forces there and Germany is not a major naval power.

2) US transfers much of its escort vessels from pacific to Atlantic to deal with the U-Boat threat. The Second Happy Time is cut short, if it occurs at all. Battle of the Atlantic is basically won by end of 1942.

3) There is essentially no naval battles except for the sub sinkings since the Germans don't have enough of a fleet to send out against the Allies, and the Italians always decide to keep a fleet-in-being.

4) The US Army intended to keep the Marines out of the fighting in the Atlantic because the top brass was still upset about the Marines getting too much press from WWI. Marines only fought because the US needed to do something in the Pacific, and Admiral King was running the show and wanted Guadalcanal. The US Marines never have a chance to perfect amphibious landing doctrine and no knowledge transfers to the Army. The Marines may not even exist after WWII since it never had the chance to earn kudos for Guadalcanal and Iwo Jima.
 
Blackfox5 said:
The US Army intended to keep the Marines out of the fighting in the Atlantic
That also pretty well kills the F4U, doesn't it?:eek:

Or does the Army (or RAF) adopt a land-based variant?:cool::cool: (Yeah, fat chance.:p)
 
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NothingNow

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4) The US Army intended to keep the Marines out of the fighting in the Atlantic because the top brass was still upset about the Marines getting too much press from WWI. Marines only fought because the US needed to do something in the Pacific, and Admiral King was running the show and wanted Guadalcanal. The US Marines never have a chance to perfect amphibious landing doctrine and no knowledge transfers to the Army. The Marines may not even exist after WWII since it never had the chance to earn kudos for Guadalcanal and Iwo Jima.

Why do I have the feeling this would just lead to the USMC getting involved in the Dodecanese campaign, with the extant fleet of APDs and LVTs? After all, It'd be a great way to get them involved in the fighting, without putting them anywhere important.
The Marines would probably thrive in that sort of environment.
 
The US pretty much has the same navy except:

1) Less ships are built because it doesn't need the huge fleet in the Pacific, and it doesn't need a huge navy in the Atlantic since Britain is also concentrating their forces there and Germany is not a major naval power.

2) US transfers much of its escort vessels from pacific to Atlantic to deal with the U-Boat threat. The Second Happy Time is cut short, if it occurs at all. Battle of the Atlantic is basically won by end of 1942.

3) There is essentially no naval battles except for the sub sinkings since the Germans don't have enough of a fleet to send out against the Allies, and the Italians always decide to keep a fleet-in-being.

4) The US Army intended to keep the Marines out of the fighting in the Atlantic because the top brass was still upset about the Marines getting too much press from WWI. Marines only fought because the US needed to do something in the Pacific, and Admiral King was running the show and wanted Guadalcanal. The US Marines never have a chance to perfect amphibious landing doctrine and no knowledge transfers to the Army. The Marines may not even exist after WWII since it never had the chance to earn kudos for Guadalcanal and Iwo Jima.


The Battle for the Atlantic was basically decided long before the US entered the war, as the British had already broken the German Naval Codes and started to use advanced ASW tactics, including the use of long range aircraft. By the time the USA faced Paukenschlag, the Germans had lost their ground in the Atlantic Trade Routes, which was one of the reasons most German U-Boote started to seek out easier prey in either US East COast regions, where ASW was not existing as such, or politically redeployed elsewhere (Mediteranean and Arctic) for otehr purposes.

The point was: The majority of the goods and supply send to the UK got through, U-Boote or not. The U-Boote still were active and remained to do so until the last day of the war, but the battle as such was over. The USA was not yet into the war, by the time the British, with some help of a certain corporal in Berlin, had done this on their own mostly.
 
Possible USMC invasion of Norway in 1944?

Extremely unlikely, given the state of the geography and defences in place at that time. It could only be a Kamikaze style invassion, with nearly 100% loss ratio, as the USN & USMC at that time in history lacked the means and technology of invcading mountaineous arctic territory, also well defended by the continental airforces of their opponent.

The Norwegean coast lacks sandy beaches for assault craft to land troops on. You need to airlift them on top of high ground, in order to do something. As VSTOL aircraft at that time did not exist, this was out of the question. Norway is better suited physically for a defending force, rather than an attacking force. Only if the defences are practically non existing, such as in april 1940, an invassion can be mounted succesfully. If the defences are in place, any direct assault will most likely result in massacre of the invading personel.

Generally, the USA on her own cannot do much in Europe directly. It must have had allies to use as a startingpoint on, or near the continent. Sealift capabilities too were only poresent in 1944 for relatively short range missions and operations, as the troops cannot be sustained for longer periods in the numbers needed, while at sea. An invassion had to be planned with only a few days sailingtime in mind, as lopng duration traveling was not yet an option. (Think of troops getting seasick in high numbers in the Norht Atlantic Swell's and the amount of supply needed to support the troops, even before setting a foot on sollid ground.)
 
Possible USMC invasion of Norway in 1944?

Or Greece in early 1944 to distract from Normandy. Do the invasion in April or May to give it a month or two for the Germans to move troops from all over and get focused there rather than the north of France...
 
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