WWI WI: Russian decisive victory in the Brusilov Offensive

During her first days the Brusilov Offensive went excedingly well, inflicting important casualties to the Austro-Hungarian army and taking back significant grounds. The austrians where in full retreat and some began to hope or fear that the southern part of the Central empires eastern front would crumble completely.

Things, however, started to go astray when the planned offensive by the russian army group on his northern flank, designed to prevent the germans to intervene in force to save the Austro-hungarians, wasn't launched. 17 german divisions where transfered to Galicia and helped the austrians stop the russians at last.

What if the attack in the northern part of the eastern front was launched, as Brusilov wanted. How badly could have things turned out for the Central empires here? How well could the Russians have done? What would be the effects on the rest of WWI?
 

CaliGuy

Banned
What if the attack in the northern part of the eastern front was launched, as Brusilov wanted. How badly could have things turned out for the Central empires here? How well could the Russians have done? What would be the effects on the rest of WWI?
If logistics don't stop them, then maybe, just maybe, the Russians will be able to finally break through the Carpathians and onto the Hungarian plains in this TL.
 

Deleted member 1487

IOTL they did attack with the West Front, which turned into a bloodbath:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baranovichi_Offensive
Concurrent to an attack by Russian Southwestern Front, the Russian Western Front was to launch an offensive in the direction of Vilna. However, the plan of attack was changed - instead of an attack on Vilna, the offensive was to target the area of Baranovichi. In early June 1916, the troops of the Southwestern Front began their offensive, achieving breakthroughs against the Austro-Hungarian army and advancing into Galicia. However, General A. E. Evert, commander of the Russian Western Front, twice postponed planned offensive towards Baranovichi, first on May 31, then on June 4, and then attempted to cancel the operation altogether. By order of Russian GHQ, General Evert was obliged to " attack the enemy on the front - Nowogrodek - Baranovichi" on June 3.

Battle
The Russian Fourth Army launched the first attack on July 2 with three army corps, but had stalled by the next day. The Russians revived the offensive on July 4 but again stalled after only two days of fighting. Under the cover of night on July 8, the Russians launched a third push but all Russian attacks were repulsed by the end of the following day. On July 14, the German Army counterattacked and took back all lost ground. A final Russian attempt was made from July 25 to July 29, but yet again failed.

Results
Despite months of preparation and a sixfold advantage in manpower and artillery, the Russians failed to break through the fortified German positions, seizing only the first fortified line in some areas of the offensive which was then lost to German counterattacks.

The answer is that this would be an even worse bloodbath if the attack happened in June.
 

Deleted member 1487

Why exactly did Evert fail while Brusilov succeeded, though?
He was fighting Germans instead of Austrians for one (Habsburg generals were shitty and didn't do their jobs, plus Conrad stripped the Eastern Front bare to provide weapons, munitions, and the best men for his Italian offensive). That and he used much worse tactics. Brusilov was the best general the Russians had and actually learned lessons from other fronts, training his men in modern infiltration tactics and was one of the few Russian generals to really have taken the lessons of the Russo-Japanese war to heart. So he had all the right virtues, the Austrians had all the wrong vices and none of the material support thanks to Conrad's obsession with Italy.
 
If logistics don't stop them, then maybe, just maybe, the Russians will be able to finally break through the Carpathians and onto the Hungarian plains in this TL.

How bad could have things gone for the Austro-Hungarian had that happened? The logistics are definitely something to keep an eye on but, at the same time, this isn't WWII and WWI armies tended to be lighter in that department.

IOTL they did attack with the West Front, which turned into a bloodbath:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baranovichi_Offensive


The answer is that this would be an even worse bloodbath if the attack happened in June.

Wouldn't the fact that the attack would be essentially designed to pin them down instead of breakingthrough make a difference in the matter tough?
 

CaliGuy

Banned
He was fighting Germans instead of Austrians for one (Habsburg generals were shitty and didn't do their jobs, plus Conrad stripped the Eastern Front bare to provide weapons, munitions, and the best men for his Italian offensive). That and he used much worse tactics. Brusilov was the best general the Russians had and actually learned lessons from other fronts, training his men in modern infiltration tactics and was one of the few Russian generals to really have taken the lessons of the Russo-Japanese war to heart. So he had all the right virtues, the Austrians had all the wrong vices and none of the material support thanks to Conrad's obsession with Italy.
OK; understood.

Also, had Evert used better tactics, how much more successful do you think that his offensive would have been?

In addition, Conrad really doesn't appear to have wanted to fight Russia, did he? After all, he seems to have been very eager to fight Serbia and Italy, but the appetite to fight Russia doesn't appear to have been there. Heck, even at the start of WWI, didn't Austria-Hungary wait several days before it actually declared war on Russia?
 

CaliGuy

Banned
How bad could have things gone for the Austro-Hungarian had that happened? The logistics are definitely something to keep an eye on but, at the same time, this isn't WWII and WWI armies tended to be lighter in that department.
To be honest, I think that logistics plus German reinforcements would have prevented them from getting very far.
 

Deleted member 1487

OK; understood.

Also, had Evert used better tactics, how much more successful do you think that his offensive would have been?

In addition, Conrad really doesn't appear to have wanted to fight Russia, did he? After all, he seems to have been very eager to fight Serbia and Italy, but the appetite to fight Russia doesn't appear to have been there. Heck, even at the start of WWI, didn't Austria-Hungary wait several days before it actually declared war on Russia?
I really don't know, because even with better tactics, the French and Brits didn't beat the Germans on the Western Front either, despite manpower and firepower advantages. Likely tactics like Brusilov used probably wouldn't get nearly as far against the Germans as compared to the Austrians because of how much more firepower the Germans had relative to each soldier, how much better their artillery was than the Russians (the Austrians IIRC were outranged by the Russians), and the fact that they had proper defenses and manning of trenches in multiple lines. The Austrians had none of the above and weighted their defense on one trench line in range of Russian artillery, while their own artillery stayed out of range to avoid counter battery fire (that is what guns were even available). So a situation like at Baranovichi where the first trench line was lost would have provoked a total collapse of defenses if the Germans had a defensive scheme like the Austrians, but didn't because there were multiple well developed trenches with strong artillery support.

Conrad wanted to fight the Italians above all else.

Wouldn't the fact that the attack would be essentially designed to pin them down instead of breakingthrough make a difference in the matter tough?
In the OTL that case the effect should have been the same, that is to pin German forces, but even with months to prepare a heavier offensive with 6x the manpower, it still wasn't enough. They'd have to commit much more to Evert than they did IOTL to get any sort of pinning effect...but that would deprive Brusilov of the men he needed to exploit his success.

One suggestion I heard that the Russian Imperial Guard Army could have been used against the Germans, but they were used by Brusilov IOTL; they were slaughtered around Rovno as I recall when used, so likely wouldn't have done much further north either. I had a decent, but short book about the Brusilov offensive that is more detailed than the wikipedia link that talked about option, but AFAIK there wasn't a good option for a pinning offensive AFAIK against the Germans by the Russians that wouldn't have destroyed the morale of the army. I think the least bad option was actually committing more troops against the Austrians and sucking the Germans into a situation where they wouldn't perform as well within their own army zone of the front. If anything they just should have cut off the offensive earlier rather than persisting and suffering unnecessary and huge losses.
 
Last edited by a moderator:

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
If anything they just should have cut off the offensive earlier rather than persisting and suffering unnecessary and huge losses.

Maybe the Russians should have gone bigger in 1916 against the Ottomans, where the CP can't send as much stuff to throw back at them. Let rescuing the Italians becomes France and Britain's problem. Or a briar patch for the Austrians.
 
In order to have a successful Brusilov offensive, you'll need at least one of two PoD's:
-Evert actually follows Brusilov's request and attacks Germany
-Russia convinces Romania to enter the war just on time for the offensive. IOTL, when Romania entered the fray, the offensive had already lost momentum, and the country was then steamrolled by the CP, giving up precious resources such as the Danube delta and the national oil fields.
 

Loghain

Banned
He was fighting Germans instead of Austrians for one (Habsburg generals were shitty and didn't do their jobs, plus Conrad stripped the Eastern Front bare to provide weapons, munitions, and the best men for his Italian offensive). That and he used much worse tactics. Brusilov was the best general the Russians had and actually learned lessons from other fronts, training his men in modern infiltration tactics and was one of the few Russian generals to really have taken the lessons of the Russo-Japanese war to heart. So he had all the right virtues, the Austrians had all the wrong vices and none of the material support thanks to Conrad's obsession with Italy.

what if The second general was Brusilov protege and was capable what would be the impact.
Presume Slighly less skilled than Brusilov but still Very Very skilled
 

Deleted member 1487

Maybe the Russians should have gone bigger in 1916 against the Ottomans, where the CP can't send as much stuff to throw back at them. Let rescuing the Italians becomes France and Britain's problem. Or a briar patch for the Austrians.
The problem was the fear that without the pressure on the Eastern Front, France falls and the Entente loses. Also logistically I don't think they could have done that much more against the Ottomans. Remember too that Verdun started before the Austrian offensive against Italy.

what if The second general was Brusilov protege and was capable what would be the impact.
Presume Slighly less skilled than Brusilov but still Very Very skilled
You mean Evert? At that level of command no one could be Brusilov's protege. He was too junior to have someone under him promoted to his level. He was a corps commander promoted to command of an army at the start of WW1, there was no way any other commander his junior would have an army command at that time. Plus the Russian Imperial system did not promote on skill, it was based on connections
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
The problem was the fear that without the pressure on the Eastern Front, France falls and the Entente loses.

That was the fear indeed. What if the Russians were not convinced? For instance, if they take the view that Britain's offensive maneuvers and capabilities against Germany on the Westfront were sufficient to keep France propped up for the year.

Would inaction or lesser, shorter action* on the Austrian front have realistically given the Germans enough freedom to win in the west? Or the Austrians to win in Italy?

*referring to the earlier suggestion that the Russians do the offensive but don't keep at it, piling up losses after it stalls.
 

Deleted member 1487

That was the fear indeed. What if the Russians were not convinced? For instance, if they take the view that Britain's offensive maneuvers and capabilities against Germany on the Westfront were sufficient to keep France propped up for the year.

Would inaction or lesser, shorter action* on the Austrian front have realistically given the Germans enough freedom to win in the west? Or the Austrians to win in Italy?

*referring to the earlier suggestion that the Russians do the offensive but don't keep at it, piling up losses after it stalls.
The fear was based on very real issues. Also the Imperial Russians to a fault always attacked if asked by their Western Allies, because in 1915 the French attacked to the point of wrecking their army to try and save Russia from the Gorlice-Tarnow advance. The Russians appreciated that effort and would reciprocate, especially as the Entente also launched the damaging Gallipoli offensive to try and open up supply lines to them at great cost, plus got them major loans and US shipments of supplies (IIRC via Murmansk and Vladivostok). So even if Russia was dubious about the chance for French defeat (which they weren't for very good reason) they were obligated under the treaty they had and the leverage the Entente financiers (Britain) had over them. If the Russians sit back (not sure why they would given they were trying to liberate their own territory and win the war) then the Somme offensive is basically pointless, because Entente strategy for 1916 was to press the CPs on all fronts as hard as possible in 1916 so that German reserves were all committed and used up, provoking collapse somewhere. If the Russians are out, then going all out on the Somme is pointless as the German strategic reserve still exists and will still be available in 1917. 1916 was thought by all the Entente to be the 'year of battles' that would decisively defeat the CPs; the Austrians were beaten up badly in the last two years, Russia, France, and Britain (with it's new armies coming online in Summer) were stronger than ever and rightly thought to outnumber the CPs by something like 2:1 so they could just press until collapse happened on some front. Russia sitting still all year in 1916 invalidates the entire point of attacking in 1916. Not sure if that gives room to let the CPs win their offensives, but it certainly doesn't hurt their chances.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Somme
The French and British had committed themselves to an offensive on the Somme during Allied discussions at Chantilly, Oise, in December 1915. The Allies agreed upon a strategy of combined offensives against the Central Powers in 1916, by the French, Russian, British and Italian armies, with the Somme offensive as the Franco-British contribution.

Allied war strategy for 1916 was decided at the Chantilly Conference from 6–8 December 1915. Simultaneous offensives on the Eastern Front by the Russian army, on the Italian Front by the Italian army, and on the Western Front by the Franco-British armies, were to be carried out to deny time for the Central Powers to move troops between fronts during lulls.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
Understood Wiking, you make a good case for inevitability of a Russian western offensive based on both national and coalition solidarity motives. Do you think all the same arguments applied with equal force to the 1917 campaign as well.

However, you also made this suggestion:
I think the least bad option was actually committing more troops against the Austrians and sucking the Germans into a situation where they wouldn't perform as well within their own army zone of the front. If anything they just should have cut off the offensive earlier rather than persisting and suffering unnecessary and huge losses.

Would this proposal of yours cost Russia heavily, in terms of being considered an abandonment or breach of faith by the Western Allies? Would it allow any decisive weakening of France or Italy?
 

Deleted member 1487

Understood Wiking, you make a good case for inevitability of a Russian western offensive based on both national and coalition solidarity motives. Do you think all the same arguments applied with equal force to the 1917 campaign as well.

However, you also made this suggestion:


Would this proposal of yours cost Russia heavily, in terms of being considered an abandonment or breach of faith by the Western Allies? Would it allow any decisive weakening of France or Italy?
Kerensky's government was just as trapped by alliance politics as the Imperial government was.

The Russians stopping 'early' probably wouldn't be that big of a deal, but they'd have to still keep pressure up some how by 'demonstration' offensives that used a lot of firepower and not a lot of manpower to keep casualties low and try and pin the Germans down somewhere, while claiming they were still helping.
 
Top