WWI WI : Later WWI.

[DracoLazarus]

As everybody knows, WWI officially started because the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne got assassinated in Sarajevo in 1914. Now let's assume the visit of Sarajevo and assassination both take place twelve months later. Would WWI still start ? And how would its unfolding be changed by the altered balance of power ? Indeed, Russia was a rapidly growing nation, and one more year of railroad development and industrial growth might tip the scales in the war...
Also, one major butterfly to consider is likely the entry of the Ottoman Empire in the war, which IOTL happened when the British kept the dreadnoughts they had built for the Ottomans and for which the Ottomans had already paid.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

As everybody knows, WWI officially started because the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne got assassinated in Sarajevo in 1914. Now let's assume the visit of Sarajevo and assassination both take place twelve months later. Would WWI still start ? And how would its unfolding be changed by the altered balance of power ? Indeed, Russia was a rapidly growing nation, and one more year of railroad development and industrial growth might tip the scales in the war...
Also, one major butterfly to consider is likely the entry of the Ottoman Empire in the war, which IOTL happened when the British kept the dreadnoughts they had built for the Ottomans and for which the Ottomans had already paid.

12 months later yeah the war would still start. 24-36 months later though probably not. 12 months later would have the Anglo-Russian treaty fall apart, plus Irish Home Rule be a major issue. Russia would be more armed up, as would France, while the CPs wouldn't be as much relatively, but the Haber Process would be more adavanced. The Ottomans would certainly have major advantage having more time to recover from the Balkans Wars and have their Dreadnoughts, but that might keep them out of the war. It would certainly be an interesting version of events, as things would be substantially different overall in 12 months.

 

[LordKalvan]

I think that even a single year might be too much, obviously depending on the way things develop in different places.
Russia, for example: IIRC the number of strikes was very high in the spring of 1914; give it one more year and things might get worse, not better. I'm not sure which railway or industrial projects were underway, but I'm a bit skeptic that whatever was in the pipeline would make a real difference in terms of war readiness (and this also assume there is no other crisis between Ottomans and Russians like it happened in 1913 after the appointment of Liman von Sanders as commander of the Ottoman troops in the Costantinople area).
As far as the Ottomans are concerned, the 12 extra months would make a significant impact on the Berlin-Baghdad railway (although not enough for completion, IIRC Damascus would be directly connected by railway to Costantinople); the two dreadnoughts would certainly make a difference in the Black sea, but their presence might make the Russians more reluctant to enter the war.
The internal situation of the UK might get significantly worse, not just about the Irish Home Rule but also because industrial strikes were significantly on the rise. UK might be more reluctant to commit to a war in the summer of 1915, and this might dampen French "enthusiasm" too (in particular if the French and the British factor in the impact of the Haber process, which I doubt had a significant impact over their decisions in 1914). IIRC industrial strikes were an issue in France too, or, to put it in another way, the socialist parties in western Europe were getting stronger and another 12 months might possibly make a difference in their support for a war.
A-H is as big an enigma as Russia: the re-negotiation of the Ausgleich is one year closer (which might make the Hungarians even more obstinate), Franz-Joseph is one year older and his relation with Franz Ferdinand is not going to get better, there might be internal strife either along ethnic lines or because of increased industrial strikes, the Austro-Italian crisis over Albania might get worse.
German decisions did not follow a full rational path (none of the participants in the war can be singled out on the basis of the rationality of their decisions, and there were a lot of agendas at play), but if Russia and/or A-H are perceived to be in trouble I think that would make Germany less impulsive and more ready to negotiate.
Italy would have replenished its ammunition reserves depleted during the war in Lybia, and this might make them less in a hurry to declare neutrality (although I think the end result would still be neutrality).

 

[Matteo]

As everybody knows, WWI officially started because the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne got assassinated in Sarajevo in 1914. Now let's assume the visit of Sarajevo and assassination both take place twelve months later. Would WWI still start ? And how would its unfolding be changed by the altered balance of power ? Indeed, Russia was a rapidly growing nation, and one more year of railroad development and industrial growth might tip the scales in the war...
Also, one major butterfly to consider is likely the entry of the Ottoman Empire in the war, which IOTL happened when the British kept the dreadnoughts they had built for the Ottomans and for which the Ottomans had already paid.

You mentioned the key issue. Germany prefered going to war in 1914 before Russian became too modern and too powerful. A few years later, the Russia-France alliance would be more powerful than the Germany-Austria-Hungary alliance.

 

[DracoLazarus]

You mentioned the key issue. Germany prefered going to war in 1914 before Russian became too modern and too powerful. A few years later, the Russia-France alliance would be more powerful than the Germany-Austria-Hungary alliance.

Yes. However, one year down the road, the balance of power isn't as heavily broken as to make Germany feel its window of opportunity as closed.

 

[Riain]

By 1915 the alliances would most likely shift and most certainly war plans will. Germany and Britain had already made feeble moves toward some sort of naval agreement and Britain and Russia weren't getting along too well on colonial questions, wether this would have any concrete fallout or probably more likely would cause Britain to vacillate on a declaration of war. Russia would go to Plan 20 in late 1914 and Germany would most likely revamp its Eastern plans.

All in all if FF was assassinated in Sajevo a year later the same path would not be followed I think.

 

[Matteo]

Britain and Russia had just settled their colonial rivalry. And if this occured, it is because both wanted to avoid a clash and because ... both felt a need to come to terms in order to be better able to face the german threat.

There is an iron law in Britain's european policy that makes your assertion unlikely.

First of all, never ever ever let any continental power dominate the european continent. This is why England/Britain went after France from 1688 to 1815, then after Russia from 1815 to around 1870, then after Germany from 1871 to 1919 and from 1940 to 1945, thenafter the USSR from 1947 to the Gorbachev years. In order to contain the most dynamic, most powerful and most expansionist continental european power.

All other rules will be sacrificed to this cardinal rule of Britain's foreign policy. Because losing on this front will jeopardize all Britain's other strategic interests, be they national security interests or economic interests. This a mere matter of geography. Britain is a geographic satellite of the european continent. It can securely project power and develop relations with all the rest of the world as long as it is not subject to the deadly threat of a continental european superpower.

Tha's why Britain committed itself into WW1 from the start. Because it knew that, although this war would ruin Britain's economy even if Britain came out victorious, not going to war in order to avoid Germany establishing hegemony would both destroy Britain's strategic position and Britain's economic foundations.

The point of formally respecting the strategic arrangements it had concluded with France and Russia was secondary. In the end, it was all about a question about : does Britain keeps on opposing any attempt of an other country to establish hegemony on the european continent or does it accepts it ? Accepting it just meant Britain ending as a strategic and economic vassal at the mercy of the continental Europe hegemon.

All this was not a matter of stubborness, ideology or miscalculation. It was all a matter of pragmatic calculation. It was the multisecular cardinal axis of british world strategy.

 

[Galba Otho Vitelius]

The iron law Matteo was mentioned was in fact pushing Britain towards Germany and away from Russia in 1914. As the French sponsored military buildup in Russia (which included a large modern fleet) came to completion, Russia and not Germany would have been the strongest continental power. In fact a key reason why the Germans went to war or didn't try too hard to avert a war in 1914 was that they knew that their window where they could realistically fight Russia at least to a draw was closing.

Now they could have tried for a diplomatic revolution in which Britain was in their corner, to hold back the Russians. Relations with Britain were improving and this would have been consistent with British diplomatic SOP. But then their diplomatic service was horrible and it would have been really risky.

Not incidentally, one of the factors propelling Russia to war in 1914 is that they were worried that the British were starting to pull away from the Entente (see Sean McMeekin's books on the subject).

 

[Roland Traveler]

The iron law Matteo was mentioned was in fact pushing Britain towards Germany and away from Russia in 1914. As the French sponsored military buildup in Russia (which included a large modern fleet) came to completion, Russia and not Germany would have been the strongest continental power. In fact a key reason why the Germans went to war or didn't try too hard to avert a war in 1914 was that they knew that their window where they could realistically fight Russia at least to a draw was closing.

Now they could have tried for a diplomatic revolution in which Britain was in their corner, to hold back the Russians. Relations with Britain were improving and this would have been consistent with British diplomatic SOP. But then their diplomatic service was horrible and it would have been really risky.

For some reason, when I read this I picture Zimmerman ruining everything with a telegram to Ireland promising independence if they help against Britain.

 

[cpip]

There is an iron law in Britain's european policy that makes your assertion unlikely.

First of all, never ever ever let any continental power dominate the european continent...

All other rules will be sacrificed to this cardinal rule of Britain's foreign policy...

Tha's why Britain committed itself into WW1 from the start.

This keeps on getting quoted as holy writ...and yet: Grey's declarations in cabinet once Grey realized he couldn't stop the war generally amount to, "We have to back France and Russia because they'll win and we don't want to be on their bad side." His Parliamentary speech turns to considerably more higher-minded things -- Belgium, for instance -- but Belgium seems entirely like a convenient cover at that point.

Of course, all that assumes the British government doesn't fall and need to be re-elected over the Irish issue -- and an election in '15 or '16 looks like a Conservative retaking of Parliament seems likely. The Conservatives/Unionists were considerably more Francophilic in this instance, and are likely to more eagerly move to France's defense -- and have a Foreign Secretary who says so -- rather than Grey's equivocating and dancing around the issue in an effort to persuade both sides to come to the table as he did in 1914.