WWI what-if: Unrestricted submarine warfare in 1914 and...

Anitsocrates,

I'm very sorry, but if you POD requires a "miracle" - as you yourself claim - than it is "ASB-ishly implausible".

I can see Germany building more subs than in the OTL. I can see Germany using subs more "offensively" and further from home earlier than in the OTL. I can see Germany "learning" about the power of submarines to sink merchant vessels faster than in the OTL. I've even suggested ways for all that to happen in this very thread.

What I simply cannot see Germany jumped immediately into a full fledged commerce destruction campaign in August of 1914 or having the number of submarines on hand that such a campaign requires or having the already trained the men those submarines will need.

It's far too much far too soon and, even if he is visited by an epiphany, Tirpitz could not convince the German government to make it happen.


Bill
 
Anitsocrates,

I'm very sorry, but if you POD requires a "miracle" - as you yourself claim - than it is "ASB-ishly implausible".

I can see Germany building more subs than in the OTL. I can see Germany using subs more "offensively" and further from home earlier than in the OTL. I can see Germany "learning" about the power of submarines to sink merchant vessels faster than in the OTL. I've even suggested ways for all that to happen in this very thread.

What I simply cannot see Germany jumped immediately into a full fledged commerce destruction campaign in August of 1914 or having the number of submarines on hand that such a campaign requires or having the already trained the men those submarines will need.

It's far too much far too soon and, even if he is visited by an epiphany, Tirpitz could not convince the German government to make it happen.


Bill
Um... Isn't this what I wrote in my last post?
You may be right about the beginning, though. So how about if we move the timetable a bit later? Say few months after Marne, or perhaps even as late as mid-1915? Ludendorff was gungho for subs. If Falkenhayn has a POD and agrees with Ludendorff for an East-first strategy, Bethmann Hollweg is out of jobs and the USW may start in 1915. But instead of 100 subs that Ludendorff had in 1917, he has few hundreds in 1915. Now what?
 
Um... Isn't this what I wrote in my last post?


Antisocrates,

Yes it is. It isn't what you wrote in your OP however.

Turning to your modified POD now, Lloyd George's postwar lies aside, the Admiralty knew perfectly well that convoys were needed and they knew that very soon after the first bout of USW.

However, just like Ernie King in early 1942, the Admiralty didn't have the assets to set up all the convoys that were needed. The Grand Fleet at Scapa and Rosyth, plus the other naval operations ranging from the Channel to the Med, all required destroyers in large numbers. There were simply none to be had, so something would have to give.

If shipping losses grew great enough, Britain would simply bite the bullet and remove the necessary destroyers and other escorts from someplace. We could see the Harwich Force disbanded, the aggressive patrolling in the North Sea curtailed, and the Grand Fleet learning to live with less. Jellicoe would scream, as he in did in the OTL, but, again like in the OTL when at the Admiralty he planned similar measures in 1917, Jellicoe will go along with it.

We may even see something similar to the WW2 destroyers for bases deal between the US and UK or more concessions to Japan in return for her sending additional naval to Europe. (The IJN provided some convoy escorts for the Med in the OLT.)

We'll see a race between convoy creation and sinking rates. The RN needn't have ASDIC or depth charges for the convoys to be successful. It's simple mathematics, by greatly reducing the number of sailings, you greatly reduce the number of potential intercepts. All the RN escorts need do is force the submarines to dive and stay underwater as the convoy passes. With their low underwater speeds, the subs will have less of a chance to reach a firing position and, if they surface to attempt an end around, they place themselves in the sights of the escorts.

USW in 1915 could prevent the Entente offensives of '15 and '16 by limiting shell production. While the Entente could still defend themselves, how Germany uses this "lull" is open to question.


Bill
 
What about the US? We have to presume that the US would enter on the side of Entente with German USW. What would their destroyer production rate be in 1915? Similar to 1917? Really, I guess this question would boil down to what would be Germany's chance to strangle Britain enough to make it say uncle within a year, before US economy bulldozes its way to Berlin by Christmas 1917?
 
What about the US? We have to presume that the US would enter on the side of Entente with German USW.


Antisocrates,

Why? Two lengthy bouts of USW didn't cause US entry in the OTL. That required that idiot Zimmerman and his telegram to the government of Mexico.

Having the US get angry about USW in 1915 means William Jennings Bryant, an avowed pacifist, is still Secretary of Sate. It also means US industry hasn't been filling Entente arms orders for 3 years and thus isn't anywhere up to speed yet. Trigger US entry in 1915 somehow and all I see is more US casualties. Planes are still clunky, there are no tanks, the Entente only has enough artillery for themselves and fewer machine guns then they'd like. All the US can provide in 1915 is food and bodies, which is even less than it provided in 1917-18.

As for destroyers, Congress loved funding the "sexy" cruisers and battleships, but routinely balked at funding the escorting destroyers both needed. Looking at my books, in 1915 the US has 32 battleships (both pre-dreadnought and dreadnought), 30 cruisers, and only 57 destroyers. By the end of 1916, those numbers are 36, 30, and 61. Again, not enough destroyers.

The UK could place orders for more escorts and merchants at US yards, but that will still take months. Maybe we see the UK buying up merchant vessels worldwide?


Bill
 

The Sandman

Banned
What about Germany adopting a Jeune Ecole strategy itself? It seems better suited to the reality of the Gerrman strategic and geographical situation. Kaiser Bill gets a handful of large ships to play with, built for extreme range and ruggedness due to the small number of available ports the Germans had off of the Continent. Perhaps also build those ships as oil-fired, and with as many other bits of modern gadgetry as possible; partly because with a relatively small number of ships necessary (figure one for East African station, one for West African station, one or two in the Pacific, and two or three for home waters to act as flagships for the HSF) you can take a bit more time and effort on each individual ship, and partly to help distract Bill with the added bling.

Submarines show up as a natural development of the Jeune Ecole strategy, especially if you use Jukra and Bill Cameron's POD of the Russian submarines being used more successfully in the Russo-Japanese War. The Germans would probably plan on using them in the opening stages of the war, before they could deal with the RN, since it's much easier to sneak a ship past British patrols if it has the option of hiding underwater until said patrol leaves.

Given an extra decade or so of determined research into submarines, coupled with a previous decade or two of Jeune Ecole planning, the Germans might be able to get something vaguely like what the OP calls for.

Of course, since the Germans still probably wouldn't be planning for unrestricted submarine warfare, their subs might be a little odd by our standards. For example, extra internal space for either prize crews or cargo holds, depending on what they do with the merchant ships they capture. And more of an emphasis on deck guns than on torpedo tubes for the commerce raiders. The fleet escort submarines and minelayers will probably be better equipped for USW, as they will be operating in situations where torpedoing a ship from hiding isn't verboten at the beginning of the war. I would expect, however, that by 1916 (and possibly as early as mid-to-late 1915) the Germans will be deploying boats that combine the torpedo and underwater operation capabilities of the fleet boats with the size and range of the commerce raider subs.
 

Ian the Admin

Administrator
Donor
Which once AGAIN shows your inadequate reading and understanding of the subject at hand.

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This simply shows your highschool level grasp of the subject at hand.

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No kidding, Sherlock. Got anything new to say? (This doesn't contradict anything I've said so far, other than your another pathetic dig at me. Wow. Your insults are just about deep as your understanding of the subject.)

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Gee, your inadequate grasp of the period just keeps on showing. Ok, I'll spell it out for you (again), buddy.

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Gee, Sherlock, presumably, part of the epiphany would include using subs as commerce raiders...There's so many wrong above, I don't know where to begin.

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More of your highschool insults? My, you are so bright and predictable.

I don't know which is worse, your ridiculously insulting behavior or your complete lack of self-awareness. At any rate, insults like that are below the standards of behavior expected for this board. You're kicked for a week.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
The change to submarines would not be the only "Leap of Faith" required in 1910.

Prior to the outbreak of WW I, there were actual, Honest to God, RULES regarding the taking and/or sinking of merchant shipping. The REALLY strange part is that, well, everyone followed them and had for several centuries. Those who didn't were, prior to the beginning of the war, and the bloodbath/stalemate in the West that more or less stripped all the humanity out of the players, considered to be pirates and tended to wind up hanged by the neck until Dead. Dead. Dead.

http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Paris_Declaration_Respecting_Maritime_Law

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague08.asp

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague10.asp

The use of warships to randomly sink vessels of neutral powers, or even to sink merchant vessel of an enemy power on the high seas, outside of a declared blockade zone, would have been almost unthinkable for any naval officer before 1915. Actually, when applied to neutral shipping, it remains outside of the rules of warfare into the modern era. The U.S. in WW II used "unrestricted submarine warfare in a very restricted manner, limiting attacks to only Japanese flagged vessels. The use of true unrestricted submarine warfare has to this day, remarkably limited participation, with very few states having gained membership in that particular club.

To posit that the HSF abandon its surface force so it can roll into WW I with a large number of submarines to begin unrestricted submarine warfare requires a pair (if not a series) of interconnected unlikely events resulting in a negligible chance of "the stars aligning" in a way that allows the POD to occur.

To realistically change the chances of the POD making any sort of sense, you need to push the date of introduction of the Whitehead as a practical weapon system back to circa 1860 and then interject a major naval conflict that demonstrates the effectiveness of the weapon against major targets. IOTL this did not occur until the 1890's, and was not demonstrated against a major power until 1904. For that matter a semi-practical open water submarine wasn't available until 1905 or so, the early Holland boats being coastal boats at best, so a breakthrough in diesel propulsion would also been needed around 1870. Once you have that, of course, the other changes are so wide-spread that there is no way to determine what the world would look like in 1910.
 
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