WWI Trench warfare POD

This is something that has bothered me for years.

In 1864-1865 the ACW combatants went into trenches in Virginia. A guy called Emory Upton (widely considered one of the best military minds of his age) invented the Schwerpunkt/Stoßtruppen concept and put it successfully into operation and ideas and deeds were widely publicised.

Move to 1915, western front. The war has degenerated into trench warfare. How it is possible that nobody, absolutely nobody in german/austrian/french/british general staff didn't say "Wait a moment, I remember reading something about a technique they used in american civil war to deal with trenches... let me check the library..."?
 
This is something that has bothered me for years.

In 1864-1865 the ACW combatants went into trenches in Virginia. A guy called Emory Upton (widely considered one of the best military minds of his age) invented the Schwerpunkt/Stoßtruppen concept and put it successfully into operation and ideas and deeds were widely publicised.

Move to 1915, western front. The war has degenerated into trench warfare. How it is possible that nobody, absolutely nobody in german/austrian/french/british general staff didn't say "Wait a moment, I remember reading something about a technique they used in american civil war to deal with trenches... let me check the library..."?

Both the British and the Germans used Stormtroopers in WW1?
 
Move to 1915, western front. The war has degenerated into trench warfare. How it is possible that nobody, absolutely nobody in german/austrian/french/british general staff didn't say "Wait a moment, I remember reading something about a technique they used in american civil war to deal with trenches... let me check the library..."?
You may want to read up about the new weapons of the era, the ones called 'machine guns'.
 

Deleted member 1487

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stormtrooper
Yeah, different situation and already in 1914 all sides were working on tactics to counter trench warfare, with the Germans in 1915 setting up what would become their Stosstruppen units. The Russians had already worked up some tactics in the Russo-Japanese war to deal with trench warfare and used those in the East. Things though had to be refined to deal with the new situation that had developed alongside new technologies in the 50 years since the USCW. Not only that, but even by 1915 there was no real issue breaking in and seizing the first several lines of trenches during an offensive, it was the problem of achieving a breakthrough into the open fields beyond, which was not an issue of stormtroop assault techniques, but a full operational system of breaking trenches and exploiting into depth quickly. That really was never resolved in WW1, as attrition 'solved' the problem by 1918 as both sides had run out of reserves at some point and allowed for breakdowns in enemy fighting ability; it should be noted that during the most successful offensive period on the Western Front after trenches had settled in was the last 100 days of the war; during that period German lines were never truly broken, they were consistently able to fall back in order and continue to inflict casualties, ~700k in all, during that 100 days.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hundred_Days_Offensive
 
Stormstuper tactecs could not work in 1915-17

Explanation: the whole idea behind the concept is
- to have advanced weapons (for the time) so you need advanced weapons such as mortats and flamethrowers
- to neutralize the opponent (not to destroy it) so you need many batteries to hammer during a short time
- to infiltrate (so as to destroy the defensive capability.

Infiltration was working in 17-18 as both sided understood that a lightly manned front line was a good idea and that most troops were in all around defensive positions (you can see it as a thin line with strong knots). As long as you need to detroy the knots to advance, the defense is effective. The storstruppen were trained to avoid them and to infiltrate.

In 1915-17... the front was heavily manned and infiltration was going to be far less efficient. Same problem with artillery: you need enough of it to neutralize.

IMHO they knew about it but both sides failed to implement it.

You will notice that in 1918 the last German attack east of Reims failed miserably once allied commander understood the idea: he desiend a second line 2km back and most forces retreated there. Germans hammered the first line, infiltrated but got pounded in open ground and tried to infiltrate an intact line. Total failure. French took back the first line the day after.
 
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You also have to remember, besides machineguns (lethality of which is vastly overrated:rolleyes:), artillery & firecontrol has changed a lot since 1863. HE is vastly more deadly than black powder, & with hydraulic recoil mechanisms, rates of fire are up substantially. Add telephone control of batteries... The lethality compared to 1865 is up by more than 10:1. So, too, the damage to no-man's land is greater, thanks to HE--not to mention overuse of arty, which isn't as accurate or damaging to trenches as the generals (or artillerymen) think...:rolleyes:
 
Of curse they did, on both sides, and that was the problem. Artillery support, infantry tactics etc evolved quite rapidly, but on the other side of the hill, and in most cases in the western front, on top of the hill, was an oponent that was skilled, had resources about level with the attackers and evolved just as quickly.

As in any war, defending is easier than attacking, and the level of evolution in the tree years and a half that go from the race to the sea to the end of the war is extraordinary.

Any war between equally skilled professionals with balanced resources turns into attrition pretty quicky.
 

Deleted member 1487

Of curse they did, on both sides, and that was the problem. Artillery support, infantry tactics etc evolved quite rapidly, but on the other side of the hill, and in most cases in the western front, on top of the hill, was an oponent that was skilled, had resources about level with the attackers and evolved just as quickly.

As in any war, defending is easier than attacking, and the level of evolution in the tree years and a half that go from the race to the sea to the end of the war is extraordinary.

Any war between equally skilled professionals with balanced resources turns into attrition pretty quicky.

I don't know if it holds that defending was easier than attacking, especially as the attacker had a lot of advantages in terms of achieving the break in. The problem was the operational/strategic breakthrough and bringing up reserves; at least initially the attacker had the benefit of being able to mass artillery and reserves at a decisive spot and was nearly always able to achieve a break in with notable exceptions (Nivelle offensive). At Verdun being on the attack was found to be cheaper than defending, provided you could keep up with expenditures of men and material; the Somme finally killed the Verdun offensive, not losses at Verdun.
 
I don't know if it holds that defending was easier than attacking, especially as the attacker had a lot of advantages in terms of achieving the break in. The problem was the operational/strategic breakthrough and bringing up reserves; at least initially the attacker had the benefit of being able to mass artillery and reserves at a decisive spot and was nearly always able to achieve a break in with notable exceptions (Nivelle offensive). At Verdun being on the attack was found to be cheaper than defending, provided you could keep up with expenditures of men and material; the Somme finally killed the Verdun offensive, not losses at Verdun.

Verdun was an attrition operation designed to inflict defensive casualties. If we're talking about limited attacks (limited in their territorial objectives, large operations by any other criteria) an offensive could be planned to be more costly for the defenders, and that's what the allies learned to do by the end of the war.
Breaking through well organised positions was the expensive preposition.

Breaching the first line doesn't count as a breakthrough. Actual breakthroughs, when the attacker could actually launch the exploitation phase of the offensive, where rare in WW1 and almost non existent in the western front.

Reversing the natural advantages of the defender was something that took time to learn, and it was only by renouncing any attempt at decisive breakthroughs that the allies were able to achive it consistently. And by then they had significant advantages in equipment (tanks being the most visible factor) and supplies.

The rule of thumb in planning is that you can defend against a force as much as three times bigger (in terms of combat potential) with a fiat chance if success if you are able to retain the defenders advantages of choosing the ground, preparation, etc.
 
Thanks a lot to all posters, I completely understood the situation. Without Tanks, AFVs and an enemy who does not keep his cool and runs away these piercings go (bad pun intended) nowhere.
 
Just an asside, if one of the beligerents had used Emory Upton's methods in 1914 agaist the very first trench systems, would the battle field have stabalised and become static so quickly?
 
Just an asside, if one of the beligerents had used Emory Upton's methods in 1914 agaist the very first trench systems, would the battle field have stabalised and become static so quickly?
Just to clarify, we're talking about:
Wiki said:
Upton devised a tactic wherein columns of massed infantry would swiftly assault a small part of the enemy line, without pausing to trade fire, and in doing so attempt to overwhelm the defenders and achieve a breakthrough.

Ultimately, that's looking back to Napoleonic columns as much as forward to infiltration tactics, probably more so IMHO. As such, I think they'd get slaughtered.
Troops in the open like that are a dream target for artillery (they can just concentrate on the one area rather than across the front), and similarly for riflemen and machine gunnners - normally you just have to try and create a beaten zone through which it's very dangerous to pass simply because few riflemen of the time had the skill to hit a moving man-sized target at a distance while under fire, so simply fired into an area. With a column of troops, that target gets much bigger so just about every bullet will hit home.

In fact, it looks to me like this exact method was tried in 1914, with the Germans making their first attacks at the Battle of Mons in column formation. They were knocked back with heavy losses, despite having huge numerical superiority (4 German battalions against 1 British company with an attached machine gun section), while a later attack in open order brushed that company aside and needed much larger British forces to hold. That's the result without any defending artillery, just small arms and a few machine guns.
 
Actually, wasn't Emory Upton's attack defeated? Though, if IIRC, that was because it was directed at the point of a salient; the Confederates eventually gave up the point but simply put another line across the base of the Mule Shoe. Might have worked if directed at a straight-line defense; still, the Union didn't apply it successfully after that during the siege of Richmond, either
 
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