WWI: Global War

Eurofed

Banned
This scenario was born out of the combination of various ideas: to make a WWI-like situation where war does spread to every continent and pretty much every great and middle power of note; to create a scenario broadly similar to the USAO TL but a variant where the Union loses the ACW and a TL-191-like US/CSA division is created; and to reverse the alleged OTL political divide between the alliance blocs by making the *Alliance mostly liberal-democratic and the *Entente mostly conservative-authoritarian (of course, things were, and are, much more nuanced than that).

Its purpose is to develop an interesting strategic situation and not to obsess about what may or may not be the 'most probable' (as if) outcome of the various main divergencies used. It is acknowledged that certain butterflies may have been purposefully chosen for the sake of getting the desired outcome or keeping certain things familiar.
 

Eurofed

Banned
At the end of the 19th century, the world is swept by the Global War, the first world war of the Industrial Age and the most extensive conflict history has ever seen. Pretty much every power of note gets involved in it, with the exception of those nations too embroiled in their domestic conflicts and/or too messed up by colonial encroachment to take any meaningful foreign policy action.

Its essential character is a series of imperialistic rivalries between the various great powers being given critical mass at once by the international polarization due to an interlocking bipolar alliance system. Political propaganda of one side often pictures it as an ideological fight between a liberal bloc and a conservative bloc; it might also be alternatively described as a clash between emergent and long-standing great powers. Both descriptions hold some truth, but fail to give a fully accurate picture of the situation.

The League:

- The USA

Since its beginning from the successful rebellion of the 15 Colonies (including Quebec and Nova Scotia) in the ARW, the young Republic reaped a remarkable series of successes for a good while, including the creation of a stable and working federal liberal democracy, a series of victorious wars with Britain, Spain, and Mexico that gave it control of the North American mainland from the Arctic Circle to the Tropic of Cancer plus Cuba and Puerto Rico, massive industrialization and settler colonization of North America, development of multicultural coexistence between Protestant English-speakers and Catholic Romance-speakers, and the establishment of ever-closer political and economic links with Gran Colombia – starting with US intervention to support its revolution - that eventually allowed a peaceful political union.

The lucky series was however broken in a major way when the growing sectional contrasts between free and slaveholding states precipitated the American Civil War, and the intervention of Britain and France - which exploited this unique opportunity to cut down the growing might of America - ensured the victory of the Confederates. At the peace table, the USA was however able to keep the “border states” (including the unionist areas of W Virginia and E Tennessee), the California’s, and the Colombian states, even if it was forced to cede the territories of the Southwest and North Mexico.

Subsequently, however, the USA was able to make a remarkable comeback thanks to its ongoing strong industrialization and vast resources, growing back to be one of the top-class great powers. The bitter experience of the defeat prompted the US to abandon its traditional isolationist foreign policy, eventually joining an alliance with the liberal bloc of the Central Powers – a friendship whose groundwork was laid with the German, Italian, Hungarian, and Polish volunteers that fought on the side of the Union. It also built a very strong military in the expectation of a rematch with the hated Confederate traitors and Anglo-French backstabbers. Other effects included a sizable swing of the US political spectrum leftward, to become one of the most liberal-progressive nations in the world, as showed by the fact they have granted suffrage to women much earlier than anyone else.

- Germany

Its tumultuous but eventually successful unification as a federal union in the liberal-national revolutionary wave of the 1840s and the collapse of the Habsburg empire laid the groundwork for its subsequent stabilization as a liberal constitutional monarchy and its impressive industrialization. The latter, despite the inevitable social problems that it caused, has established it as one of the strongest great powers in the world, the equal of Britain and the USA. The French invasion of the Low Countries during the Western War subsequently created the political conditions, through a Pan-Germanic mood swing in the Dutch public opinion, for the union between Germany and the Netherlands, with the latter getting a special autonomy statute. The establishment of a sizable colonial empire rounded up the rise of Germany to great power status.

- Italy

In most regards, its history makes a remarkably close analogue to the parallel case of its ally Germany, including its successful rise from the chaos of the 1840s revolutions and the collapse of the Habsburg, its successful struggle to evolve into a stable federal liberal constitutional monarchy, the jumpstart of a strong industrialization that allowed it to heal most of its previous social problems (however replaced by the inevitable social issues related to industrial development) and to grow into a true great power in its own right, the full equal of its traditional rival France. Its successful participation in the Western War against France and the involvement in the Balkan War against Turkey gained it several colonies in North Africa and protectorates in the Western Balkans. This was later rounded up to the development of a sizable colonial empire in the Horn of Africa and Indochina.

- The Danube Union (AKA ‘Hungary and its friends’)

Often hailed as a “political miracle” and the most astonishing fruit of the 1840s revolutions, the rise of the Eastern European federation dominated by Hungary can in all likelihood be deemed a result of several factors in combination: the Habsburg monarchy coming to rule all of Hungary, Croatia, and northern Serbia since the 18th century; many Croats and Serbs opportunistically siding with the Habsburg cause but getting defeated by Magyar, Italian, and German revolutionaries, allowing Hungary to keep control of South Slav lands; involvement of Hungary and its CP allies in the Eastern War and the Balkan war awarding Budapest control of Bosnia, southern Serbia, and Moldavia-Wallachia; the willingness of Hungarian, Serb, and Romanian national liberals to make some compromises in order to protect themselves from reactionary Russia and Turkey.

Under the prodding of Berlin and Rome, an uneasy compromise was reached between the four major constituent nationalities (Magyars, Croats, Serbs, and Romanians) that bound them in a federation and traded continuance of Hungary’s control on its traditional lands of the Kingdom of St. Stephen with federal autonomy for the other three nationalities in their own traditional lands and cultural autonomy for the Romanians and Serbs under Magyar rule. It has been far from a fully stable solution - the recurrent power plays and bickering between the various nationalities of the DU (such as the squabbles between Hungary and Romania over Transylvania, and between Croatia and Serbia over Bosnia, which was made a territory under direct federal rule as a compromise) have become a stereotype, but so far they have consistently remained below the critical point of a constitutional crisis, despite the near-constant need for a certain degree of careful political balancing.

- Scandinavia

The third major nation-state to be born from the 1840s revolutionary wave, the roots of its birth lie in the Schleswig-Holstein War, as the victory of Germany against the Danish-Swedish alliance prompted a liberal revolution in Denmark and the unification of Scandinavia into a federal liberal constitutional monarchy. Despite the inevitable initial bad blood caused by this war, the compromise that returned Northern Schleswig to the Nordics and the participation of Scandinavia in the Eastern War, which won it Finland, favoured the reconciliation of Scandinavia with Germany and its integration in the CP alliance system. The creation of a federal system between the member states of Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, and the growth of a common Nordic identity seems to have provided sufficient political stability to the Nordic union.

- Poland

Its rebirth from the ashes of the 18th century partition was another major consequence of the 1840s revolution and the Eastern War. The rebellions of the Poles, Finns, and Romanians during the revolutionary period, albeit defeated, tied down the Russian forces during the critical period that was necessary for the revolution to triumph in Germany, Italy, and the Habsburg empire. Their sacrifice was rewarded first with the creation of a Polish state in Posen and Galicia, then by the CP victory in the Eastern War that allowed the liberation of Congress Poland, Finland, and Moldavia-Wallachia from Russian yoke, and the reunification and independence of the bulk of the Polish nation. Since then, reborn Poland has grown into a sufficiently stable state, despite recurrent tensions between the Poles and the Jew and Ukrainian minorities, as well as the enmity with Russia fuelled by Polish irredentist ambitions over its former eastern territories.

- Spain

The 19th century was for Spain the culmination of a long period of national stagnation and decline that started two centuries before; the only saving grace was the suppression of the rebellions in Portugal and Catalonia during the 17th century that allowed to keep them as integral, if sometimes unruly, components of the Spanish nation-state. Such decline continued with the French invasion, the collapse of the Spanish colonial empire in the Americas, a crippling series of civil wars between liberals and conservatives - which past a point also became a proxy conflict between France and Germany-Italy -, and a bankruptcy that forced Spain to cede Angola and Mozambique to Germany and Britain – acting in a rare moment of cooperation (that also was the occasion for the land-swap that traded Tanganyika – of strategic interest to Britain for its Cape to Cairo railroad project – for Northern Rhodesia and Ghana). Spain only kept the Philippines because the USA vetoed their seizure, fearing their acquisition by Britain. In recent times, the takeover by the liberals made Spain grow closer to the US-CP bloc, whose influence has allowed a significant amount of industrialization and hopefully some more political stability. Such economic and political ties, as well the Spaniards’ desire to regain Gibraltar and a colonial empire in Africa by seizing some French possessions, have motivated Spain to side with the League in the present conflict.

- Japan

In many ways the poster child for successful modernization of a non-European polity, the Japanese Empire spent the last part of the 19th century evolving from a backward feudal state to a modern up-and-coming power that successfully adopted European ways and fused them with its own cultural values. Politically its authoritarian political system makes it akin to the Entente powers and the odd man in the League, and lingering racist prejudice still causes Japan to be underestimated by friends and enemies alike. In the recent decades, however, the Japanese thoroughly modernized their society according to the European model, jumpstarted their industrialization, and exploited the great powers’ intervention in China to annex Korea, Taiwan, and Sakhalin. Growing tensions between Russia and Japan about their respective control of Manchuria and Korea motivated Tokyo to grow closer to the USA and the CP and join the conflict on the side of the League.

- Peru

The tumultuous and instable political course of the Peruvian state has its roots in the chaos of the independence struggle of South America, its long-standing social problems, and its uneasy geopolitical situation. Peru neither was conquered by the British Empire like the Southern Cone, nor became a regional power in its own right like Brazil, nor was absorbed by the USA like Gran Colombia. It ended up becoming an uneasy buffer state and a prize in the continental rivalry between those powers, which exploited its political instability and domestic conflicts to try and affirm their own influence, with the liberals often seeking US support and the conservatives often siding with Britain and Brazil. In recent years, the liberals have gained the upper hand (the example of the prosperity and freedom the Colombians have enjoyed under US rule probably played a role) and made Peru become aligned with, and effectively a client state of, the USA. When the Global War started, such alliance ties and the Brazilian invasion soon dragged Peru in the conflict.

- Bulgaria and Greece

Both of those states were (re)born and acquired their current borders in the 19th century out of the decline and collapse of Ottoman hegemony in the Balkans, due to the long-standing decline of the “sick man of Europe”, the Balkan nationalities’ struggle to cast off the Turkish yoke, and the other great powers’ interventions in the process, which in various ways involved the Greek War of Independence, the Eastern War, and the Balkan War. Since their birth, both Bulgaria and Greece have been plagued by serious political instability and often embroiled in clashes with each other and their former Ottoman masters, and were contested as clients between various great powers - for Bulgaria, between Russia and Germany, and for Greece, between Britain and Italy. As a result of these factors, Bulgaria and Greece initially picked neutrality in the Global War, but the Turkish attempt to exploit the situation and recover various territories lost to them (such as Thrace and Cyprus) started an event sequence that soon dragged both sides in the conflict, with Turkey on the side of the Entente and the Balkan states joining the League. Greece did so more or less wholeheartedly, Bulgaria with considerable reluctance and lack of reliability as it concerns fighting Russia.
 

Eurofed

Banned
The Entente

- Britain

After having been the top great power for the better part of the 19th century, thanks to its pioneer role in global industrialization, in recent decades Britain has witnessed a growing challenge to its supremacy due to the ascent of other major players such as the USA, Germany, and Russia. A first serious setback had been suffered when the American Revolution caused the collapse of the First British Empire in North America (and its transformation in a future rival), prompting London to seek a compensation with the conquest of the Spanish colonies in the Southern Cone and of the Dutch colonies in Southern Africa. Besides them, Britain rebuilt an empire, and eventually made it the largest on Earth, with entrenchment of its exclusive control on India and the colonization of sizable chunks of South East Asia and of Africa, notwithstanding the serious competition of the other great powers in the latter two areas and of Russia in Central Asia. For a long time the prototype of a constitutional monarchy, the success of its political system and imperial rule has been marred by its frequent failure to timely modernize both. This has been a recurring problem, as shown by the American Revolution, the mid-century civil disorder in Britain, and the great rebellions in Ireland and India.

In the domestic sphere, such events resulted in the eventual development of a political system that shares many features with the liberal constitutional monarchies of Middle Europe, although somewhat more conservative and class-based. In many ways, this makes the British Empire the “odd man” in an alliance bloc otherwise made up of authoritarian and slave-holding empires. In the colonial sphere, there was a long-standing reluctance to award autonomy to the settler colonies of South America, Southern Africa, and Oceania, which bred considerable resentment; eventually this resulted was reached with the creation of the Dominions of La Plata, South Africa, and Australia. Those federations of settler colonies have been endowed with a limited amount of self-rule, an uneasy compromise that although deeply unsatisfactory to many colonists, has somewhat lessened - but certainly not abolished - malcontent in the settler colonies.

Not even such a compromise has so far being possible to remedy the festering problem of Ireland, which remains seething with anti-British resentment after the brutal repression of the Fenian Rising. In India, the quashing of the Great Rebellion was followed by an attempt to stamp out pre-colonial social structures – seen as one of the main causes of the uprising, including transition to direct rule of the British government over the vast majority of the subcontinent and renewed efforts to modernize Indian society in the European model. Such policies however had the unforeseen side effect of accelerating the rise of Europeanized elites that gradually embraced nationalism and started to make calls for self-rule, so far left unheeded.

In the foreign policy field, Britain was increasingly faced with the challenges to its hegemony caused by the rise of the ‘new’ great powers of the USA, Germany, and Italy, the growing power and ambition of Russia, and the traditional rivalry with France. It tried to address them in various ways, including the intervention in the American Civil War, which slowed the rise of the USA and gave it a regional rival in the CSA, but could not stop it for long, and made the Yankees a bitter enemy of the British Empire. France, being threatened with similar problems of relative decline in a more serious way, shifted from long-standing rival to ally, despite political differences. Forced to make a choice between Russia and the Central Powers, London picked an alliance with the Russian Empire, despite the imperialistic rivalry in Asia, deeming it the overall lesser threat.

- France

Another long-standing great power, its 19th century political course was marked by serious political instability and a stubborn struggle to resist the relative decline of French power in Europe and the world. This caused various political convulsions and regime changes before and after the revolutionary wave of the 1840s, and a shift in foreign policy alignment, from alliance with the liberal bloc in the Eastern War to intervention in the ACW to prop up the Confederacy, to suspicion and resentment towards Germany and Italy about their growing power in Europe which eventually ensued in the Western War. The shock of defeat scarred France, prodding it to embrace, after more political instability, an authoritarian radical-right police-state regime backed by reactionary counterrevolutionaries, militarist-populist revanchists, and a bloc of the conservative Catholic Church, officer corps, wealthy farmers, and business interests. Authoritarian France focused on rebuilding national power and prestige, a purpose that sustained the development of the second French colonial empire in Africa and South East Asia, and on the establishment of the Entente alliance system as a preparation for the long-awaited rematch with the hated Central Powers. For a while, this power base and platform provided the regime sufficient political capital to keep running despite some growing pressure for liberalization and social reform. Now the time has come fro the regime to make its rhetoric come true on the battlefield or die trying.

- Russia

After centuries spent in the unquestionably successful effort to build up its empire in Eastern Europe and Asia, Russia had its domestic backwardness called due when the success of the 1840s revolutionary wave left it largely isolated in Europe – an outcome it was unable to prevent due to the spread of rebellions to several areas within its borders and sphere of influence, such as Poland, Finland, and Moldavia-Wallachia, and the need to quell them. Its isolation and the political antagonism with the liberal bloc created by the revolution in turn bred the Eastern War and its humiliating outcome, which caused the loss of Poland, Finland, and hegemony over Romania.

This pushed the reform-minded sector of the Russian elites to seek their own path to modernization of the Motherland, which resulted in various important reforms – including abolition of serfdom, concession of a constitution, and a reform package to modernize the state and the economy, which jumpstarted the industrialization of Russia. This transformed the political system in a hybrid that combined some significant liberal features and an elected parliament with the survival of a fundamental authoritarian imprint – the ‘Asian way’ to development, also followed in Japan and Turkey, which combines the modernization of the state, society, and economy according to Western-Central European models with the maintenance of conservative cultural values and a largely authoritarian political system.

In the foreign policy field, Russia largely focused on the successful development of its Asiatic empire, including the conquest of large swaths of Central Asia, and culminating with its participation in the great powers’ intervention in China. The latter allowed Russia to wrest East Turkestan, Mongolia, and Manchuria from Chinese control and set-up them as a ring of Russian client states. The Balkan War gave Russia an opportunity to regain some influence in the area with the end of Ottoman hegemony and the creation of Bulgaria; the consequences of the Western War turned France into an eager and politically-akin partner; and the rising might of the Central Powers and the USA eventually persuaded Britain to make an alliance, despite the ‘Great Game’ rivalry in Asia.

The reforms have started the industrialization and modernization of the Russian Empire in earnest, somewhat ameliorating, but certainly not abolishing, the traditional backwardness and social problems of Russia. It remains to be seen how much the authoritarian modernization path that Russia has picked can also indirectly succeed at dampening the demand for political liberalization and lessening of social inequalities, an issue crucial for the long-term perspectives of the Tsarist regime. Of course, with the global conflict, much of its fortunes are now at stake on the battlefield. Besides political and social tensions, another significant domestic problem is the unrest of certain national minorities, especially the Baltic peoples and the ethnic Poles and Romanians still under Russian rule, whose nationalism the Central Powers generously support.

- Ottoman Empire

Turkey was another long-standing great power that experienced the better part of the 19th century as the culmination of a long period of national stagnation and decline that started two centuries before and earned the Ottoman Empire the infamous label of "sick man of Europe". The hallmark of such decline was the disastrous Balkan War, when a series of rebellions of subject nationalities in the Balkans erupted and drove the Central Powers and Russia to intervene in a rare moment of opportunistic if uneasy cooperation. Turkey lost all its territory in Europe besides Constantinople and a narrow stripe in Eastern Thrace, various Armenian and Georgian territories in the Caucasus (to Russia), Libya (to Italy), Cyprus, Crete, and the Aegean islands (to Greece) in the Mediterranean. British pressure ensured the Ottomans at least kept sovereignty on the Straits, but Ottoman rule in the Balkans was completely dismantled. The region was partitioned between the Danube Union (Bosnia, southern Serbia), Bulgaria (Vardar Macedonia, Bulgaria proper, Thrace), Greece (Epirus, Thessaly, Aegean Macedonia), and the Italian protectorates of Montenegro and Albania.

The trauma of defeat drove the Ottoman Empire to engage on a reform course to prevent its dissolution from nationalist unrest and foreign aggression. A modernist ruling clique of reform-minded sultans and prominent reformers who were European educated bureaucrats and officers, backed by a coalition of reform-minded pluralists, Turkish nationalists, and Western-oriented secularists, took over an d enacted an extensive course of reformation to modernize the Ottoman state and society. Changes included reorganization of the army and of the finance and tax system on the European model; educational, institutional and legal reforms; various measures to promote full legal equality for citizens of all religions and ethnicities; and systematic attempts at eliminating corruption and promote industrial and commercial development. To a large degree, those reforms followed the model of the similar Russian policy course that combined a systematic effort to modernize the Ottoman Empire on the Western model while keeping their own cultural values and political system. In this case, the official ideology became "Ottomanism", which was meant to unite all of the different peoples living in Ottoman territories. For this purpose, Islamic law was put aside in favor of secular law. In the political field, the new course included the creation of a constitutional monarchy system, with an elected parliament, even if its fundamental character remained authoritarian and the bulk of power remained in the hands of the monarchy and the bureaucratic-military ruling elites.

In the foreign policy field, the Ottoman Empire followed a cautious course for a good while, trying to balance the influences of the various great powers and prevent further threats to its integrity. As the reforms took root and remedied the most damning weaknesses of the empire, voices began to be raised for a more ambitious policy, that could return to the Ottoman Empire at least some of the power that had been lost during its period of decline. Those expansionists were however divided about the best potential target for an Ottoman comeback, and as a result about the most preferable alliance option. Therefore, the Porte did not commit to any alliance bloc, often wavering between the CP, Britain and France, and, against expectations, even Russia. As a result, when the Global War started, Turkey remained neutral for a while, and soon the plan took form in its ruling elite to exploit the distraction of the great powers and attack Bulgaria and Greece to seize back Thrace and Cyprus. Unfortunately for Constantinople, the Turkish attack drove the Balkan states to seek the protection of the League, which was sympathetic to their pleas, and eager to exploit the situation to try and seize control of the Straits. The resulting event chain brought the Ottoman Empire fully into the conflict and forced it to align with the Entente.
 

Eurofed

Banned
- The CSA

Since its birth in the fires of the American Civil War, the CSA has been shaped and ruled with an iron first by its planter elites to be a state of slavers, by slavers, for slavers; the trappings of a democratic federal system quite similar to the US one barely conceal the reality of a harsh hierarchical race and class system that keeps the bulk of the Black population in chattel slavery while it oppresses poor whites and Hispanic peons. The Confederacy has been exposed in its history to various potential threats, including particularistic fragmentation, rebellions from exploited classes and ethnicities, and tensions between conservative and reformist segments of the ruling elites. To a large degree, the constant threat from a vengeful USA has acted as an effective cohesion element to dampen ever-recurrent particularistic tensions between the Confederate states below the critical point of a constitutional crisis.

In the socio-economic field, tensions between the conservative advocates of the traditional planter economy and chattel slavery and the reformist supporters of industrialization and manumission has been so far settled with a compromise that made manumission easier and made some effort at supporting industrialization. Chattel slavery has been however kept and upheld despite growing international hostility to the system and calls for its abolition; freed Blacks are still subject to severe legal and social discrimination, much like the masses of Indian peons. On the other hand, the Confederacy has integrated the Hispanic landowning elites in its own quite effectively, due to the lack of prejudice towards Catholics and Spanish-speakers, an heritage of multicultural US culture. This has effectively nullified the threat of Hispanic nationalist separatism, even if racial, ethnic, and class tensions remain another issue entirely. Such tensions, and possible rebellions from Black slaves, Indian peons, and to a lesser degree poor Whites, remain a constant threat and a major concern for the Confederate elites, even more so since the USA do their best to support them from across the militarized border.

The CSA has accomplished a mediocre amount of industrialization, nothing remotely comparable to the powerhouses of the USA, Britain, Germany, France, and Italy; in the economic field, it largely remains a client of Britain and France. At the peace table, it won the territories of the Southwest and Northern Mexico, which it has since Americanized fairly effectively, due to the relatively scarce original population, despite the persistence of a partial Hispanic cultural imprint (much like Cuba and Puerto Rico). The Confederacy also annexed Southern Mexico (Tampico, Yucatan, and Chiapas) and most of Central America (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador) by various acts of filibustering, intimidation, and bribery of local elites, even if those areas keep a more definite Hispanic character.

Annexation of densely populated Central Mexico, due to the staunch resistance of the locals to reintroduction of slavery, proved to be a bridge too far; therefore Mexico remained an unruly client state initially of France, later of the CSA after the Western War. It has been plagued by severe political instability, pro-US liberals often clashing with pro-CSA conservatives. At the start of the Global War, Mexico technically joined the Entente, but the conflict gave the liberals, long on the losing side due to Confederate influence, a golden occasion to try a takeover with generous US support, and the country soon collapsed into civil war. The expansionism of Confederate filibusters in Central America scared Costa Rica and Hispaniola into joining the USA. Both the USA and the CSA has since gone to have their own inter-oceanic canals, the USA in Panama, the CSA in Nicaragua - the latter was actually built and is managed by Anglo-French capital.

- Brazil

After its birth in the collapse of the Spanish colonial empire, Brazil has evolved in the last half-century to become a fairly close Catholic, Romance-speaking copy of the CSA, entrenched to defend its chattel slavery system, despite growing international hostility and calls for its abolition. This was due to the influence of tight political ties with the “sister nation” of the Confederacy, and international polarization between liberal and conservative states. Again much like the CSA, this ensued in a mediocre amount of industrialization, an increasingly harsh and repressive race- and class-based socio-political system at home, and serious border tensions with the abolitionist USA. In such conditions, participation in the Global War as a member of the Entente was a fairly easy outcome for Brazil.

- Belgium

Created by the great powers and sponsored by Britain to be a buffer state between France and Germany, this unlucky artificial state has long since exhausted its fragile national identity as Catholicism gradually lost appeal as a unifying force and its constituent nationalities became alienated. The French invasion of the Low Countries during the Western War was a first severe hit to its political stability, even if Britain then ensured its survival by trading its neutrality in the conflict with guarantees for its integrity from both sides. A further blow to its prestige was the Congo issue: the colonization of most of the Congo river basin by a private company controlled by Belgian interests was carried out in such extremely brutal mistreatment of the local peoples and plunder of natural resources to become a major international scandal even for the jaded racist sensibilities of 19th century Europe. The scandal, and the failure of Belgium to annex the colony due to financial problems, led to the partition of Congo between France, Britain, and Germany. The growing polarization between the two alliance blocs was mirrored within Belgium by nationalist hostility between pro-German Flemish and pro-French Walloons. Belgium degenerated to become an instable police state ruled by Walloon elites and barely kept together by Anglo-French support. At the start of the Global War, it nominally joined the Entente, but the conflict unleashed a civil war between the Flemish and the Walloon communities.

Neutrals

- China

Once-proud Imperial China has spent the 19th century mired in increasingly severe decline under the combined pressure of its own backwardness, foreign aggression, and domestic unrest. Such factors caused the rise of a xenophobic movement that waged a series of attacks against foreign nationals and drove the great powers - an impromptu alliance of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the USA, Russia, the Danube Union, Spain, the CSA, Japan, and Brazil, joined in a rare moment of cooperation - to a military intervention to quash it. This in turn moved the Imperial government to declare war to the Eleven-Power Alliance. The resulting all-out conflict utterly crushed China and resulted in a most harsh peace. East Turkestan/Xinjiang, Tibet, Mongolia, and Manchuria were formally detached from China and set up as independent states and clients of Britain (Tibet) or Russia (the rest); Japan annexed Korea, Taiwan, and Sakhalin; China was forced to pay an exorbitant reparations bill and lost effective sovereignty over many of its coastal and southern provinces, that became "concessions" under de facto control of various great powers (Britain, France, Germany, Italy). The humiliating defeat has been the nail in the coffin for the Qing dynasty; China collapsed into revolution and has since inched ever closer to fragmentation into warlord chaos, being far too weak to take an active role in the Global War.

- Persia

Much like China, at the beginning of the Global War Persia was too weak and divided to take an active role in it, being mostly split between Russian and British spheres of influence and torn by civil unrest between constitutionalists and backers of the Shah.

- Switzerland

Apart from the wavering diplomatic standing of Bulgaria, Greece, and the Ottoman Empire in the alliances game, Switzerland was the last truly neutral state in Europe on the eve of the Global War; its stance had as much to do with diplomatic tradition and geopolitical constraints as with the effects of the domestic political situation. Switzerland had entered the 19th century as a loose confederation of the various cantons, with a constitution that soon proved to be increasingly dysfunctional for the needs of a society undergoing industrialization. Clashes among and within the various cantons between liberals and conservatives repeatedly happened and erupted in a civil war during the 1840s revolutionary wave. The Swiss Civil War saw a victory of the conservatives, which stalemated efforts at reform for years. Subsequently, the evolving international situation, with France and Germany-Italy shifting from friendship to rivalry, imposed added external restraints. All three powers started to harbor expansionistic ambitions on Switzerland; although they could not agree enough to establish a working partition, their influence was enough to derail the emergence of a strong Swiss state. The Swiss constitution was eventually amended to provide several liberal reforms, but any reform to functional federalism was stalemated by the influence of the great powers, and the cantons kept their dysfunctional loose confederal bond.

Over the following decades, this made lasting damage to the development of a Swiss national consciousness, which was increasingly supplanted by competing German, Italian, and French identities. During the Western War, Swiss identity temporarily flared up due to the fear of invasion and becoming a battleground - a concern only heightened when France invaded the Low Countries-, and it manifested in the form of strong commitment to Swiss neutrality. After the war, the geopolitical status quo locked back into place, and Switzerland resumed its devolution process into a loosely-knit confederal constellation of microstates increasingly kept apart by rival French and German-Italian nationalisms and foreign influences. Much like Belgium, Switzerland became a dysfunctional buffer state with a weak national cohesion propped up by external geopolitical constraints; growing polarization of Europe into rival alliance blocs prevented its partition, due to its strategic value. Unlike Belgium, the relationship between the various nationalities remained civil in peacetime, since all communities could agree on a neutral foreign policy as a compromise. When the conflict started, Switzerland eagerly clung to neutrality, in the hope it could avoid becoming a battleground.
 
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Eurofed

Banned
The world at the beginning of the Global War.


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OK, I'm confused here.

1) The 19th Century USA absent the Confederacy will have no interest in getting involved in European alliances and intrigues. It will be focused on a more commercial/indirect system and keeping much of its military power garrisoning the long border with the Confederacy, and incapable short of a Pearl Harbor-style incident of raising a larger army than what it would have for the purpose of those garrisons.

2) How does Germany unify and why does the collapse of the Habsburg state lead to a Germany anywhere near as obsessed with a huge army as the Prussia on steroids that happened IOTL?

3) How the Hell does Russia do what you have it do ITTL when it was incapable and unwilling to do this even under Alexander II, the last reformist Tsar of any sort, IOTL? For that matter, how and why does Poland manage to break away from Russia ITTL and why does Poland want to ally with the Germany of TTL?
 

Eurofed

Banned
The alliance blocs at the beginning of the Global War:

Orange = League
Green = Entente
Blue = in a state of civil war/disorder, factions aligned to the alliances
Red = in a state of civil war/disorder, factions unaligned to the alliances
White = neutral


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OK, no. This is never going to happen:


The CSA has accomplished a significant amount of industrialization, but nothing remotely comparable to the powerhouses of the USA, Britain, Germany, France, and Italy; in the economic field, it largely remains a client of Britain and France. At the peace table, it won the territories of the Southwest and Northern Mexico, which it has since Americanized fairly effectively, due to the relatively scarce original population, despite the persistence of a partial Hispanic cultural imprint (much like Cuba and Puerto Rico). The Confederacy also annexed Southern Mexico (Tampico, Yucatan, and Chiapas) and most of Central America (Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador) by various acts of filibustering, intimidation, and bribery of local elites, even if those areas keep a more definite Hispanic character.
1) The CSA doesn't have the capital to do any of this. It would see its industrial sectors expanding somewhat but they'd be in a situation equivalent to merchants in China. CS national ideology is not going to favor industrialism much, if at all.

2) LOL, what? The Southwest is a no-go, it utterly failed there IOTL. Northern Mexico? How the Hell does it get that? Magic fairy dust?

3) Hahahahaha, the CSA wouldn't have anyone with a lick of sense try to actually settle or Americanize that area. At the very most assuming the immense number of improbabilities here happen you get some slaveowners using slaves in the mines and that's that. What happens to the Apaches and Navajo ITTL?

4) OK, this is just plain ridiculous. Yucatan all by itself is the kind of poison pill that would destroy the Confederacy.
 

Eurofed

Banned
1) The 19th Century USA absent the Confederacy will have no interest in getting involved in European alliances and intrigues.

So ? There is a CSA (born out of European intervention in the ACW) ITTL.

It will be focused on a more commercial/indirect system and keeping much of its military power garrisoning the long border with the Confederacy, and incapable short of a Pearl Harbor-style incident of raising a larger army than what it would have for the purpose of those garrisons.

To lose a vast chunk of one's nation to Anglo-French backstabbing does change some things in the Yankee mindset re the usefulness of a strong standing military and having powerful allies in Europe. Nonetheless, even so, the bulk of the US military power is indeed earmarked to a) fight on the long land border with the Confederacy b) defend the Colombian states and protect the communications between them and the North c) prevent the Entente from achieving naval superiority in the Atlantic and the Caribbean.

2) How does Germany unify and why does the collapse of the Habsburg state lead to a Germany anywhere near as obsessed with a huge army as the Prussia on steroids that happened IOTL?

Obviously, there is a successful *1848 revolution. They become much more liberal than OTL, but liberal does not mean pacifist (ask the British).

3) How the Hell does Russia do what you have it do ITTL when it was incapable and unwilling to do this even under Alexander II, the last reformist Tsar of any sort, IOTL?

They suffer a worse defeat than OTL in the Eastern War, the broad equivalent of the Crimean War, which costs them Poland and Finland. This provides added motivation to undergo a Meji-like path to modernization (same happens to Turkey under the similar circumstances of the Balkan War, which is the broad equivalent of the Russo-Turkish War, the Italo-Turkish War, and the 1st Balkan War rolled into one).

For that matter, how and why does Poland manage to break away from Russia ITTL

Freed by the victorous liberal powers in the Eastern War.

and why does Poland want to ally with the Germany of TTL?

The liberal CP bloc first gave them Posen and Galicia, then it freed Congress Poland from the Russian yoke a few years down the line.

For an easy (and broad) reference, these are the most important wars in TTL mid-late 19th century:

Mexican-American War (the USA annexes North Mexico)
American Civil War (Anglo-French intervention to back the CSA)
Eastern War (France, Germany, Italy, Hungary-led Danubian Confederation, Poland, Scandinavia, maybe or maybe not Britain too, vs. Russia) -Crimean War broad equivalent
Western War (France vs. Germany and Italy) -Franco-Prussian War broad equivalent
Balkan War (Balkan rebels, Germany, Italy, Hungary-led Danubian Confederation, Russia vs. Turkey) -Russo-Turkish/Italo-Turkish/1st Balkan War broad equivalent
 
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Eurofed

Banned
errrr.....why?

Butterflies during the equivalent of the Boxer Rebellion (including the insurgents storming the Legation Quarter and massacrating everyone) make the Imperial government decide the best course is to go all the way on the side of the *Boxers. A very unwise decision, but terrible mistakes happen. Even IOTL, there was a faction in the Imperial court that advocated to do so.
 
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Eurofed

Banned
1) The CSA doesn't have the capital to do any of this. It would see its industrial sectors expanding somewhat but they'd be in a situation equivalent to merchants in China. CS national ideology is not going to favor industrialism much, if at all.

The scenario writeup remarks that the industrialization of the CSA (and Brazil) does happen to a mediocre amount, nothing to write home about in comparison to the real industrial powers, and in the economic field, the CSA and Brazil remain client states of Britain and France, precisely because of those issues. E.g. it's Anglo-French capital that builds the Confederate Nicaragua Canal. So the point you make is acknowledged. It might be an issue of the most appropriate language to express it.

2) LOL, what? The Southwest is a no-go, it utterly failed there IOTL. Northern Mexico? How the Hell does it get that? Magic fairy dust?

At the peace table, the USA bargains keeping the settled areas of the border states, California's, Colombian states, unionist W Virginia/E Tennesse in exchange for the unsettled territories of the Southwest and Northern Mexico. ITTL the CSA wins entirely due to European intervention, so there is some room for negotiation at the peace table for both sides. Northern Mexico, was, of course, annexed by the USA before the ACW, in the *Mexican-American War.

What happens to the Apaches and Navajo ITTL?

They get trampled just like OTL, if not worse.

4) OK, this is just plain ridiculous. Yucatan all by itself is the kind of poison pill that would destroy the Confederacy.

Densely populated Central Mexico may be, and that's the reason why the CSA (and its allies) keep it as a client state.

Yucatan ? Bah. The Caste War didn't certainly destroy or cripple OTL Mexico in any meaningful way.
 
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Regarding the CSA maybe after the war the army (as the only truly national institution) decided to take charge after the economy take some hit, nobody can or want take measure to solve the problem, the various state goverments are not very collaborative and the soldiers (plus the poor white) finally see that the ACW was basically a 'rich man war fight by the poor'.
The 'Emergency goverment' and later the 'duly elected president' can make the necessary step to put the CSA in the situation described as OTL; regarding Mexico maybe has buy CUba and lot of Mexico by the French and the Spaniard, but is faced by a decades long low level guerrillas and the people sent to 'americanize' the place are of two type
1- poor white trash sent there with a lot, lot of incentive
2- people that don't have really a choice.
A politic of 'appleasment' of the latinos is the new CSA way...as the local are too numerous and the continous guerrilla warfare is not very good for the economy, plus the first time a KKK like group tried to do their work on Veracruz, their member had suffered a deadly attack of lead poisoning.
In all by all, the CSA is stable as OTL Austro-Hungary, plus is an ally that the rest of the entente keep only very important strategic reason, otherwise is growing become an embarassment.

Poland can support an alliance with Germany both for gratitude for liberation from Russia, economic ties...and the fact that 5 second after leave this alliance Russian soldiers will be at their border. Probably they don't like much that situation, but they try some 'realpolitick' and frankly they are the CP power less interested in war and more diplomatic

Stragegically speaking in the Meditterean we will see Regia Marina in a fight for her life, she is basically alone against the Marine Nationale and the Royal Navy Mediterrean squadron (plus whatever the Ottoman can give), as i don't think that neither Spain or Hungary can give much aid. She can go on two way a total defensive stand, try to blunt and repell the entente attack with occasional sortie but this mean that Lybia and Tunisia will be left alone or try to be overtly aggressive, maybe trying to invade Malta (can be this TTL Gallipoli). in the French-Italian border we will see a repeat of the situation between Italy and A-H in WWI as the border don't really favor the attacker.
 

Eurofed

Banned
The 'Emergency goverment' and later the 'duly elected president' can make the necessary step to put the CSA in the situation described as OTL; regarding Mexico maybe has buy CUba and lot of Mexico by the French and the Spaniard,

ITTL the USA conquers Cuba in the 1810s when it intervenes to support the revolutionaries in Latin America. This is also how they basically make Bolivar and co. willing to join the USA. Northern Mexico is conquered in the MAW equivalent.

In all by all, the CSA is stable as OTL Austro-Hungary, plus is an ally that the rest of the entente keep only very important strategic reason, otherwise is growing become an embarassment.

Yep, the alliance with slaver CSA and Brazil is a political embarassment for Britain, but seen as a distasteful necessity to keep the USA in check. TTL France is protofascist, and Russia and Turkey still basically authoritarian, so they don't care so much.

Poland can support an alliance with Germany both for gratitude for liberation from Russia, economic ties...and the fact that 5 second after leave this alliance Russian soldiers will be at their border. Probably they don't like much that situation, but they try some 'realpolitick' and frankly they are the CP power less interested in war and more diplomatic.

Well, the Poles do have some irredentistic ambitions on Russia...

Stragegically speaking in the Meditterean we will see Regia Marina in a fight for her life, she is basically alone against the Marine Nationale and the Royal Navy Mediterrean squadron (plus whatever the Ottoman can give), as i don't think that neither Spain or Hungary can give much aid.

Hungary is more or less as strong (and solid) as OTL A-H. But they have nothing to fear from Italy, so they can focus on fighting Russia and Turkey. Their fleet is certainly no match for the ones of the big players, but I suppose they can spare some naval power to give Italy an hand -at least to balance Turkey.

Spain is a bit stronger than OTL, and suffered no Spanish-American War disaster, so it can lend another hand (of course, it has to protect its own coasts, too). Plus, it can offer its allies an easy path to Gibraltar.

The RN and the MN also have to fight the KM and the USN combo in the Atlantic, so it is questionable they can spare really that much for the Med.
 
1) Having a hostile neighbor to the south of it means the USA will be very much thinking in terms of a continental power ITTL, not a global one. The CSA will not have the ability to expand outside its own borders in any remotely realistic TL, let alone all of the Yucatan.

2) Sure, and all that focus will go to the Army for good reason. The sheer size of the US-CS border and a truly militarized USA means a very different, alien mindset. A TL-191 style CSA-wank will see the USA focusing primarily on North America, not the Navy.

3) How? Which state and which faction from which state unifies Germany like this? It sure the Hell won't be Prussia. Liberal Germany also won't build the military machine of reactionary Wihelmine Germany. Liberal Germans had other priorities than to build a separate, independent clique of generals that would challenge civil authority and be a stronghold of reaction.

4) I don't see this as happening. Russia can't pull a Meiji without becoming a Stalinist-style totalitarian state, just as Japan pulled a Meiji to wind up an authoritarian military dictatorship. Russia is far too vast, its terrain too unwieldy, its native financial resources too limited to pull anything like that off. Especially when it loses Poland and Finland, displaying a completely alien European mindset to OTL, a mindset more likely to see a reverse San Stefano at Russian expense, regardless of whether or not that would ever stick.

5) So they just stop with Poland? :confused:

6) Well, that backstory certainly helps somewhat.
 
The scenario writeup remarks that the industrialization of the CSA (and Brazil) does happen to a mediocre amount, nothing to write home about in comparison to the real industrial powers, and in the economic field, the CSA and Brazil remain client states of Britain and France, precisely because of those issues. E.g. it's Anglo-French capital that builds the Confederate Nicaragua Canal. So the point you make is acknowledged. It might be an issue of the most appropriate language to express it.

Except in this case, why's the CS military considering a war with the much stronger USA, aside from suicidal impulses or a death wish?

At the peace table, the USA bargains keeping the settled areas of the border states, California's, Colombian states, unionist W Virginia/E Tennesse in exchange for the unsettled territories of the Southwest and Northern Mexico. ITTL the CSA wins entirely due to European intervention, so there is some room for negotiation at the peace table for both sides. Northern Mexico, was, of course, annexed by the USA before the ACW, in the *Mexican-American War.

Unsettled save by the Navajo and the Apache, given the OTL Navajo Reservation is larger than all of Belgium. Unless the Navajo in particular were subject to one of your genocides for sufficiently aesthetic maps....

They get trampled just like OTL, if not worse.

This was hard enough for an OTL Union to do. Having the CSA do that is preposterous, it wouldn't have the logistical or cultural power to do that and will have enough fun and games with the Comanches and their like in Texas.

Densely populated Central Mexico may be, and that's the reason why the CSA (and its allies) keep it as a client state.

Yucatan ? Bah. The Caste War didn't certainly destroy or cripple OTL Mexico in any meaningful way.

That's a rather interesting statement given Mexico still has rebellions in Yucatan now. I suppose if you want the CSA to waste money forever in the Yucatan.......
 

Eurofed

Banned
1) Having a hostile neighbor to the south of it means the USA will be very much thinking in terms of a continental power ITTL, not a global one. The CSA will not have the ability to expand outside its own borders in any remotely realistic TL, let alone all of the Yucatan.

2) Sure, and all that focus will go to the Army for good reason. The sheer size of the US-CS border and a truly militarized USA means a very different, alien mindset. A TL-191 style CSA-wank will see the USA focusing primarily on North America, not the Navy.

To a degree, sure. But they know from experience it is just as vital for their security to prevent the Entente from achieving naval superiority in the Atlantic, and so coming to the rescue of the CSA again. They won't send forces to Europe or the Pacific anytime soon. But teh Atlantic is another issue entirely.

Liberal Germany also won't build the military machine of reactionary Wihelmine Germany. Liberal Germans had other priorities than to build a separate, independent clique of generals that would challenge civil authority and be a stronghold of reaction.

You don't need an authoritarian state to build a strong military. TTL liberal Germany more or less builds its military tradition fighting back the Tsarist bogeyman.

4) I don't see this as happening. Russia can't pull a Meiji without becoming a Stalinist-style totalitarian state, just as Japan pulled a Meiji to wind up an authoritarian military dictatorship. Russia is far too vast, its terrain too unwieldy, its native financial resources too limited to pull anything like that off. Especially when it loses Poland and Finland, displaying a completely alien European mindset to OTL, a mindset more likely to see a reverse San Stefano at Russian expense, regardless of whether or not that would ever stick.

Well, your assessment and mine differ here. The scenario however still stands even if Russia and Turkey are made no really better than OTL, if a little less original.

5) So they just stop with Poland? :confused:

Plus Finland and Moldavia-Wallachia. The war aim of the liberal bloc in the Eastern war is to make Russia persuaded through a bloody nose they are in Europe to stay, and liberate Poland, Finland, and Moldavia-Wallachia from the Tsarist yoke. They aren't interested in going down the footsteps of Napoleon and go in the depths of Russia if they can avoid it.
 
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