WWI: Alternate German Commander in Chief

MrP

Banned
take Britain away, and I don't see how Germany can lose...

Stronger French fleet and tacit British acceptance of a French blockade of Germany in combination with an earlier start to the war has the potential to prevent OTL's German chemical industry from producing the requisite munitions to fight a long war. But that's a lot of ifs, I freely admit.
 
I believe the CP could have won against the Entente with Britain. The gap between the CP and Allies in industrial indicies isn't so large as raw stats would suggest. For example the Allies worked on external lines of communication, which were both less efficient and vulnerable to interdiction. The Allies were also geographically seperate and thus had trouble coordinating their strategy and operations. The Germans fought better and were a step ahead on the allies in battlefield trends, so the Allies needed to have greater numbers or everything merely to achieve parity, let alone superiority needed to win wars.

The position they found themselves in against France was of strategic offensive/tactical defensive which is the strongest form of warfare. They also found themselves able to defeat the Russians at will in the field. Their greatest mistake/misfortune was not winning the 'Race to the Sea', which would have put them on the strategic defensive/tactical offensive against Britain. Their second biggest mistake was Verdun instead of a more useful offensive elsewhere.

As for Britain's entry into the war without the S plan; with weeks of desperate fighting in France from August 1914 the British govt would have found it easy to get public support for war against Germany as time went by.
 
As for Britain's entry into the war without the S plan; with weeks of desperate fighting in France from August 1914 the British govt would have found it easy to get public support for war against Germany as time went by.
One would agree, but they might need public support of some degree to enter the war in the first place, and that probably needs a casus belli (or else the declaration of war risks failing in Parliament, or splitting the government, neither of which is desirable if you wish to enter the war), so they might not have weeks of desperate fighting in France from August 1914.
Finding a casus belli (or just something to rally the people) needn't be that hard if you're looking for them, though.
 
Without the S plan to push them into war Britain would have the luxury of time, measured in months probably, to mobilise and declare war at an opportune moment. Also people weren't so squeamish about declaring war as they are today, after the experience of the world wars, so the cassus belli needn't be airtight or particularly shocking to our eyes.
 

Deleted member 1487

Even with the reports of epic slaughter coming from the front? I think the newspapers would do a bit to dampen enthusiasm for the conflict. Also, just the mental image of Hearst foaming at the mouth about the French or any potential British DoW is priceless.
 

MrP

Banned
The Allies were also geographically seperate and thus had trouble coordinating their strategy and operations. The Germans fought better and were a step ahead on the allies in battlefield trends, so the Allies needed to have greater numbers or everything merely to achieve parity, let alone superiority needed to win wars.

Hm, I'm not so sure about this. The French have elements of Stormtroop training in '15, the British have stuff going on by '17, and the section Lewis guns, an idea the Germans borrowed from them. I'm wary of saying one army was definitively better than another - largely because British training was so utterly erratic until Maxse turned up. Different training in different armies, different corps, different divisions, and all tolerated in accordance with Haig's Field Service Regulations, which specified that the man on the spot knew best how to act.

Just so nobody thinks I'm having a go at the Germans, I'm not. I'm just wary of placing a holistic interpretation onto whole armies at the expense of, er, local colour, shall we say? ;)
 
Without the S plan to push them into war Britain would have the luxury of time, measured in months probably, to mobilise and declare war at an opportune moment. Also people weren't so squeamish about declaring war as they are today, after the experience of the world wars, so the cassus belli needn't be airtight or particularly shocking to our eyes.

I will go with the political worries of British Leadership of the time. If they figured that they couldn't get Parliament to declare war without some overreaching German provocation like Belgium then why should we assume otherwise? Especially with Parliament set to explode over the Irish issue. The UK could work it self up into getting into the war but that would be months and then Parliament is going to have a major reason for pause with 100K per month body counts coming out of France.

As to France doing a blockade of Germany keep in mind that the HSF is stronger than the MN in all aspects. What you will see is convoys and cruiser warfare across the globe.

Michael
 

MrP

Banned
As to France doing a blockade of Germany keep in mind that the HSF is stronger than the MN in all aspects. What you will see is convoys and cruiser warfare across the globe.

Michael

Indeed - IOTL. It'd require signal earlier changes to get around that fact.
 
Some comments on a Eastern strategy Great War.

It is by its very nature going to be a relatively long war (unlike a certain someone who hasn't posted here in years I do not believe in the Russian glass jaw). Unless a really huge multiple armies encirclement is accomplished (and Russian war plans would be backpedaling in this scenerio) which might cause the Tsar to open negotiations the Germans must realize that they are talking about a one year war minimum.

The stretch of industrial France that Germany took in OTL would instead be pumping out 155mm howitzers and munitions galore in 1915.

The main fleets of the combatants would be searching for a mission but there would be large scale cruiser warfare and the French fleet is better suited to do this effectively. In addition to Belgium the British considered the presence of the HSF in the Channel a causus belli.

The question of British entry is a complicated one. Provided the Channel is not violated a quick British entry can be ruled out. But again as the war drags on there would be mounting political pressure from the likes of Lord Northcliffe to paint Wilhelm as the new Napoleon and warning that if the Huns conquer Europe they will turn their eyes on Britain next. What is odd here is that with countries like Italy, Bulgaria and Romania etc. the tendency i for them to jump in on the winning side. With Britain I think it would be the reverse.

The other wild card is of course Ireland. Some incl. German military intel thought distraction with implementing Home Rule would distract the British (which is why the Germans armed both the UVF and MacNeill). Now in Operation Heinrich Marina argued that Asquith might try to use a delayed entry into the Great War to unify an empire badly divided by an Orange Uprising. Lastly there is the possibility is that there is no large scale Ulsterman revolt. Both Gough and Carson have said they were bluffing (Henry Wilson though is another matter). Perhaps instead of a major blowup there is a small fringe underground Protestant extremist group a sort of cross (pardon the pun) between the KKK and the IRA of OTL. Once Redmondism is triumphant then Asquith may hector Berlin about their war aims and thereby generate a crisis.
 
With an East-focused Central Powers and a neutral British Empire, what would be the position of Japan?

OTL, Japan jumped in to WWI "Honoring its alliance with the UK" or "land grabbing undefended German possessions" depending on how charitable one wishes to be.

ITTL, the UK is neutral with Parliament ensnared in deeply distracting Irish problems and/or full of quite a few MPs and assorted influential personages quite irritated at France for violating Belgian neutrality. Small-scale naval actions are taking place all over the world as the French and German fleets attempt to protect sea lanes and raid commerce, as well as the occasional attempt to defend or attack a colonial target of opportunity. In those colonies themselves, France without the British Empire is having a much more difficult time in Africa, and Belgium's entry in the war won't much help matters in that regard.

Russia is bleeding to death, and probably loses Poland and much else west of Riga, Kiev and the Pinsk/Pripyat/Pripet Marshes in stages. If the Ottoman Empire is in the war, Russian exports are mostly shut off, the Caucus is a mess, and CP fleets from the Med could penetrate the Black sea and raid the coast or support advances.

Observers in Tokyo taking in all this might well at some point consider the gains to be made if Japan sides with the seemingly successful Central Powers in a deal. Germany's Pacific possessions (or some portions thereof) might end up as part of the bribe or the price for Japanese entry, and considering Micronesia and New Guinea, not a very high one. China might be a more troublesome point of negotiations, but in victory both Japan and Germany would be poised to gain more than enough to compensate for whatever deals required between them.

What Japan might want isn't so hard to guess; European concessions in China, effective control of Manchuria, all Sakhalin Island, and some ill-defined slice of the Russian far east are a given, and probably well within the reasonable ability of Japan to seize. Russia is fighting a life or death struggle (or at least a "life or health" one) in Europe, and doesn't have the qualitative advantages in equipment and vehicles (no tanks at all) that characterized OTL face-offs like Nomonhan, let alone August Storm. It wouldn't be the cakewalk of seizing a few German islands, but you don't get invited to the peace table if you aren't involved.

I'm not at all sure what Japan would think of French Indochina. A valuable colony for France, and all else being equal, any colonial power might want it, which suggests the Germans might sigh wistfully in regret if they must sign it away to Japan. Certainly, the IJN could probably defeat whatever colonial fleet France tasked to defend it, but it is some distance away, and seizing (and holding) it during the war might be difficult. As I've no idea whether the Japanese even had an opinion on that place at the time, or if they had the capability of taking a stab at it, perhaps someone with expertise could enlighten us all?

As for international reactions to Japanese opportunism outlined here, it could depend on how Japan chooses to enter. Should it follow a convenient incident of French commerce raiders making a dreadful mistake or so, or an incident with Russia, opinion in the UK might be a disappointed shrug given French violation of Belgium. I can imagine Australians and Americans (as OTL) being rather less sanguine about Japanese expansion, but that'd only come into play later on if the British Empire or the US don't join the conflict. On the other hand, a Japanese ultimatum to Russia or France followed by a DOW without a good provocation would probably expose deeper misgivings from Britain over the alliance, spurred on no doubt by the Australians' concerns. The US still might not care much beyond a small boost to Japanophobia in the US Naval community and the west coast, but that's only if Japan avoids offending American and other neutral trade in China.

In any case, Japan's position one way or the other would not be decisive in Europe, but nonetheless an interesting knock on that would drastically upset the balance of power in Asia in the longer term, and present yet another problem to the unfortunate Russians. So, I suppose the question stands as whether Japan's policymakers would find a German deal worthwhile given the likely conditions, as described by others in this thread. Would Tokyo take the plunge, and shoot the Bear in the back? It is the best way, after all...
 
Tyg, you've raised an interesting point. If the Japanese do attack the Russians, then they're even more screwed than historically. Heck, we could see Imperial Russia knocked out of the war far earlier than OTL, something which would be of great advantage to the Germans. If they've got Belgium on their side, the Russians knocked out and the Italians coming in on the side of the Central Powers when it starts to look like their victory is a forgone conclusion... well, France will be in trouble! The question is, will Britain come to the aid of France if it looks like it's France on its own against a hostile Europe dominated by Germany? Remember, they do have a history of trying to maintain a "Balance of Power" in Europe...

Anyways, this concept is looking more and more interesting the more I think about it!
 
The question is, will Britain come to the aid of France if it looks like it's France on its own against a hostile Europe dominated by Germany? Remember, they do have a history of trying to maintain a "Balance of Power" in Europe...
I expect them to maintain a pro-French policy (better terms for loans, and so), but whether that will extend to actually entering the war...
 
I expect them to maintain a pro-French policy (better terms for loans, and so), but whether that will extend to actually entering the war...

That's quite probable, but would only go so far without actual participation in the war. If it looks (or start appearing to look) like the French are going to lose, why keep dumping money overboard? On the other hand, the French might be able to offer up French possessions as collateral or sale. (Pondicherry, New Caledonia, Tahiti?) Same could go for France's possessions in the Americas (French Guyana, West Indies, St.Pierre and Miquelon) for access to American capital, but I'm not sure how the logistics of a deal like that would work, and it'd certainly be perceived as a desperate move, and probably an unlikely one.

Tyg, you've raised an interesting point. If the Japanese do attack the Russians, then they're even more screwed than historically. Heck, we could see Imperial Russia knocked out of the war far earlier than OTL, something which would be of great advantage to the Germans. If they've got Belgium on their side, the Russians knocked out and the Italians coming in on the side of the Central Powers when it starts to look like their victory is a forgone conclusion... well, France will be in trouble!
Well, OTL's WWI was like a well-balanced chemical reaction. The influence of all the balanced elements kept things at a slow burn till the end. ITTL, that balance of influences isn't there in the long run thanks to effectively better German leadership, and the absence of British power in the equation. So, once the Central Powers appear to be winning, neutrals will begin to join them, or avoid joining the Entente one by one. The Entente then begins suffering more, leaving even marginal players on the fence to pile on to join the winning side. In this TL, why indeed should Romania risk everything for a desperate Russia, when it can risk little and get Bessarabia/Odessa cheaply? Why should Japan stay neutral when there are apples ripe for the plucking with an ease that might not be seen again? Why should Italy side against its nominal allies when not only are they subject to an attack as described in treaty, but look like winners?

The worse the Entente position appears, the worse it will become until one of them collapses or sues for peace, thanks to this bandwagoning effect. Also thanks to that, the likelihood of direct British intervention weakens over time. Fighting with a fresh France and Russia against a German violator of Belgian neutrality and disturber of the peace of nations is one thing, joining a war with a flailing France and collapsing Russia against the upholder of neutral rights, justice over assassins and anarchists, etc against a France and Russia fighting an aggressive war of choice is quite another thing entirely.

It might be more likely to have the British pushing for a fair peace when the situation becomes apparent, but their success depends on how willing each side is to compromise. Judging from OTL, I wouldn't bet on peace iTTL until maybe late 1916. I suggest that year particularly as the point of either Russian collapse on multiple fronts, revolution, and/or Tsarist desperation. France, facing Germany Italy, Belgium, Japan etc without significant allies throws in the towel shortly after and later begins an unhappy circular firing squad on those leading at the top.

I wouldn't say though, that Germany is ensured domination of Europe here. Peace probably breaks out with the French generally holding most of its colonies and metropolitan France itself, and probably a few tradable German and Belgian territories. Russia on the other hand, suffers a bigger loss as usual in these scenarios... Finland, the Baltics, Poland, Bessarabia, slices of the Causcus and the Russian far East, etc. But, it won't have been eliminated as a power, and either under the Tsar, a Republic, or a red-tinged government, will almost certainly hold core Russian lands.

Lastly, it would be a bit naive to expect the Balkans to just settle down and live happily ever after once the borders are redrawn again, and the Austro-Hungarians are still going to be wracked by problems. Italy, of course, now has all the lands (more or less) it covets from France, Tunisia and Corsica at the very least. But, there still are those unfortunate Italians or "historically Italian" lands under the Austrian crown... Let's not forget either, that the Ottoman Empire is still going to be tottering over even with the Germans propping it up.

And so, we come to Germany, or how the British might see them at a general peace. Victorious, absolutely. Enlarged, most certainly. Stronger? Well... Even with the most competent of commanders, a war of this size is going to consume masses of young German lives. Not to the extent of OTL, but then no one here will have OTL to compare, and as such these losses will look horrific, even to the victors. And even with victory, one might observe, Germany doesn't get the rest of peace. Instead, it faces the long, costly struggle to consolidate its gains from France and Russia over the objections of the inhabitants of said gains. Germans must now exert constant effort to keep squabbling allies from fighting over the spoils of war or each other, and keep its largest ones from shattering into component parts. All this, while Russia recovers behind her borders nursing a grudge, and France still lives to do the same.

At the same time... the British have lost nothing in the war, instead having profited immensely from trade with the belligerents, and suffering none of their exhaustion. Further, given that we have postulated that Belgian neutrality is defended by Germany, the Low Countries are likely to survive as independent states, keeping Germany away from the channel ports. In this TL, Britain's isolation from the Great War might look lucky or wise, even taking into account Germany's increase in prestige. While not entirely pyrrhic, German victory would probably look so costly (even with good leadership) as to make them the "Continent's Tallest Pygmy", with plenty of opportunities for meddling by Perfidious Albion, should it be required.
 
Interesting concept, Tyg. Just what do you imagine Germany claiming as a result of victory under these conditions? Do you see something like the OTL Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, or perhaps more being claimed? In the west, I'd agree - France is going to be cut down to size.

Of course, I'd also agree about Britain coming out pretty well from it all. Remember Nial Ferguson saying that the Brits would be better served to have sat out the war? Well, here he'd be even more right about that!

Anyways, I'm interested in what you'd think the Germans would claim. Especially when it comes to colonies. If Japan went with the CPs, well, it could get interesting. I just have this image, cruiser clashes all around, and then Japan throwing its lot in with the Central Powers... if they do, then the French cruisers would be screwed, that's for sure!
 
Interesting concept, Tyg. Just what do you imagine Germany claiming as a result of victory under these conditions? Do you see something like the OTL Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, or perhaps more being claimed? In the west, I'd agree - France is going to be cut down to size.

Actually, as the war would be shorter without the British Empire, I was thinking Brest-Litovsk-Lite. Russia loses all or most of the Baltics, Congress Poland, Bessarabia, and perhaps a bit of western Ukraine. Finland is a tossup in my view, depending on what the Finns think and just how badly Russia is beaten. The Ottomans get up to Baku perhaps. Georgia either stays with Russia or is a German protectorate/client, not much love for the Turks there.

France might actually get off pretty lightly compared to Russia, if only because in this scenario little to no French territory in France is actually occupied by the Central Powers at the end. Maybe Germany takes the little piece of French territory east of the Moselle, and Belgium gets some of Artois that used to belong to Flanders. Probably not so far as to extend to the Somme or Calais though.

France would lose a lot of colonies instead, save for Algeria and a few others here and there. Germany definitely wants Morocco and much of the French Congo, and probably swipes whatever they think is valuable in West Africa. Italy, if it participates might get Corsica and Tunisia. Nice and Savoy, the pieces the Kingdom of Sardinia originally surrendered to Napoleon III in return for his aid against Austria might go to Italy as well, but Italy might have to do better than it did OTL, or the French prefer those losses to others Italy may want.

Since France fought an offensive campaign in this projected TL, we should also keep in mind that French land and property generally escapes the conflict unscathed, unlike Belgium and parts of Germany. On the other hand, the front line has probably crossed over most of what the CP's get from Russia, leading to some damage there. France, if it does pay an indemnity, definitely is giving something to Belgium.

. If Japan went with the CPs, well, it could get interesting. I just have this image, cruiser clashes all around, and then Japan throwing its lot in with the Central Powers... if they do, then the French cruisers would be screwed, that's for sure!

It'd be quite interesting, a modern war of guerre de course and commerce protection around the world in a way even OTL's world wars never saw. I wonder if our putative alt-German CinC would have anything to say about the use of submarines.
 

General Zod

Banned
One has to wonder...but the British would not have gone over to the German side and would have even pressured the Belgians to letting the French thru. The British were not going to allow the Germans to dominate the continent.

I think there is a bad case of post-WWII hindsight here. The Entente Cordiale and the realignment against Germany was still a very shaky halfhearted thing by 1914, only Belgium cemented it into stone. If not for the naval race and terrible diplomatic bungling by the Kaiser it would not have happened at all and UK would have allied withe germany sometime in 1890-1910 (there were serious mutual attempts at a German-British detente as late as 1912-13). Until a few years ago France was the hereditary enemy and Russia the feared strategic rival. If Germany goes east and France invades Belgium in the minds of the vast majority of the British public it will be Louis XIV or Napoleon bully France raping the Low Countries and making yet another attempt to dominate Europe all over again. Sure, there might be a few Germanophobe hawks in the British elite but they will meet an impassable wll of scorn in the Parliament and the public if they dare propose siding with France and Russia. Think Churchill at Munich. Britain will at the very least stay neutral throughout the war.

Heck, if the Central Powers play the diplomatic and propaganda game well, they highlight the Napoleon analogy, since the Belgians are going to resist French invasion any bit as forcefully as they did the German one, and they will loudly call for aid from anybody, most definitely including UK and Germany, and the invading French blatantly misbehave any bit as bad as the OTL Germans, there is a realistic chance that a strong anti-French reversal in the British public opinion and Parliament will bring a pro-CP government to power and a British DoW against France. The plots of some Germanophobe ministers to hatch a flimsly casus belli against Germany won't go absolutely anywhere in this political atmosphere.

So UK is either neutral or CP with a French rape of Belgium. Say 65-35%. This also means a neutral USA or a late entry for the CP if France messes too much with the USA merchant shipping to Germany. Somewhat more likely if Republicans win in 1916. French rape of Belgium paints France as the bully of Europe in America and it stays that way.

There is a realistic chance that Netherlands will enter the war on the side of Germany when France invades Belgium. It does not change the strategic equation too much unless UK sides with the CP, but it makes the Alliance look even more good among neutrals.

Germany never suffers any blockade. This alone would garantee victory, as it would the fact that French manpower will never withstand the onslaught of the vast majority of the CP Armies after Russia collapses. But there's more.

With Britain out of the Entente, Italy will never defect to that side, too. With France clearly the aggressor, there is a very strong chance that they entry the war for the CP in 1914, if not it will be in early 1915 after getting a garantee about the satisfaction of their plentiful French claims from their CP allies ("Trento and Trieste ? Bah, let's pick what's more affordable, Nice, Savoy, and Tunis, join the strongest side, cripple rival France, and look very good by being loyal to our old allies with a good casus belli. Austria-Hungary will be the job for another generation"). They are not likey going to make any big inroads on the Alps without Schliffen but they tie down a significant slice of the French Army, send several divisions to butter up the front in A-L and Belgium, and 100% of the A-H Army is free for Serbia and Russia. They also send an expeditionary corps in Albania and Montenegro, so either this spells the immediate collapse of Serbia or when Bulgary attacks the whole Serbian Army is encircled and it surrenders.

With Britain neutral or CP, it will take a little diplomatic mollifying for Germany to take the Ottomans in the Alliance with Italy already in it, but with hereditary enemy Russia on the other side and claims to pick in the Caucasus, it will most likely happen roughly on schedule. Where the Quadruple Alliance goes, so does Bulgaria to reclaim Macedonia, so Serbia goes out.

French fleet now is badly overstretched from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, losing control of both. Blockade won't hurt them as bad as the Germans, but it hurts, and the French Empire is in serious trouble, with communications with the homeland all but cut off. Germany and Italy eat it bit by bit. No colonial troops for France. Paris already has very serious manpower troubles in the long term against the Italo-German combination and a front stretching from Flanders to Nice and no British help and each foolhardy "elan" offensive will only make it worse.

This all means that Greece is a friendly neutral which smiles and nods when the Alliance speaks.

Barring exceedingly good Entente diplomatic skill or temporary show of strength, Romania stays neutral or realizes the only Romanian realistic claims in this situation are Bessarabia and Odessa, so they might well attack Russia.

Sweden has a pro-German King and Army, and ITTL the CP are getting a lot more sympathy, and they have a strong interest in expelling the Russians out of Finland and Estonia. They have the difficulty of a socialist Parliament which is pacifist on principle, but if the Russians make some aggressive move (they came very close to attacking the Swedish fleet OTL) or Germany plays the diplomatic-propaganda card of the liberation of Finland weel, they might enter the war, either in 1914 (the former casus belli) or in 1915-16 (the latter).

Japan very likely realizes sometime in 1915 that there is still plenty of booty to be picked in Manchuria and Siberia and the opportunity is just too good.

Now FR-RU vs. DE-AH-IT-OE is already a death sentence for the Entente in 2-3 years. Each additional front by Japan, Sweden, and Romania accelerates the collapse of Russia by say a season or two.

As for ideas about the kind of peace deal that France will get, see my Reverse Versailles (the PoD is different here, so some things may seem strange, ignore references to Belgium ceding territory). Russia gets the usual Brest-Litovsk treatment, only worse. Even in the most favourable case, there is going to need at least 1-2 years to bring Russia to collapse. No peace by Christmas. The length of the war and the loss of blood and mony won't be nowhere as hard to the CPs as OTL, but substantial enough that France and Russia will get an harsh peace deal. Besides, ITTL France has been the aggressor for three times in a century (Napoleon, 1870, and 1914). Not going to find much lenience.
 
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Interesting points, but I think the analogy and continuation of 'the hereditary enemy' bit of British vis a vis France is a serious load of hogwash. There was a effective change of diplomacy and understanding between London and Paris between 1872 and 1900, which was greatly helped by the likes of Edward VII.
 

General Zod

Banned
Interesting points, but I think the analogy and continuation of 'the hereditary enemy' bit of British vis a vis France is a serious load of hogwash. There was a effective change of diplomacy and understanding between London and Paris between 1872 and 1900, which was greatly helped by the likes of Edward VII.

Diminishing centuries-long hostility is not making ironclad strategic committments, which only materialized when Germany attacked Belgium. If Wilhelm II had not pandered to the naval lobby and been such of a diplomatic boor, Germany and UK would have solidified an alliance in 1898-99. See Until Germany attacked Belgium, the Entente Cordiale was politically reversible with far less provocation than France invading Belgium yet another time. To think otherwise is to put 1945 hindsight in the minds of 1914 Britons. Anyway, the point is valid only as it concerns a CP Britain. With a Germany going East and France invading Belgium the chance of Britain going Entente is politically ASB if Germany does not do something terribly stupid. Hence the rest of my analysis stands. The Quadruple Alliance & co. will dig the grave of the Dual Entente in a couple years.
 
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You Read my mail ....

The Russia first strategy and an in-depth defense of the Vosges Mts makes a lot more sense than pissing everybody off by trying to go thru Belgium.
 
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