WW3 in 1945

Do you find this credible?


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My point was that absent a "Pearl Harbor" sort of event the American public was not going to sign off on the US/UK attacking the USSR. While the American public was supportive of the UK/France up until PH, and actually the German DOW (first) there was no appetite to get directly involved in the war in Europe. The American public was pro-China, and anti-Japanese however prior to PH the USA was not going to shed American blood to deal with Japan. Going to war with the USSR, after several years of a wartime alliance, propaganda about the Soviet people and their fight against Nazism, and turning a psychopath is to a pipe smoking teddy bear ("Uncle Joe") coming out and saying "the USSR represents a threat as great as the Nazis and its their turn" (true or not) without a PH type cause simply is unsaleable to the American public, and I would posit the British public as well. More than any issues about correlation of forces, or what cutting of LL from aviation gasoline to spare parts for Studebaker trucks to SPAM would do it would be about public opinion. Fighting a war of this dimension without public support is not possible.
 
'44: Liberation of France, but managed by the communist resistance. De Gaulle is totally side lined

The liberation of France had far more to do with Gen. Bradley and Gen. Patton than any faction of the Resistance.

The French Resistance was a SMALL movement of very brave and resourceful people. In terms of size and capability, compared to the partisan resistance to the Nazis in Poland and Belarus the French Resistance was a Boy Scout troop.
 
The only country where the "resistance" was primarily responsible for throwing the Germans out was Yugoslavia. Of course even here there was direct and indirect support from the Allies, and the red Army did "finish" the job of ejecting the Germans. The reality was the french Resistance was relatively small potatoes and mostly useful for intelligence until 1943 or so. The communists were pretty quiescent until after Barbarossa kicked off. Sure, communist groups in France and Italy especially could be a nuisance for the west but especially if the USSR starts the fighting the support will be limited and many of the communists will be conflicted.
 
Probably all about perceptions.

In many ways, the perception must have been that the resistance liberated Paris - and that the communists were in the front.

If US/UK should start a sneak attack on USSR - as Unthinkable was all about - I think the French in droves would have been a bit miffed.

That Churchill also had wanted to arm 200,000 former German troops would not sit well in France either.

I somehow also believe that the French political landscape in '44 and right up until the break-up of the alliance in '46 was very confusing.

In essence: it could any which way.
 
Probably all about perceptions.

In many ways, the perception must have been that the resistance liberated Paris - and that the communists were in the front.

If US/UK should start a sneak attack on USSR - as Unthinkable was all about - I think the French in droves would have been a bit miffed.

IIRC, Unthinkable in its 1945 version was exclusively British idea that never got US support, which means that it never was a realistic option.
 
In his book "The second world war" by Antony Beevor who is I think an extremely credible and knowledgable historian on ww2 on p765, claims that Stalin in 1944 (date not specified) was seriously considering landing in Norway, an invasion of France and Italy.

What Stalin was thinking was America would soon abandon Europe, and their colonial problems would paralyse Britain and France, he would be able to move. Stalin's generals expected that with their 400 divisions it would take less than a month to grab these areas.

What aborted these plans was that Stalin heard that the US had an atom bomb and were putting it into mass production. Stalin told Beria, "that if Roosevelt had still been alive, we would have succeeded."

To be more precise, what Beevor actually says is that Beria's son claimed that General Shtemenko (who at the time of the supposed plan was not yet Chief of Staff or even Deputy Chief) told him that the Politburo had ordered Stavka to prepare plans for such an invasion. In all these retellings, there is plenty of room for exaggeration, turning a contingency plan into an actual intention, maybe even complete fabrication...
 
in
To be more precise, what Beevor actually says is that Beria's son claimed that General Shtemenko (who at the time of the supposed plan was not yet Chief of Staff or even Deputy Chief) told him that the Politburo had ordered Stavka to prepare plans for such an invasion. In all these retellings, there is plenty of room for exaggeration, turning a contingency plan into an actual intention, maybe even complete fabrication...


"Beria - My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin" book by Sergo Beria seems to be well regarded as a source, I noticed that Simon Montefiore used him in his book and according to the Wikipedia "General Shtemenko"

https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Sergei_Shtemenko

"In June 1942, he replaced Sharokhin as the department chief. Shtemenko took part in the operational planning of the Battles for Crimea, the Caucasus and Stalingrad. In May 1943, he was promoted to be the chief of the Operations Directorate, serving directly under Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky. In November of that year he escorted Stalin to the Tehran Conference.[3]

During February and March 1944, Shtemenko served as the Stavka representative in the 2nd Baltic Front during the campaign to relieve the Siege of Leningrad. During the Spring of 1944, he toured between the different fronts fighting in Belarus and coordinated their operations.[4]

After the German surrender, Shtemenko was among the organizers of the Victory Parade. In August 1945, he took part in the planning of the Soviet–Japanese War.[3]"

If such an attack was planned, it is certain Shtemenko would know.

The actual intention, we cannot determine but I doubt from this that it is a complete fabrication.
 
in


"Beria - My Father: Inside Stalin's Kremlin" book by Sergo Beria seems to be well regarded as a source, I noticed that Simon Montefiore used him in his book and according to the Wikipedia "General Shtemenko"

https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Sergei_Shtemenko

"In June 1942, he replaced Sharokhin as the department chief. Shtemenko took part in the operational planning of the Battles for Crimea, the Caucasus and Stalingrad. In May 1943, he was promoted to be the chief of the Operations Directorate, serving directly under Marshal Alexander Vasilevsky. In November of that year he escorted Stalin to the Tehran Conference.[3]

During February and March 1944, Shtemenko served as the Stavka representative in the 2nd Baltic Front during the campaign to relieve the Siege of Leningrad. During the Spring of 1944, he toured between the different fronts fighting in Belarus and coordinated their operations.[4]

After the German surrender, Shtemenko was among the organizers of the Victory Parade. In August 1945, he took part in the planning of the Soviet–Japanese War.[3]"

If such an attack was planned, it is certain Shtemenko would know.

The actual intention, we cannot determine but I doubt from this that it is a complete fabrication.

(1) On Sergo Beria's reliability, Robert Service has mixed views: "His portrait of life at the apex of Soviet politics - the fears, the pace of work, the recreations, the dinner parties - is more vivid than anything that has yet appeared. On political decisions he is less reliable. Often he did not know what was really going on, and anyway he is heavily biased in his father's favour." https://www.theguardian.com/books/2001/jun/30/historybooks.artsandhumanities

(2) If Stalin was serious about such an attack, it is certainly plausible that Shtemenko would know, but there are quite a few other people, both in the military and in the highest ranks of the Party who would know, and AFAIK none of them corroborated Sergo Beria's story, even when Stalin was out of favor.
 
(1) On Sergo Beria's reliability, Robert Service has mixed views: "His portrait of life at the apex of Soviet politics - the fears, the pace of work, the recreations, the dinner parties - is more vivid than anything that has yet appeared. On political decisions he is less reliable. Often he did not know what was really going on, and anyway he is heavily biased in his father's favour." https://www.theguardian.com/books/2001/jun/30/historybooks.artsandhumanities


The full quote here is

"This does not prevent it from being full of important information. Sergo Beria knew all the Kremlin leaders, and depicts them with a waspish wit. As a trained linguist and scientist, he attended crucial meetings such as the Yalta Conference. His portrait of life at the apex of Soviet politics - the fears, the pace of work, the recreations, the dinner parties - is more vivid than anything that has yet appeared. On political decisions he is less reliable. Often he did not know what was really going on, and anyway he is heavily biased in his father's favour."

So Robert Service is not ruling him out, plus the fact that both Simon Montefiore and Anthony Beevor, two historians that I think most here consider heavyweight are willing to take him seriously, to me at least means we cannot rule Sergo Beria out as being unreliable.


(2) If Stalin was serious about such an attack, it is certainly plausible that Shtemenko would know, but there are quite a few other people, both in the military and in the highest ranks of the Party who would know, and AFAIK none of them corroborated Sergo Beria's story, even when Stalin was out of favor.

As far as the military we have few sources for operation unthinkable too in the British military. I suggest for the same reason as this one. It is quite likely such a contingency plan did exist. If they did exist then we know from this they led nowhere and were quickly given up. The most likely reason is that no-one took it seriously including Stalin.

However, Shtemenko memoirs came out in 1970 and most of the Soviet planners would be his age. This is not a period when it was a good idea to make waves.

As far as the highest ranks of the party, who are you thinking of? Molotov would if it was serious, I doubt Khrushchev would know.
 
As far as the highest ranks of the party, who are you thinking of? Molotov would if it was serious, I doubt Khrushchev would know.

Beevor: "Well before Churchill's fantasy of Unthinkable, a meeting of the Politburo in 1944 had decided to order the Stavka to plan for the invasion of France and Italy, as General Shtemenko later told Beria's son." https://books.google.com/books?id=XS8xlDaZVJMC&pg=PT802 In 1944, Molotov, Mikoyan, and Khrushchev were all full members of the Politburo, so they presumably would know, yet none of them--even Khrushchev, so eager to discredit Stalin--mentions the alleged decision.

IMO this was at most a contingency plan that Stalin never had any intention of adopting--and the idea that he dropped it because he learned about the US atom bomb project is simply a surmise by either Shtemenko or Beria's son.
 
Beevor: "Well before Churchill's fantasy of Unthinkable, a meeting of the Politburo in 1944 had decided to order the Stavka to plan for the invasion of France and Italy, as General Shtemenko later told Beria's son." https://books.google.com/books?id=XS8xlDaZVJMC&pg=PT802 In 1944, Molotov, Mikoyan, and Khrushchev were all full members of the Politburo, so they presumably would know, yet none of them--even Khrushchev, so eager to discredit Stalin--mentions the alleged decision.

Well if the Politburo authorized the plan then how does it release help them discredit Stalin and not themselves? Stalin did that probably on purpose.


IMO this was at most a contingency plan that Stalin never had any intention of adopting

I suspect so which is probably why the decision to make it was made by the Politburo rather than Stalin.

--and the idea that he dropped it because he learned about the US atom bomb project is simply a surmise by either Shtemenko or Beria's son.

Why do you say that? the atomic bomb changed much, we know that the Russian leadership was taken by surprise by the speed that the Americans went from development to operational use. Once the bomb was dropped, much changed in Russia. One of the decisions might have been stopping these plans.
 
Well if the Politburo authorized the plan then how does it release help them discredit Stalin and not themselves? Stalin did that probably on purpose.


Oh, come on--they went along with all Stalin's decisions, and their later excuse was they had no choice...
 
Oh, come on--they went along with all Stalin's decisions, and their later excuse was they had no choice...

Indeed and often if the Politburo made a decision then, it was because Stalin wanted them rather than himself to make it. But then also not all decisions were made by Stalin, even if one accepts like I do that he was a micromanager who made decisions. No-one could make all the decisions in an organisation as big as the USSR. Stalin made many, the Politburo adopted those decisions and made a few of their own, the ones under them carried these decisions out and also made a few decisions themselves and so on down the chain.
 
Indeed and often if the Politburo made a decision then, it was because Stalin wanted them rather than himself to make it. But then also not all decisions were made by Stalin, even if one accepts like I do that he was a micromanager who made decisions. No-one could make all the decisions in an organisation as big as the USSR. Stalin made many, the Politburo adopted those decisions and made a few of their own, the ones under them carried these decisions out and also made a few decisions themselves and so on down the chain.

Yes, but the level of Stalin's involvement in even relatively minor matters was pretty astounding. For example, during the purges prior to WWII Stalin would compose lists of dozens to hundreds of individuals to be rounded up for execution and send out the secret police to execute them, with many of these people being fairly obscure.
 
Well if the Politburo authorized the plan then how does it release help them discredit Stalin and not themselves? Stalin did that probably on purpose.

There's a difference between authorizing a plan and executing it. Historians agree that the Politburo authorized Zhukov's May 15th 1941 Pre-emptive strike plan, but they did not agree too it's execution. Furthermore, as the May 15th example shows, plans authorized by the Politburo immediately before and during WW2 have been accessible to academics with access to Soviet archives. So then the details of this plan should have been found by now. Yet the sum total of evidence remains the word of a single person who was never involved in the plan and never saw it claiming someone else told him about it.

Why do you say that? the atomic bomb changed much, we know that the Russian leadership was taken by surprise by the speed that the Americans went from development to operational use. Once the bomb was dropped, much changed in Russia. One of the decisions might have been stopping these plans.

The Russian leadership wasn't surprised by the atomic bombs use at all. They were shocked, but that's not the same thing. Even then, they did not recognize the bomb as a big change nor does the claim that it changed much in Russia withstand scrutiny.
 
What is a bit obscure - still - is the fact that Churchill had wanted to enroll some 200,000 former German soldiers into Unthinkable.

Did the UK staff start to consider where they would be coming from? And also why would they enroll for another war?

There can only be one set of Germans wanting to have another go at Russia: SS.

Was that part of Unthinkable glossed over or was it just too … unthinkable and was dropped out of the plan rather fast?

There are plenty of options really:

LW pilots with Me-262
SS Panzer divisions with Tigers
SS conscripts from Baltic

Who from US/UK side would have liked having SS troops in their command?

… or was this just another fanciful flight of reality of Churchill? (wonder what he was smoking, surely not good for him!)
 
Yes, but the level of Stalin's involvement in even relatively minor matters was pretty astounding. For example, during the purges prior to WWII Stalin would compose lists of dozens to hundreds of individuals to be rounded up for execution and send out the secret police to execute them, with many of these people being fairly obscure.

The level of his micromanaging is extraordinary and extremely destructive, Adam Bruno Ulam in his book on Stalin, stated that the greatest military feat of ww2 was the successful German retreat from Russia despite Hitler's interference and claims that the only reason that the Germans pulled it off was because of Stalin's interference.


There's a difference between authorizing a plan and executing it. Historians agree that the Politburo authorized Zhukov's May 15th 1941 Pre-emptive strike plan, but they did not agree too it's execution. .

Absolutely

Furthermore, as the May 15th example shows, plans authorized by the Politburo immediately before and during WW2 have been accessible to academics with access to Soviet archives.

(a)
My understanding is that only limited access has been allowed to academics often with conditions. Boris Yeltsin did open some archives mainly to help discredit the Communist regime. But by the mid-1990s many of those archives had closed, while others — including the foreign and military intelligence archives and the defence ministry archive — were never open to most researchers in the first place.


So then the details of this plan should have been found by now. Yet the sum total of evidence remains the word of a single person who was never involved in the plan and never saw it claiming someone else told him about it.

I presume if these exist they would be in defence ministry archives see (a) above





The Russian leadership wasn't surprised by the atomic bombs use at all. They were shocked, but that's not the same thing. Even then, they did not recognize the bomb as a big change nor does the claim that it changed much in Russia withstand scrutiny.

After the bomb drop, the Russian army went into immediate alert in the East, the attack on the East was started early. Work on the Russian nuclear program was stepped with all all-out crash program.

No.

You overlook the East Prussians, whose homes are now literally part of Russia.

Plus in this POD, much of Germany will be occupied by the Russians
 
Ok, I will accept that. What I was looking at was organized military units with a political motivation as well. SS conscripts from the Balkans, etc might or might not have 'qualified' in this context.

The thing is: I cannot see German army troops having any interest in another war. I can see SS as being politically motivated to have another go at it.

It leaves the SS commanders to be considered. The best part were war criminals and were being detained or going on trial. Would they have been released in the name of 'crusade against communism'? that would have upset all the previously occupied arears throughout Europe.

If even the thought about using SS by US/UK had come out, I doubt very much that there would have been any support for the coming of NATO later on. Each and every nation had felt the heel of SS.

With the very limited info on the exact supposed workings of Unthinkable, it is difficult to see if there were any distinction between German army troops and SS. BUT: How would and could US/UK distinguish if the goal was to raise 200,000 German troops?

Does anybody know: was there ever an attempt of recruitment in the German POW camps?
 
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