In any case, the wiki article plays some accounting games to make the WAllies numbers look better then they actually are. The most glaring example is counting every single AFV the WAllies have in Europe, regardless of where it is or what's it doing, while only counting the Soviet AFVs they have assigned to units.
The figures for AFVs are generally analogous. 90-plus percent of the time ETO tank reports were only concerned with operational strength, because that's what mattered for immediate combat capability.
While Zaloga never outright says his numbers exclude tanks under repair or otherwise unavailable to line units, it can be inferred that this is the case because the 21st Army Group's after action report (p. 57) tallied 9,248 at war's end as opposed to Zaloga's 4,241. If you want to nit-pick, possible alternative explanations might include:
1) The British uncharacteristically lumped in TDs and SPGs (absent in Zaloga) under the name "tanks," which, on top of the egregious misnomer makes even less sense in the context of this document since "enemy tanks and SP-guns" are referenced as such a few sentences later.
2) Zaloga horribly underrported the strength of the British armo(u)red force by a factor of 2, making the ratio look even worse for the Soviets.
2) Zaloga horribly underrported the strength of the British armo(u)red force by a factor of 2, making the ratio look even worse for the Soviets.
Given the second sentence of this post and since neither (1) nor (2) seem particularly likely, the default is that this is an apples to apples comparison of operational categories.
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That said, In my opinion the biggest real problems with this table are the following:
1) Because I don't have any statistics from April/May 1945 the numbers I used for the Soviets (shown below) are from January. While it's possible they may have had more tanks and planes in April, the personnel strength of operational forces decreased to 6,249,517, which suggests an overall weakening of combat power. Without any way to be certain one way or another, I used the earlier numbers.
2) The table excludes Eastern European puppet troops (Poles, Romanians, etc), again, due to a sheer lack of data. In any regard, in this case they would have contributed little more than warm bodies and likely would not have been all that willing to help the Soviets.