WW2 WI: Only a Northern Pacific Offensive/Campaign

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

1) Let's say that the United States and the Allies come to their senses and realize that the Japanese logistically can't invade Australia, Hawaii, and New Zealand.

2) Let's also say that the United States and Allies realize that Japan has devoted most of its forces to the South and Central Pacific along with mainland Asia, while devoting very little to the Northern Pacific.

3) Because of this, the United States and it's Allies decide to scrap all offensive plans in the Southwest and Central Pacific and instead decide to devote otls resources towards a solely Northern Pacific Offensive with the goal of flanking the Japanese defense networks, securing naval trade routes with Russia, and hitting Japan as quickly as possible.

The timetable would be as follows (after Midway) :

A) Summer/Fall 1942
- Retake Kiska
- Retake Attu

B) Spring/Summer/Fall 1943
- Retake Wake Island
- Take Minami-Tori-Shima (Marcus Island)
- Take the Kuril Islands
- Finish off remnants of Kido Butai

C) Spring/Summer/Fall 1944
- Take Hokkaido
- Take Ogasawara Islands

D) Spring/Summer 1945
- Bomb Japan into oblivion if they haven't sued for peace yet.

4) Is such a campaign logistically, strategically, and tactically possible, assuming the starting point is Anchorage, Alaska?

 

[jlckansas]

4) Is such a campaign logistically, strategically, and tactically possible, assuming the starting point is Anchorage, Alaska?

No, because nothing was in Anchorage in 1941, to 1. Support the military. 2. No way of providing logistical support from that point. 3. Its way out of the way to start there to end up where you want to go.
There is no way to support logistics up in the Aleutians with the long distances, lack of infrastructure and weather making it almost impossible under normal circumstance to work there.


Hawaii was the starting point for everything Pacific whether North, Central or South because of the logistical bases already their and where everything lead from their.

 

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

No, because nothing was in Anchorage in 1941, to 1. Support the military. 2. No way of providing logistical support from that point. 3. Its way out of the way to start there to end up where you want to go.
There is no way to support logistics up in the Aleutians with the long distances, lack of infrastructure and weather making it almost impossible under normal circumstance to work there.


Hawaii was the starting point for everything Pacific whether North, Central or South because of the logistical bases already their and where everything lead from their.

A) Given that otl US campaigns in the Aleutians during 42/43 we're based out of Anchorage and Dutch Harbor, I'd argue that you're partially incorrect that there isn't enough infrastructure in the area to support larger operations.

B) The United States built dozens of airfields, bases, and depots during the war in the Southwest and Central Pacific so that they could expand operations. I don't see any reason as to why that's impossible in Alaska, especially considering much of the Central Pacific in particular is desolate with nothing major around it.

C) Anchorage is closer to Tokyo than Honolulu, and California is closer to Alaska than Hawaii. There's nothing Logistically out of the way/indirect from going from taking a Northern Pacific Campaign.



The only thing I agree with in your post is that weather could be an issue.

 

[jlckansas]

You are confusing taking two small islands, one of which the Japanese retreated from before we invaded it, and the Central/Southwest Pacific campaign. You would literally have to build at a minimum everything that was not only at Pearl Harbor for the Navy, drydocks, fuel tank farms, airfields, ammo supply points; but also everything there to support the Army bases, again fuel tank farms, food, ammo dumps, but also the airfields for the AAF, including their base housing, hangers, fuel tank farms, ammo dumps. You also have to build out the transportation infrastructure to connect all this together around Anchorage. This is just to get up to the starting point of what you have existing in the Hawaiian Islands before Pearl Harbor in 1941 let alone what was built afterwards.

Weather up there is terrible most of the year with non flyable times judged in weeks at times by WW2 standards. the sea states in the North Pacific are terrible most of the time that would not let them do underway replenishment and have to go back the the Great White Fleet logistic model of having to put into a port to refuel, rearm and other logistics like food transfer that a normal unrep was done in the other areas of the Pacific.

 

[BobTheBarbarian]

For what it's worth, historically the Army judged a Central Pacific only campaign to be militarily infeasible, illustrated by the talking points brought up during the Luzon vs Formosa "debate" (which, judging by the evidence really wasn't much of a debate at all - in my opinion the significance of MacArthur's political maneuverings for a return to the Philippines is way overblown and the invasion probably would have happened no matter who was in charge).

 

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

You are confusing taking two small islands, one of which the Japanese retreated from before we invaded it, and the Central/Southwest Pacific campaign. You would literally have to build at a minimum everything that was not only at Pearl Harbor for the Navy, drydocks, fuel tank farms, airfields, ammo supply points; but also everything there to support the Army bases, again fuel tank farms, food, ammo dumps, but also the airfields for the AAF, including their base housing, hangers, fuel tank farms, ammo dumps. You also have to build out the transportation infrastructure to connect all this together around Anchorage. This is just to get up to the starting point of what you have existing in the Hawaiian Islands before Pearl Harbor in 1941 let alone what was built afterwards.

Weather up there is terrible most of the year with non flyable times judged in weeks at times by WW2 standards. the sea states in the North Pacific are terrible most of the time that would not let them do underway replenishment and have to go back the the Great White Fleet logistic model of having to put into a port to refuel, rearm and other logistics like food transfer that a normal unrep was done in the other areas of the Pacific.

The Alaska theater in otl supported over 144,000 men in otl.

Aleutian Islands campaign - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

I think you're highly underestimating US logistical abilities.

 

[David Floyd]

What islands would the USN use as advanced anchorages? Ulithi doesn't really exist in the North Pacific.

 

[Chris Triangle]

The vast majority of supplies would of course come by sea no matter what but you can still bring a fair amount overland. They built the Alaska highway in 9 months though it wasn't actually needed. If this campaign occurs, it definitely is needed. It would also be necessary to build a rail connection between Anchorage and Prince George British Columbia, which was considered but not attempted OTL. How long this would take, I do not know. Probably about a year.

 

[CV12Hornet]

B) Spring/Summer/Fall 1943
- Retake Wake Island
- Take Minami-Tori-Shima (Marcus Island)
- Take the Kuril Islands
- Finish off remnants of Kido Butai

To my mind, this sequence doesn't make sense. The Kurils make sense as an advance from the north. But adding Wake, which is further from the Kurils and Aleutians than it is from Hawaii? Especially since Wake and Marcus are rather small islands unable to provide much airpower help and no help at all as anchorages?

C) Spring/Summer/Fall 1944
- Take Hokkaido
- Take Ogasawara Islands

At this point you've got two separate campaigns going, the southern of which is vulnerable to interdiction from the Marshalls.

 

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

To my mind, this sequence doesn't make sense. The Kurils make sense as an advance from the north. But adding Wake, which is further from the Kurils and Aleutians than it is from Hawaii? Especially since Wake and Marcus are rather small islands unable to provide much airpower help and no help at all as anchorages?


At this point you've got two separate campaigns going, the southern of which is vulnerable to interdiction from the Marshalls.

I'm fine with taking out Wake, Marcus, and Ogasawara.

I threw them in there because they're on the border of North and Central Pacific and because they'd make good sub bases.

 

[jlckansas]

The Alaska theater in otl supported over 144,000 men in otl.

Aleutian Islands campaign - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

I think you're highly underestimating US logistical abilities.

1. Everything still has to be built from scratch, all the bases and support infrastructure. The USN and Army Air Corps had plenty of pre war experience up there and told the Joint Chiefs in the planning after Pearl Harbor that we cannot go that way. Everything has to go by sea to Alaska and too much would be tied up in logistics just getting it there.

2. 144,000 was total of everyone, Navy, Army, Army Aircorps there. The Invasion of the Marshalls had that many in ground troops for just invading 3 islands.

3. Weather is horrible, have you ever watched Dangerous Catch on Discovery? They are in the Aleutian and will give you ideas of what it’s like up there.

 

[McPherson]

1) Let's say that the United States and the Allies come to their senses and realize that the Japanese logistically can't invade Australia, Hawaii, and New Zealand.

2) Let's also say that the United States and Allies realize that Japan has devoted most of its forces to the South and Central Pacific along with mainland Asia, while devoting very little to the Northern Pacific.

3) Because of this, the United States and it's Allies decide to scrap all offensive plans in the Southwest and Central Pacific and instead decide to devote otls resources towards a solely Northern Pacific Offensive with the goal of flanking the Japanese defense networks, securing naval trade routes with Russia, and hitting Japan as quickly as possible.

The timetable would be as follows (after Midway) :

A) Summer/Fall 1942
- Retake Kiska
- Retake Attu

B) Spring/Summer/Fall 1943
- Retake Wake Island
- Take Minami-Tori-Shima (Marcus Island)
- Take the Kuril Islands
- Finish off remnants of Kido Butai

C) Spring/Summer/Fall 1944
- Take Hokkaido
- Take Ogasawara Islands

D) Spring/Summer 1945
- Bomb Japan into oblivion if they haven't sued for peace yet.

4) Is such a campaign logistically, strategically, and tactically possible, assuming the starting point is Anchorage, Alaska?

There is a wonderful TV series that shows why the North Pacific (Aleutians) route was considered insane in WWII. It was called "Deadliest Catch". When one watches a few episodes, one comes away with a better understanding of weather's influence on sea-power and history.

 

[nbcman]

The Alaska theater in otl supported over 144,000 men in otl.

Aleutian Islands campaign - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

I think you're highly underestimating US logistical abilities.

Battle of Leyte / Luzon had over 320k IOTL. Okinawa was over 750k. I won't go to how many millions of personnel were estimated for Ops Olympic & Coronet. It far outstrips the very limited space that is available for ports / airfields on the volcanic and wind swept Aleutians and beyond.

Additionally, the northern route allows the Japanese to hold SEA and reduces the risk to shipping between Japan and points south so oil and other resources will be more plentiful.

 

[Dilvish]

To my mind, this sequence doesn't make sense. The Kurils make sense as an advance from the north. But adding Wake, which is further from the Kurils and Aleutians than it is from Hawaii? Especially since Wake and Marcus are rather small islands unable to provide much airpower help and no help at all as anchorages?


At this point you've got two separate campaigns going, the southern of which is vulnerable to interdiction from the Marshalls.

Wake and Marcus may make sense as bases for reconnaissance aircraft. Wake Island as a further practice landing before the big ones? Not that I'm advocating for the Northern Pacific strategy.

Another thought. With the US committed to a far northern advance, the IJN may decide to wait on the decisive battle until the Americans get close to Hokkaido. That battle could go a lot differently than the Philippine Sea or Leyte Gulf.

 

[The Tai-Pan]

You are also leaving the Philippines and Australia out to dry here.

 

[McPherson]

Wake and Marcus may make sense as bases for reconnaissance aircraft. Wake Island as a further practice landing before the big ones? Not that I'm advocating for the Northern Pacific strategy.

Another thought. With the US committed to a far northern advance, the IJN may decide to wait on the decisive battle until the Americans get close to Hokkaido. That battle could go a lot differently than the Philippine Sea or Leyte Gulf.

These can be seaplane base support and fighter bases to support a direct attack on the Marianas Islands.

 

[nortex]

My concern would be if there was a significant naval battle in the northern Pacific the death rate of sailors from sunken ships/downed air crews would be extremely high. Bad for morale. Even with a quick rescue hypothermia would be a huge concern. Ship death tolls potentially like Scharnhorst at North Cape.