WW2: WI no strategic bombing?

It is often said that the strategic air campaign waged by the UK and US against Nazi Germany was a waste of resources.
It is also said that the campaign was a war crime (not by me).

So, what would have happened if the RAF and USAAF had not been devoted to strategic bombing?

POD
Strategic bombing did not appear during the war - to remove it we need an earlier POD. Douhet's book "The Command of the Air," HG Wells' "The Shape of Things to Come," Mitchell's experiments and the RAF's use of bombing to police Britain's Middle Eastern territories all had their parts to play. The Guernica raid and the attraction of strategic bombing as a way to ensure the independence of the RAF are also important.

I suspect multiple PODs would be required. The removal of Douhet, Mitchell and Trenchard might suffice. If the RAF never became independent and remained the RFC and RNAS, British air power could be focused on anti-shipping, medium bombers and close air support. If Guernica results in moral outrage, a government could cut funding for the strategic bombing force.


Now, assuming that the butterflies have been quiet, WW2 begins according to OTL. What would be the effects of this lack of a strategic bombing force?

The consequences of bombing on the German industry have been widely debated, but if the factories are not bombed flat, production will be higher, resulting in a more effective front-line force. The Ploesti oil fields will be safe.

Secondary consequences will include the damage to the railways, and the time and resources no longer required to rebuild/bombproof factories.

The forces required to defend the Reich against the bombers will be available to the fronts. By 1944, over 2,000 88mm guns were involved in the AA role in Germany - these could have been employed in the anti-tank role. The Luftwaffe's day fighters were nearly wiped out during the spring of 1944 when the US introduced long-range fighter cover.

No Tallboy or Grand Slam bombs - the aircraft to carry them won't exist. This won't change much, but these were the only weapons capable of hurting u-boats inside their pens. The Dambusters raid won't be possible.

When the atom bomb is thought up, the bombers to carry it will have to be designed from the ground up - OTL's experience of building such aircraft won't exist.


We can assume that the Allies will use the resources that in OTL were used for the bomber force on something else. I can think of the following options.

More medium bombers, along the lines of the US B-25, B-26, a British equivalent, and the Mosquito.

More close air support.

More aircraft will be available for convoy and antisub patrols. These may be OTL's flying boat designs, or may include long-range land-based air cover. This would help swing the Battle of the Atlantic to the Allies, but the lack of strategic bombing will allow higher production of U-boats.

With spare engine production, more landing craft may be built.

Without the demand on the Merlin engine, Britain may get the Cromwell tank earlier - but the Sherman was about as good.


Politically, the Western allies were able to point to the resources used in the bomber offensive when Stalin called for a second front. Without this, the Allies may have to launch the invasion of Europe earlier than OTL, probably in 1943.

Without the bomber offensive, they may have the troops needed, but won't have air superiority. Given the limits on assault shipping the landings may have to be in the Mediterranean (if the invasion of Italy happens), or a reduced cross-channel offensive. However, the Atlantic wall won't have been built.

The desert war would probably go better for the British - the Germans were limited by logistics, and the British will be better off from the spare capacity.

This assumes that the Battle of France goes as OTL, of course. If the British army has more air support they may be able to destroy the bridges over the Meuse, thus stopping the German encirclement.


I'm sure I've not covered everything here, so let me know what I've missed and where I've gone wrong!
 
Why not butterfly away the whole Great War and the zeppelin raids, not to mention the Gotha and Handley-Page bombers? Someone will figure it out.
 

CalBear

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Realistically this is impossible. The Germans had bombed London starting in 1915 and had continued until the end of the War. Great Britain had used heavy bombing in WW I had had planned to use the V/1500 to bomb Berlin in early 1919.

The best you could hope for is a taboo on bombing of purely civilian targets. This would have a dramatic impact on target selection by Bomber Command (and would likely break Air Marshall Harris' bloody minded heart), and a small impact on USAAF target selection in the ETO and a much more noteworthy impact on B-29 targeting in the campaign against Japan. The impact on Luftwaffe operations would also be considerable, starting with the Rotterdam Raid, which largely set the pattern for both sides for the rest of the war, likely never taking place.

The combat utility of heavy bombers was so great that it is virtually impossible that they would not be used.
 

Lonewolf

Banned
If no strategic bombers would have been build, what can you build instead?

A B-17 bomber had a weight of 16 tons. Not all of it metal. Compare it to the weight of a destroyer or battleship and you have maybe 3 more ships in your inventory.

Another solution would be to copy the blitzkrieg concept. More armor and short range planes like the Stuka JU-87.

More artillery or aa guns would be also possible.

And CalBear, I just looked up the Hague Conventions.

Article 25
The attack or bombardment of towns, villages, habitations or buildings which are not defended, is prohibited.

Article 26
The Commander of an attacking force, before commencing a bombardment, except in the case of an assault, should do all he can to warn the authorities.

Article 27
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps should be taken to spare as far as possible edifices devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not used at the same time for military purposes.
The besieged should indicate these buildings or places by some particular and visible signs, which should previously be notified to the assailants.

I found no reference that Rotterdam was declared an open city. And a city that is defended, can be attacked.
Warsaw was declared a fortress and the germans were allowed to shoot.

In the case of Rotterdam I once read a description that said that a german bomber wing was not informed that negotiations took place and therefore their attack was to be postponed. The bombers went into attack mode (pulling in their radio antennas) and the first three machines dropped their bombs. Meanwhile the germans on the ground were firing flares to stop the attack and a german offcer pursued the bomber wing in a ME-109 to stop them. After the first three machines had dropped their bombs they saw the flares and stopped the bombing. In this report it was also mentioned that the firefighters of Rotterdam were using outdated equipment.

But I would agree with you CalBear, that maybe the rules of selecting bombing targets would be more strict in regard to civilian targets. Maybe the air superiority of the allies would be much greater in regard to fighters, fighterbombers or battlefieldattackplanes (the Ju-87 with two 37mm cannons was a very good anti tank plane. Just think of houndreds more of Typhoons as antitank or antiinfantry planes.) In this case i think that maybe the decisive battles would have been fought in France and maybe the war would have been over earlier.
 

CalBear

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The Hauge Convention was never violated by the bombing campaign of either side in the ETO or bythe USAAF in the PTO (the Japanese actions against Manilia are questionable) since every city or town in Europe and Japan WAS defended by AAA & fighters.

I brought up Rotterdam as an example, not because it was a Hauge violation, but as the example of a effectively civilian city being bombed. The British were probably the great civilian bombers in Europe, thanks to Harris, while the USAAF mostly was in the collateral damage business (and that business was good), while the Luftwaffe did most of the work in the East.

Strategic bombing has never been a violation of the existing rules of war. Unrestricted submarine warfare, on the other hand...
If no strategic bombers would have been build, what can you build instead?

A B-17 bomber had a weight of 16 tons. Not all of it metal. Compare it to the weight of a destroyer or battleship and you have maybe 3 more ships in your inventory.

Another solution would be to copy the blitzkrieg concept. More armor and short range planes like the Stuka JU-87.

More artillery or aa guns would be also possible.

And CalBear, I just looked up the Hague Conventions.

Article 25
The attack or bombardment of towns, villages, habitations or buildings which are not defended, is prohibited.

Article 26
The Commander of an attacking force, before commencing a bombardment, except in the case of an assault, should do all he can to warn the authorities.

Article 27
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps should be taken to spare as far as possible edifices devoted to religion, art, science, and charity, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not used at the same time for military purposes.
The besieged should indicate these buildings or places by some particular and visible signs, which should previously be notified to the assailants.

I found no reference that Rotterdam was declared an open city. And a city that is defended, can be attacked.
Warsaw was declared a fortress and the germans were allowed to shoot.

In the case of Rotterdam I once read a description that said that a german bomber wing was not informed that negotiations took place and therefore their attack was to be postponed. The bombers went into attack mode (pulling in their radio antennas) and the first three machines dropped their bombs. Meanwhile the germans on the ground were firing flares to stop the attack and a german offcer pursued the bomber wing in a ME-109 to stop them. After the first three machines had dropped their bombs they saw the flares and stopped the bombing. In this report it was also mentioned that the firefighters of Rotterdam were using outdated equipment.

But I would agree with you CalBear, that maybe the rules of selecting bombing targets would be more strict in regard to civilian targets. Maybe the air superiority of the allies would be much greater in regard to fighters, fighterbombers or battlefieldattackplanes (the Ju-87 with two 37mm cannons was a very good anti tank plane. Just think of houndreds more of Typhoons as antitank or antiinfantry planes.) In this case i think that maybe the decisive battles would have been fought in France and maybe the war would have been over earlier.
 
Tricky topic. The adoption of strategic bombing, as opposed to the use of heavy bombers, was not particularly war-winning until the escorted American raids of 1944. I don't believe that ignoring the heavy bomber offensive would have improved the Army co-operation performance in France, since the doctrine had not yet been created. The long-range anti-submarine patrol situation would possibly be worse since it drew from heavy bomber production and was never considered priority enough to spur it's own development. The accellerated use of Mosquito aircraft could have cut RAF aircrew losses dramatically, but has some butterflies involved. More arguments please.
 
I found no reference that Rotterdam was declared an open city. And a city that is defended, can be attacked.
Warsaw was declared a fortress and the germans were allowed to shoot.

In the case of Rotterdam I once read a description that said that a german bomber wing was not informed that negotiations took place and therefore their attack was to be postponed. The bombers went into attack mode (pulling in their radio antennas) and the first three machines dropped their bombs. Meanwhile the germans on the ground were firing flares to stop the attack and a german offcer pursued the bomber wing in a ME-109 to stop them. After the first three machines had dropped their bombs they saw the flares and stopped the bombing. In this report it was also mentioned that the firefighters of Rotterdam were using outdated equipment.
Although a part of the above is correct, a large part of it you probably remembered wrong. If you're interested, you should look it up.

Rotterdam was bombed by more then 3 bombers.
The German flares could also very well have been used to indicate the location of the German troops to stop those from getting bombed.

It's not so crazy the Germans tried to blame the Dutch afterwards.
Afterall, that would be a good way to spread the responsibility around.

Do you genuinely think it's possible 25 000 houses would be destroyed because of outdated equipment used by firefighters? Even without any attempts at firefighting whatsoever it'd be hard to get that much destroyed by so few bombers...

rot40no2.jpg


Sorry to ramble on so long, but your post slightly annoyed me.

On-topic;
the largest difference IMHO would be the large amount (100 000+) of very skilled and talented men the Brits and Americans would have for another purpose. The best were usually selected for the strategic bombers with the dredge ending up with the footsloggers.

imgres
 
Wilfred Freeman had a survey done in 38 or 39 on the cost effectivenes of medium vs heavy aircraft in terms of cost, and aircrew, groundcrew and ground installations required and it came out in favour of heavy 4-engined vs medium 2-engined by a factor of around 2.


The problem with the heavy bombers is what do you target?


Oil and Transport are now seen to be the targets that should have been chosen but there are also alternatives



Target:Hitler’s oil, Allied attacks on German oil supplies 1939-45 by Ronald C. Cooke and Roy Conyers Nesbit

Apart from the oil plants and transport network, there were other weak points in the German economy, which would have been very worthwhile targets for attacks by the Anglo-American strategic bombers. These were plants producing key war chemicals such as synthetic nitrogen, methanol (synthetic wood alcohol), tetraethyl lead and synthetic rubber. Nitrogen was vitally important in the manufacture of explosives and V2 rocket fuel; it was also essential in the production of agricultural fertilizer. Tetraethyl lead was an indispensable ingredient of aviation fuel; without it the Luftwaffe’s fighter aircraft would have been deprived of 40 per cent of their engine power and have been hopelessly outclassed in combat. With the almost complete cessation of imports of natural rubber from overseas on the outbreak of war, the production within Germany of synthetic rubber, needed for many types of wheeled vehicle, assumed great importance.

In the case of some of these products, for example nitrogen, the plants that manufactured them were very few in number and of large capacity. Direct attacks on them would probably have had an even more crippling affect than the raids on the oil installations. Although, the Western Allies know a great deal about German industry even before the war began, the military leaders did not appreciate the crucial importance of the chemical industry or of the close interdependence between certain branches of production, as between the manufacture of oil, chemicals, synthetic rubber and explosives. This information came to light only after the war, when American and British survey teams carried out post mortem investigations in Germany into the effectiveness of Allied strategic bombing.

None the less, manufacture of the above key items was greatly hampered as a by-product of the oil-offensive, although this fact was not fully realised at the time. When the oil plants at Luena and Ludwigshaven were temporarily put out of action, Germany was deprived of 63% of its current output of nitrogen, 40% of its synthetic methanol and 65% of its synthetic rubber production.






The problem is, it is going to take time to get the force required to do the damage required and war doesn't allow for waiting around.
 
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Strategic bombing was also carried out by tactical bombers such as during the Blitz and Malta, so it seems that everyone sees its value but the execution is the problem. If so, then increasing bombing effectiveness is the way to go. The Germans were well ahead with their Knickebein, X and Y Gerat navigtion devices and KG 100 semi-pathfinders, the use of which could have been worked out before the war to get better results.

In contrast the RAF used dead reckoning and other shitty navigational methods so regularly missed their target areas by milies and miles in 1940. Britain needed to develop Gee and Oboe to be ready in 1940 so strategic bombing wasn't so wasteful and ineffective.
 
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burmafrd

Banned
We did not need more DDs or really any ships; nor tanks or trucks for that matter (maybe more trucks would have come in handy but you need fuel to run them and that was a distribution problem in ETO). So really nothing else to expend that metal or materials or labor on.

Long range bombers had been bandied about since WW1 and quite a few were working on them and would have continued even without Mitchel and the rest. As aircraft technology improved, they got bigger anyway. Once Boeing built the prototype of the B-17 it got a lot of attention from many countries that started looking even harder at LR bombers. I think its virtually impossible to butterfly that away, and same with strategic bombing-one led to the other.

I am amazed how badly the allies screwed up Strategic Bombing; it should have been obvious that only a few things are vital to the german war machine and that oil would be the most critical factor; and a little research and thought would have come up with the others. Even the Ball Bearing attacks if say continued by the Brits at night would have had significant consequences if production could have been badly delayed for several months. Just attacking transportation in germany would have been very productive; bridges and rail roads can be fairly well targeted and once again consequences would have been significant.
 
I'm surprised no one's mentioned one of the Strategic Bombing campaign's largest costs to Germany: planes and pilots, both in combat/attrition and in numbers diverted from the front lines. Not to mention fuel and ammo used up in the process.

The Air campaign, particularly the US daylight raids, were a bloodbath for both sides. It became a brutal war of attrition which favored the Allies in numbers and industrial capacity. For example, while bombing Schweinfurt-Regensburg in '43 cost the Allies 60 bombers, it cost the Luftwaffe 40 fighters (citing wiki, so excuse any inaccuracies) while temporarily reducing German production 43%. This was a very bad bad day for the allies...perhaps the worst day of the campaign. Yet those 60 allied aircraft could be replaced in weeks, the air crews in months. The Germans could replace the planes in a couple months or so, but the pilots were a quickly dwindling resource.

Not only did this ease up the air campaign in the east, but the attrition eventually sapped the Luftwaffe to the point that by June 1944 the Normandy landings encountered a minimal German air presence. The Wehrmacht even had a saying: If [the plane's] green, it's British, if it's silver, it's American, if it's invisible, it's ours."

Pilot losses showed as well. By 1944 the allies faced a handful of seriously dangerous veterans leading a mob of under-trained newbs...with a predictable shift in kill ratios.


So, no Strategic Bombing campaign will mean more planes and pilots over the Soviet Union, which will be bad for the Eastern Front. It could damn well make the difference in some major battles like *Kursk. (Note: the USSR eventually wins anyway, IMO, but it will be bloodier and take longer) It will mean more German aircraft over Africa and Italy...and over Northern France. It will also mean (assuming tactical losses in the east don't counteract this) more seasoned pilots for the allies to face. Landing in Europe will be far costlier without the air supremacy the WAllies had OTL and possibly not doable. Worst case scenario: I could see Germany holding out another year or more and probably most of Europe falling to Stalin. Note those added months mean that many more holocaust casualties, probably more than enough to make up for civilian losses avoided ATL.

In Japan, without the strategic campaign there will be no surrender. Either the Allies invade by ship or come to a negotiated settlement.
 

Lonewolf

Banned
Strategic bombing has never been a violation of the existing rules of war. Unrestricted submarine warfare, on the other hand...

Hello Calbear,
first excuse me for shortening the quote of your post.
Second as far as I know the germans used unrestricted submarine warfare after the british used Q-Ships to sink subs that behaved according to the rules of warfare. (surfacing, inspecting the ship, using the gun to sink the ship.)

Do you allow me to be a rules lawyer? (in roleplaying terms it means the person sticks to the rules and knows them perfectly and points outs even minor error by the other players) If yes I would like to ask two questions:
1) Before the germans bombed Warsaw they dropped leaflets and additionally asked if Warsaw was a defended city. I used goggle but I found no instance where the allied forces asked if german cities were fortresses (like Warsaw) or open Cities (like Paris 1944).
2) I own a solitaire game of sub warfare ( I am willing to post the name of the company and the game) and on page 5 it is said that 6 hours after Pearl Harbour the following message was sent to all US naval forces: "Execute unrestricted Air and submarine warfare against Japan."

Please look http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied_submarines_in_the_Pacific_War

To FlyingDutchman:
I admit it is many years ago I read it. As you read this I did some searching. So I was in a small part right but in a greater part wrong. Please accept my apology.

According to
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rotterdam_Blitz
3 planes of the southern and 54 planes of the north-eastern attack formation dropped their bombs.
Why the uncontrollable fires (vegetable oil storage was hit and some sources mention timberframed houses and a steady fire supporting wind) could not be controlled, I find nothing reliable (for Coventry for instance in the wikipedia article it is entered that "Firemen from throughout the Midlands came to fight the fires but found that each brigade had different connections for their hoses. Consequently much fire-fighting equipment could not be used.")

In the internet and the article I read I find views ranging from "fire fighting equipment from 1600", to "the equipment was mishandled or not capable of controlling such a big fire" to "not enough equipment".
So if you have a better information I would appreciate if you would give me more information.
Thank you.
 
So, what would have happened if the RAF and USAAF had not been devoted to strategic bombing?

How about massive Allied airborne troops and airborne supplies? With help of air transport the Allies would be able to conduct an unprecedented blitzkrieg after the landings. Army level airborne troops instead of division-corps level troops of OTL, planes flying supplies for rapidly advancing armored troops instead of slugfests of OTL...
 
Airborne troops and supplies would have been shot down by the Luftwaffe fighters which had not been themselves shot down in great quantities defending Germany from strategic bombardment. One of the original goals of the AAF campaign was the elimination of Luftwaffe fighters. No campaign means more fighters on the front lines. It also means more fuel for those fighters. In fact, the atom bomb is a strategic bomb. There's no need for B-29's if there's no strategic bombs.
The effect of indiscriminate strategic bombing on the morale of civilian populations was pretty much overplayed, but the effect on industrial output and the ability to wage war was real.
Focke-Wulf manufactured their own Moskito out of plywood. Production was halted by the loss of glue production. Strategic bombing. Just a very small aspect, but an effect.
The suffering of civilian populations during strategic bombing was horrific, but the suffering of civilian refugees strafed on roadways to impede military traffic was horrific as well. War is hell. And winning isn't everything, it's the only thing.
The strategic campaigns weren't always fought well or wisely, but they were fought as best as possible, and improved with time.
To imply that any other aspect of war would have been improved by the elimination of heavy strategic bombardment is to ignore the fact that those other aspects have to be learned as well.
 
I'm surprised no one's mentioned one of the Strategic Bombing campaign's largest costs to Germany: planes and pilots, both in combat/attrition and in numbers diverted from the front lines. Not to mention fuel and ammo used up in the process.

This is true, but it is only a indirect benefit of strategic bombing and probably could have been largely duplicated by tactical bombing in support of theatre operations. I think the real issue is that the Allies set out to destroy German production but only succeesed in winning a battle of atrittion. And this advantage has to be wieghed against the indirect loss in things like Coastal Command not getting enough planes to combat Uboats and the value of longer range bombing in support of operations in the Med.

I think that strategic bombing wouldn't be controversial if it was successful in the earliest days. I think this would happen with a combination of better technology such as electronic navigation, and doctrine such as selecting targets commensurate with BCs capabilities.
 
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