WW2: What if Vichy declares war on Britain after attack on Mers-el-Kébir?

Even in non-nightmare mode, the increased presence of French and German subs out of Morocco and West Africa means the South Atlantic starts turning into the most dangerous place to sail for the British.
This is Post 13 from the thread and have emboldened the part that supports what you have written.

It is a British assessment of the consequences of Mers-el-Kébir driving France into war against them.

It is from Page 141 of the Mediterranean and Middle East Volume I on they Hyperwar website.
The decision that, if all else failed, the French capital ships were to be attacked was as serious as it was repugnant, seeing that it might have driven France to war against us. Had this occurred, the naval situation, especially in the Mediterranean, would have become graver still. In all there remained under the Vichy Government's control one battlecruiser, one aircraft carrier, four 8-inch and ten 6-inch cruisers, thirty destroyers and seventy submarines. Numerous bases would have become available to the Axis. French air forces had flown in large numbers to North Africa, where there were now believed to be 180 French bombers and 450 fighters. Attacks could have been made on Malta and Gibraltar and any of our naval forces that might be in the Central or Western Mediterranean. Malta would have become more isolated than ever. Shipping bound for the Middle East by the Cape route would have been liable to attacks from naval and air bases on the west coast of Africa and from Madagascar, while the defences of the important convoy assembly port of Freetown would have required strengthening urgently. Various other defence commitments would have arisen in consequence of threats from neighbouring French territories, while in Egypt a large number of hostile French residents and officials would have been an embarrassment. Finally, if German and Italian action had compelled the withdrawal of the fleet from the Eastern Mediterranean, the transport of Axis forces to Syria could no longer have been prevented and this might have produced a very serious situation indeed.
 
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This is Post 22 repeated.

This is more information on how the British Government viewed the Fall of France and the consequences of the Vichy Government declaring war on Great Britain. It is from Volume X of Grand Strategy.

CHAPTER X

THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF THE FRENCH COLLAPSE (2)


Second in importance only to the French Fleet were the French overseas possessions. Just before the fall of the Reynaud Government the Chiefs of Staff expressed their hope that the French would continue to fight from North Africa, using the abundant shipping at Marseilles to convey all the troops and material possible, with priority for specialist and technical units. But on the same day they advised on the action to be taken in the event of a total French collapse, involving the whole of the army and colonial empire. Much would depend on the attitude of local French authorities, but the general conclusions of the report were that we should intensify the blockade by controlling produce at source and deny the use of French colonial bases to the enemy; there could be no question of taking over the French possessions ourselves. The Mediterranean coast of French Africa would be outside our control but we should press the French to allow us the use of Casablanca should Gibraltar become untenable. By every means the enemy must be kept out of Syria. In the Far East the French defeat might temp the Japanese to occupy Indo-China, whence they could threaten Singapore by both sea and air; we out to do nothing which might disturb the status quo. Here, as elsewhere, American co-operation was most desirable. We should also try to induce Turkey to declare herself a belligerent. In any case, should the Government at Bordeaux make terms with the enemy, we should appeal to the local administrations to disregard a surrender made under duress and fight on with us. General de Gaulle was not as yet a national figure. His broadcasts, especially that of June 23, challenging the authority of the Pétain Government to speak for France, and the British declaration in support of him had naturally incensed Bordeaux, and his initiative was by no means universally applauded even by patriots determined to resist. Nevertheless on June 28 he was recognised by the British Government as "the leader of all Free Frenchmen, wherever they may be, who rally to him in support of the Allied cause".

The Cabinet on June 17 approved both reports. For some days it seemed that the French colonial authorities might respond favourably, but even those who had protested against surrender were reluctant to disobey lawful authority and show a divided front. On the 22nd the British Cabinet authorised a further appeal, but General Noguès, Commander-in-Chief in French North Africa, had accepted defeat by the 25th. He refused to meet Mr. Duff Cooper, Minister of Information, and Lord Gort, who flew to Rabat on the 26th, and they were not allowed to make contact with member of the Reynaud Government.[1] By June 27th it seemed clear in London that there was little hope of resistance in the African colonies. The news from the Levant too was bad. Nowhere, it seemed, in the French overseas empire was anyone of commanding repute prepared to give a lead.[2]

For a few days after the incident at Mers-el-Kebir it was touch and go whether the Government, now installed at Vichy, would be provoked into declaring war on Great Britain. A few French bombs were in fact half-heartedly dropped on Gibraltar and the French Government broke of diplomatic relations. A strategical appreciation of the implications of French hostility was clearly called for, and on July 16 the Chiefs of Staff issued a report on this subject, assuming the worse case, of a France actively hostile.

The most serious military results were likely to appear in the first place in the altered balance of naval strengths in the Mediterranean and the eastern Atlantic, particularly if the enemy used French West African ports. This danger, of the enemy using French bases, came next, and thirdly there was the increased risk to some of our own overseas possessions. Gibraltar might become unusable if attacked from North Africa, and it might become very difficult to reinforce Malta. The use of either Cassablanca or Dakar by the enemy, especially Dakar, would be most serious, nor could we tolerate the use of Diego Saurez in Madagascar as a base for enemy raiders in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand we were in a good position to influence by economic pressure the attitude of the more isolated French colonies.

Steps had already been taken to strengthen the defence of Gibraltar. The local anti-aircraft defences were derisory, a mere eight guns, when the Chiefs of Staff decided on June 19 to send sixteen heavy anti-aircraft guns as a matter of urgency. The importance of Gibraltar as "the only capital ship dock between the United Kingdom and Durban" was stressed at meetings a month later, and also the danger to ships in harbour from the Spanish 12-inch howitzers known to be mounted near by. It was agreed that the fortress must be defended to the last, but the Chiefs of Staff recognised that in the absence of fighter aircraft it could not be used indefinitely as a base for the fleet in the face of heavy air attack from Africa or Spain.

Should Gibraltar become untenable, Freetown in Sierra Leone would become "vitally important" as a bunkering station and a port where convoys could be assembled and routed.[3] Even with Gibraltar still available, Freetown's importance had been greatly increased by the closure of the Mediterranean, since most of the supply ships and transports of the Middle East called at Freetown for water, fuel and stores. This port was also the headquarters of Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic, who had a small force of cruisers at his disposal as escorts and for the protection of trade. The Chiefs of Staff recognised that Freetown might be bombarded in the course of raids by German or Italian ships, but they did not consider serious attack likely unless France became hostile, and they thought it unnecessary to send British troops to Freetown at present. There merely recommended that the coastal and anti-aircraft defences and accommodation prepared for an infantry brigade and a squadron of fighter aircraft. An alternative to Freetown, the possible use of Takoradi in the Gold Coast as assembly port for convoys should be investigated, and it might be feasible to route some part of the Australian and New Zealand trade by the Pacific and Panama, whilst a small proportion of the Cape traffic could be routed via Trinidad; this would however greatly increase the distance and the demand for escorts. Freetown would in any case continue to be a link of the first importance in our sea communications.

The recommendations of the Report of July16 included the maintenance of a capital ship fleet at Gibraltar, as well as of the existing fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean; also immediate action to improve the defences of Malta. On July 22 the Cabinet approved the recommendations and later the same day the Defence Committee paid special attention to the defence of Gibraltar against a surprise attack.

Happily the worst did not occur. Marshal Pétain did not declare war on his old ally. The remaining French warships did not fall into enemy hands. The Germans did not seize the Mediterranean or West African ports. Spain did not admit German troops from France, and German attempts later on to make use of Syria merely gave the Allies an opportunity to occupy it. Neither Gibraltar nor Freetown was not seriously attacked, while Malta resisted all assaults from the air. Nor indeed did the whole of the French Empire adhere to adhere to Vichy; before the end of 1940 the vast regions of French Equatorial Africa joined General de Gaulle.[4]

But our good fortune went further. The Vichy Government itself was neither so uniformly ill-disposed nor so incapable of taking a line of its own as was commonly assumed in London. There were many shades of grey between the black malevolence of Laval, the vacillations of the senile chief, and the latent sympathies of Weygand. Moreover there were limits to the pressure which the conqueror would put on them. Hitler explained to Ciano on July 7 that a separate peace with France was undesirable for two reasons; Germany could not at present occupy French African colonies which she proposed to annex when peace was signed, and it was better to leave them meanwhile in French possession; secondly, the Atlantic coast of France must be retained in German hands for the double purpose of intensifying the war against England and maintaining communications with Spain, "a country which was most useful for the Axis game whatever happened, and indispensable should one wish to make an attempt on Gibraltar".[5]

Hitler evidently thought that in the meantime French official goodwill would be a considerable convenience, and he preferred therefore not to humiliate the Pétain Government beyond a certain measure. A further argument, which may have influenced him, for treating France with some leniency was the emergence of the Free French movement; so long as Britain was undefeated nothing must be done to encourage resistance or, least of all, to drive the French colonies into the Gaullist camp. Vichy had in fact a good many counters to bargain with.

The first test of the relationship between victor and vanquished came on July 16. On the previous day the Germans had demanded military facilities in North Africa: eight air bases in Morocco, the use of the railway from Tunis to Rabat, the use of French ports and French ships to convey German air units to Africa. This demand far exceeded the terms of the armistice and Pétain successfully resisted it.[6] We can now see that, while in the last resort Vichy must obey the crack of the German whip, the Germans would be loath to crack it, or at any rate to use it, more often than necessary. This was not, however, fully understood in England at the time.

[1] See Viscount Northwich, Old Men Forget (1953) pp. 282-284.

[2] For the Levant, see below, p. 302 General Catroux, Governor-General of Indo-China, who afterwards joined de Gaulle, was recalled in July.

[3] See Map 8.

[4] See below, p. 317, and Map 12.

[5] Ciano's Diplomatic Papers p. 376.

[6] Weygand, Rappelé au Service p. 320. Baudouin 172-174
 

thaddeus

Donor
the Vichy "war effort" might mirror the German effort, submarines and air force, rather than employing their fleet? for reasons of fuel and to preserve their capital ships (and of course numerous ships being repaired and/or finished)

My thinking is along those lines. Where I differ is that (fuel permitting) they will employ their fleet, giving first priority to their cruisers and second to the surviving capital ships.

I didn't say so in that post, but one possibility is that the Vichy Air Force in Morocco bombs Gibraltar with greater vigour than OTL, which forces the withdrawal of Force H. ... After Gibraltar's coast artillery is put out of action it will be possible for Axis warships in the Atlantic to move to the Mediterranean and vice versa.

certain you are correct they would want to use their "super destroyers" and that possibility was mooted several times historically.

my view the nightmare scenario is that the (OTL) Battle of Britain and North Africa Campaign are eclipsed by Med Strategy and Channel campaign, resulting in a more unfavorable loss ratio of ships and aircraft for UK than historical.

it would be harder to open a meaningful second front against the Axis once Barbarossa had begun? do not think Stalin would view the loss of French colonies as a second front?

instead of an Operation Torch, the US would be in position of having to reinforce UK in Egypt? or even worse in Iraq/Iran?
 
Given an Axis Vichy, I wonder how the South Atlantic aircraft ferry missions are affected.

Does it lead to increased recruiting of Oz, NZ, &/or Canadian troops? Or greater French colonial numbers? (Does that increase the willingness of Quebecois to enlist?)

Does this butterfly the sending of infantry to HK & Singapore, & their doom? That seems likely, to me.

Does this impact British willingness to accept casualties in Bomber Command? If it looks like the war is going worse, do the Brits became more risk averse sooner, & move away from city-burning? (I don't accept that was the only option, tho it's commonly held out as such.)

With the goal of reducing transport delay, could production of Lancs, Spits, & tanks be set up in Oz? Or the *Sentinel put in production? (*Sentinel with a local variety of the Chrysler Multibank engine?)

In that same vein, was there a chance of increased Canadian production? (Or is Canada max'd out by lack of population?)

Does any of this fall afoul of the U.S. having ample excess capacity...? (Probably:rolleyes: )
 
Given an Axis Vichy, I wonder how the South Atlantic aircraft ferry missions are affected.
Do you mean the aircraft that were flown to Egypt (via Nigeria, French Equatorial Africa and the Sudan) from the deep water port of Takoradi in the Gold Coast?
 

thaddeus

Donor
my view the nightmare scenario is that the (OTL) Battle of Britain and North Africa Campaign are eclipsed by Med Strategy and Channel campaign, resulting in a more unfavorable loss ratio of ships and aircraft for UK than historical.

instead of an Operation Torch, the US would be in position of having to reinforce UK in Egypt?

wondering the fate of the French flotilla at Alexandria? scuttle their own ships as the British arrive to take control of them?

a break out seems unlikely as speculated upon previously, however they might damage any RN ships there? as the Italians did later in Dec. '41, sorry am not finding a handy source for what ships were there (on British side) in last months of 1940?
 
I also think that the pipelines, oil refineries and ports will be high priority targets for the RAF.

However, if they're bombing Vichy targets in the Levant they aren't bombing Italian targets elsewhere in the Middle East and Mediterranean.

I think that the 4 squadrons that were sent to Greece by the end of 1940 IOTL will be sent to Palestine ITTL. One of the RAF pilots that served in Greece was Marmaduke Thomas St John Pattle so his transfer alone is likely to mean many fewer Regia Aeronautica and Luftwaffe losses over Greece and a very high loss rate for the Vichy air force in Syria.

If the refineries are in range of naval guns then the French in the Eastern Med will struggle to keep the RN from Alex leaving a calling card or two.

I have posted this twice (Posts 13 and 181) and am posting it again because I think it has some relevance to your comment.

This is a British assessment of the consequences of Mers-el-Kébir driving France into war against them.

It is from Page 141 of the Mediterranean and Middle East Volume I on they Hyperwar website.
The decision that, if all else failed, the French capital ships were to be attacked was as serious as it was repugnant, seeing that it might have driven France to war against us. Had this occurred, the naval situation, especially in the Mediterranean, would have become graver still. In all there remained under the Vichy Government's control one battlecruiser, one aircraft carrier, four 8-inch and ten 6-inch cruisers, thirty destroyers and seventy submarines. Numerous bases would have become available to the Axis. French air forces had flown in large numbers to North Africa, where there were now believed to be 180 French bombers and 450 fighters. Attacks could have been made on Malta and Gibraltar and any of our naval forces that might be in the Central or Western Mediterranean. Malta would have become more isolated than ever. Shipping bound for the Middle East by the Cape route would have been liable to attacks from naval and air bases on the west coast of Africa and from Madagascar, while the defences of the important convoy assembly port of Freetown would have required strengthening urgently. Various other defence commitments would have arisen in consequence of threats from neighbouring French territories, while in Egypt a large number of hostile French residents and officials would have been an embarrassment. Finally, if German and Italian action had compelled the withdrawal of the fleet from the Eastern Mediterranean, the transport of Axis forces to Syria could no longer have been prevented and this might have produced a very serious situation indeed.
I've emboldened the last sentence, because there won't be any RN warships in the Eastern Med to give the French a calling card or two, if German and Italian action had compelled the withdrawal of the fleet.

However, I think that it's more likely to be Vichy action that forces the withdrawal.

Occupying Madagascar will be high on the list of British priorities and some of the warships needed to do it might come from the Eastern Mediterranean.

I think bombing by the Vichy Air Force in North Africa will compel the British to withdraw Force H from Gibraltar in July 1940 and it might also knock out the Colony's coast artillery. That will allow the Vichy Navy to send Strasbourg and the 4 heavy and 6 light cruisers it had in the Western Mediterranean to Casablanca. If that happens, the British will be forced to protect its SL convoys against attack against French capital ships and cruisers. It may be necessary to withdraw ships from the Eastern Mediterranean to provide the escorts.

Even if Vichy can't reinforce the battleships Richelieu (at Dakar) and (incomplete) Jean Bart (at Casablanca) and the light cruiser Primaguet (also at Dakar in July 1940) with more surface warships, there will still be scores of Vichy submarines operating from Casablanca and Dakar. That might force the British to withdraw the Mediterranean Fleet's destroyers because they were needed to give the SL convoys stronger anti-submarine escorts.
 
wondering the fate of the French flotilla at Alexandria? scuttle their own ships as the British arrive to take control of them?

a break out seems unlikely as speculated upon previously, however they might damage any RN ships there? as the Italians did later in Dec. '41, sorry am not finding a handy source for what ships were there (on British side) in last months of 1940?
So have I.
If Vichy does declare war on Great Britain, what becomes of the French squadron at Alexandria?

From memory it consisted of the old battleship Lorraine, 3 heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and 3 destroyers of the 1,500 tonne type.

IIRC the French ships at Alexandria didn't join Free France until the middle of 1943 and AIUI were amongst the last (if not the last) parts of Vichy to join the Allies.

My guess is that it tries to put to sea and make for the nearest Italian port (in Libya or the Dodecanese) before proceeding to Toulon.

It's very likely that the French Squadron would annihilated by the British Mediterranean Fleet before it could clear the port.

That is unless the British ships were at sea. Perhaps it could be arranged for the Italian Fleet to put to sea the day before Vichy declared, war as a diversion. However, even if that worked Cunningham's ships would still be between the French ships and a safe harbour. Therefore, there's a good chance that the squadron would be sunk somewhere in the eastern Mediterranean instead of being sunk whilst trying to get to sea.

OTOH the battle, wherever it was fought, might not be one sided and the French might take some British ships down with them.
 

thaddeus

Donor
So have I.

just IMO, the RN would take steps immediately to prevent them getting to sea, however clandestine actions more likely?

but cannot find what RN ships were there, during last quarter of the year (1940) or reference to what disarming of the French ships was done?
 
What is most interesting IMHO is the situation in the Middle East. If the Italians agree to let German paras use Rhodes as a base from which to invade Cyprus (which was effectively undefended at that point), the way to sending supplies to Vichy Syria would be clear. The British would recognize this as well, hence why we would most likely see a Battle of Cyprus, as Wavel strips Egypt of forces.

As I mentioned before, IMO one of the best ways to put pressure on Egypt is to take Cyprus, establish a supply line to Syria and start deploying troops there.
The Italians aught to be able to occupy Cyprus if they act quickly.

They only had 2 parachute battalions in June 1940, but they were based in Libya and IIRC the British garrison of Cyprus consisted of a single company of infantry.

However, I'm not sure that the Italians would act quickly.

My impression is that Mussolini thought that he could wait for Germany to finish the British off and then he could occupy the French and British territory that he wanted. AIUI this is why the Italians didn't attempt an invasion of Malta in the summer of 1940 and why Mussolini forbade the Duke of Aosta from immediately going on the offensive in Italian East Africa.

IMHO that was a perfectly reasonable conclusion in the context of Britain's position in June 1940. It wasn't until the Luftwaffe lost the Battle of Britain and Operation Sealion was postponed that he found himself in a long war which is country wasn't prepared to fight.

If Vichy does declare war on Great Britain in July 1940 he might think that there is even less reason to act quickly.
 
just IMO, the RN would take steps immediately to prevent them getting to sea, however clandestine actions more likely?

but cannot find what RN ships were there, during last quarter of the year (1940) or reference to what disarming of the French ships was done?
Off the top of my head the Mediterranean Fleet in early July 1940 consisted of the aircraft carrier Eagle, 3 battleships (Malaya, Royal Sovereign and Warspite), 6 cruisers and 20 destroyers.

I can't remember what it said, but there is some information on the French squadron at Alexandria in this.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Med-I/UK-Med-I-Contents.html

IIRC there is also some in Volume II of Grand Strategy, but there isn't a transcript of it on the internet that I know of.
 
just IMO, the RN would take steps immediately to prevent them getting to sea, however clandestine actions more likely?

but cannot find what RN ships were there, during last quarter of the year (1940) or reference to what disarming of the French ships was done?

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Med-I/UK-Med-I-Contents.html

This is an interesting paragraph from Page 124.
On 18th June the Chiefs of Staff felt bound to consider whether, with France dropping out of the war, the British Mediterranean Fleet ought not to be withdrawn altogether: for one thing it did not lie between the Italian Fleet and the vital Atlantic trade routes. But the effects of withdrawal would have been so serious that it was decided not to force this grave issue until the fate of the French Navy had been settled, and the question was submerged in the clash of events. On the loth Admiral Cunningham was able to report that Admiral Godfroy's squadron was full of fight, and was about to take part in a sweep by the fleet into the Central Mediterranean planned to begin on the 22nd. The fleet had just begun to leave harbour when this operation was cancelled on the Admiralty's order—a vivid reminder of the general uncertainty about the French Navy. Godfroy was still without official notice of the armistice terms, but his attitude was unchanged; in Syria too, the naval morale was high. But on the 24th Godfroy received an order from his Admiralty to cease hostilities and proceed to French ports upon the armistice being ratified. Admiral Cunningham thereupon made it clear that he would not allow the French ships to leave Alexandria in any circumstances. Thus began a state of tension, but more than a week was to pass before the crisis was reached.
I wonder if Cunningham would have carried out his threat if Godfroy had called his bluff and put to sea on 24th June.
 
If the med falls the likelihood of Franco joining or being more pro axis increases. Allowing German troops to take Gibraltar. Leaves only Turkey as a neutral med state and perhaps this forces them to pick a side.
 

marathag

Banned
If the med falls the likelihood of Franco joining or being more pro axis increases. Allowing German troops to take Gibraltar. Leaves only Turkey as a neutral med state and perhaps this forces them to pick a side.
Other than the problem that the Axis nations didn't have the food or fuel to spare for Spain, and Franco knew that.
 
If the med falls the likelihood of Franco joining or being more pro axis increases. Allowing German troops to take Gibraltar. Leaves only Turkey as a neutral med state and perhaps this forces them to pick a side.

Other than the problem that the Axis nations didn't have the food or fuel to spare for Spain, and Franco knew that.
It depends upon how long he thinks the war is going to last. If Vichy does declare war on Great Britain in July 1940 an early Axis victory over Great Britain will seem much more likely than it did IOTL. This might make Franco think that the war will be over in a few weeks and he should "Come to the aid of the winning side," while he has the chance.

Though I think he's less likely to enter the war ITTL. This has nothing to do with Spain's shortages of food and fuel. It's simply because there is less in it for him, because it's less likely that he will be given the French territory in North Africa that (AIUI) he wanted.

IMHO the German's won't need to take Gibraltar via mainland Spain ITTL. Axis bombers operating from French North Africa will force the British to withdraw their warships and make the airstrip unusable. They might also be able to knock out the Colony's coast artillery, which will allow Axis warships and merchant shipping to pass the Strait of Gibraltar. Although the British will be able to send supply convoys to Gibraltar without incurring unacceptable losses, there's a good chance that they will be bombed and sunk in harbour before they can be unloaded. IOTL at least two supply ships that made it to Malta were sunk in harbour before they could be unloaded.

My guess is that Gibraltar holds out to the end of 1940 at the latest if Vichy does declare war of Great Britain in July 1940.
 
Leaves only Turkey as a neutral med state and perhaps this forces them to pick a side.
AFAIK Turkey was pro the Allies IOTL but tried to play one side off the other in order to get as much as it could from both sides.

Hitler might be able to force the Turkish Government to allow the Axis to send aid to Iraq and Syria via the Berlin-Baghdad railway. AIUI Sweden was forced to let German aid to the Finns pass through its territory in 1941-42 IOTL.

On the other hand if Vichy does invade Palestine from Syria in July 1940 the Turks might declare war on the Axis and invade Iraq and Syria from the north. They might not advance very far, but it would divert French troops away from the Palestinian front.

Yugoslavia is still neutral in July 1940. However, it's very likely that their government will decide to join the Axis (as AIUI they did IOTL) but the difference in TTL is that it doesn't trigger a pro-Allied coup. This will butter fly the OTL invasion of Yugoslavia.
 
Do you mean the aircraft that were flown to Egypt (via Nigeria, French Equatorial Africa and the Sudan) from the deep water port of Takoradi in the Gold Coast?
Not just those. I'd include any ultimately bound for UK (if they didn't go by way of Greenland).
 
just IMO, the RN would take steps immediately to prevent them getting to sea, however clandestine actions more likely?

but cannot find what RN ships were there, during last quarter of the year (1940) or reference to what disarming of the French ships was done?

Even more interesting if the sweep is not countermanded, and the French receive their orders to pull back WHILST AT SEA with the British by their side...

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Med-I/UK-Med-I-Contents.html

The information that is most relevant is in Chapter VII from Page 138 onwards. This is because it explains what actually happened to the French squadron at Alexandria in July 1940.

I'm not going to copy all of the relevant pages, but I'm posting this because of the penultimate sentence.
The reply to this was that, if the use of the French ships could be obtained without bloodshed, well and good; if not, there were two alternatives which were to be presented to the French Admiral on 3rd July. Either the ships were to be placed in a non-seagoing condition with skeleton crews, the British Government being responsible for pay and upkeep, or they were to be sunk at sea. After due reflection Admiral Godfroy wrote to say that he had no choice but to sink his ships. He was accordingly told officially to prepare to sail at noon on 5th July, but Admiral Cunningham wrote privately saying that he quite understood that Godfroy might regard the reduction of his crews as incompatible with his duty; would he therefore be prepared to order the oil fuel to be discharged from his ships and the warheads from his torpedoes to be landed? To this suggestion Godfroy agreed without demur, in spite of his having received a signal from the French Admiralty ordering 'Weigh immediately and leave Alexandria with all your ships, using force if necessary'. By 5.30 p.m. the French ships were discharging their fuel.
In another section Cunningham said that had the French ships been sunk in a battle with this fleet or scuttled, Alexandria harbour would have been fouled by the wrecks. They would probably fail in the attempt, but the French could scuttle their ships in the harbour entrance to stop the British ships getting to sea. In the unlikely event that they succeeded the British ships would be trapped in the harbour while the wrecks were removed.
 
Eh. It means one or two Vichy formations fighting alongside Rommel in Libya, and maybe whatever is left of the Vichy navy could harass the British fleet in the Mediterranean... but really, Vichy's so toothless that it won't make much difference.


That is about right. For one thing, Hitler had little to offer Vichy in the form of British colonies. Vichy control in Africa (which might have been useful to the Reich except for the Sahara) did not put Germany in a position to take over Britain's African colonies. Bases in the Caribbean? The United States was going to take those out.

Hitler could not keep his Japanese Partners from taking over Indochina... he kept the Vichy regime in existence only so long as it was useful to him
 
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