Interesting points
There are several problems with this scenario. First of all the British are fighting in North Africa and would want to finish this before starting a new campaign. The Soviets would not want to launch this. The Soviets are facing millions of Germans and if it is late June onward then the Soviets are dealing with Fall Blau and the attack on Stalingrad-in short they won't think they have a few divisions to spare. The British would have to do all of the heavy lifting with the amphibious assault (which the Soviets have little experience with) and don't want the Soviets to be in Greece.
To respond to 'would want to finish this before starting a new campaign', the UK & allied forces committed boots-on-the-ground to Greece/Crete in 1941 whilst
already fighting already in Africa, so I'm not convinced that they would automatically dismiss Crete in 1942 as a non-starter because 'we're fighting in North Africa at the moment' - especially as the concept under consideration is that Russian troops are going to be the ones on the ground this time (plus presumably any 'free Greek forces', if there were any such formations available at this time). Furthermore, as I understand the situation, holding Crete potentially
helps the Allied North Africa campaign, since gaining it allows its use as a base from which Axis shipping to Libya can be interdicted, whilst simultaneously removing it as an Axis base that can be used to similarly cover such convoys.
I'm also a bit doubtful over 'and don't want the Soviets to be in Greece'. Why not? The London government was perfectly happy to cooperate with the Russians in 1941 in a joint-operation to 'secure' Persia. Or would the Persian operation (or something which happened in it???) for some reason put the London government off any such further cooperation efforts - sufficiently so that they'd prefer the Germans and Italians to be in Crete, holding it, and using it as a base, to the Russians coming anywhere near it?
As regards British shipping involved, I assume it would have to be found/diverted from some other operation, if there weren't already available in that part of the Mediterranean for something like this.
Russian troops is the big question; it seems to me that during the winter of 1941-42 (especially when things seem to be going well for the Russians) that Stalin might think he could spare some troops for other theatres. (Or, if he got the idea sufficiently early, he might even want to carry out an attack on Crete as part of a diversion in preparation for the 1941-42 Russian winter offensives, although that might imply an Alien Space Bat level of forward-thinking and readiness on Stalin's part.)
I concede that it's possible that even if Stalin initially wanted to carry out such an operation in 1942 (Crete, that is to say), that once 'Fall Blau' arrived - if any Crete operation hadn't already taken place - that Stalin might very well inform the British that the troops he was intending to supply were in fact being allocated somewhere else more urgent...