WW2: Make a single change

Deleted member 1487

I'm not hearing any actual refutation of the argument...
Because there isn't much of one to refute other than you not liking what he's saying. If you read that specific passage it is pretty hard to refute with the numbers you listened, which were full year numbers not the numbers per month of the period he discusses; it was perfectly within the subject he is covering, which is the Germany economy; strategic bombing was relevant to that topic.

Get a copy from the library and read it yourself.

I've posted this repeatedly in our discussions, but you never seem to get it:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Ruhr#Outcome
In his study of the German war economy, Adam Tooze stated that during the Battle of the Ruhr, Bomber Command severely disrupted German production. Steel production fell by 200,000 tons. The armaments industry was facing a steel shortfall of 400,000 tons. After doubling production in 1942, production of steel increased only by 20 percent in 1943. Hitler and Speer were forced to cut planned increases in production. This disruption resulted in the Zulieferungskrise (sub-components crisis). The increase of aircraft production for the Luftwaffe also came to an abrupt halt. Monthly production failed to increase between July 1943 and March 1944. "Bomber Command had stopped Speer's armaments miracle in its tracks".[23]

At Essen after more than 3,000 sorties and the loss of 138 aircraft, the "Krupps works...and the town...itself contained large areas of devastation"[4] Krupps never restarted locomotive production after the second March raid.[4]
Operation Chastise caused some temporary effect on industrial production, through the disruption of the water supply and hydroelectric power. The Eder Valley dam "had nothing whatsoever" to do with supplying the Ruhr Area.[24] A backup pumping system had already been put in place for the Ruhr, and Speer's Organisation Todt rapidly mobilized repairs, taking workers from the construction of the Atlantic Wall. The destruction of the Sorpe dam would have caused significantly more damage but since it was a stronger design less likely to be breached it was effectively a secondary target.

A more valid point. But given how overstretched the Germans were... well, I could see the absence of a single company leading to the defeat of a division that wouldn't have happened otherwise IOTL causing a cascading effect in the summer-autumn of 1941 as I outlined above. Vastly less probable then the absence of a full division. But far more probable is that the absence of those companies are felt in the winter of '41/'42, given how skeletonized many German infantry divisions were by then. Losing the 9th Army to encirclement at Rzhev may not accelerate the end of the war by as much as Barbarossa stalling out around Smolensk-Kiev, but it will nevertheless accelerate the end of the war.

Not guaranteed, but a possibility nonetheless.
Extremely unlikely that a single company or company equivalent number of men made a difference to any division.

Leaving aside the scarcity of German industrial resources preventing mass production and the fact that the Germans were heading down a different path to proxy fuses and the uselessness of the V-1... how do you propose they develop a jammer to something we still haven't figured out how to jam today? More so, how do you propose they develop a jammer portable enough to be fitted onto a platform as unstable as the V-1 without upsetting it's deployment?
In 1944 they had a radio and electro-static project, which would be the two routes they would have in the scenario I'm suggesting, as the restarted work in 1942 was the stuff that was being worked on when things were cancelled in 1940.

What are you talking about? The US had a jammer for the VT fuse before they deployed it. It was extremely simplistic:
http://www.smecc.org/proximity_fuze_jamming_-_w_w__salisbury.htm

Something broadcasting on all frequencies that reaches out a 100 meters even with WW2 tech can be made quite small.
 
f you read that specific passage it is pretty hard to refute with the numbers you listened, which were full year numbers not the numbers per month of the period he discusses

Finally found my copy and looking at the table for the period cited, it would require that the 1943 yearly figures I cited be about 60-70% of what they actually are, representing a mere 20% increase over the 1942 numbers. But they are not. The increase in yearly figures can't be covered by an increase in those first few months.

it was perfectly within the subject he is covering, which is the Germany economy; strategic bombing was relevant to that topic.
But it was not relevant to his central thesis, which really seeks to explain the disparity between the 1940-41 levels of production and the '43-'44 levels of production. You can parrot him all you like, but the reality is that the numbers on this don't quite line up like Tooze says they do.

Extremely unlikely that a single company or company equivalent number of men made a difference to any division.
By the winter of 1941/42, the effective strength of German forces had been reduced by more then 25%. You had companies guarding kilometers worth of front. And the Germans ultimately only held out by the skin of their fingers. Without those 15,000 men, each division will either be forced to have a hole of several kilometers in them or simply stretch their companies out so far that even the incompetently executed Soviet assaults can punch straight through them. Either way, the consequences are predictable...

So yes, the absence of even a single-company-per-division can have a significant impact, given how close the Germans came to a Stalingrad-esque turning of the tide in the winter of '41/'42. They needed every man they could get their hands on.

Or to quote you...

I applaud his efforts in trying to create a broad survey of WW2 economics in Germany, but he has a very bad habit of ignoring contradictory evidence when it doesn't fit his point.

In 1944 they had a radio and electro-static project, which would be the two routes they would have in the scenario I'm suggesting, as the restarted work in 1942 was the stuff that was being worked on when things were cancelled in 1940.
I'm only seeing an electro-static project. And they failed in three years where the US succeeded in one. That suggests the issue is not simply intellectual capitol (either that, or German intellectual capitol was grossly inferior to American one).

What are you talking about? The US had a jammer for the VT fuse before they deployed it. It was extremely simplistic:
http://www.smecc.org/proximity_fuze_jamming_-_w_w__salisbury.htm

Something broadcasting on all frequencies that reaches out a 100 meters even with WW2 tech can be made quite small.
Well, if it's that simple then the WAllies quickly add it to their aircraft and nullify the German advance. The V-1, for its part, continues to be an ineffective weapon given it's inaccuracy and poor German targetting and intelligence.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Finally found my copy and looking at the table for the period cited, it would require that the 1943 yearly figures I cited be about 60-70% of what they actually are, representing a mere 20% increase over the 1942 numbers. But they are not. The increase in yearly figures can't be covered by an increase in those first few months.

But it was not relevant to his central thesis, which really seeks to explain the disparity between the 1940-41 levels of production and the '43-'44 levels of production. You can parrot him all you like, but the reality is that the numbers on this don't quite line up like Tooze says they do.
So again if you disagree with his assessment you discard it, but if you like it you say its worthwhile. Cherrypicking at its finest. So I guess we just have to rely on your wisdom to interpret what is the real truth. :rolleyes:

Or to quote you...
So now you think he's totally bunk? Because I was referring to his claims there was no inefficiencies in the German economy to be worked out, despite that patently being false.

By the winter of 1941/42, the effective strength of German forces had been reduced by more then 25%. You had companies guarding kilometers worth of front. And the Germans ultimately only held out by the skin of their fingers. Without those 15,000 men, each division will either be forced to have a hole of several kilometers in them or simply stretch their companies out so far that even the incompetently executed Soviet assaults can punch straight through them. Either way, the consequences are predictable...

So yes, the absence of even a single-company-per-division can have a significant impact, given how close the Germans came to a Stalingrad-esque turning of the tide in the winter of '41/'42. They needed every man they could get their hands on.
1 company is not defending several km by themselves. And that is not how replacements work, it would be perhaps 1-2 men per company over the entire division.


I'm only seeing an electro-static project. And they failed in three years where the US succeeded in one. That suggests the issue is not simply intellectual capitol (either that, or German intellectual capitol was grossly inferior to American one).

Well, if it's that simple then the WAllies quickly add it to their aircraft and nullify the German advance. The V-1, for its part, continues to be an ineffective weapon given it's inaccuracy and poor German targetting and intelligence.
They had several projects. It was whittled down to two, the radio and electro-static projects. The static one wouldn't be jammed by a radio jammer, so still work just fine. The radio project would tell them the radio fuse was possible and how to defend against it. Which would have an impact against late war Wallied artillery shells if they can then detonate them long before they become dangerous. As to the V-1 several thousand landed in London and were highly effective until countered by the VT fuse. The alternative is the FAR more expensive proposition of using the timed burst shells, which required several thousand to get a shoot down and means its costing the Allies a lot more to shoot them down then to launch them and requires a lot more guns to put up the necessary shrapnel density. So the will get through and hit their target, unlike IOTL. The over and undershoots was a problem, but most were getting into the city before the shoot downs and ground overrunning of the launch sites shut it down.

As to the German projects they started again in late 1942, didn't have the ground work as the US project did through the Tizard exchange of technology from Britain (the Brits even got a prototype German fuse through a disgruntled German anti-Nazi in 1940), and had multiple competing projects instead of centralized one by Bell Labs.
 
So again if you disagree with his assessment you discard it,

Well no shit. I'm going to disagree with his assessment if the numbers don't support what he is saying and if I disagree with the assessment because the facts don't align, I discard it.

Cherrypicking at its finest. So I guess we just have to rely on your wisdom to interpret what is the real truth.
Maybe you'd actually have a point if you'd go on to refute the numbers I presented, but I guess the reason your harping on supposed "cherry-picking" is because you know you can't do that. The most you've managed is to try and pretend that numbers covering the year of 1943 have no relation to other numbers which cover 75% of that same year... which is totally inane.

So now you think he's totally bunk? Because I was referring to his claims there was no inefficiencies in the German economy to be worked out, despite that patently being false.
And I'm referring to his claim that strategic bombing caused a flat lining in German armament production growth in 1943, which doesn't match-up with what it would take for the Germans to achieve the level of armaments production they did in 1943 historically. It's a specific response to a specific claim that is patently false, just like your little post is.

1 company is not defending several km by themselves.
Quite frequently, they were. That is how overstretched the Germans were.

And that is not how replacements work, it would be perhaps 1-2 men per company over the entire division.
Which adds up. Either the companies contract and cover less ground, leaving larger gaps in the line that the Soviets pass through, or they spread themselves over an even greater area which leaves them weak enough for the Soviets to punch through.

The radio project would tell them the radio fuse was possible and how to defend against it.
It didn't OTL and they had roughly the same amount of time upon reconstituting the project.

As to the V-1 several thousand landed in London and were highly effective
They essentially were a blind terror weapon that had no impact on the WAllied military operations or British war production. So unless your sole measurement of effectiveness is killing random Londoners of no importance to the larger war, no, they were not effective. At all.

As to the German projects they started again in late 1942, didn't have the ground work as the US project did through the Tizard exchange of technology from Britain (the Brits even got a prototype German fuse through a disgruntled German anti-Nazi in 1940), and had multiple competing projects instead of centralized one by Bell Labs.
So a whole lot of things that will continue to hinder them ITTL and likely continue to prevent significant development.
 
By the winter of 1941/42, the effective strength of German forces had been reduced by more then 25%. You had companies guarding kilometers worth of front.

A rough calculation, dividing the strength of the armies with the length of the front, gives roughly 1000 soldiers per kilometer by December.

Examples of companies (of maybe 60-70 men) holding several kilometers worth of the front was surely the exception and not the rule.

And the Germans ultimately only held out by the skin of their fingers. Without those 15,000 men, each division will either be forced to have a hole of several kilometers in them or simply stretch their companies out so far that even the incompetently executed Soviet assaults can punch straight through them. Either way, the consequences are predictable...

Doing another rough calculation, without these men (and assuming none are replaced by occupation troops elsewhere), each division would be short about 2 infantry squads and 50 support personnel come December.

Countering the loss of these two squads would be an improvement in the supply situation for the division since it can distribute available supply on fewer troops.

As you say, the consequences of losing two infantry squads per division is predictable.
 
A rough calculation, dividing the strength of the armies with the length of the front, gives roughly 1000 soldiers per kilometer by December.

Back-of-envelope calculation gives me a bit less then that. Closer to 900 men per kilometer.

Examples of companies (of maybe 60-70 men) holding several kilometers worth of the front was surely the exception and not the rule.
Actually it was. The Germans concentrated themselves around the major supply points and left the massive regions in between them pretty undermanned. Soviet response to this deployment was... erratic. Some formations just kept throwing themselves at the German strongpoints while others did what they were supposed to do and went around. The latter effort almost allowed the Russians to cut the main railline connecting Rzhev with Smolensk.

Doing another rough calculation, without these men (and assuming none are replaced by occupation troops elsewhere), each division would be short about 2 infantry squads and 50 support personnel come December.

Countering the loss of these two squads would be an improvement in the supply situation for the division since it can distribute available supply on fewer troops.
To an extent. One can debate whether having more shooters at once is better then having more ammunition for fewer shooters (alpha damage vs the length damage can be inflicted, to use a video game expression), and why a Russian breakthrough isn't a sure thing... merely an increased probability.
 
I'd like to see whose numbers these are.

Breaking it down, the German aircraft production in 1943 comes out to a monthly ~1,700 to 1942's monthly of ~1,600.

If true, this is actually highly significant and supports Tooze's point about 1943 not being all that impressive an increase over 1942, because the air war, as both O'Brien and Tooze point out, was given much higher production priority than the ground one. From Wages of Destruction, pages 595-6, "Even at the height of the Adolf Hitler Panzer Programme, the share of tanks in total armaments production did not exceed 7 per cent... Karl Frydag, who, as senior engineer at Henschel, oversaw both the production of the Tiger tank and the Main Committee for Airframes, there was no comparison: 'Tank production and Luftwaffe production are always being compared... They cannot be compared; tank production is dirt, when set against the Luftwaffe.'... in terms of value produced or resources consumed, the production of combat aircraft was at least five times more important than the output of tanks."

AFVs are nearly ~1,000 monthly compared in 1943 to ~460 monthly in '42. Small arms, ~262,150 to ~141,100. Machine guns, ~13,800 to ~6,450. Artillery (all calibers), ~4,500 to ~2,800. Ammunition (all types), ~110,900 metric tons to ~55,000 metric tons.

I'll further note that all of the 1942 numbers are themselves generally rough doublings of the 1941 numbers, so Tooze got that right. And then the 1944 numbers are themselves doublings of the 1943 ones. But no matter how you look at it, German production in 1943 doubled compared to 1942. Including ammunition. That is a sign of steady and relentless growth, not any long period of stagnation.

Tooze has some good stuff and he does a lot to support his central thesis (which I have already described). But strategic bombing is not part of his central thesis and when it comes to the claims related to that, the numbers just do not support him.

The passage I quoted doesn't go into the specific kind of items being mentioned here, with the exception of ammunition, so it's the only one where there is a contradiction I'm in a position to address. The source for Tooze's claim of ammunition production only going up by 20% is "BAL R3/1738, Chronik, second half 1943, 126." BAL stands for Bundesarchiv Militaerarchiv Branch, he's getting his information directly from original archival documents.

It's chump change in terms of an increase. But when the Germans margins for which they achieved their OTL victories are so thin, taking away even a single division is a whole 'nother matter...

"By the panzer commander's [Guderian] own admission, had the Western and Reserve Fronts achieved just a 'bit more' at El'nia and east of Smolensk, his panzer groups adventurous southward dash might have ended with the destruction of the 10th Motorized Division and the abrupt end to his dramatic southward dash. To Field Marshal Bock at Army Group Center, the achievement of a 'bit more' in these regions meant the incapacitate of another one or two infantry divisions, which would have required the continued presence of the SS Dash Reich Motorized, GD Infantry Regiment, or both in these regions." (The Battle for Smolensk Volume III, David Glantz, Page 498)

Here, we haven't "incapacitated" another infantry division... we've removed it completely.

There is no reason whatsoever to suppose that the missing division would be taken from Army Group Center and plenty of reason to suppose otherwise. AGC was by far the most important army group until Case Blue and it was the last force which would be cut. If the Germans did find themselves one division short, it would probably be taken from either AGS or, more likely, AGN. This is assuming they don't just make up for it with replacements, which at the beginning of Operation Barbarossa numbered something like a few hundred thousand IIRC. Alternatively, they could make up for the lost 15,000 by drawing from what was left in the west, unless you're going to argue that 15,000 fewer defenders would allow a Wallied landing in France in 1941-42. Even if all of the above is rejected, for the sake of argument we could say that at the same time Hitler decides against conscripting the scientists he also decides against sending Rommel to North Africa. Two armored divisions and a motorized division would more than make up for the loss of one regular infantry division.
 
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Back-of-envelope calculation gives me a bit less then that. Closer to 900 men per kilometer.

Might very well be. I went with a total length of the frontline of about 2100km (excluding Finland), but that was a very rough guesstimate.

Going back to the initial calculation, I realized I erred a bit in my calculation.
Our assumption has been that retaining 15k engineers/scientists in the industry, would deprive the Ostheer of 15k troops.

That is obviously not correct.

Firstly, the total size of the Wehrmacht was much bigger than the size of the Ostheer, and a lot of these men would probably end up in a technical position in some other branch. While others would end up as occupation troops.
Secondly, the German army split its force into an invading army and an occupation army. Once again, we assumed that the entire cut would be felt among the invading army. In all likelihood, it was the occupation forces that would feel the brunt of the cut.

So, we're not talking about losing 15k troops in the east, but maybe 5k troops at best.
Which leaves us with each division being short half an infantry squad and some support troops come December.

Actually it was. The Germans concentrated themselves around the major supply points and left the massive regions in between them pretty undermanned.

Which was a pretty good decision all in all.
Anyway, I'll modify my position to 'the Germans did not defend areas they deemed important with less than a company per kilometer.'
 
A single change in the west to accompany Calbear's single change in the east.
Don't take the rest of Czechoslovakia until you want to go to war. Do the Molotov Ribbentrop pact and then take Poland with the SU if you are a megalomanic maniac and cant help it.
 
Back-of-envelope calculation gives me a bit less then that. Closer to 900 men per kilometer.

Actually it was. The Germans concentrated themselves around the major supply points and left the massive regions in between them pretty undermanned. Soviet response to this deployment was... erratic. Some formations just kept throwing themselves at the German strongpoints while others did what they were supposed to do and went around. The latter effort almost allowed the Russians to cut the main railline connecting Rzhev with Smolensk.

To an extent. One can debate whether having more shooters at once is better then having more ammunition for fewer shooters (alpha damage vs the length damage can be inflicted, to use a video game expression), and why a Russian breakthrough isn't a sure thing... merely an increased probability.

Let me ask you something. Is there any minor or major German WW2 POD that doesn't result in the Soviets crushing the Germans and launching the 1942 equivalent of Bagration for you? Seriously, every time you and Wiking (with others supporting both sides) get into one of your Eastern Front debates, you always seem to argue the point that the Red Army is one lucky battle away from collapsing the entire German front. 15k men, not all of whom would even be sent to the East, will not make a difference. Are you seriously suggesting that not conscripting 15k scientists and engineers will butterfly away the Kiev encirclement?
 
Dunkirk - moral victory, sure, but didn't change outcome.

I think the book "Blitzkrieg Legend" really settled the issue on the topic.
http://www.usni.org/store/books/history/blitzkrieg-legend
Had the Germans gone in they would have taken it with little issue (the only force defending the route was a French reserve division that had already been in combat in Belgium and was worn down, the Brits weren't really in the way until 2 days after the Halt Order by Rundstedt was issued) and held it against the disordered forces the BEF had to offer at the time.

I'm inclined to agree with those who think Germans could have taken the Dunkirk pocket had they been even more aggressive.

But I don't think this omission changed the outcome of the war. Though it shortened it.

Even had they captured the troops who escaped OTL the Nazis still couldn't have successfully landed in the UK in 1940. They lacked air superiority, naval superiority, landing craft, and logistic support. See the *mammal_that_shall_not_be_named" threads.

Even had they managed to force the RAF to withdraw to the North of England, they couldn't have stopped the Royal Navy from interdicting a Nazi Armada.

Sure they could've dropped some paratroopers in but they wouldn't have survived.

Churchill had only been PM three weeks. He could have easily and truthfully deflected blame to the incompetence of his predecessors and allies.

Sure, without those troops the Allies would have been weaker. Rommel might have gotten to Cairo, but I doubt much further. Or maybe the Italians would have never asked for German help in North Africa.

Either way Torch would have still happened, in some form, as would Overlord.
 

Deleted member 1487

I'm inclined to agree with those who think Germans could have taken the Dunkirk pocket had they been even more aggressive.

But I don't think this omission changed the outcome of the war. Though it shortened it.

Even had they captured the troops who escaped OTL the Nazis still couldn't have successfully landed in the UK in 1940. They lacked air superiority, naval superiority, landing craft, and logistic support. See the *mammal_that_shall_not_be_named" threads.

Even had they managed to force the RAF to withdraw to the North of England, they couldn't have stopped the Royal Navy from interdicting a Nazi Armada.

Sure they could've dropped some paratroopers in but they wouldn't have survived.

Churchill had only been PM three weeks. He could have easily and truthfully deflected blame to the incompetence of his predecessors and allies.

Sure, without those troops the Allies would have been weaker. Rommel might have gotten to Cairo, but I doubt much further. Or maybe the Italians would have never asked for German help in North Africa.

Either way Torch would have still happened, in some form, as would Overlord.

I think its more a political blow than anything else. There was an invasion panic in Britain in the Summer of 1940 after the Fall of France and with the BEF destroyed in May it will be even worse than IOTL and regardless of Churchill's speeches the pressure to negotiate might have just been too much to resist; plus Churchill might have started off with a major political blow due to the loss of the BEF and might well lose the May Cabinet Crisis, which was resolved in Churchill's favor by the successful formation of the Dunkirk Perimeter. With the Germans grabbing it before the Brits really even get there then Churchill probably loses that debate. That debate was between Halifax and Churchill about asking the Germans for terms and deciding what to do based on how harsh they were. If Hitler asked for a White Peace with Britain and just having his treaties with the defeated continentals recognized then based on the dialogues that the War Cabinet was having at the time they would have taken those terms; they didn't expect to get them though. The other issue too is that Churchill wanted to wait for the German invasion attempt to defeat it and then negotiate...but if there is no BEF his calculation may well drastically change and even his will to fight be compromised.

So it really comes down to the May Cabinet Crisis and whether or not they ask for terms. I think at the time Hitler was willing to give the White Peace option with Britain in return for recognizing his treaties with the continentals and expelling the governments in exile, which is something the War Cabinet seems to have been willing to accept IOTL under Churchill in May 1940.
 
I think its more a political blow than anything else. There was an invasion panic in Britain in the Summer of 1940 after the Fall of France and with the BEF destroyed in May it will be even worse than IOTL and regardless of Churchill's speeches the pressure to negotiate might have just been too much to resist;....

So it really comes down to the May Cabinet Crisis and whether or not they ask for terms. I think at the time Hitler was willing to give the White Peace option with Britain in return for recognizing his treaties with the continentals and expelling the governments in exile, which is something the War Cabinet seems to have been willing to accept IOTL under Churchill in May 1940.

Certainly pressure to make a deal would have been greater; still they all knew Hitler's record of making, then breaking deals. And the cabinet knew the invasion threat was bluster.

Still if there was a peace it would have been temporary. Like the Treaty of Amiens (1802) with Napoleon. UK would have kept arming.

And FDR knew that Hitler was the greatest threat. He's have a found a way in, eventually.

So while Hitler was hellbent on USSR any peace with UK would've been uneasy. Eventually Hitler (or Mussolini) would have broken it - in North Africa, or Gibraltar, or Iraq perhaps. They couldn't help themselves.

So I'd still predict US would enter war later, better prepared, and ready to invade French North Africa. And a year farther along with the Manhattan project...
 

Deleted member 1487

Certainly pressure to make a deal would have been greater; still they all knew Hitler's record of making, then breaking deals. And the cabinet knew the invasion threat was bluster.
Actually they did not, they thought it was serious, the Royal Navy was saying it wouldn't fight in the Channel and there was a lot of uncertainty around whether the RAF after losing nearly all its continent forces could stand up to the Luftwaffe. So there was a very real fear Britain could lose in the Summer of 1940, but Churchill was convinced they could win; the question is whether he and the Cabinet would have thought so if the BEF was lost in toto in May.

Still if there was a peace it would have been temporary. Like the Treaty of Amiens (1802) with Napoleon. UK would have kept arming..
No doubt, but it wouldn't really have much public support for starting another war. Plus due to the way it handled India in 1939 when peace comes India will break away from Britain and no be participating in any renewed hostilities, which will be a major problem for Britain reentering the war.

And FDR knew that Hitler was the greatest threat. He's have a found a way in, eventually..
Except he wasn't a dictator, didn't have a public interested in declaring war, nor had a wedge issue like a Britain continuing to resist, nor an ongoing war in the Atlantic to create an incident or series of them to start a war.

So while Hitler was hellbent on USSR any peace with UK would've been uneasy. Eventually Hitler (or Mussolini) would have broken it - in North Africa, or Gibraltar, or Iraq perhaps. They couldn't help themselves.
:confused:
Why would Italy attack the British ever? Why would Hitler if he just wanted peace so he could fight the USSR? The only ones interested in renewing hostilities would be the British and they would have major issues doing so due to the issue with India and threat of Japan if they did. Especially if the Axis Pact is concluded Britain is not going to try and restart of war, because it would mean Italy and Japan join in to help Germany and they lose US public sympathy in the process.

So I'd still predict US would enter war later, better prepared, and ready to invade French North Africa. And a year farther along with the Manhattan project...
No, actually its far more likely that if Britain quits in 1940 then the US never enters the war, even with Germany invading the USSR.
 
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