WW2 Italian campaign WI: Allies stop and dont go all the way

WI the allies instead of taking all of Italy they decided to save lives and only take a portion of the Peninsula? WI they halted after taking Naples? Halting at the Gustav line? Halting after taking Rome?
 
Once Sicilly is taken with the benefits that gives the Allies re shipping in the Med. then the aim is to tie down as many German soldiers as possible i.e. suck them into the penninsular.
Whilst an easy advance in Italy would be welcome, IMO the main objective is not Rome (however much Mark Clark would like it), but the Foggia airfield complex.
Once that has been achieved together with a reasonable area in front for security, then forces could be deployed elsewhere - though with the proviso that the Germans are not able to also redeploy!
 
WI the allies instead of taking all of Italy they decided to save lives and only take a portion of the Peninsula? WI they halted after taking Naples? Halting at the Gustav line? Halting after taking Rome?
Funnily enough I was just thinking about this yesterday with regards to Astrodragon's The Whale Has Wings thread. I think the main thing the Allies need to do is advance far enough north to get a position that can be well defended, what's the terrain like between Naples and the start of the German defensive lines? Basically they need to find somewhere they can dig in so that a German counter-offensive doesn't seriously threaten them. As for what it does to the war it probably means fewer casualties on both sides. Still tie up large numbers of Allied manpower and equipment though as they need to keep a credible attacking force there and carrying on probing attacks or the Germans will simply move parts of their troops elsewhere as well.


Once Sicilly is taken with the benefits that gives the Allies re shipping in the Med. then the aim is to tie down as many German soldiers as possible i.e. suck them into the peninsula.
Whilst an easy advance in Italy would be welcome, IMO the main objective is not Rome (however much Mark Clark would like it), but the Foggia airfield complex. Once that has been achieved together with a reasonable area in front for security, then forces could be deployed elsewhere - though with the proviso that the Germans are not able to also redeploy!
Maybe I'm missing something but once the Allies have captured the airfield, dug in and sent a large part of their troops elsewhere what exactly stops the Germans from also redeploying large amounts of their troops? If the Allies don't have enough troops to attack the German lines then why would they keep a bunch of extra guys just sitting about, or are you saying that air power from Foggia would be that powerful?
 
OP - questioned what objective whether to hold at Naples, Rome or the Gustav line.

Hence, my reply was centred on seizing the airfield complex and the surrounding area.
But once you have that 'area' it opens out the potential for attacks in other areas of the Adriatic.
If the Allies have the opportunity to use the troops elsewhere - as long as the Ninth Air Force air bases are secure - fine.
Meanwhile the Germans won't have the recon ability, so there 'may' be another landing in support of Tito - they don't know!!
 
The thing you have to remember is that Italy consumed a higher proportion of German than of Allied resources. The whole campaign is a net gain for the allies

In 43 for the Wallies its the only game in town so why not commit large resources or at least push as far as you can. Its not like the allies are in a position to launch overlord in 43 anyway and strategically you can always shift forces out of theatre for Overlord of Anvil/Dragoon quickly
 
In late 1943 the Soviet leaders were seriously questioning the US &
brit commitment to grappling with the German army. A group of Red Army generals & other officers were sent to inspect the italian front to judge if there was actually any useful fighting going on there, or if it was all propaganda. You have to wonder what they & Stalin would have pondered had they found only a quiet defensive front.

In 43 for the Wallies its the only game in town so why not commit large resources or at least push as far as you can. Its not like the allies are in a position to launch overlord in 43 anyway and strategically you can always shift forces out of theatre for Overlord of Anvil/Dragoon quickly

..and you have to wonder where Kesselrings surplus units & supplies would have been deployed had they not been consumed & pinned down defending Italy against the frequent Allied offensives. You can make some valid arguments for better Allied operations in Italy, but until the main Allied thrust is executed in NW Europe there is a equally valid argument that offensive operations in Italy were a stratigic necessity. The only way I can see avoiding that is to organize a similarly sized offensive somewhere else.
 
Carl Schwamberger said:
you have to wonder where Kesselrings surplus units & supplies would have been deployed had they not been consumed & pinned down defending Italy against the frequent Allied offensives. You can make some valid arguments for better Allied operations in Italy, but until the main Allied thrust is executed in NW Europe there is a equally valid argument that offensive operations in Italy were a stratigic necessity. The only way I can see avoiding that is to organize a similarly sized offensive somewhere else.
There are two things wrong with this. One, the Allies had twice as many men in Italy as the Germans. Two, the amount of shipping tied up in supplying the armies, & civilians, in Italy was so large, it made invading Normandy impossible for 1943.

Take away the Allied supplies & make Italy hostile to the Germans, the number of German troops goes up & the number of Allied is zero. Add Allied raiding ops along Italy's coast, the number of Germans goes up, & the Allied supply demand climbs very slightly, remaining still well below OTL.

Meanwhile, buildup for *Neptune '43 accelerates... And at the time, Normandy is far less well-defended. Moreover, the Sovs are much farther from their prewar border, which is good for the postwar outcomes...
 
You're coming at this from the wrong direction if you're arguing for an invasion of Northern France in 1943. To achieve that you need to get as a minimum 2 US Armies to England ie 15+ divisions plus enough amphibious capability to land at least 3 divisions in the first wave. This needs to be started well before the fall of Tunisia if you want it to happen in 1943.

Can you explain where you got twice as many Allied men in Italy, as IIRC divisional numbers were about equal?

As has been pointed out before the Allies needed enough troops in Italy to guarantee a solid defence and threaten a breakthrough if the Germans reduced their forces. Best use would probably have been to keep enough forces in Italy (and use them properly) to breach the Appenines after taking Rome and reach the Swiss border/ Alps where a much narrower front woyuld have been necessary. Dragoon could have delayed to the autumn of 1944 and may not have been needed as the Germans might well have withdrawn by then.
 
You're coming at this from the wrong direction if you're arguing for an invasion of Northern France in 1943. To achieve that you need to get as a minimum 2 US Armies to England ie 15+ divisions plus enough amphibious capability to land at least 3 divisions in the first wave. This needs to be started well before the fall of Tunisia if you want it to happen in 1943.

Specifically the decision must occur at the Symbol (Casablanca) confrence in January 1943. Thats about the latest in OTL a decision for stratigiclly meaning full 1943 invasion of NW Europe can be made.

Can you explain where you got twice as many Allied men in Italy, as IIRC divisional numbers were about equal?

The Germans had smaller divisions? Its been years since I studied the Italian campaign in any depth, but I do remember how complicated it is to sort out things like men & equipment. The obvious is comparing actual unit strengths vs number of units. More subtle is trying to sort out comparisons of battle and non battle casualties. In the latter case the winter weather caused a fair number of long term & permanent casualties among the men stuck out on the mountain sides. Then there were things like who could afford to lose the equipment and expend the artillery ammunition...

As has been pointed out before the Allies needed enough troops in Italy to guarantee a solid defence and threaten a breakthrough if the Germans reduced their forces.

What are the other choices? Invade Norway? Satisfy Churchill with a Balkans adventure? Or not invade the Italian mainland at all and leave the German ground forces unegaged for eight to ten months? There is only so much the deception operations can accomplish to aid the Red Army. Neither does picking off islands like Sardinia, Leros, Roades really do much for the casue. Or somehow in January 1943 convince Brooke & company a invasion of France in 1943 is practical? The decisions made at the Symbol confrence in January & then Post Husky in July/August more or less boxed the Allies into a Italian campaign.

Best use would probably have been to keep enough forces in Italy (and use them properly) to breach the Appenines after taking Rome and reach the Swiss border/ Alps where a much narrower front woyuld have been necessary.

That might be doable, if more Allied strength is committed to the Italian campaign earlier, and more aggresive actions early in September. ie: a amphibious landing near Rome in conjunction with op Giant in September. That would have been risky, but it might have also caused Hitler to panic & reverse approval of Kesselrings southern strategy, firmly ordering a retreat north of Rome.

Dragoon could have delayed to the autumn of 1944 and may not have been needed as the Germans might well have withdrawn by then.

No Dragoon means Marsailles/Toulon are not delivering supplies to the US 21st Army Group in September. October, & beyond. The failure to open the Atlantic & Channel ports to the Allied Supply ships in July, August, September, & even into November meant the southern France ports & nearly undamaged railroads were essential to sustaining three Allied Army Groups of seven armies in NW Europe by November. Since the bulk of the western ports remained in German hands, & were otherwise unusable until late 1944 12th & 21st Army Groups were receiving barely two thirds the expected supplies through the western ports in October/November 1944. The reinforcement schedule for the US Army was set back due to this and deliveries diverted to the southern French ports & from the 6th AG allowance. Without Marsailles/Toulon Ike would have been stalled post breakout in September without the material for further offensives, and without the 6th AG.

If one wants to avoid a Italian campaign as fought in OTL then you have to take a hard look at landing substantial forces on some other coast. That boils down to taking a chance on a 1943 invasion of France, either in the south or the west.
 
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