*WW2 in a Central Powers victory scenario

Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empire are both still internally weak even if a win in WW1.

Germany might see itself as the one Reich, one people, one ruler thing just not as extreme as the Nazis.

So with A-H falling apart, the annexation of Austria could still happen.

Perhaps the Germans and English develope a mutual understanding and trade relationship. Germany gives up competing with Britain for global empire for trade and knowledge that it is the sole continental European power.

With this new balance, France and whatever comes from Russia are screwed.

With the "if you cannot beat them, join them" attitude for both Brit and Germany, a peace develops in Europe.

Asia - Japan will still want to expand. With a weaker Russia/Soviet Japan will advance in Manchuria. Will they invade China? China would be have German support.

The German-British balance would not want Japan to disrupt that balance.

So Japan may be limited to Manchuria.

So could be no WWII
 

BlondieBC

Banned
In a scenario where Germany won WW1 in Kaiserreich-esque circumstances (via not launching unrestricted submarine warfare and therefore pissing off the Americans), how would alt-WW2 develop in a scenario where the Russians and French go revanchist and launch Round Two to gain revenge (assume the Germans and Austria-Hungary get a case of complacency akin to the one which struck Britain and France IOTL) with the collusion of a militarist Japan similar to OTL's? Who do the Americans (and British) side with? How does *WW2 end? What does the post-*WW2 order look like?

Americans are still isolationist who made a fortune off WW1. They skip WW2 too. A combined German, A-H, rump Ottoman Empire will likely be able to handle the French and/or Russian attack. UK is flat broke, hard to call if they join this one. Japan will sit on the sidelines. ITTL, the USA will be laser focused on Japan and vice versa.
 
I don't now that there necessarily would be a Second World War in a Central Powers victory timeline. There could be, but the prospect is far from assured.
 

Deleted member 109224

The terms Germany imposes on France will likely be a large indemnity and territorial adjustments (Briey-Longwy, Belforte, the slopes of the western Vosges, perhaps a western border partially on the Moselle) that'd be comparably minor compared to those imposed upon France OTL. The Germans had more ideas regarding territory from Belgium (a Meuse border) and Luxembourg (the whole thing) IIRC. There'll also likely be limits on France's military. The goal will be to neutralize France as a threat for a generation at least and gain strategic depth. Although if there's a third war, maybe somebody will bring up the boundary of Westphalia.

I'm not sure why France would go communist. Post-war France historically had a more active revanchist right than radical left, so I think it's far more likely Maurras's Action Francaise or de la Rocque's Croix de Feu would take over in France. Of course, unlike Germany OTL (who only lost one war) here France will have lost two wars in 47 years (Germany OTL ultimately losing two wars in 31 years). It's not unlikely that France could embrace a heavy dose of defeatist culture (heck they were pretty glum post-war OTL and they won the thing).


The big question depends on how peace in the east is decided and the boundaries that come with it. I say there's 4 ways it could go.

1) No Kerensky Offensive and Kerensky sues for peace in 1917. Russia loses Congress Poland, Luthuania, Courland, Bialystok, Grodno, Kars, and Adjara. Russia still has strategic depth, the Ukrainian breadbasket, and Baku oil. There will likely be a stab-in-the-back myth or some other type of nationalist fervor put forward by the reactionary-nationalist right.
2) There is a Kerensky Offensive and it goes as OTL, but Kerensky doesn't release the Bolsheviks during the bout of idiocy that was the Kornilov Affair. Russia holds on until 1918, but the government continues to lose to Germany. Come February 1918 as the Ukrainian Secretariat continues to be grumpy with Kerensky (Kerensky recognized the secretariat but only granted them authority over Central and western Ukraine - Novorossiya, Donbas, and Kharkiv remained under Moscow's purview and Kiev was very unhappy with this) they strike their own deal with the CPs and declare independence unilaterally. As this happens, Romania probably calls it quits in exchange for Bessarabia. By this point OTL the Germans had occupied the Estonian archipelago as well. As things generally fall apart, the Russians sue for peace, ceding Congress Poland, Lithuania, Courland, the West Estonian Archipelago, Western Belarus (OTL Polish Kresy lands), Kars, Adjara, maybe Nakhchivan-Yerevan, and Western and Central Ukraine. I'm thinking the Russians will retain Kharkiv, Donbas and Taurida east of the Dnieper. At most they lose OTL Ukraine minus Crimea, which would still leave them Baku oil.
3) There's a Russian Civil War but the Nationalists win. OTL Brest-Litovsk borders plus a revanchist-nationalist population and government and there likely being a couple of muslim states in the north caucuses as well. Crimea was supposed to be Russian under the treaty historically, but I think Ukraine or the Ottomans will take it here. However, it's also possible a white russia would be full of warlords and fiefs for a decade or two. It won't really be poised to be the biggest threat against Germany.
4) There's a Russian Civil War but the Communists win. OTL Brest-Litovsk borders plus an insecure Soviet government ad there likely being a couple of muslim states in the north caucuses as well. Crimea was supposed to be Russian under the treaty historically, but I think Ukraine or the Ottomans will take it here. The Soviets know the world wants their regime destroyed, so expect paranoia and insecurity. However, it will likely be a more secure government.


The thing about the Ottomans is that by mid-1918 they've already lost Hijaz, Basra, Baghdad, Kirkuk (though they abandoned Mosul after a couple weeks), and Jerusalem. The British aren't going to give those territories back. Ottomans will likely retain Damascus, Aleppo, and Mosul though. Looks like the British will get everything they wanted from Sykes-Picot and the French get squat (unless the British decide to push for France getting Lebanon). The territory they gain will all be in the Caucuses and perhaps Crimea.


So France hates Britain over being stabbed in the back in the mideast, France is either neutered or depressed but too weak to do anything anyways, the Ottomans are reduced but also a smaller and more Turkish polity that still holds on to most of the most important cities of the Empire, the British have made colonial gains but lost a lot of blood and have basically been stalemated, Germany dominates central Europe but is weary of what's to the east, and there's a bunch of eastern client states that probably won't like German domination.

As for colonies, Germany probably gets Togo and Cameroon back from France but they aren't getting Tanganyika or SW Africa back. Britain might sign off on Germany getting back the colonies the French occupied if the Germans get out of Belgium (which I'm sure Germany will probably be fine with as a neutral Belgium suits their strategic needs just fine, they've gained more depth in the west at the expense of France, and most of their attention is going to be on Russia and Central Europe anyways.

The US has likely stayed out of one war and is probably quite content with itself. Japan probably more or less has the same territorial gains and politics as OTL, though they might get more respect racially-speaking than they did historically if Wilson isn't there to muck things up. Without the US in the War and able to pressure Japan afterwards, Japan probably doesn't have to give Qingdao back. Without the disrespect from the OTL end of the war and without being forced to give up Qingdao and their influence in Shandong, I don't think Japan will necessarily go down the same militaristic route as it did historically. Plus if the US is not in the war, Britain probably sticks with the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Maybe when the Empire adopts Imperial Preference, Japan gets an exception.

Japan will be preoccupied holding onto its Shandong gains and will likely skirmish with China (think of things like the OTL January 28th incident in 1932). China will probably be pro-Germany here. If there's no Russian Civil War, there's no independent Outer Mongolia (Ungern-Sternberg not being able to run off and cause trouble). Japan's main concerns are likely (1) China (2) a US wary of what Japan is getting up to (3) what Russia is doing and (4) the low hanging fruit that is French Indochina. In all 4 of these concerns, alliance and good relations with the UK make a lot of sense. A less militaristic, more diplomatic, more UK-aligned Japan means a different dynamic in the period for sure.


If I had to guess what starts WWII (or an equivalent) it would be uprisings in German dominated Europe and Austria-Hungary breaking out at around the same time following the Great Depression of TTL and Russia seeing an opportunity to regain some strategic depth (nothing really as megalomaniacal as OTL Germany and Japan I think). The question is one of "who benefits from undoing the European order and has some capacity to act" and I think the answer is Russia, Italy, and (if the Russians renounce claims to Bessarabia) Romania. If the Turks get involved, then Bulgaria probably has an incentive to be on team Russia (although perhaps they attack Romania for Dobruja and force Germany to give them a free hand in dominating Albania and taking lands from Greece - or they just stay out of it and sell weapons to both sides). Britain meanwhile watches with popcorn because aside from Japan nobody in this context has a positive opinion of the UK, who was the only Entente country to make gains from WWI.

Japan meanwhile is doing its own thing on the other side of the world, unless a German-backed China supports Germany against Russia, in which case Japan has to make a decision: attack Russia or attack China? Or China doesn't enter the war and Japan has to think about whether messing with Russia is a good idea or whether to focus on the Chinese issue.
 
Certainly true. If the French worker state believes that Germany would succumb to Revolution once war begins, an attack, for me at least, would be more believable.

Don't forget how said left-wing regime could practice a combination of socialism with left-wing nationalism.

They COULD think this way, but the real question is would they? The situation in France is not remotely close to that of Russia that lead to OTL's Soviet--style system. In France's cultural civil war of the long 19th century, militancy/nationalism and centeralized authoritarianism (Single party stuffs censorship, ect.) was senonimous with the Right: a perception that isent going to change overnight, and the evidence of the past generations of conflict have clearly demonstrated that Germany, if nothing else, was quite good at coming together in the face of invasion had had a great deal of morale/material staying power. The public also have an expectation of and experience with popular participation in politics rather than submitting to the dictates of elites from above, unlike in Russia, so Paris won't have the leeway to independently decide on policy/ideology against popular opinion (an opinion of which your average Frenchman is far more self conscious than the average Soviet citizen had been)
 
In a scenario where Germany won WW1 in Kaiserreich-esque circumstances (via not launching unrestricted submarine warfare and therefore pissing off the Americans), how would alt-WW2 develop in a scenario where the Russians and French go revanchist and launch Round Two to gain revenge (assume the Germans and Austria-Hungary get a case of complacency akin to the one which struck Britain and France IOTL) with the collusion of a militarist Japan similar to OTL's? Who do the Americans (and British) side with? How does *WW2 end? What does the post-*WW2 order look like?

Maybe WW2 wouldn't happen at all.

OTL WW2 was only possible because Germany was humiliated but not weakened enough to prevent a second war. France wanted to break Germany's back in 1919, foe example by annexing the Ruhr area, but Great Britain was opposed to it for fear of a French hegemony on the continent.

Imperial Germany was much less lenient than the United Kingdom - this was proven my Brest-Litovsk. If it had won in the west, it would have transformed Belgium into a protectorate and significantly weakened France. France and Russia simply wouldn't have been strong enough for round 2 in universe where Germany wins the Great War. That's pretty clear.
 

Anchises

Banned
They COULD think this way, but the real question is would they? The situation in France is not remotely close to that of Russia that lead to OTL's Soviet--style system. In France's cultural civil war of the long 19th century, militancy/nationalism and centeralized authoritarianism (Single party stuffs censorship, ect.) was senonimous with the Right: a perception that isent going to change overnight, and the evidence of the past generations of conflict have clearly demonstrated that Germany, if nothing else, was quite good at coming together in the face of invasion had had a great deal of morale/material staying power. The public also have an expectation of and experience with popular participation in politics rather than submitting to the dictates of elites from above, unlike in Russia, so Paris won't have the leeway to independently decide on policy/ideology against popular opinion (an opinion of which your average Frenchman is far more self conscious than the average Soviet citizen had been)

Probably right. Wouldn't the French left after a failed WW1 tilt towards pacifism and internationalism?

However I wouldn't rule out a development towards authoritarianism. In my oppinion the authoritarian excesses of the far left are a systemic problem.

A USPD relaying overly optimistic reports that the Revolution of the proletariat is imminent and maybe a political crisis in Germany, could be tempting too resist.
 
In a scenario where Germany won WW1 in Kaiserreich-esque circumstances (via not launching unrestricted submarine warfare and therefore pissing off the Americans), how would alt-WW2 develop in a scenario where the Russians and French go revanchist and launch Round Two to gain revenge (assume the Germans and Austria-Hungary get a case of complacency akin to the one which struck Britain and France IOTL) with the collusion of a militarist Japan similar to OTL's? Who do the Americans (and British) side with? How does *WW2 end? What does the post-*WW2 order look like?


As others have mentioned, a Central Powers victory in WWI greatly decreases the possibility of WWII. However, if the victory is late enough you could weaken the central Powers alliance enough to make WWII no seem suicidal for the Russo-French revanchist alliance.

Lets take the usual POD with no USA in the war. The Entente by 1917. was quite reliant on US goods, and no unsecured loans dramatically weakens the offensive capabilities of the Anglo-French, but they could fight on deep into 1918. Say the war ends after an alt-Spring Offensive that batters the Entente enough that without the promise of American reinforcements all hope for victory is lost and a peace is negotiated that is rightfully seen by everyone as a German victory.

However, despite winning the war, the post-War situation becomes a headache for the Germans as both the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary collapse. The collapse of Austria-Hungary in particular would mean that (after the post-war demobilization) the Germans would have to abandon the Ukraine to pacify Central Europe.

With the Germans distracted in Austria-Hungary`s corpse and the Ottomans terminally weakened after the late-War losses against the British, the USSR takes the Ukraine and the Caucasus so its borders are roughly as OTL.

So Germany wins, gets the limited gains in the West they wanted and a giant Central European buffer zone against Russia, but it has lost all of its major allies except Bulgaria, and now has to oversee a dozen small nations in Central and Southern Europe. This isn`t the worst position to be in, as Germany with the Austrian part of the former Empire is now the richest, most industrialized and most populous country in Europe and has arguably become the strongest military power in the world.

However the USSR is roughly as powerful as OTL, and if we assume that France despite everything does indeed become a revanchist power (even a far-right regime works), you could have this Russo-French anti-German alliance form and start the war roughly in the same time frame as OTL.

Now as for how the war would go, I don`t think Britain would get involved with the Russo-French. Breaking Germany in this case means giving up half of Europe to the Russians and that can`t really be the best thing for Britain`s economic interests. Italy is a wild card, and could go either way, but lets assume the Italians join the anti-German alliance since they barely got anything (Trentino, Monfalcone and Trieste) from Austria-Hungary`s dissolution.

The French probably won`t try to break through Alsace-Lorraine, and might take the same defensive attitude as OTL, so at most they`ll occupy Belgium and maybe the Netherlands and hunker down, and maybe try to achieve something on the high seas with commerce raiding to try to block Germany`s access to global resources. Having Italy on-side would help with this somewhat as France and Italy combined would have a formidable navy. But the main purpose of France and Italy in this war would be to tie down part of Germany`s army so they can`t concentrate everything against the USSR. Though it would be clear to everyone that the USSR would have to do all the heavy lifting, so for the war to even happen in the first place you need the USSR to see Germany as the main threat for its existence, so much so that the USSR`s leadership is willing to attack.
 
Probably right. Wouldn't the French left after a failed WW1 tilt towards pacifism and internationalism?

However I wouldn't rule out a development towards authoritarianism. In my oppinion the authoritarian excesses of the far left are a systemic problem.

A USPD relaying overly optimistic reports that the Revolution of the proletariat is imminent and maybe a political crisis in Germany, could be tempting too resist.

I'm not doubting that the radical socialists may have authoritarian bents. The question is weather the French; who are used to having compedative and involved politics, would tolerate the implimentation of a totalitarian state in such a circumstance.
 
A successfully implemented German New Order in the East combined with the detaching of Briey-Longwy basically ensures the Central Powers can easily handle any Franco-Russian threat.
 

Anchises

Banned
I'm not doubting that the radical socialists may have authoritarian bents. The question is weather the French; who are used to having compedative and involved politics, would tolerate the implimentation of a totalitarian state in such a circumstance.

That is the million dollar question isn't it ?
 
That is the million dollar question isn't it ?

It certainly is. I just get a little annoyed sometimes with how almost everybody assumes strongmen regeimes are inevitable in these kinds of scenarios (Stalins for the left , Hitlers to the right), so I feel obliged to argue for the alternative
 

Anchises

Banned
It certainly is. I just get a little annoyed sometimes with how almost everybody assumes strongmen regeimes are inevitable in these kinds of scenarios (Stalins for the left , Hitlers to the right), so I feel obliged to argue for the alternative

Agreed. I always think it is ironic that a radical left-wing regime that doesn't succumb to a strongmen, might really easily fall due to worker unrest. Similar to what would have happened in the GDR without the Soviets.
 
Also, on the matter of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, I think it depends on the victory of the Central Powers. Their internal weakness gets brought up a lot by that seems to me to be a lot of Post-Facto reasoning; both Empires lasted four years through what was then the definition of industrialized mass warfare before collapsing. The Ottomans even survived for a time in defeat as well.
 
Also, on the matter of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, I think it depends on the victory of the Central Powers. Their internal weakness gets brought up a lot by that seems to me to be a lot of Post-Facto reasoning; both Empires lasted four years through what was then the definition of industrialized mass warfare before collapsing. The Ottomans even survived for a time in defeat as well.

I also believe that both empires would survive after a CP victory. However, my scenario was built upon the premise that WWII must happen, and Germany's position looks far more precarious without any major strategic allies than with them. For a WWII-equivalent to even be possible, you need at least a strong USSR, which means that even if the Ottoman Empire survives it mustn't expand into the Caucasus, and that coupled with the late-war losses in the Middle East means this surviving Ottoman Empire wouldn't be much larger than OTL post-war Turkey.
 
Agreed. I always think it is ironic that a radical left-wing regime that doesn't succumb to a strongmen, might really easily fall due to worker unrest. Similar to what would have happened in the GDR without the Soviets.

I don't think it's ironic in and of itself, but it is really humerious if you look at it through a Marxist lense. Fundimentally it rises from the real issue that unity through mutual opposition isent unity at all. "Workers" aren't a natural monolithic Bloc, so once you take the bougious out of the equation (or at least create that perception) conflicts between different classes come to the surface. So you either need to open up the political system enough to air them peacefully (which means tolerating rightists) or a crackdown in order to prevent another move to the barracades.

If we look at it from the "political question" rather than the "social question" France throughout the 1800's is the poster child for this. Which is exactly why I hesitate to see them being able to take a consistent, hard ideological line
 
In a scenario where Germany won WW1 in Kaiserreich-esque circumstances (via not launching unrestricted submarine warfare and therefore pissing off the Americans), how would alt-WW2 develop in a scenario where the Russians and French go revanchist and launch Round Two to gain revenge (assume the Germans and Austria-Hungary get a case of complacency akin to the one which struck Britain and France IOTL) with the collusion of a militarist Japan similar to OTL's? Who do the Americans (and British) side with? How does *WW2 end? What does the post-*WW2 order look like?
In such a TL, France and Russia are probably going to get their butts kicked.

I certainly don't expect either Britain or the U.S. to actually fight in this TL's World War II, and without either Britain or the U.S., I simply don't think that France (especially one which is shorn of Briey and Longwy) and Russia (which is shorn of its western borderlands) are actually going to have a chance against the German juggernaut. This would be especially true if Germany is able to mobilize large numbers of men from Mitteleuropa. After all, the Poles and Ukrainians have a lot of manpower which Germany is probably going to be eager to exploit in a future war with France and Russia.
 
A successfully implemented German New Order in the East combined with the detaching of Briey-Longwy basically ensures the Central Powers can easily handle any Franco-Russian threat.
As long as Britain and the U.S. don't interfere, that is absolutely correct.

Also, please keep in mind that Germany's Mitteleuropa is going to provide a lot of additional manpower for the German cause in any World War II in a TL where the Central Powers win World War I.
 
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