WW2 Germany first - Allied offensives limited in the Pacific

The real question is what would happen after Germany is defeated. In OTL, final victory over Japan was only months away when Germany capitulated. In this TL, the Allies (the USA mainly) would be faced with a largely intact Japanese empire to recapture, and history proves that even poorly equipped, isolated, and starving Japanese troops fought to the death to hold evey island. The US would not have its advanced bases for the strategic bombing campaign. I think the concern is real that such a situation might lead to pressure on the US to accept a negoiated settlement with Japan rather than a 2-year and bloody island-hopping campaign.

By mid-1944, even if the Japanese had not lost a single capital ship after Midway (which is unlikely) the USN together with the British Pacific Fleet would have had a truly overwhelming material and qualitative superiority over whatever IJN could throw. Most importantly they would have strategic mobility making 1942-1943 campaigns simply unimportant.

By late 1944 the key elements for defeat of Japan would be at place anyway. Probably even sooner than OTL thanks to Japan most probably reinforcing the forward positions and ignoring inner ring of defenses more than OTL.
 
I'm talking about time after battle of Midway where Japanese carrier force was already broken.



Stalin did not get his Second Front until 1944 in OTL. A more amphibious Allied strategy might well include landings in North Africa first, Sicily and Norway second, Northern and Southern France then and maybe a support operation in Denmark.

Advancing through Denmark would be considered too risky, but as a flanking operation after landings in Northern and Southern France I don't see any fundamental obstacles. After all, one cannot land if one is not willing to close in enemy attack bases which in OTL of 1944 were pretty much eliminated anyway.

By the way, with what Germans would be able to bomb Sjaelland hell and back?


Ah ok, after Midway i can see where this is going. Basically in OTL this was the American plan, since Germany did go first. I thought you meant that the USA would use their fleets in the Atlantic and Meds and give the Japanese fleet free reign untill 1944 and just attack their convoys.

Midway was a defensive battle for the Americans, but i thought since they had taken a more pacifistic approach in your TL it wouldn't happen.

Oh, and i exaggerated when i said Saelland would be "bombed to hell and back". But Germany would deploy any type of aircraft they can spare, including their reserves and everything they have in Finland. it will be bombed plenty enough to make sure nobody can build up an invasion from it.
 
Politically speaking, is this realistic at all? Not only did the American public want revenge for Pearl Harbor, but there were some VERY powerful voices within the US military (Gen. MacArthur and Adm. King spring to mind) who either lobbied heavily for a Pacific campaign to retake the Philippines, or were fairly Anglophobic.

As has been pointed out, additional American naval power in the Atlantic isn't going to do too much, except in the realm of the Uboat campaign. But putting the American carrier fleet in the Atlantic doesn't do much to fight Uboats, and it isn't an option to strip away all of their escorts in the Pacific to go fight Uboats in the Atlantic, for the simple reason that it isn't acceptable to either a)put the carrier fleet at high risk or b)leave the carrier fleet docked in Pearl Harbor.

Additionally, putting Marines in the Atlantic also doesn't do much good. Sure, maybe you could use them as front lines assault troops against defended beaches, but at that point you have to either withdraw them immediately and replace them with Army ground forces (who now don't have the experience of a combat landing) or leave them in prolonged combat against forces they are ill-equipped to handle (I really wouldn't want to see the 1st Marine Division go up against, say, the Herman Goring division, for instance).

Next, you still have to send some level of Army forces to secure the lifeline to Australia (this is how the Americal division was formed), and you still have to send forces to Australia to shore up invasion fears. As I recall, weren't 2 National Guard divisions sent to Australia almost immediately? In addition, you still have to reinforce Hawaii.

My point is this. Discontinuing all major offensive operations in the Pacific except for a submarine campaign makes no sense, because it doesn't allow you to utilize your assets productively. The US Navy, not to mention the American people, aren't going to stand for 4-5 aircraft carriers sitting around doing nothing, but if you task those aircraft carriers with objectives, then you have to support them. You're not going to sail 2 American carriers within range of Japanese ground based air cover in 1942-43, without a plan to invade the island on which that air cover is based (pinprick raids on Kwajelein, Marcus Islands, etc., aside). It doesn't make any sense. The flip side is, with minimal diversion from the ETO, you CAN productively use the assets (USMC, US PacFlt) that can't otherwise be utilized in the Atlantic. Could less combat power be diverted to the Pacific? Probably - the problem is that a lot of the combat power that was strictly unnecessary (for example, 2 National Guard divisions to Australia or a huge Hawaii garrison) was seen as politically mandatory, not to mention we had no idea at the time it was militarily unnecessary.
 
Wel, revenge for the Pearl Harbor attack came in the form of the Doolittle raid.

The OP doesn't say the entire Pacific Fleet will be relocated to the atlantic, i thought that too at first. Just a more defensive approach and the Carriers in tasks of protection, rather then intervention.

Plus, most of the Japanese fleetcarriers where already destroyed at Midway.

I do agree about the increase of forces around Australia though. Can't ignore Guadalcanal and New Guinea, even though we now know that was a hopeless effort by the Japanese. MacArthur wasn't the olny one who saw these as main objectives.
 
Wel, revenge for the Pearl Harbor attack came in the form of the Doolittle raid.

Sure, but the US public was still angry - it's not as if the Japanese could have sued for peace following the Doolittle Raid and gotten it. The reality is that the Doolittle Raid was a pinprick, something that couldn't be repeated until late 1944.

The OP doesn't say the entire Pacific Fleet will be relocated to the atlantic, i thought that too at first. Just a more defensive approach and the Carriers in tasks of protection, rather then intervention.

You mean, like the Doolittle Raid :p

My point is that carriers aren't really defensive weapons, and when used as such they are at risk of being sunk. Carriers are offensive tools, to be used to sink enemy warships, deny the sealanes, and support invasions.
 
Because Kalkhin Gol was so painful the Japanese would want to take another round of punishment just because? OTL no Soviet Forces had to be withdrawn from the Far East region at any point during the war, the Siberian troops which were rushed into Moscow were largely from the Ural/Central Asian regions not the Soviet Far East. If the Japanese try for round two in 1942 Stalin might decide he's done with their BS and do something fairly permanent about Manchuria after the Red Army is done using the Kwangtung Army for target practice.

The bulk of lend lease came through Vlaidivostok on Russian flag ships. The goal is to cut this off so the Germans have a better chance competing vs the strengthened European effort vs. waiting around doing nothing for Germany to fall to get attacked by the Soviets anyway like OTL. You don't have to attack the Soviet Union first just cut the trade and let the Soviet Union attack you if they want. No Japanese option is ever good.
 
The bulk of lend lease came through Vlaidivostok on Russian flag ships. The goal is to cut this off so the Germans have a better chance competing vs the strengthened European effort vs. waiting around doing nothing for Germany to fall to get attacked by the Soviets anyway like OTL. You don't have to attack the Soviet Union first just cut the trade and let the Soviet Union attack you if they want. No Japanese option is ever good.

The Japanese would do more damage to Soviet shipping by sinking everything bound to and from Vladivostok than by actually taking the city assuming they ever actually could take it in the first place. The trade-off for either approach is the Soviet Far East forces tearing through Manchuria like wet tissue paper, ripping the heart out of the Japanese Empire in continental Asia, and watching the Red Army eat the largest, most prestigious formation in the IJA for breakfast. The amount of supplies interdicted wouldn't come close to justifying the potential cost considering such an action would cripple Japan in exchange for at best mildly annoying the Soviets.
 
Sure, but the US public was still angry - it's not as if the Japanese could have sued for peace following the Doolittle Raid and gotten it. The reality is that the Doolittle Raid was a pinprick, something that couldn't be repeated until late 1944.

Doolittle raid was an excellent way to boost morale for both the fighting forces and the homeland. It was a direct counter to the surprise attack on Pearl, though of a much smaller scale. It did what it had to do.

You mean, like the Doolittle Raid :p

My point is that carriers aren't really defensive weapons, and when used as such they are at risk of being sunk. Carriers are offensive tools, to be used to sink enemy warships, deny the sealanes, and support invasions.

He meant the defensive will be put on in summer 1942. That means after doolittle, after midway and after the battle of the coral sea. But it means no or smaller solomons campaign.

The carriers main task was already done basically, Japan couldn't keep up with Allied ship building and lost its momentum. Japan had to go on the defense as well.

Still, Australia won't be happy and won't be very cooperative with the US strategy, seeing Japanese attacking Milney bay, Port Moresby even and hold the Solomons better. With raids on Darwin who knows what they'll do. They won't have enough troops to stop the Japanese on their own.
 
I'm thinking, if the Allies, especially USN, has stomach for it, after construction of the naval logistics train of mid-1944 they could perform a true naval blitzkrieg through Pacific late 1944 without need for long attritional fight of 1942-1943. Just bypass the Solomons and New Guinea altogether, head straight out for Gilberts, Marianas, Iwo, Okinawa and the Philippines (for political reasons necessary I'd guess).

You and others here are talking about the old War Plan Orange, which outlined a extended period of raiding and probing or opportunities, for some 12-18 months. The time was seen by the WPO planners as necessary for building up overwhelming superiority and the necessary logisitcs support. The USn of any decade was incapable of charging out across the Pacific without extensive preperation.

That did not change much under the Rainbow plans. Admiral King and his peers planned on waiting until the battleship and Essex class carrier construction programs were complete, and the fleet 'logistics train' built. that is exactly what king & co did. They raided and sought opportunities to damage the IJN, but substantial offensive ops were not undertaken until the Autum of 1943 (Operation Galvanic).

MacArthurs South pacific offensive was not part of the plan, and was launched for political reasons. Some folks argue the material it expended in 1943-44 could have been better used elsewhere.
 
David Floyd said:
The US Navy, not to mention the American people, aren't going to stand for 4-5 aircraft carriers sitting around doing nothing, but if you task those aircraft carriers with objectives, then you have to support them.
AFAIK, nobody suggested CVs swinging at anchor, just no Army involvement or major amphib ops anywhere. (IDK if anybody excludes AAF ops; I don't think I would.)

Neither, AFAIK, is anybody saying the Pacific Fleet should be transferred, in whole or part, to ATO ops, only the number of DDs/DEs detailed to PTO reduced to bolster ASW & the merchantmen otherwise deployed to PTO turned to buildup for *Neptune. (Or, should I say Roundup?)
 
Wel, revenge for the Pearl Harbor attack came in the form of the Doolittle raid.
....

They are largely forgotten now, but the January Marianas raid, and the February/March raids in the New Guinea-Raubal region were made into 'revenge' events at the time. Those were not as spectacular as the Tokyo raid, but they were important in their cumulative effects on the thinking of the Japanese naval leaders. had the Tokyo raid been conducted in isolation it would have had little effect on Japanese strategy. However it was the final blow in a series of raids which increasingly embarassed and angered the IJN leaders. In this it is important to remember the Midway Operation was planned and on the table before the Tokyo raid occurred. There is better than a 50/50 chance the Midway attack would have been launched had the Tokyo raid not happened.
 
They are largely forgotten now, but the January Marianas raid, and the February/March raids in the New Guinea-Raubal region were made into 'revenge' events at the time. Those were not as spectacular as the Tokyo raid, but they were important in their cumulative effects on the thinking of the Japanese naval leaders. had the Tokyo raid been conducted in isolation it would have had little effect on Japanese strategy. However it was the final blow in a series of raids which increasingly embarassed and angered the IJN leaders. In this it is important to remember the Midway Operation was planned and on the table before the Tokyo raid occurred. There is better than a 50/50 chance the Midway attack would have been launched had the Tokyo raid not happened.

Marianas raid? You mean the Marshall and Gilbert islands raids? I don't know about any raids in the New Guinea-Rabaul region, unless you mean the battle of the Coral Sea.

They did indeed add to the morale boost i agree.

The doolittle raid was a more direct counter to it, personal request by FDR, seemed to be somewhat more important. It might even have been a bigger boost for FDR and his staff then the populace. I don't know about the servicemen.

As for Yamamoto, i always thought(read somewhere sometime) the doolittle raid showed him how dangerous the American carriers were and caused him to decide to destroy them ASAP. But, i could be wrong. Could be all raids put together.
 
lionhead said:
As for Yamamoto, i always thought(read somewhere sometime) the doolittle raid showed him how dangerous the American carriers were and caused him to decide to destroy them ASAP.
Doolittle was used as a cause. I've heard also there was a belief the raiders came from Midway. In either case, it appears to have been an excuse, since Yamamoto seems to have decided this is what he wanted well beforehand.
 
Marianas raid? You mean the Marshall and Gilbert islands raids? I don't know about any raids in the New Guinea-Rabaul region, unless you mean the battle of the Coral Sea.

Lionhead,
There was a US carrier raid in response to the Japanese invasion of Lae (?) in New Guinea. Lexington and Yorktown sent their air groups over the Owen Stanley range in a surprise attack. This was before the Coral Sea.
 
Quote:
Originally Posted by lionhead
Marianas raid? You mean the Marshall and Gilbert islands raids? I don't know about any raids in the New Guinea-Rabaul region, unless you mean the battle of the Coral Sea.

You are correct. I mistakenly wrote Marianas instead of Marshals


Lionhead,
There was a US carrier raid in response to the Japanese invasion of Lae (?) in New Guinea. Lexington and Yorktown sent their air groups over the Owen Stanley range in a surprise attack. This was before the Coral Sea.

There were two raids in the South Pacific, the first was in late Febuary with he Lexington. The target was Raubal. Adm Brown decided to abort the raid when his TF was spotted and repported by Japanese reconissance planes. Before the TF made any distance it was attacked by 17 Betty bombers. Most of those were shot down, the Japanese losing all but parts of three aircrew and only two damaged bombers returning to Raubal. This was the battle where 'Butch' O'Hare splashed five bombers in less than five minutes.

The Yorktown joined the Lexington and in March the two launched a strike from south of New Guinea against a Japanese convoy. The flight path at high altitude across land was unusual for the USN pilots. The convoy was scattered & returned to port without unloading its cargo. One ship was sunk and a few more damaged. The failure to delivery the goods was a significant setback for the IJA attempting to advance from Lae as it was approximately a month before any of the ships unloaded at their destination. More important it and the other raids were a loss of face for the IJN as they failed repeatedly to counter the US carriers.

Gamble in 'Fortress Raubal' has descriptions of both raids, including a entire chapter on the Lexingtons February action.

There was also a aborted December raid attempted between 8th December and the attempted rescue of the Wake garrison.
 
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