Deleted member 1487
That is the stereotype about American troops:I'm reminded at this point the school book seldom matched the attacks or defense we planned in training, or when studying examples.
That is the stereotype about American troops:I'm reminded at this point the school book seldom matched the attacks or defense we planned in training, or when studying examples.
And in reality it was the other way around. To cross a ditch a German battalion needed a short spoken order, a US/British battalion needed five pages of written orders! A little exaggerated, but not far off.That is the stereotype about American troops:
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And in reality it was the other way around. To cross a ditch a German battalion needed a short spoken order, a US/British battalion needed five pages of written orders! A little exaggerated, but not far off.
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I'd call the second as much a canard or stereotype as the first. I've seen in writing & heard directly from veterans plenty of descriptions of well trained units, & experienced veteran units streamlining their command and control, and operating with fast efficient staff work. One of the common themes I've observed from US Army vets of the 1944-45 battles was how the Germans operated in a rigid fashion & when their attack plan or defense broke down they were unable to adapt & became confused. Not the usual stereotype, but that was their view as infantry or tank crew & it was as common as descriptions of the German infantry or tank crews being better.
Certainly there were a lot of mediocre & undertrained US officers & NCOs. But there are a lot of superb combat leaders and staff as well. The German army suffered from having its well trained leaders being killed off faster than replacements could be brought up to the same standard, thus by 1944 there were to many battalions, regiments, and divisions led by men who lacked the extra edge. The mobilization of the Home Army into the replacement pool & creation of the Volksgrenadier units in latter 1944 further diluted the German Army in a big way.
Closing on another stereotype - in the US Army the best officers were put in charge of logistics and in the German they were infantry or panzer commanders."
I will disagree with this one. From my experience, those who often get the best FitReps, those who are supposedly better officers, were not always in logistics but out in the field, getting command tickets punched for advancement. Almost universally I found them to have the leadership ability of a K Mart manager, uninspiring, possibly dangerous, and thinking in terms of career preservation vice operational effectiveness. Part of this is the normal way of a peacetime military. All too often those who are the most capable are a bit "rough around the edges", not as socially acceptable, and therefore don't get the promotions the ticket punchers get. I believe by 1944 most of the Kmart managers had been weeded out of the military field commands, either afloat or ashore.
Of course there were lots of extremely competent US officers, the ratio not less than in other armies, and I'm even sure you also could find a lot of examples of initiative and creativity.
But following the basic US situation you had to emphasis systems, planning, standardisation etc. over improvisation, creativity and initiative. In the German system it had to be the other way around, but still not excluding the possibility of finding a cautious German following his plans.
Closing on another stereotype - in the US Army the best officers were put in charge of logistics and in the German they were infantry or panzer commanders.
The Germans used a lot of 4.5-5 tonners for their army group level logistic units in Barbarossa and apparently they tore up the unpaved roads pretty badly. France was a far better logistic situation, but there was some off roading that needed to be done and if there were maintenance issues, there was less damage done overall if 1x 2.5 tonner fell out vs. a 5 tonner.There are good arguments for larger transports. The US Army logisticians planning for OVERLORD asked for five tonners for the transportation companies in Europe. The decision ultimately went for a majority being 2.5 tonners. That decision has had some strong criticism since. Tactically within the combat formations smaller vehicles have favorable arguments.
Vehicle weight is very determining for strain/wear on the road. When my neighborhood a few years ago had to renew its roads the road engineer told us that 10.000 ordinary cars 1-2 tons) could pass before they put the same wear on the road as a heavy truck (18 tons).The Germans used a lot of 4.5-5 tonners for their army group level logistic units in Barbarossa and apparently they tore up the unpaved roads pretty badly. France was a far better logistic situation, but there was some off roading that needed to be done and if there were maintenance issues, there was less damage done overall if 1x 2.5 tonner fell out vs. a 5 tonner.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Ball_ExpressWhich brings the questions f what the Franco/Belgian roads were designed for? The logistics planners for the campaign in NW Europe expected 9 - 12 months before reaching Germany & the German roads. Thats quite a while on French highways. What were they expecting there?
Beyond that most folks were expecting to restore the French railways for use. The schedule for shipping construction material & rolling stock to France fit the anticipated advance, Not the 90 days into 30 that actually occurred.
Apparently, whatever they were designed for, they held up well given the use they got during the Normandy campaign.The highways in France are usually good, but are ordinarily not excessively wide. The needs of the rapidly advancing armies, consequently, promptly put the greatest possible demands upon them. To ease this strain, main highways leading to the front were set aside very early in the advance as "one way" roads from which all civil and local military traffic were barred. Tens of thousands of truckloads of supplies were pushed forward over these one way roads in a constant stream of traffic. Reaching the supply dumps in the forward areas, the trucks unloaded and returned empty to Arromanches, Cherbourg and the lesser landing places by way of other one way highways. Even the French railroads were, to some degree, operated similarly, with loaded trains moving forward almost nose to tail.[7]
— For Want of a Nail: The Influence of Logistics on War (1948) by Hawthorne Daniel
I'd call the second as much a canard or stereotype as the first. I've seen in writing & heard directly from veterans plenty of descriptions of well trained units, & experienced veteran units streamlining their command and control, and operating with fast efficient staff work. One of the common themes I've observed from US Army vets of the 1944-45 battles was how the Germans operated in a rigid fashion & when their attack plan or defense broke down they were unable to adapt & became confused. Not the usual stereotype, but that was their view as infantry or tank crew & it was as common as descriptions of the German infantry or tank crews being better.
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=wu.89094692084;view=1up;seq=10Thanks for the reference. I sense a forgotten classic there. I seem to recall one way roads being used during the Wilderness campaign in 1864.
... A larger and more organized staff employed properly shouldn't hinder subordinates, it should enable them.