WW2: Fewer divisions better?

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I'm reminded at this point the school book seldom matched the attacks or defense we planned in training, or when studying examples.
That is the stereotype about American troops:
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Redbeard

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That is the stereotype about American troops:
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And in reality it was the other way around. To cross a ditch a German battalion needed a short spoken order, a US/British battalion needed five pages of written orders! A little exaggerated, but not far off.

Again, not because the Wallied were less smart, but in order to transform their materiel superiority (firepower) into victory they first of all needed a systematic and planned application of that material superiority - and certainly not some dashing type making risky movements. The Germans had little to loose and everything to win from taking the risk and anyway could build on a tradition going back to the Liberation wars (from Napoleon) where the (defeated) stiffness of Frederickian liniear warfare was abolished and initiative and creativity at all levels emphasised (ie the opposite of what we usually see as Prussian).
 
And in reality it was the other way around. To cross a ditch a German battalion needed a short spoken order, a US/British battalion needed five pages of written orders! A little exaggerated, but not far off.

...

I'd call the second as much a canard or stereotype as the first. I've seen in writing & heard directly from veterans plenty of descriptions of well trained units, & experienced veteran units streamlining their command and control, and operating with fast efficient staff work. One of the common themes I've observed from US Army vets of the 1944-45 battles was how the Germans operated in a rigid fashion & when their attack plan or defense broke down they were unable to adapt & became confused. Not the usual stereotype, but that was their view as infantry or tank crew & it was as common as descriptions of the German infantry or tank crews being better.

Certainly there were a lot of mediocre & undertrained US officers & NCOs. But there are a lot of superb combat leaders and staff as well. The German army suffered from having its well trained leaders being killed off faster than replacements could be brought up to the same standard, thus by 1944 there were to many battalions, regiments, and divisions led by men who lacked the extra edge. The mobilization of the Home Army into the replacement pool & creation of the Volksgrenadier units in latter 1944 further diluted the German Army in a big way.
 

Redbeard

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I'd call the second as much a canard or stereotype as the first. I've seen in writing & heard directly from veterans plenty of descriptions of well trained units, & experienced veteran units streamlining their command and control, and operating with fast efficient staff work. One of the common themes I've observed from US Army vets of the 1944-45 battles was how the Germans operated in a rigid fashion & when their attack plan or defense broke down they were unable to adapt & became confused. Not the usual stereotype, but that was their view as infantry or tank crew & it was as common as descriptions of the German infantry or tank crews being better.

Certainly there were a lot of mediocre & undertrained US officers & NCOs. But there are a lot of superb combat leaders and staff as well. The German army suffered from having its well trained leaders being killed off faster than replacements could be brought up to the same standard, thus by 1944 there were to many battalions, regiments, and divisions led by men who lacked the extra edge. The mobilization of the Home Army into the replacement pool & creation of the Volksgrenadier units in latter 1944 further diluted the German Army in a big way.

Of course there were lots of extremely competent US officers, the ratio not less than in other armies, and I'm even sure you also could find a lot of examples of initiative and creativity.

But following the basic US situation you had to emphasis systems, planning, standardisation etc. over improvisation, creativity and initiative. In the German system it had to be the other way around, but still not excluding the possibility of finding a cautious German following his plans.

Closing on another stereotype - in the US Army the best officers were put in charge of logistics and in the German they were infantry or panzer commanders.

I certainly also agree on the late war German units often being of low quality. Boys and old men in a TOE framework based more on wishful thinking than realistic operational analysis. But it is astonishing how good units you can build around a core of about 25% veterans.

But please note, that at least my agenda in this hasn't been praising or scolding any army, I rarely find that interesting, but to point out that it rarely gives much meaning to judge one army (or whatever) by the standards of another in a different situation.

And when that is all said, then - yes - I am very fascinated by the thinking behind "Auftragstaktik/Mission tactics" and I'm a dedicated proponent of using it in business management. A few years ago you had to be vary careful to not tell people they were lead according to Prussian principles from the 19th century, but now I'm actually seeing acknowledged scolars reading and quoting Moltke senior's principles and seeing them as a contrast and alternative to instrumentalistic methods like New Public Management.

BTW I've been in quite some liason jobs with US Army and Marines units in the 1980s, although it mainly was British and German units I "socialised" with. I have the greatest respect for all, even if the differences were notable. The common NATO context made the similarities much stronger than the differences though - but different enough to be exotic :)
 
Closing on another stereotype - in the US Army the best officers were put in charge of logistics and in the German they were infantry or panzer commanders."

I will disagree with this one. From my experience, those who often get the best FitReps, those who are supposedly better officers, were not always in logistics but out in the field, getting command tickets punched for advancement. Almost universally I found them to have the leadership ability of a K Mart manager, uninspiring, possibly dangerous, and thinking in terms of career preservation vice operational effectiveness. Part of this is the normal way of a peacetime military. All too often those who are the most capable are a bit "rough around the edges", not as socially acceptable, and therefore don't get the promotions the ticket punchers get. I believe by 1944 most of the Kmart managers had been weeded out of the military field commands, either afloat or ashore.
 
Of course there were lots of extremely competent US officers, the ratio not less than in other armies, and I'm even sure you also could find a lot of examples of initiative and creativity.

But following the basic US situation you had to emphasis systems, planning, standardisation etc. over improvisation, creativity and initiative. In the German system it had to be the other way around, but still not excluding the possibility of finding a cautious German following his plans.

This derived in part from German doctrine, but there was a second more important factor. The US Army went from a mobilized strength in the autumn of 1940 of some 200,000 active service, 250,000 National Guards, and a bit over 60,000 reservists. To put it another way it started with around 17,000 fully trained officers & a similar number of long service NCOs, & another 80 or 90 thousand partially trained National Guard and Reserve officers. Less than three years later it had grown to six million+ with a requirement for 600,000 or more capable officers & senior NCO. In comparison the German army had from 1933 to 1939 to prepare a broad leadership cadre & 20 more months 1939-41 of relatively brief operations to add to the training time. If you count to the summer of 1944 the US Army had a little under four years to prepare for full scale sustained operations. The Germans started in 1934 training a officer/NCO cadre for a fully mobilized army & hit the sustained operations wall in latter 1941 over six years later. That is the Germans hd double the time to give their cadre the extra edge. The US Army had enough time to master the core skills, but not enough to take everyone to the next level.

Closing on another stereotype - in the US Army the best officers were put in charge of logistics and in the German they were infantry or panzer commanders.

Generally the best in the German army went to the General Staff school when they hit promotion to major. The US was similar , with the best senior captains & majors selected for the Staff & Command course @ Leavenworth. A few of the cream went to the Navy War College, or foreign officer schools. It is correct 2d Lts entering the service had what appeared to be the best skimmed off for specific specialties, but as we all know its unpredictable how a 22 y/o college grad will do ten years out. or even five. Playing averages only takes you a limited distance in this. Thats why selection for the advanced courses, the staff schools & the senior war colleges are screened each round. Performance in Westpoint, State U, OCS, the basic specialty school is only a general indicator of who is in the upper percentiles at the five, ten, fifteen, or twenty year marks.
 
I have to ask, do you mean simply increasing the number of divisions from the same manpower pool (smaller divisions), or more manpower in a larger number of divisions (so both increase)?

Either way, as already noted, I'm seeing transport issues, not least numbers of vehicles & fuel for them (or fodder for horses, which takes up way more transport space than oil or men:eek::eek:).

A thought: if you have more "big" divisions, can you counter with bigger transports? Or is the deuce-&-a-half (actual practical payload 5 tons on good roads, tho rarely loaded so heavy) about the practical upper limit?
 
There are good arguments for larger transports. The US Army logisticians planning for OVERLORD asked for five tonners for the transportation companies in Europe. The decision ultimately went for a majority being 2.5 tonners. That decision has had some strong criticism since. Tactically within the combat formations smaller vehicles have favorable arguments.
 

Deleted member 1487

There are good arguments for larger transports. The US Army logisticians planning for OVERLORD asked for five tonners for the transportation companies in Europe. The decision ultimately went for a majority being 2.5 tonners. That decision has had some strong criticism since. Tactically within the combat formations smaller vehicles have favorable arguments.
The Germans used a lot of 4.5-5 tonners for their army group level logistic units in Barbarossa and apparently they tore up the unpaved roads pretty badly. France was a far better logistic situation, but there was some off roading that needed to be done and if there were maintenance issues, there was less damage done overall if 1x 2.5 tonner fell out vs. a 5 tonner.
 

Redbeard

Banned
The Germans used a lot of 4.5-5 tonners for their army group level logistic units in Barbarossa and apparently they tore up the unpaved roads pretty badly. France was a far better logistic situation, but there was some off roading that needed to be done and if there were maintenance issues, there was less damage done overall if 1x 2.5 tonner fell out vs. a 5 tonner.
Vehicle weight is very determining for strain/wear on the road. When my neighborhood a few years ago had to renew its roads the road engineer told us that 10.000 ordinary cars 1-2 tons) could pass before they put the same wear on the road as a heavy truck (18 tons).
 
Which brings the questions f what the Franco/Belgian roads were designed for? The logistics planners for the campaign in NW Europe expected 9 - 12 months before reaching Germany & the German roads. Thats quite a while on French highways. What were they expecting there?

Beyond that most folks were expecting to restore the French railways for use. The schedule for shipping construction material & rolling stock to France fit the anticipated advance, Not the 90 days into 30 that actually occurred.
 

Deleted member 1487

Which brings the questions f what the Franco/Belgian roads were designed for? The logistics planners for the campaign in NW Europe expected 9 - 12 months before reaching Germany & the German roads. Thats quite a while on French highways. What were they expecting there?

Beyond that most folks were expecting to restore the French railways for use. The schedule for shipping construction material & rolling stock to France fit the anticipated advance, Not the 90 days into 30 that actually occurred.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Ball_Express
The highways in France are usually good, but are ordinarily not excessively wide. The needs of the rapidly advancing armies, consequently, promptly put the greatest possible demands upon them. To ease this strain, main highways leading to the front were set aside very early in the advance as "one way" roads from which all civil and local military traffic were barred. Tens of thousands of truckloads of supplies were pushed forward over these one way roads in a constant stream of traffic. Reaching the supply dumps in the forward areas, the trucks unloaded and returned empty to Arromanches, Cherbourg and the lesser landing places by way of other one way highways. Even the French railroads were, to some degree, operated similarly, with loaded trains moving forward almost nose to tail.[7]

— For Want of a Nail: The Influence of Logistics on War (1948) by Hawthorne Daniel
Apparently, whatever they were designed for, they held up well given the use they got during the Normandy campaign.
 
I'd call the second as much a canard or stereotype as the first. I've seen in writing & heard directly from veterans plenty of descriptions of well trained units, & experienced veteran units streamlining their command and control, and operating with fast efficient staff work. One of the common themes I've observed from US Army vets of the 1944-45 battles was how the Germans operated in a rigid fashion & when their attack plan or defense broke down they were unable to adapt & became confused. Not the usual stereotype, but that was their view as infantry or tank crew & it was as common as descriptions of the German infantry or tank crews being better.

It's not really mutually exclusive. You need effective command and control to allow tactical flexibility. A larger and more organized staff employed properly shouldn't hinder subordinates, it should enable them.
 
... A larger and more organized staff employed properly shouldn't hinder subordinates, it should enable them.

Something the Germans were starting to run short of in 1944. In that context fewer divisions makes for a lot more sense. Consolidate the capable men you still have in fewer command cells & consolidate the battalions under them. This is what the Red army did in 1941 when it eliminated the corps HQ & regrouped the remaining trained staff in the Army HQ.

One of the things that struck me when reading the biographys of the US general officers of WwII is how they had been put through a sort of 'Staff Hell' as captains and majors in the interwar years. It appears their seniors took the more embarrassing lesson of the Great War to heart & were determined to build the officer corps into the finest staff material possible. Looking at the bios it appears personalities like 'Bulldog Bowser' or MacArthur were judging these guys by their ability to plan and organize. How successful they were I won't say. It does look like when Marshal was faced with the problem of building a 6-8 million man army with just 17,000 trained officers he went for the guys with proven track records in planning and organizing.
 
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