WW2: Fewer divisions better?

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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But in the spirit of this thread it has to be said that those 73 Divisions (49 Infantry, 20 Armoured and 4 Paratrooper) that Ike commanded in 1945 were division for division stronger in terms of manpower, vehicles, AFVs and guns than their Soviet and German equivilents. So each one could have more effectviely covered a greater frontage than the equivilent German or Soviet unit.

Hard to argue there. Just counting cannon, armored vehicles, and infantry weapons a 'average' Commonwealth corps had some serious advantages. Factor in the efficiencies from communication, much larger ammunition supply, fewer obsolescent weapons, ect... & the difference grows & grows.

Another issue is the connection between doctrines and logistics. US and British doctrines had their focus on firepower rather than manoeuvre. This probably reduced British and US casualties but also meant that a British or US Division typically required close to double the amount of supplies (mainly arty ammo) in combat compared to a German. ...

I've found it useful to use the measurement of the US/Commonwealth logisticians of 1944. That is "Division Slice" As applied to logistics planning & execution of Op OVERLORD it included all ground forces both combat & service, and tactical air forces ashore in Europe. This was divided by the number of division HQ ashore & came out to a standard of 44,000 men. To keep each division slice in sustained offensive combat the Overlord planners aimed at 900 short tons daily for each. This included a small allowance for a small reserve. From D +60 the goal was 950 tons rail to accelerate build up of a supply reserve in Europe. Source: Ruppenthals 'Logistics in Overlord".

It must also be understood the Logistics planners, & the Allied leaders from SHAEF through Army Group & downwards did not expect every division to be in offensive combat at all times. They anticipated that after a few weeks some 20%+ of the ground combat forces would be out of the battle zone to rest, repair, and train replacements. Much the same as the ground forces in the Pacifc, or the Mediterranean theaters.

I've only applied this Division Slice approach to a few brief back of the envelope calculations for German forces in western Europe. One of the points that jumped up in doing this was the paucity of tactical air forces to draw on the aggregate supply. Another was how to count the laborers in the Todt organization. A large portion of those performed tasks that were done by uniformed men in the US and Commonwealth service units. Unfortunatly its not easy to estimate how many should be included in the calculation for German forces and how many would be the equivalent of the European laborers employed by the Allied armies.

I seriously doubt if you, even with the US resources could keep 200 Divisions supplied in the OTL firepower doctrine on a Eastern Front infrastructure....

They'd have built their own infrastructure. The Persian Railway is a obvious example. Aside from completely rebuilding the railroad end to end they added to it, improved the port at the Gulf end, added a barge port at the north end, built a truck assembly plant, & miscl support facilities. Another example would be the US railways. Depending on the source & method of calculation between 70% & 120% of the railroads were reconstructed to modern standards & the capacity raised. Smaller examples would be the reconstruction or selected Italian railroads, a broader reconstruction of the Franco/Belgian railways 1944-46 from US provided material & financing. Given the same starting points as the Germans the Commonwealth and US were capable of rebuilding the core trunk lines and selected secondaries across the USSR as needed. Add in port construction capability & the capability grows.

The other half of the above is the question of 200 Commonwealth & US divisions being necessary.
 

Redbeard

Banned
But in the spirit of this thread it has to be said that those 73 Divisions (49 Infantry, 20 Armoured and 4 Paratrooper) that Ike commanded in 1945 were division for division stronger in terms of manpower, vehicles, AFVs and guns than their Soviet and German equivilents. So each one could have more effectviely covered a greater frontage than the equivilent German or Soviet unit.
Not so sure about the greater frontage.

I haven't got the US 1945 TOE at hand here, but according to the 1942 one, a US Infantry Division was very close to a German one. The number of infantry battalions would be the most important factor in setting the frontage and both had nine between three regiments. Both German and US regiments had similar support units. The field artillery also was very similar with 36 105 mm howitzers and 12 155/150 mm howitzers. The main difference would be the US lacking a GPMG (IMHO a great disadvantage) and the US Enginer btn having much less combat power than the German Pioneer btn. Later the US Divisions often could count on a tank btn in support, at least more often than the Germans having a StuG btn at hand.

The US Division probably could stay in combat for longer time, but I very much doubt it had a significantly larger frontage.
 
Many were RWD only. The Opel and Ford Cologne trucks were based off of lighter duty GM and US Ford designs, but the main trouble was the lack of standardization, even in tire and wheel sizing

Maybe that was because GM owned Opel, most the trucks Germany produced were from GM in a way, just like the patent for synthetic oil was given to Germany by the US.
 
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I'm not aware of how many horses could be "mobilised" in USA by 1940, but transporting them across the Atlantic would appear a challenge of its own.

There was a certain amount of resistance to total mechanization from the Cavalry branch, but the U.S. got rid of all horse-mobile units because it was 70% more efficient to ship vehicles than horses.
 
Not so sure about the greater frontage.

I haven't got the US 1945 TOE at hand here, but according to the 1942 one, a US Infantry Division was very close to a German one. The number of infantry battalions would be the most important factor in setting the frontage and both had nine between three regiments. Both German and US regiments had similar support units. The field artillery also was very similar with 36 105 mm howitzers and 12 155/150 mm howitzers. The main difference would be the US lacking a GPMG (IMHO a great disadvantage) and the US Enginer btn having much less combat power than the German Pioneer btn. Later the US Divisions often could count on a tank btn in support, at least more often than the Germans having a StuG btn at hand.

The US Division probably could stay in combat for longer time, but I very much doubt it had a significantly larger frontage.

My understanding is that a US Division was a triangle affair with a total of 9 Infantry Battalion while the German 1944 division Toe (with the exception of Static Divisions) had reduced this to 6 with the 'Fusilier' or reconnaissance Battalion effectively a 7th (but still responsible for recce work) - the US Division also had a dedicated Tank Battalion and Tank Destroyer Battalion and its tail to troop ratio was massively superior (I seem to recall that a German 1944 Division was 85% combat arms having massively reduced its logistical troops) and its access to transport was again much greater allowing it to cover a greater frontage and while the number of guns etc is not dissimilar the greater Logi in a US/British Division allows its artillery to shoot a great deal more

Also while on paper the US division is not that much stronger in manpower the US had the ability to reinforce units relatively quickly while German units where very often well below its allocation of well pretty much everything from 1942 onwards

Lastly the US and largely the British as well standardised on equipment with one main artillery type - 105mm or 25 pounder at division level while the Germans were often obliged to have a number of weapon systems often captured etc often within the same unit confounding the already poorer logistical system

In addition the artillery would be backed up by Corps and even Army level heavy artillery Regiments further increasing their firepower.

As for MG yes no GPMG was a disadvantage but not so much as you imply as there was enough M1919s in a given battalion for 2 per Platoon and while its no GPMG it was a Browning!

Also while probably not sporting to even mention it - the Wallied division could count on a level of air support that a German or Russian divisional commander could only fantasise about - a level that on any given day make day time movement of both combat units and logistics perilous while at the same time the Wallied unit was protected by a level of air superiority that allowed virtually unrestricted movement behind the lines - this gives a walleid unit far greater freedom of movement and effective firepower over a Soviet or German one.
 
Not so sure about the greater frontage.

I haven't got the US 1945 TOE at hand here, but according to the 1942 one, a US Infantry Division was very close to a German one. The number of infantry battalions would be the most important factor in setting the frontage and both had nine between three regiments. Both German and US regiments had similar support units. The field artillery also was very similar with 36 105 mm howitzers and 12 155/150 mm howitzers. The main difference would be the US lacking a GPMG (IMHO a great disadvantage) and the US Enginer btn having much less combat power than the German Pioneer btn. Later the US Divisions often could count on a tank btn in support, at least more often than the Germans having a StuG btn at hand.

The US Division probably could stay in combat for longer time, but I very much doubt it had a significantly larger frontage.
According to the June 1943 TOE the 44th Reichsgrenadier "Hoch and Deutschmeister", with 9 Btns, had an establishment of 17,734; a 1945 US Infantry Division 14,037, with 9 Btns.
(With 16 LMG per Coy vs 9 BAR & 2 M1919. The Hv Weapons Coy of a US Inf Btn had another 8 M1919, the equivalent German Company another 12 MG)

By 1945 the establishment of a German Infantry Division had dropped to as little as 10,027 on a Volksgrenadier TOE, and only 6 Btns. A Fallschirmjager Division of 1944, with 9 Btns, had an establishment of 15,976.

A Panzer Division of 1944 pattern had a TOE of 13,726. A US Armd Division of 1945 was 10,670.
The Largest German OOB on record is 22,300 for the Bodyguard. In June 1944 Das Reich had an establishment of 19,200.

The Red Army Rifle Division varied in TOE between 18,841 & 9,380. In 1945 the establishment was 11,780.
(Tank & Mechanized Corps were 12-15,000)

A British Army Infantry Division of 1944 had a TOE of 18,347.

The idea that Wallied Divisions were uniformly larger is not supported by the evidence.
 
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The US divisions had a combat support establishment 3-4 times the German. The most glaring are the Independent Armored and Tank Destroyer battalions. In the ETO the ratio was such that all infantry divisions had either a AB or TAD battalion attached. The majority had both. With a nominal strength of 54 tanks and 36 TD a US Inf Div had more tanks/TD than a average strength German armored div. The TD battalion also brought some two dozen armored cars as part of their T/E, which added to the standard mech cavalry troop gave the US Inf Div a mech recon capability close to that of a PzDiv. A German commander of a Pz Grenadier division could consider himself lucky to have a tank battalion at half strength. Often as not a company size group of assaults guns were the armor strength. The commander of the horse mobile division could not even count on that.

For 21 Army Group the disparity in tanks was so great as to be absurd. The ratio of tank to infantry battalions was such the 21 AG constituted a tank army in everything but name.

On the artillery side the Ratio of medium and heavy artillery in the German corps/army artillery pool was about two battalions to each armored, motor, or horse mobile division. In the US and Commonwealth armies in Europe the ratio was more than double that with 4-5 battalions in the corps/army pool per division. In the case of the Germans the corps artillery were usually busy with the deep battle & seldom worked directly with the divisions artillery . The US and Commonwealth routinely reinforced directly the divisions with battalions from the corps artillery groups, directly linking to division artillery communications & HQ. The quantities of ammunition available to the W Allies aggravated the difference. The worst US ammunition shortages were comparatively a better than average day for the German artillery commander.

Similarly the worst periods of equipment replacement for W Allied commanders looked like a surfeit of riches from the German commanders PoV. The US & Commonwealth divisions seldom fell below 80% of establishment, & higher was normal. German units rotated out of the battle field were rebuilt, but while in the battle zone seldom were above 70% & often less. In 1944 depleted German divisions were usually rebuilt with obsolescent & worn equipment & in some case lacked even that.

In the air was the worst disparity. In the east in 1943 the operational strength of the GAF averaged some 2500 flyable aircraft each month. In the west a bit more. Perhaps 3000 in a good month, & spread across the entire theatre from Norway, through France, to Italy, and in Germany. The W Allies had better than 15,000 operational aircraft from Scotland to the eastern Mediterranean mid 1944.

A average US Amy corps of 1943-45 had two infantry divisions of 18 infantry battalions, 16+ artillery battalions in the division/corps artillery groups, two tank battalions, two TD battalions, 4-5 engineer battalions in the div/corps. Never mind the AAA battalions, Armored Cavalry Groups, Armored Divisions, & mess kit repair units that could be added in.
 

Redbeard

Banned
My understanding is that a US Division was a triangle affair with a total of 9 Infantry Battalion while the German 1944 division Toe (with the exception of Static Divisions) had reduced this to 6 with the 'Fusilier' or reconnaissance Battalion effectively a 7th (but still responsible for recce work) - the US Division also had a dedicated Tank Battalion and Tank Destroyer Battalion and its tail to troop ratio was massively superior (I seem to recall that a German 1944 Division was 85% combat arms having massively reduced its logistical troops) and its access to transport was again much greater allowing it to cover a greater frontage and while the number of guns etc is not dissimilar the greater Logi in a US/British Division allows its artillery to shoot a great deal more

Also while on paper the US division is not that much stronger in manpower the US had the ability to reinforce units relatively quickly while German units where very often well below its allocation of well pretty much everything from 1942 onwards

Lastly the US and largely the British as well standardised on equipment with one main artillery type - 105mm or 25 pounder at division level while the Germans were often obliged to have a number of weapon systems often captured etc often within the same unit confounding the already poorer logistical system

In addition the artillery would be backed up by Corps and even Army level heavy artillery Regiments further increasing their firepower.

As for MG yes no GPMG was a disadvantage but not so much as you imply as there was enough M1919s in a given battalion for 2 per Platoon and while its no GPMG it was a Browning!

Also while probably not sporting to even mention it - the Wallied division could count on a level of air support that a German or Russian divisional commander could only fantasise about - a level that on any given day make day time movement of both combat units and logistics perilous while at the same time the Wallied unit was protected by a level of air superiority that allowed virtually unrestricted movement behind the lines - this gives a walleid unit far greater freedom of movement and effective firepower over a Soviet or German one.

Yes the 1944 German TOE reduced the frontline btns to six - out of desperation, but claiming that the increased firepower of MG42s and assault rifles would make up. IMHO they only did so to a limited degree and for very short time. Casualties were extremely focussed in the ranks of infantry and with only six btns you simply would run out of infantry too fast.

But as this debate had much been about a Barbarossa scenario I found it most appropriate to compare the mid war TOEs. The 1942 US Divisional TOE appear almost a copy of a 1941 German one, apart from the German horses being replaced by various motor vehicles but still with the US infantry foot marching. Foreign and German materiel usually wasn't mixed inside the Divisions. Most (if not all) of the category 1 Divisions had only German artillery and weaponry. The foreign materiel was concentrated in the category 2 Divisions (limited offensive capacity) and so that say Czech materiel was concentrated in one Division and French in another (IMHO the Czech arty was better).

The available firepower to the commanders at various levels was very similar and with the German infantry being superior but the US Divisional artillery having an advantage due to motorisation and more radios. The German Pioneers (platoon at each Reg and a Divisional Pioneer btn) were way more versatile than the US Engineers, and the German Division would be superior when attacking (field)fortifications. The closest US equivalent would be the Seabees from the Pacific, which evolved because they were needed. Had the US Army been in a situation where it should face largely fortified enemies like the French and Red armies, I guess they would have introduced Pioneers or "Groundbees" generally, but it really just underline my point, that each army evolve its doctrines etc according to its task and the resources available. In this context we shall be very careful when suggesting the methods af another army with another job and different resources. We should judge each army by how it utilised what it had for the job given.

But back to the Divisonal frontage I haven't found any US Divisional field manuals, but the regimental and btn field manuals (FM 7-40 and FM 7-20) prescribed a btn frontage between 1000 and 2000 yards and in rare circumstances as high as 3500 yards. The regimental frontage would be the sum of the btns in front and the divisional frontage the sum of regiments in front. This could wary very much however, as the triangular organisation usually meant "two up, one back" deployment. If this was followed from btn and up you would get a very deep position being very difficult to penetrate, but it would be very narrow - two regiments in front, each with two btns in front - ie a total frontage of 4-8.000 yards.

Terrain usually meant that certain sectors could be left less covered but also meant that others had to be extraordinarily manned. From the manuals and war history it would appear that the "ideal" frontage of a triangular Division would be around 10 km, but usually doing well up to 15 km. There are many examples of Divisional frontages much beyond that. In very difficult terrain it would usually be no problem and in open terrain a formation with all nine inf btn in front covering say 20 km and with reece/AT/pioneer btns in reserve certainly could fight back, especially if they could utilise the Divisonal artillery and general interarms co-operation. But if exposed to a concentrated and not at least persistent attack this deployment would offer few opportunities to fall back and retreat relatively intact. It would be rolled over and annihilated - just like at Bagration in July 1944 when Armygroup Mitte practically ceased to exist. Please also note that most armies by this time didn't deploy in coherent lines any more, but rather in "hedgehog" positions deployed in chessboard formation.

And finally back to Barbarossa and the origin of this thread - if you engage in a campaign including a 3000 km "line of combat contact" you will need at least 200 Infantry Divisions of the US/German triangular type (no matter the combat persistence of the Divisions) - and add to that the maneuver units and the strategic reserve!

Germany needed more Divisions not fewer.
 
Here is a chart (with sources! no less! of British, German, and Soviet defense frontage 1943-44.

Screen Shot 2018-01-13 at 8.51.34 AM.png


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Not been able to read this essay in depth. It reflects post war doctrine & TO/TE, but looks relatively close to the US Army in 1944.

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/doc..._72/b_Harvard/03_53_InfForDefenseWest_Dec.pdf

The relevant illustration from the article, on page 29 shows a frontage of approx 10,000 meters for a infantry division in the defense.

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After sleeping on my previous post I have to repeat the problem of chronic understrength of the German ground forces, with the rifle strength being the worst portion. Commonwealth and US commanders had the luxury of fighting with infantry divisions that were consistently above 80% strength in manpower & 90% in equipment. The German average overall was 70% or less.

A second point to reiterate was the mass of reinforcing combat power that expanded the 'Division Slice' of combat power. The US and British infantry divisions as they actually fought in 1944-45 were powerful combined arms formations with armor and air support as integral components. Just counting the TO/TE strength of the assorted armies divisions badly distorts the comparison.
 
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Eh, as to the question of non-mechanized infantry being deemed somewhat or totally 'useless' there is a reason that while the USSR had over 20,000 tanks and self-propelled artillery in 1945 they chose not to have thirty tanks armies but rather six. Here are a couple
  • Infantry divisions are essential for the breakthrough of enemy defense lines so that armor-mechanized divisions aren't attrited (armor is held at ransom until these infantry catch up too because the damage falls on them until then)
  • Non-mech. infantry being caught fighting with tank-mechanized divisions was not unknown albeit rare, nor non-mech. infantry taking on tank divisions. In the triangle formed by Brody-Lutsk-Dubno there were an abundance of infantry divisions on the site of tank battles. At Kursk..
  • Most tank losses were attributable to non-mech. infantry divisions (rather the artillery) anyways for the Soviets and the Germans (at Smolensk for example).
 
Here is a chart (with sources! no less! of British, German, and Soviet defense frontage 1943-44.

View attachment 365278

A Soviet division on the defense having a frontage of 50-120 kilometers? That has to be some sort of mistake. Even a full strength American division wouldn't be able to defend such a frontage. Hell, a modern mechanized division would be considered spread thin on such a frontage...
 
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Capitalist weaklings, no match for Soviet superman.

Soviet Superman?

the Institute of Experimental Pathology and Therapy, the first primate testing centre in the world, and possibly the site of a macabre Stalinist experiment to breed a human-ape hybrid. Set amid palm trees and lush greenery on a hill just outside the centre of Sukhumi LINK
 

Deleted member 1487

I caught that. Either the intent was 5-12 km, or i was a reference to army front in the defense. Probably the first.

That's more reasonable. I take it their averages? I know in specific examples where a side could predict or already knew (from intelligence) where an enemy attack would come they would have divisions condense more so as to deepen the defensive belts. Like at Kursk...

Super Simian.

Super Soviet Simian.
 
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