WW2: Fewer divisions better?

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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Never is. Were these motorized divisions fielding the same number of rifle & artillery battalions as the 1st Wave ID? Or were they smaller, with less fire power & ability to sustain losses?
What I meant about it not being that simple is that the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Wave division had fewer motor vehicles and more horses. Plus there were sub-wave divisions. E.g. only 23 of the 35 First Wave division were organised on the standard pattern. The other 12 were spread among 9 different variations.

In September 1939 the motorised infantry divisions and 1st wave ID had the same number of infantry battalions and the same amount of artillery. However, the 1st Wave IDs had a replacement battalion and the motorised divisions didn't. But neither did the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Wave IDs.
 
Yes an awful lot of Petrol, Oil and Lubricants must have been wasted moving fodder to the frontlines, with something along the lines of your suggested revision this can be avoided.
A kg of oats through a horse probably would bring a ton of supplies as far as a kg of fuel would in a 1940s motor vehicle going on bad Russian roads and tracks - and here not even considering the spares needed for the motor vehicle and fuel not available anyway.

Overall, A Horse, logistically speaking had the footprint of 10 men. Besides the Fodder, you needed gallons of clean water.
And the Horses need that Fodder an Water every day, working or not. Trucks use fuel only when moving

On the other end, US farms typically freed up 1/3 of the total acreage that had been used for Fodder, just by mechanizing. That was a big boost in productivity

For efficiency. IC engines have specific fuel consumption very roughly of 0.5 lb/Hp-hr
Horses find it even rougher to be in mud all day, see the WWI rates of horse replacement just behind the communication trenches

To keep a Horse healthy, you need 4-5 pounds of Oats or grains a day, plus as much Hay as they care to eat, and around 6-7 gallons of water.
Thats for just living. you can double it for hard work.
HP is horsepower is the ability to raise 550 pounds of mass 1 foot, in 1 second. Originally for determining how much coal a Horse could move from a mine.
A Draft Horse could do 16 HP for a short time, but over time averages to 1 HP-- imagine that.

Gasoline is a bargain
 
... A German motorised infantry division (of which there were four) had 4,028 motor vehicles and no horses. A standard 1st Wave infantry division (of which there were 23) had 1,539 motor vehicles and 4,842 horses. So the exchange rate is about 2.5 ordinary infantry divisions for one motorised division. Except that it isn't as simple as that.

Hmm... how much fuel would those 1539 autos use per day? 30 liters average? Weight of petrol varies quite a bit depending on the temperature and the exact blend. .71kg to .77. Using the low figure thats .71 x30 =21.3 kg x 1539 =32,780kg of fuel.

If the horses consume 6kg each of grain & misc thats x4842 =29,052kg of feed.

Not really a big difference. If the autos are consuming 25% more fuel thats 40,975kg. 25% more horse feed is 36,315kg.

At the lower number the Motor ID consumes 85,796.4kg fuel.
 
Hmm... how much fuel would those 1539 autos use per day? 30 liters average? Weight of petrol varies quite a bit depending on the temperature and the exact blend. .71kg to .77. Using the low figure thats .71 x30 =21.3 kg x 1539 =32,780kg of fuel.

If the horses consume 6kg each of grain & misc thats x4842 =29,052kg of feed.

Not really a big difference. If the autos are consuming 25% more fuel thats 40,975kg. 25% more horse feed is 36,315kg.

At the lower number the Motor ID consumes 85,796.4kg fuel.

Don't forget that just grain causes trouble, need fiber, and add the water weight as well
 
Theres a variety calculators for horse feed https://www.rowenbarbary.co.uk/feed-advice/feeding-made-easy/

A large draft hose is going to need between 5 & 6 kg of grain or concentrate when at heavy work. Between four and five at normal work. Another 6-7 kg of forage is needed & this is best provided by normal grazing. Dried/stale forage substitutes are inferior for working animals. Grain can be substituted for forage to a limited extend, but health problems result if this fibre is reduced much.

Knappe in his description of the 1941 operations indicates they were stripping the country side of forage and grain for the horses. The transport between the railheads and the units could cope with the load only out to 50-100 km from the rail side dumps. I presume this large scale draw on the Soviet farms is partially responsible for the damage to the eastern farms production & lower output in 1942-43.

... and add the water weight as well

Do you seriously think water was shipped by rail and supply wagon from Germany to the battlefields in Poland, France, Yugoslavia, & the east??????
 

Deleted member 97083

Do you seriously think water was shipped by rail and supply wagon from Germany to the battlefields in Poland, France, Yugoslavia, & the east??????
They co-opted and used the existing Polish/French/Yugoslav/Soviet water infrastructure, right?
 
Yeah, like where they watered their livestock.

Need to plan logistic around it, need to corral near streams, rivers or wells. It also takes time to unhitch the team. faster to bring water to the horses at times.

Fresh water is actually difficult in cold winters for large numbers of animals.
And no, they can't get their water needs by eating snow. If they aren't watered enough in Winter with all that dry feed they eat, they get stomach impactions.
 
Never is. Were these motorized divisions fielding the same number of rifle & artillery battalions as the 1st Wave ID? Or were they smaller, with less fire power & ability to sustain losses?

What I meant about it not being that simple is that the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Wave division had fewer motor vehicles and more horses. Plus there were sub-wave divisions. E.g. only 23 of the 35 First Wave division were organised on the standard pattern. The other 12 were spread among 9 different variations.

In September 1939 the motorised infantry divisions and 1st wave ID had the same number of infantry battalions and the same amount of artillery. However, the 1st Wave IDs had a replacement battalion and the motorised divisions didn't. But neither did the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Wave IDs.

This document lays out the basic organisation of German Infantry Divisions assigned to Barbarossa with notes on the variations for each wave and often by division.

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CGSC/CARL/nafziger/941GFAB.pdf

Of course adding to the difficulty of a simple formula for translation between motorised and part-motorised/horse-drawn divisions and in part something I think NOMISYRRUC was alluding is the fact that the Germans, right from the start, had such a plethora of equipment types, so one division might be using say six-wheel 3-tonne capacity movers while another might be using four-wheel 1-tonners and multiple varieties in between.
 
This document lays out the basic organisation of German Infantry Divisions assigned to Barbarossa with notes on the variations for each wave and often by division.

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CGSC/CARL/nafziger/941GFAB.pdf

Of course adding to the difficulty of a simple formula for translation between motorised and part-motorised/horse-drawn divisions and in part something I think NOMISYRRUC was alluding is the fact that the Germans, right from the start, had such a plethora of equipment types, so one division might be using say six-wheel 3-tonne capacity movers while another might be using four-wheel 1-tonners and multiple varieties in between.
I actually meant other types of infantry had more horses and fewer motor vehicles. I thought that was simply because there weren't enough motor vehicles to allow all the infantry divisions to be organised on the same pattern. However, the lack of standardisation in motor vehicle types is a valid point.

AFAIK the variety of motor vehicles was a logistical nightmare. Also AFAIK early in 1940 the German Army had to start a de-motorisation programme replacing trucks with horses because production did not meet the demand caused by wastage and the expansion of the army.
 
About a year ago I attempted to work out the motor vehicle establishment of the German Army in September 1939 using the info on Leo Niehorster's website plus some source documents he sent to me.

The 85 1st to 4th Wave infantry divisions in the German Army in September 1939 had a combined establishment of 432,515 horses (210,430 light draught, 78,291 heavy draught and 143,794 riding).

They also had a total establishment of 114,799 motor vehicles (31,653 personnel carriers, 41,090 load carriers & prime movers, 147 armoured cars and 41,909 motor cycles).

If they had all been motorised infantry divisions they would have had a total establishment of 342,380 motor vehicles (84,065 personnel carriers, 143,395 load carriers & prime movers, 2,550 armoured cars and 112,370 motor cycles) and no horses.

That's a difference of 227,581 motor vehicles (52,412 personnel carriers, 102,305 load carriers & prime movers, 2,403 armoured cars and 227,581 motor cycles) and 432,515 horses.

A German motorised infantry division (of which there were four) had 4,028 motor vehicles and no horses. A standard 1st Wave infantry division (of which there were 23) had 1,539 motor vehicles and 4,842 horses. So the exchange rate is about 2.5 ordinary infantry divisions for one motorised division. Except that it isn't as simple as that.
Most of the discrepancy between the 1939 motorised division and the standard 1st Wave division is the transport of the 3 infantry regiments. In the motorised division the 3 infantry regiments had a total of 9,318 men, 1,968 motor vehicles and no horses. The standard 1st Wave division had 9,180 men, 315 motor vehicles and 624 horses. That leaves about 2,000 motor vehicles in the rest of a motorised division and 1,200 in the rest of a 1st Wave division.
 
I actually meant other types of infantry had more horses and fewer motor vehicles. I thought that was simply because there weren't enough motor vehicles to allow all the infantry divisions to be organised on the same pattern. However, the lack of standardisation in motor vehicle types is a valid point.

AFAIK the variety of motor vehicles was a logistical nightmare. Also AFAIK early in 1940 the German Army had to start a de-motorisation programme replacing trucks with horses because production did not meet the demand caused by wastage and the expansion of the army.

I know Halder proposed such, I am not sure how far it went though it might well have been the inspiration behind the motorised divisions losing a regiment of infantry at the end of '40. That said the Heer did double its stock of mechanised divisions both panzer and motorised in '41. The wastage problem though was I think though partly the result of keeping too many divisions active. That food requirement of about 100 tons daily per infantry division (roughly half and half for humans and horses) necessitated a lot of haulage from railheads that depleted the useful lives of the motorised transport rather uselessly. Better to leave the men and horses, if not at home at least in depots I would argue, as while the infantry divisions were potentially fine instruments in battle a lot of them spent the early campaigns simply trailing in the wake of the lead elements, these I will admit included some horse-drawn forces so there is room for debate on how many divisions could be cut but assuming the OTL cap on transport and drivers remains in place fewer divisions I think is the better trade off.

Someone up thread argued this was about the Heer going Wallied in doctrine but I do not think so. We are talking divisions as the Germans were obsessed with divisions. The Allies both Western and Soviet instead concentrated an awful lot of their armour, heavy artillery and even in the case of the Soviets motor transport outside of divisional structures so it could be bolted on to whichever divisions were actually engaged in action. The Heer being persuaded of that notion seems a bit of a stretch too far. The Germans I think would still think in terms of divisions and some of those divisions will require horse transport. My, perhaps somewhat optimistic proposal, is that the Germans could move their Army from being composed almost 90% horse drawn formations to around 75% horse drawn divisions with a greater pool of replacements for lost men, horses and equipment.

However that is one proposal along the theme, there is wide room for debate on how the Heer could cut and concentrate, where and when.
 

Redbeard

Banned
Overall, A Horse, logistically speaking had the footprint of 10 men. Besides the Fodder, you needed gallons of clean water.
And the Horses need that Fodder an Water every day, working or not. Trucks use fuel only when moving

On the other end, US farms typically freed up 1/3 of the total acreage that had been used for Fodder, just by mechanizing. That was a big boost in productivity

For efficiency. IC engines have specific fuel consumption very roughly of 0.5 lb/Hp-hr
Horses find it even rougher to be in mud all day, see the WWI rates of horse replacement just behind the communication trenches

To keep a Horse healthy, you need 4-5 pounds of Oats or grains a day, plus as much Hay as they care to eat, and around 6-7 gallons of water.
Thats for just living. you can double it for hard work.
HP is horsepower is the ability to raise 550 pounds of mass 1 foot, in 1 second. Originally for determining how much coal a Horse could move from a mine.
A Draft Horse could do 16 HP for a short time, but over time averages to 1 HP-- imagine that.

Gasoline is a bargain

Sure, but if you don't have fuel or motor vehicles it is not a question of choosing between horses and trucks, but of utilising what you have (horses, oats, hey and water) as much as possible.

Anyway the very important point is, that the typical Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht was NOT horsedrawn, but semi-motorised. Including light vehicles and motorcycles (each of about 400 kg and carrying three men incl. equipment) a standard InfDiv would have close to 1000 motor vehicles and the core of which were 5-600 trucks of an average carrying capacity of 2,5 tons. This meant that most of the logistic capacity actually was motorised and that a typical category 1 Inf Div could field a motorised combat group of Regiment/Brigade size (the Pioneer battalion, the Reece battalion and the AT battalion and the AT companies in the regiments). In the category 2 Divisions (defined as limited offensive capacity) the above units were often reduced to company size and/or with reduced complement of motor vehicles - but still far from being "horse drawn". I have the OoB at home, incl. which Inf Div were category 1 or 2, but at Barbarossa the large majority, and indeed those taking the brunt of the fighting were category 1.

Of course it is still interesting to discuss where the organisational balance is. IMHO the OTL one of the Wehrmacht wasn't far off compared to what they had and the more I study the subject the more impressed by how they utilised the resources at hand.
 

Deleted member 1487

Better to leave the men and horses, if not at home at least in depots I would argue, as while the infantry divisions were potentially fine instruments in battle a lot of them spent the early campaigns simply trailing in the wake of the lead elements, these I will admit included some horse-drawn forces so there is room for debate on how many divisions could be cut but assuming the OTL cap on transport and drivers remains in place fewer divisions I think is the better trade off.
Trailing the mobile divisions...but still fighting hard battles all along the way:
FI02_03_ZF_Jun22-Jul11_41.jpg


Someone up thread argued this was about the Heer going Wallied in doctrine but I do not think so. We are talking divisions as the Germans were obsessed with divisions. The Allies both Western and Soviet instead concentrated an awful lot of their armour, heavy artillery and even in the case of the Soviets motor transport outside of divisional structures so it could be bolted on to whichever divisions were actually engaged in action. The Heer being persuaded of that notion seems a bit of a stretch too far. The Germans I think would still think in terms of divisions and some of those divisions will require horse transport. My, perhaps somewhat optimistic proposal, is that the Germans could move their Army from being composed almost 90% horse drawn formations to around 75% horse drawn divisions with a greater pool of replacements for lost men, horses and equipment.

However that is one proposal along the theme, there is wide room for debate on how the Heer could cut and concentrate, where and when.
Not sure it was a Heer problem as much as a Hitler issue, who seemed to be chronically obsessed with reducing efficiency for numbers. The Germans did have a fair bit of extra-division units that were bolted on like the Assault Gun Battalions/Brigades, plus random independent brigades/regiments. Later they did learn from the Soviets and tried to create special artillery formations at higher levels:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/18th_Artillery_Division_(Wehrmacht)
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/VolksArtKorps/Gliederung.htm
 
Sure, but if you don't have fuel or motor vehicles it is not a question of choosing between horses and trucks, but of utilising what you have (horses, oats, hey and water) as much as possible.

Except the issue here is the Heer did have the fuel and motor vehicles and wasted a not insignificant proportion of both supporting the horse parks. Take your 1,000 motor vehicle division, that has somewhere in the region of 5,000-5,500 horses consuming 50-60 tonnes of oats and hay daily as against perhaps 20 tonnes of fuel and a tonne of lubricants for the motor vehicles, while the men of the division might consume roughly fifty tonnes of food per diem*. Another way of putting that is two of the division's 30 tonne capacity supply columns are being used to transport almost solely supplies for the horses.

Yet another way of looking at it is that a resting Panzer Division in Russia was estimated as requiring 30 tons (I think short tons considering the source) daily while inactive, Infantry division required 80 tons daily in the same posture. See Section IV. of the below:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Germany/HB/HB-6.html

I think a better question would be, were enough of the infantry divisions engaged to a sufficient degree to justify their numbers or could a suitable mix of smaller number part-motorised/horse drawn divisions and a larger number of fully motorised infantry divisions been able to handle the burden? The gain of the latter organisation being in the larger pool of trained replacement men and horses, together with more equipment being held as replacements for losses and a lower overall logistics requirement.

*it should be noted that measuring human food by weight alone can give widely variable figure given the huge variety and preparations of foodstuffs humans consume
 
Trailing the mobile divisions...but still fighting hard battles all along the way:

Well that is the key question really how often did each division engage? My impression is the lead horse-drawn divisions engaged but at least some further behind in the column of march only rarely caught up to the fighting. At least some divisions seem to have marched the full 40 kilometres/25 miles typically possible of a human on the march on some days which would not have allowed units to close up much if at all.
 

Deleted member 1487

Well that is the key question really how often did each division engage? My impression is the lead horse-drawn divisions engaged but at least some further behind in the column of march only rarely caught up to the fighting. At least some divisions seem to have marched the full 40 kilometres/25 miles typically possible of a human on the march on some days which would not have allowed units to close up much if at all.
As I understand it the border fighting engaged the foot infantry divisions more than the later mobile fighting, but when things got positional around Smolensk and then later during the Vyazma pocket foot infantry manpower was needed much more. The more I read about Barbarossa and the logistic situation the trade offs for fewer divisions, but more mobile with less manpower is really tough to truly accept given the resulting battle complications from having fewer troops at the front; logistics are easier, but combat power is compromised in the defensive fighting and pocket battles, perhaps fatally so. Likely the best compromise if having a much better rail construction apparatus even at the expense of reduced numbers of infantry divisions.

The one place it makes sense to reduce foot infantry divisions in favor of fewer mobile divisions is in AG-North. Trading in 4 foot infantry for 2 motorized infantry divisions would be extremely helpful there, especially during the border battles and race to the Dvina. 18th Army really needed a motorized infantry corps to rush Riga and cut off the exit for the Soviet 8th Army over the Dvina; they tried IOTL, but had too weak of a motorized element to risk trying to cut off the mass of retreating Soviet infantry. Having that OTL motorize army element plus a motorized infantry corps to attach it to would have been extraordinarily helpful, especially then in the subsequent push through Estonia. Motorize the 1st Corps and you'd have a substantially tougher 18th army, even with fewer divisions. You'd probably have to eliminate the 2x 200s series divisions in the army to motorize the corps using their trucks, while of course shrinking the size of the divisions. Their mobility though would really enhance their abilities in the mobile fighting in June-July.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/18th_Army_(Wehrmacht)
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gliederungen/Korps/IKorps-R.htm
 
This is a bit off topic, but still germane I think. I have seen numerous photos of abandoned, damaged and destroyed Soviet equipment, artillery, wagons, soft skinned vehicles and armor, especially from the early phase of Barbarossa. Did the Germans attempt to utilize those vehicles in a systematic way? The gain in trucks alone should have been huge, yet I am unsure of just how, or if, they dealt with them. The impression I have gotten in my reading is that early in the campaign, much Soviet equipment was simply left to rot, whereas if it had been utilized, it could have at least partially equipped German units and decreased their dependency upon horses.
 
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