WW2: Fewer divisions better?

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Deleted member 1487

Germany lacked the fuel required for a larger mechanised Force, they made very good use of their mechanised forces but larger mechanised forces would require vastly increased fuel supplies.
Eliminate a number of 'non-motorized' divisions would free up a substantial number of vehicles that were used historically, allowing them to be concentrated in another motorized division.

RSO appears only after they are waste deep in USSR? with unanticipated problems ... SPGs might look like good idea prior to that?

looking at (relative) ineffectiveness of their divisions from another angle, if they had been equipped with anti-tank rifle grenades (per a prior thread) how would that affect logistics? that they are not using ever bigger guns to deal with Soviet tanks.
They had fully tracked prime movers before the RSO, the Balck suggestion was written in 1943 and specifically mentioned the RSO, which is why I mentioned it.
Otherwise there was also the Pz I chassis that could be used for that if not even the Pz II in some cases when it was clear it needed to be retired.
The AT rifle grenade would have been a relatively minor item in terms of logistics, not having a significant impact, but could have had a significant combat impact. Thing about that is that the rifle grenade is a last ditch weapon for the infantry, not a real replacement for say a proper AT gun.
 

Deleted member 1487

Actually this is one area where I think Wiking may be on to something. Not that it will win the war for Germany by amazing flipflop but unlike a lot of other proposals it helps. Essentially you accept that there will be no change to the total mechanisation of the Heer rather you reduce, say about 50 horse drawn infantry divisions and replace with say about 10 extra motorised infantry divisions. You still have the men, the guns and the horses and about half the motor vehicles of the stricken 40 divisions as reserves in the Ersatz Heer command structure that can be used to keep the operational divisions up to strength.
Plus since motorized units require substantially less weight of supply to keep going, it would actually unburden the supply system.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horses_in_World_War_II#Horse_logistics
Horses seemed to be a cheap and reliable transport especially in the spring and fall mud of the Eastern Front[16] but the associated costs of daily feeding, grooming and handling horses were staggering. In theory horse units could feed off the country, but grazing on grass alone rendered horses unfit for work and the troops had no time to spend searching the villages for fodder.[17] Hard-working horses required up to twelve pounds of grain daily;[17] fodder carried by the troops made up a major portion of their supply trains.[17]

Horses needed attendants: hitching a six-horse field artillery team, for example, required six men working for at least an hour.[1]Horse health deteriorated after only ten days of even moderate load, requiring frequent refits; recuperation took months and the replacement horses, in turn, needed time to get along with their teammates and handlers.[1] Good stables around the front line were scarce, makeshift lodgings caused premature wear and disease.[1] Refit of front-line horse units consumed eight to ten days, slowing down operations.[1]

Movements over 30 kilometers (daily horse travel limit[18]) were particularly slow and complex. Longer hauls were relegated to trucks at first opportunity, while horses persisted at divisional level[19] and in auxiliary units.[20] Horse transports were particularly inadequate in deep offensive operations, just like they were in 1914. American trucks supplied to the Soviets allowed operations up to 350 kilometers away from the railhead, a distance impossible for horse-drawn sleighs.[21] Likewise, replacement of field artillery horses with jeeps allowed towing 120-mm mortars in line with advancing troops, another tactic not possible with horses.[21]

Especially as you consider that many divisions even at the start of the Barbarossa Campaign were not at full strength/TOE and these units were often incapable of handling combat ops
Which divisions? Unless they were those used in the Balkans, which were in large part mobile divisions, all but security divisions should have been at near peak strength. Even 'regular' infantry divisions had a lot of motor vehicles for Barbarossa:
https://books.google.com/books?id=6...AG#v=onepage&q=barbarossa motorcycles&f=false

https://books.google.com/books?id=U...AH#v=onepage&q=barbarossa motorcycles&f=false

And at the same time if possible (and I am semi quoting Manstien I think)
Many people have said that.

stop the private armies (SS and LW field divisions) as these robbed the heer of thousands of quality soldiers - and in the case of the SS took heavy losses when they should not have and in the case of the LW field division took heavy losses due to a lack of 'tribal knowledge and experiance'.

Again he writes that a the quality of troops in many of these 'private army' units were of high quality and therefore 'robbed' the heer of many potential NCOs and Officers
Enormously so.
 
Plus since motorized units require substantially less weight of supply to keep going, it would actually unburden the supply system.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horses_in_World_War_II#Horse_logistics

Yes an awful lot of Petrol, Oil and Lubricants must have been wasted moving fodder to the frontlines, with something along the lines of your suggested revision this can be avoided.

Which divisions?

If you take a look at the video CryHavoc posted above at about 3:08 it lays out the that the total Heer had about 136 fully operational divisions out of 209. Essentially as you say the Barbarossa divisions(133-134 total?) would have likely consumed almost the entire frontline strength of the Heer. The figures for May 1942 though appear (to my eyes at least) to count just Ostheer divisions as you have a total of 160 divisions counted (I am not sure of the total Heer division count at this point but IIRC it went up rather than down), essentially not only has the Ostheer by these figures been ground up but it is making further calls on the reserve and garrison strength of the remainder of the Army.

This is the situation having a properly resourced Ersatz Heer ought to at least ameliorate.
 

Deleted member 1487

If you take a look at the video CryHavoc posted above at about 3:08 it lays out the that the total Heer had about 136 fully operational divisions out of 209. Essentially as you say the Barbarossa divisions(133-134 total?) would have likely consumed almost the entire frontline strength of the Heer. The figures for May 1942 though appear (to my eyes at least) to count just Ostheer divisions as you have a total of 160 divisions counted (I am not sure of the total Heer division count at this point but IIRC it went up rather than down), essentially not only has the Ostheer by these figures been ground up but it is making further calls on the reserve and garrison strength of the remainder of the Army.

This is the situation having a properly resourced Ersatz Heer ought to at least ameliorate.
Barbarossa used 153 divisions:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa
The Germans deployed one independent regiment, one separate motorized training brigade and 153 divisions for Barbarossa, which included 104 infantry, 19 panzer and 15 motorized infantry divisions in three army groups, nine security divisions to operate in conquered territories, four divisions in Finland and two divisions as reserve under the direct control of OKH.[107] These were equipped with 6,867 armored vehicles, of which 3,350–3,795 were tanks, 2,770–4,389 aircraft (that amounted to 65 percent of the Luftwaffe), 7,200–23,435 artillery pieces, 17,081 mortars, about 600,000 motor vehicles and 625,000–700,000 horses.[108][109][4][8][5]
That's not counting the full range of Axis allied divisions that grew over the course of 1941-42.

A big help would have been a properly resourced rail construction corps to enable rail supply to take the burden off of the 'Grosstransportraum' heavy truck supply units:
https://forum.axishistory.com//viewtopic.php?t=108967
 
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In terms of fully mechanised Western divisions the CW forces made use of mule transport in both the Italian & Far Eastern theatres due to the terrain being too difficult for motorised transport in places - as noted by Wiking above.
 
Bigger divisions places a bigger load on the division staff, and downward at the next level. The trade off is you need fewer HQ per comparable number of pairs of of boots. Maybe the staff manpower saved can be used to improve support services or distributed downwards at the company & battalion level?

... The Soviets arguably showed that more divisions aren't necessarily bad, even if they were smaller, perhaps out of necessity due to the size of the front. The Germans seem to have gotten the worst of both worlds, having too many divisions they couldn't properly equipment/supply/man and not enough mobile divisions to meet needs, which sucked up the striking power of the army. Post-war when refounded they went for a smaller army with total mechanization. ...

Years ago I found it useful to discard the English language labels for Soviet forces of 1941-45. Looking at their size and tactical/operational roles a Red Army 'army' of that era resembles a large corps with a large pool of maneuver & support brigades & no intermedaiate HQ. That perspective gave some clarity to how the Red Army from 1942 'right sized' if combat forces for the task.
 
Actually this is one area where I think Wiking may be on to something. Not that it will win the war for Germany by amazing flipflop but unlike a lot of other proposals it helps. Essentially you accept that there will be no change to the total mechanisation of the Heer rather you reduce, say about 50 horse drawn infantry divisions and replace with say about 10 extra motorised infantry divisions. You still have the men, the guns and the horses and about half the motor vehicles of the stricken 40 divisions as reserves in the Ersatz Heer command structure that can be used to keep the operational divisions up to strength.

I'd thought similar in terms of manpower, equipment might be a problem tho. For motor vehicles my understanding is the low grade infantry divisions never had their full complement of automobiles, and all the infantry divisions were strpped of their cargo trucks and a portion of the light autos to outfit the newly formed armored and motor rifle divisions. Germany & the occupied nations were combed over for cargo trucks as well.

Off the top of my head early war you would thus still have 68 horse drawn divisions for flank, line of communications coverage but the Panzer Armee portion of the Heer would now have some 15 motorised infantry divisions (+ 2 Waffen SS equivalents and 1 essentially mechanised cavalry division) supporting the 10 panzer divisions (of which 4 had formerly been Leichte aka Light Divisions).

This may not add up in terms of cargo trucks available to Germany across Europe. One of the reasons the automotive transport did not do as well as hoped was the number of second and third rate vehicles brought along to bring the motor/armored forces to strength. They weren't holding up to the demands for military operations in the east.
 

Deleted member 1487

I'd thought similar in terms of manpower, equipment might be a problem tho. For motor vehicles my understanding is the low grade infantry divisions never had their full complement of automobiles, and all the infantry divisions were strpped of their cargo trucks and a portion of the light autos to outfit the newly formed armored and motor rifle divisions. Germany & the occupied nations were combed over for cargo trucks as well.
When and which 'low grade' infantry divisions? AFAIK it wasn't an issue in 1941 when going into the USSR (other than the Balkan losses that weren't made good yet), but became a major problem once the losses started. IIRC infantry divisions going into Russia in 1941 had as many or more motor vehicles than they had in 1940.

This may not add up in terms of cargo trucks available to Germany across Europe. One of the reasons the automotive transport did not do as well as hoped was the number of second and third rate vehicles brought along to bring the motor/armored forces to strength. They weren't holding up to the demands for military operations in the east.
Foreign civilian motor vehicles in general, sure. So for Barbarossa there would be the OTL de-motorization for any so equipped motorized division. Spreading those out to minimize impact concentration and stripping infantry divisions in 1941 vs 1942 should somewhat help with that, even if it makes foot infantry divisions less mobile. It would also probably help if Hitler didn't hold back replacement equipment from Barbarossa forces to build up brand new armor and motorized divisions at home during the campaign and into 1942. Referring back to an older thread of mine, part of the issue with the German experience from 1940 on was a dilution of equipment by Hitler continually demanding more divisions and burning out those in the field, depriving them of replacement manpower and equipment to build up new divisions constantly:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ler-doesnt-overexpand-the-german-army.402301/
 
I'd thought similar in terms of manpower, equipment might be a problem tho. For motor vehicles my understanding is the low grade infantry divisions never had their full complement of automobiles, and all the infantry divisions were stiffed of their trucks and a portion of the light autos to outfit the newly formed armored and motor rifle divisions. Germany & the occupied nations were combed over for cargo trucks as well.

This may not add up in terms of cargo trucks available to Germany across Europe. One of the reasons the automotive transport did not do as well as hoped was the number of second and third rate vehicles brought along to bring the motor/armored forces to strength. They weren't holding up to the demands for military operations in the east.

Both are good points but IIRC and I must admit I do not have the most exhaustive sources to hand at the mo a typical complement for a German motorised infantry division was about 1600 vehicles* of all kinds while the horse drawn sort had a shade under 950 motor vehicles at establishment and about 1,100 horse drawn vehicles. The horse drawn army essentially absorbed the motor output that would have kept the Panzer Armee mobile and then ate most of the foreign haul of motor transport to boot.

*bear in mind on OTL ToE a motorised infantry division did give up an infantry regiment but had a more powerful reconnaissance battalion versus most versions of the horse drawn division.
 

Deleted member 1487

Bigger divisions places a bigger load on the division staff, and downward at the next level. The trade off is you need fewer HQ per comparable number of pairs of of boots. Maybe the staff manpower saved can be used to improve support services or distributed downwards at the company & battalion level?

Years ago I found it useful to discard the English language labels for Soviet forces of 1941-45. Looking at their size and tactical/operational roles a Red Army 'army' of that era resembles a large corps with a large pool of maneuver & support brigades & no intermedaiate HQ. That perspective gave some clarity to how the Red Army from 1942 'right sized' if combat forces for the task.
Hermann Balck suggested a somewhat similar concept for the Grossdeutschland division that was interesting and perhaps might have been a workable model for the rest of the German army; it effectively presaged the concept of the modern brigade combat team/modern division structure :
 

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Deleted member 1487

Both are good points but IIRC and I must admit I do not have the most exhaustive sources to hand at the mo a typical complement for a German motorised infantry division was about 1600 vehicles* of all kinds while the horse drawn sort had a shade under 950 motor vehicles at establishment and about 1,100 horse drawn vehicles. The horse drawn army essentially absorbed the motor output that would have kept the Panzer Armee mobile and then ate most of the foreign haul of motor transport to boot.

*bear in mind on OTL ToE a motorised infantry division did give up an infantry regiment but had a more powerful reconnaissance battalion versus most versions of the horse drawn division.
That's a good point. Despite having fewer men it also had a higher offensive combat power while using the same or less weight of supply to sustain it. The trade off was more limited ability to absorb casualties and more limited defensive ability due to relative lack of manpower compared to a regular infantry division.
 
Both are good points but IIRC and I must admit I do not have the most exhaustive sources to hand at the mo a typical complement for a German motorised infantry division was about 1600 vehicles* of all kinds while the horse drawn sort had a shade under 950 motor vehicles at establishment and about 1,100 horse drawn vehicles. The horse drawn army essentially absorbed the motor output that would have kept the Panzer Armee mobile and then ate most of the foreign haul of motor transport to boot.

*bear in mind on OTL ToE a motorised infantry division did give up an infantry regiment but had a more powerful reconnaissance battalion versus most versions of the horse drawn division.

John ?Ellis in 'Brute Force' has a paragraph or three on the shortage of automobiles vs expansion goals in early 1941 & the redistribution. Siegfried Knappe spent this period in a artillery battery & has some bits on the use or non use of automotive transport in his infantry division 1939-41, & again in 1943 in Italy. There has been a monograph on the specifics of this for the preparations for attacking the USSR in early/mid 1941 circulating for a couple decades. Maybe I can turn that up.
 

Deleted member 1487

John ?Ellis in 'Brute Force' has a paragraph or three on the shortage of automobiles vs expansion goals in early 1941 & the redistribution.
P.49: "75 of the Barbarossa divisions were each equipped with 200 Russian one horse panje carts instead of motor transport." I assume that means for the supply elements, as other sources like Askey's Barbarossa books, which are highly detailed wargamer volumes on the campaign, do back up the average of 950 motor vehicles for infantry divisions.
https://books.google.com/books?id=6u8GBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA165&lpg=PA165&dq=german+infantry+division+barbarossa+motor+vehicles&source=bl&ots=KtNSTRV8GP&sig=Oh8hYwOxOHiV09OSIKovque7PMo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjXv6H-7sjYAhWm24MKHeVKA7UQ6AEIVDAF#v=onepage&q=german infantry division barbarossa motor vehicles&f=false
P.50 though has some interesting information about supply. The average mobile operation supply require for a mechanized division was 300 ton per day, while that of an infantry division was 200 tons. So trading in 2 infantry divisions for 1 motorized division would mean a savings of 100 tons of required supply per day, while resulting in a surplus of motor vehicles and a major surplus of manpower.

I found this about supply:
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=85630&start=15
Structure of the Back-Line Services in the Division

Supply Services / Supply Troops

Specified strengths, which varied greatly in individual divisions

1939-1941

Infantry Division
- Staff Div. Supply Leader
- 6 small vehicle col., 30 t each
- 1 small fuel column, 30 t
- 1 vehicle repair platoon
- 1-2 wagon columns, 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (?t-mot?), 3 platoons
- 1 ammunitioin command at division supply leader

Infantry Division (mot.)
- 10 small veh. col., 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (mot.), 2 platoons

Panzer Division
- 10 small veh. col., 30 t each
- 1 supply co. (mot.), 2 platoons
 

Redbeard

Banned
The Germans clearly fielded many more divisions than they could appropriately support. The Wallies arguably could/should have fielded more divisions, while the Soviets arguably fielded more than was needed and could have done better with fewer.


Again, that is arguable. The Soviets had a much much larger pool of horses than anyone but the US IIRC, while the Germans had way too few and hadn't recovered from WW1 and only were able to handle it due to taking over Europe's and part of Russia's population of horses. They decimated that population in the war too. Also a horse supplied division is 80% less efficient than a truck supplied one.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Horses_in_World_War_II#Horse_logistics

I'll try to elaborate.

The Wehrmacht at Barbarossa actually achieved a Supply Distribution Efficiency much superior to that of the Red Army with their combination of motor vehicles, horses - and not at least railways. That is what matters - and not what the British or US Army regulations might prescribe. A lot could indeed have been prepared better, not at least concerning the railways, but I still can't see any option whatsoever in trying to be more "wallied". It would only have meant resources tied up in motor vehicles broken down and/or out of fuel, and the frontline short of Divisions.

The link you provide has a lot of interesting data and remarks, thanks for that, I kind of collect such things, but not many if any German Divisions were 100 % horse supplied. In a standard German Infantry Division of Barbarossa most of the supplies inside the Divisional area were carried by motor vehicles and outside hardly any by horse. But the horses were valuable in the final miles of the logistic chain and there was no realistic option for replacing them with motor vehicles.

The data about available horses are not complete, as the occupied territories were a main supplier of horses. I haven't got data at hand, but you could probably multiply the available German pool of horses by three or four. And again, horses, fodder and men to maintain them were at hand, motorvehicles, fuel and men to drive and repair them were not. The old equations about the logistic limit of horses in the army were anyway largely obsolete after railways. A kg of oats through a horse probably would bring a ton of supplies as far as a kg of fuel would in a 1940s motor vehicle going on bad Russian roads and tracks - and here not even considering the spares needed for the motor vehicle and fuel not available anyway.

The horse drawn Divisional artillery of course put a limit on how fast you could support offensive operations, but the most critical factor here would not be how fast you could move the guns themselves but how fast you could bring forward the ammo. And the ammo supply for the artillery was mainly motor carried.

I can't enough recommend Nigel Askey's comprehensive works on Barbarossa - a Paradise of data!

http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/

(and no, I do not get commission, but would indeed like to share the pleasure of having good data at hand :) )
 
About a year ago I attempted to work out the motor vehicle establishment of the German Army in September 1939 using the info on Leo Niehorster's website plus some source documents he sent to me.

The 85 1st to 4th Wave infantry divisions in the German Army in September 1939 had a combined establishment of 432,515 horses (210,430 light draught, 78,291 heavy draught and 143,794 riding).

They also had a total establishment of 114,799 motor vehicles (31,653 personnel carriers, 41,090 load carriers & prime movers, 147 armoured cars and 41,909 motor cycles).

If they had all been motorised infantry divisions they would have had a total establishment of 342,380 motor vehicles (84,065 personnel carriers, 143,395 load carriers & prime movers, 2,550 armoured cars and 112,370 motor cycles) and no horses.

That's a difference of 227,581 motor vehicles (52,412 personnel carriers, 102,305 load carriers & prime movers, 2,403 armoured cars and 227,581 motor cycles) and 432,515 horses.

A German motorised infantry division (of which there were four) had 4,028 motor vehicles and no horses. A standard 1st Wave infantry division (of which there were 23) had 1,539 motor vehicles and 4,842 horses. So the exchange rate is about 2.5 ordinary infantry divisions for one motorised division. Except that it isn't as simple as that.
 

Deleted member 1487

About a year ago I attempted to work out the motor vehicle establishment of the German Army in September 1939 using the info on Leo Niehorster's website plus some source documents he sent to me.

The 85 1st to 4th Wave infantry divisions in the German Army in September 1939 had a combined establishment of 432,515 horses (210,430 light draught, 78,291 heavy draught and 143,794 riding).

They also had a total establishment of 114,799 motor vehicles (31,653 personnel carriers, 41,090 load carriers & prime movers, 147 armoured cars and 41,909 motor cycles).

If they had all been motorised infantry divisions they would have had a total establishment of 342,380 motor vehicles (84,065 personnel carriers, 143,395 load carriers & prime movers, 2,550 armoured cars and 112,370 motor cycles) and no horses.

That's a difference of 227,581 motor vehicles (52,412 personnel carriers, 102,305 load carriers & prime movers, 2,403 armoured cars and 227,581 motor cycles) and 432,515 horses.

A German motorised infantry division (of which there were four) had 4,028 motor vehicles and no horses. A standard 1st Wave infantry division (of which there were 23) had 1,539 motor vehicles and 4,842 horses. So the exchange rate is about 2.5 ordinary infantry divisions for one motorised division. Except that it isn't as simple as that.
The situation in 1939, 1940, and 1941 (and beyond) were all somewhat different based on changing OOB and motor vehicle stocks. Any idea how things would have compared in 1941 to 1939? Askey's Barbarossa book has a significantly lower number for vehicles and horses compared to your 1939 numbers:
https://books.google.com/books?id=6...ry division barbarossa motor vehicles&f=false
 
The situation in 1939, 1940, and 1941 (and beyond) were all somewhat different based on changing OOB and motor vehicle stocks. Any idea how things would have compared in 1941 to 1939? Askey's Barbarossa book has a significantly lower number for vehicles and horses compared to your 1939 numbers:
https://books.google.com/books?id=6u8GBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA165&lpg=PA165&dq=german+infantry+division+barbarossa+motor+vehicles&source=bl&ots=KtNSTRV8GP&sig=Oh8hYwOxOHiV09OSIKovque7PMo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjXv6H-7sjYAhWm24MKHeVKA7UQ6AEIVDAF#v=onepage&q=german infantry division barbarossa motor vehicles&f=false
In a word, no. Sorry.
 
...

A German motorised infantry division (of which there were four) had 4,028 motor vehicles and no horses. A standard 1st Wave infantry division (of which there were 23) had 1,539 motor vehicles and 4,842 horses. So the exchange rate is about 2.5 ordinary infantry divisions for one motorised division. Except that it isn't as simple as that.

Never is. Were these motorized divisions fielding the same number of rifle & artillery battalions as the 1st Wave ID? Or were they smaller, with less fire power & ability to sustain losses?
 
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