WW2 Effective Italian Army

The Italian navy was modern and well equiped.
The BB where new (litorio class) or rebuilt to the point of being new (Cavour and doria classes) The cruisers where good, both the Treaty cruisers, that where as good as their contemporaries, and the light condotieri class cruisers. Italian submarines where good and their destroyers modern and capable. They lacked radar in 41, but progressively integrated german and later italian sets. They lacked a carrier, (two carriers and two litorios rather than the four planned litorios would have made for a better balanced fleet.)

The Navy was good except that it lacked enough oil to deploy effectively and so stayed in port for the most of the war. Italy also had the misfortune that its two key competitors - the French and British - still outclassed them. It could not win a war against them.

Ultimately, it's evidence that while Italy was a great power comparative to other mid-tier powers like Romania, Spain, or Hungary; it still wasn't in the same league as the true great powers.
 
Ultimately, it's evidence that while Italy was a great power comparative to other mid-tier powers like Romania, Spain, or Hungary; it still wasn't in the same league as the true great powers.
Except, not really. You're either a great power, or a mid-tier one, no one-and-three-fifths. In this respect, Italy was no better than Romania: Axworthy postulates that, in fact, Romania was far more important for the Axis war effort than Italy; moreover, analysis of military operations showed that Italy's entrance in the Axis was in fact detrimental to the war. True, this is with the all-seeing power of hindsight, but several (British) strategists at the time noted it.
 
Rather like ,say Qaddafi, Mussolini opposed a well-trained, equipped, ably led army with high morale because it might coup him.
 
I haven't read that much about it, but I get the impression that the italian army had a positive image post WW1 - despite the fact of a very bad performance, from top to bottom, during the war.

I'm not really surprised you have not read much about it. Not after reading your posts.
Maybe you might try to elaborate a bit and convince me otherwise
 
A truly effective Italian army would take a lot, as is the consensus here so far. An Italian army that performed somewhat better in World War II than it did historically? Considerably easier.

One possibility (to be followed by more tomorrow:

Mussolini had many failings as a war leader, but he, and Italy, would have done considerably better if he had understood one concept: Concentration of force. Italy had a limited amount of military power. It could conceivably do well if it concentrated that limited power on one objective in one portion of the war while its opponents were forced to divide their power. Italy never concentrated on one objective at any point in the war.

In the summer of 1940 they put far more logistical effort into preparing to invade Yugoslavia (a project Hitler vetoed) than they did into trying to take North Africa at a time when British weakness made that at least somewhat more possible. They were also looking at possibly trying to grab Corsica at that point, and sending some of their best aircraft to fight in the Battle of Britain--where they were laughably outclassed, rather than using them in an area that made sense for Italy, and where they would have made some difference because Britain couldn't spare their good stuff yet.

In the fall, they invaded Greece, which again diverted forces from North Africa. From then on they had to support forces bogged down in the Balkans. Add to that: They had troops fighting in the Soviet Union, a couple hundred thousand of them at the peak. Again, those guys had to be supplied from Italy's meager industry and meager raw materials.

Concentrate all of the Italian truck, aircraft and tank production on supplying North Africa and the Italians do better. That probably wouldn't change the shape of the war much though. They don't win, because logistically they can't. Winning means taking Egypt and that wasn't logistically possible for either the Italians or the German and Italians together. A more mobile Italian army would probably still get defeated by the first British offensive in North Africa, but it probably wouldn't get totally cut to pieces like it was historically. More of it would escape to fight again. They would probably still need German help, but with it they could probably do the desert see-saws that we saw historically, but with the Italians fighting somewhat more effectively. And when US Lend-Lease got massive in late 1942/early 1943 they would still be buried in an avalanche of metal.
 
Sheer mass is not enough to win, though. To Montgomery's credit, that's not what he did OTL, why would he do it here?

If the Italians are fighting more effectively, including more supplies going to the African Armies (used as Rommel will take advantage of it), that might be not insignificant.
 
Getting more supplies into Africa means upgrading the facilities in Tripoli, without that, scale-up is incredibly difficult.
 
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Mussolini had many failings as a war leader, but he, and Italy, would have done considerably better if he had understood one concept: Concentration of force. Italy had a limited amount of military power. It could conceivably do well if it concentrated that limited power on one objective in one portion of the war while its opponents were forced to divide their power. Italy never concentrated on one objective at any point in the war.

Quoted for truth. Concentrating only on a target at time and avoiding silly adventures as Greece, would have helped a lot. It would have even helped more if Mussolini had taken few months to actually get ready for the war. Gathering the merchant fleet, stockpiling critical resources and getting as many men as possible out of the trap that AOI was, would have put Italy in a better position.
Anyway all of that would have been just a palliative: Italy wasn't anywhere ready to war and the fascists knew that. IRRC Ciano wrote to Hitler that Italy would have been ready only in 1944. Now, he was exaggerating the data in order to keep Italy out of the war, but even so...
Point is that Mussolini convinced himself that victory was at hand, that the allies were already defeated, that he needed "only few thousand deads to sit at victor's table".
He gambled and lost.

Sheer mass is not enough to win, though. To Montgomery's credit, that's not what he did OTL, why would he do it here?

Italian best chance is in the early 1940, when the british had not yet a large army in the area. IF Mussolini had prepared for war (a big IF, indeed) an all out offensive toward Egypt, with a large use of trucks and tanks (instead of putting them on reserve for some lame offensive against Yugoslavia or Greece), could reserve some nasty surprise to the UK.

Axworthy postulates that, in fact, Romania was far more important for the Axis war effort than Italy; moreover, analysis of military operations showed that Italy's entrance in the Axis was in fact detrimental to the war. True, this is with the all-seeing power of hindsight, but several (British) strategists at the time noted it.

Interesting. I've always thought the contrary, I.E. that Italy no matter what was still an important ally for Germany. Can you point me to these strategist and Axworthy's works?
 
Interesting. I've always thought the contrary, I.E. that Italy no matter what was still an important ally for Germany. Can you point me to these strategist and Axworthy's works?
Mark Axworthy, Corneliu Scafeș, Cristian Crăciunoiu, Third Axis - Fourth Ally; Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941-1945; Arms and Armour Press, London, 1995.

Borrowed a copy some years ago from my local British Council library, and recently found an electronic 'copy' as well.

As for the second, it was from another thread on Italy; a member quoted one of Eden's postwar interviews. The Foreign Office had analysed (with help from the General Staff) the utility of a last-ditch attempt at trying to pull Mussolini towards the Allies; the result of said analysis was that Musso's adventurism and the Italian Army's state as a paper tiger meant the Germans would have to pull his chestnuts out of the fire in case of him going off and attacking somebody, tying down resources better used elsewhere and potentially overstretching their capabilities. The Foreign Office concluded that Mussolini was, ironically, more useful to the Allies as an enemy.

Not coincidentally, they happened to be right.
 
Italian best chance is in the early 1940, when the british had not yet a large army in the area. IF Mussolini had prepared for war (a big IF, indeed) an all out offensive toward Egypt, with a large use of trucks and tanks (instead of putting them on reserve for some lame offensive against Yugoslavia or Greece), could reserve some nasty surprise to the UK.

Probably. You'd need something like this for any chance of North Africa not being a frustrating distraction for the Axis, with too much logistical muscle (not necessarily armored muscle, but logistical) needed to overcome the barriers in the way.

The Allies can handle logistical shortcomings more easily from their deep pockets than the Germans or Italians.
 
The rebuilds were the result of the Washington treaty, that set limits on new BB constrution. Everybody did it. Even without that, it's always easier to get politicians to spare money for a modernization than for a new ship.
Italy, according to the Washington Treaty, was allowed to lay down a new BB in 1927, 1929 and 1931, with dates of completion respectively in 1931, 1933 and 1935. There's no legal reason for Italy stoping them from replacing old BBs with new ones instead of rebuilding old BBs.
 
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The best case scenario I can think of is that the Italians realize they can't become a truly great power on par with GB and France anytime in the near future but it can be the strongest of the mid rank powers and maybe challange France as a great power by the 1960s . The first thing it does is scale back its navy somewhat as it can't compete with France and GB no matter what it does in its forseeable future. It first starts in the 1920s to improve its infantry by slicing the number of divisions it has but trains its men more effectively and gives greater prestige to its officers. To keep the military happy increase its pay to compensate somewhat, particularly its officers. This will also improve the officer corps by attracting more educated and driven men. Start slowly introducing tanks and planes into the mix in the early 1930s. Avoid Eithiopia and any formal alliance with Hitler. Play GB and Germany against each other trying to get both sides to sell you weapons cheaply to make sure you don't go to the other side sometime in the mid 1930s when you have quite professional infantry with a growing number of tanks and planes. Stay neutral in the early war period and go over to the Allies somewhere around 1944 when Germany starts becoming really weak.
 
The only way that Italy would stay out of the war would be if Mussolini never became the leader. As dale pointed out the failure of Italy to concentrate all of its efforts into accomplishing one task doomed Italy to failure. If the Italians had concentrated all of their efforts in North Africa they just might have been able to win. It would also bee better to have 50 truly capable divisions that had staying power than 100 divisions that might collapse when thrown into combat.

Perhaps the best strategy for Italy would have been to make a surprise attack on Malta on the first day that it entered the war rather than attempting to invade Southern France.
 
Mark Axworthy, Corneliu Scafeș, Cristian Crăciunoiu, Third Axis - Fourth Ally; Romanian Armed Forces in the European War, 1941-1945; Arms and Armour Press, London, 1995.

Borrowed a copy some years ago from my local British Council library, and recently found an electronic 'copy' as well.

As for the second, it was from another thread on Italy; a member quoted one of Eden's postwar interviews.

Thank you, Slowpoke. I'll look for the book and try to dig up that thread.

The best case scenario I can think of is that the Italians realize they can't become a truly great power on par with GB and France anytime in the near future but it can be the strongest of the mid rank powers and maybe challange France as a great power by the 1960s .

Avoid Eithiopia and any formal alliance with Hitler. Play GB and Germany against each other trying to get both sides to sell you weapons cheaply to make sure you don't go to the other side sometime in the mid 1930s when you have quite professional infantry with a growing number of tanks and planes. Stay neutral in the early war period and go over to the Allies somewhere around 1944 when Germany starts becoming really weak.

Interesting, but it seems to me a bit unrealistic.

First, no fascist goverment would ever accept to consider itself a second rate power. Gaining and upkeeping military prestige was one of the key factor of Fascism from its very inception.

Second, no Ethiopia conquest is going to alter the timeline. The sanctions made Mussolini consider Hitler as a possible ally and made him amicable to the idea of a german Austria. If Mussolini remains cold toward Germany, the austrian anschluss could be opposed altering thus the OTL, leading thus to completely different WW2 (or to no war at all).

Third, Mussolini in the 30s was actively looking for a field to show his might. Basically he was looking for troubles. If not Abyssinia, where?
 
Italy, according to the Washington Treaty, was allowed to lay down a new BB in 1927, 1929 and 1931, with dates of completion respectively in 1931, 1933 and 1935. There's no legal reason for Italy stoping them from replacing old BBs with new ones instead of rebuilding old BBs.

True, but...
Italy was limited to a 177800mt max, so either the ships would be 29000mt or the third ship would mean scrapping Cesare. With France not building as early as allowed, and the designers finding it hard to fit all the required qualities of a fast BB into 35000mt, let alone 29000mt, Italy delayed building. With the 30s rearmement, it made sense to go for a High/low mix, with the first two Littorios being complemented by the four rebuilt BB. The rebuilts were meant to outrun and outrange the old french BB, and looked on paper as a match for Dunkerk and Strasbourg.
So without the Washington treaty Italy would have followed a different path, that would make such extensive modernization less likely.
and the treaty meant that, after a long battleship holliday, there was a sudden need for BB that could better be met by a mix of new and rebuilt ships.
 
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