WW1 with no trench warfare

Quick question: What if World War one was delayed by two or three years, enough that tanks and airplanes became fairly widely used in European armies. When WW1 starts, both powers already have the weapons needed to break trench warfare. So how would the war go? Would it just be a proto-WW2, or would there still be trenches, but just less so?
 

PipBoy2999

Banned
Tanks were a technological response to the stalemate of trench warfare. No trenches means no tank development.
 
The war would be over by the end of 1915; casulaties would remain at 1914 (contrary to popular belief, trench warfare saved more lives than it killed) and no country could sustain that sort of suffering for very long. Who won, is open to debate, but I reckon it would be a German victory over France and Russia but with Britain getting the French colonies in Africa to restrict Germany's advance and then signing a white peace with Germany.
 
Even today infantery that has the opportunity digs itself in for defence (normally 2 man - platoon foxholes).
The longer they expect to stay somewhere the more ellaborate those fortifications become.
We had trenches in most wars between 1860 and today. Just not so many and so overdone as in wwII.
 
Even somehow granted the weapons (absent WWI I don't think the tank would emerge), what about the doctrine and communications systems? It is my understanding that maneuver warfare depends just as much on tactical communications (radios) as on AFVs.

Also remember if that tank shows up pre-war, there will be time for anti-tank weapons to be developed; at least anti-tank rounds for existing light field guns.
 
While I agree that tanks would not show up absent trench warfare, odds are that you would at least see a bit more development when it comes to armored cars. If armored cars are more developed and used in slightly larger numbers, then tanks probably show up a bit earlier in the course of alt-WWI.
 

Deleted member 1487

Didn't we just answer this question in the last week or two?
Simple answer, the Germans beat France in 1914. The simplest way to do so would require two changes: first Bülow (2nd army) doesn't force Kluck (1st army) to cleave to his army before Mons, meaning that Kluck moves out wider and encircles the BEF at Mons, utterly destroying them. The second is that Prittwitz (8th army) never makes the call to OHL about abandoning East Prussia meaning that OHL does not send two corps East before the Marne.

This means that Germany has two extra corps at the Marne, while the BEF is not present thanks to being destroyed earlier in the campaign. The French counter attack is halted and Kluck has his opportunity to beat the French 6th army, something he was convinced he could do if he was not forced to fall back by the BEF pressure on his flank. As a result Paris gets encircled (potentially) while the French are forced back near Verdun. The French counter attack falls apart and the war maintains its maneuver phase for longer.

Now this does not mean that war is over or that trench warfare never comes to pass, but it does give the greatest chance of that happening. Especially with the arrival of the 6th and 7th German armies further West, it is going to be hard for imagine the Entente recovering from these major set backs.

The counter point is that the Russians do better in 1914, but only up to a point...
 
If you want to avoid trench warfare by delaying WWI enough to let some technological changes avert the trench warfare stalemate, your best bet would be increased use of trucks for logistics. The big limiting factor for Germany's advance in 1914 (apart from tactical mistakes Wiking brings up) was that the German army was on the verge of outrunning its supply lines. This limited the German's ability to move quickly on the offensive, so the French were able to bring reinforcements to defend at the Marne before the Germans could overwhelm the French defenders. With a more motorized supply train, the existence of an intact and unified rail network for internal supply and troop movement becomes less of an advantage for the defender.

Other areas of opportunity would be self-propelled or motorized-towed artillery (to exploit breakthroughs in trenches, since IOTL minor breakthroughs were often made by both sides, but quickly plugged because the attackers could only bring infantry to reinforce the breakthrough, while the defenders still had intact artillery positions to support a counterattack) and the armored cars Chengar Qordath suggests that could fill the tactical role previously filled by cavalry.
 
There was earlier trench warfare to show the lessons that should have been (but were not) learned - the Russo-Japanese war. The siege of Port Arthur basically showed just what trench-style warfare would be like in Europe, and also that with machine guns now so prevalent that digging in was the only option for survival.

So you'd need observers of the war to recognise these facts, and be listened to, in order to start development of some way around it. Tanks arent too likely at first - the engines available probably wern't good enough - but a logical start would be better armoured cars, first machine gun proof, then growing tracks for bad terrain and slowy metamorphosising into tanks.

This probably wouldnt affect the start of the war (unless germany decided they really needed a little more time to develop their armoured vehicles), but it would go differently. The big question is are the tanks of the time better at offense than defence? remember the mobility and reliability were terrible, so there are big restraints on hown much offense you can have - blitzcrieg is simply not going to work without a lot of tech development.
 
I think its POSSIBLE for a different style of war to occur, but not because of the technology as such

War where defensive lines were the launch point and fallback positions but were not next to each other would give war a flavour of the 7 years war in Germany

Best Regards
Grey Wolf
 

Deleted member 1487

If you want to avoid trench warfare by delaying WWI enough to let some technological changes avert the trench warfare stalemate, your best bet would be increased use of trucks for logistics. The big limiting factor for Germany's advance in 1914 (apart from tactical mistakes Wiking brings up) was that the German army was on the verge of outrunning its supply lines. This limited the German's ability to move quickly on the offensive, so the French were able to bring reinforcements to defend at the Marne before the Germans could overwhelm the French defenders. With a more motorized supply train, the existence of an intact and unified rail network for internal supply and troop movement becomes less of an advantage for the defender.

Other areas of opportunity would be self-propelled or motorized-towed artillery (to exploit breakthroughs in trenches, since IOTL minor breakthroughs were often made by both sides, but quickly plugged because the attackers could only bring infantry to reinforce the breakthrough, while the defenders still had intact artillery positions to support a counterattack) and the armored cars Chengar Qordath suggests that could fill the tactical role previously filled by cavalry.


The only major problem with that is oil. Galician oil was the only source for the Central Powers until the Romanians started to sell them oil in 1915 and even then it was in limited quantities. The first consumer of said resource was the navy, which had dibs over any army transport. Also rubber for tires is cut off too, which means that except for the initial campaign trucks are a luxury that can't be afforded.

There is also the issue of production; prewar the French were the number one producers of motor vehicles, which means that the Germans will have trouble producing enough in a few years to supply anywhere near the needed amounts of supplies. IIRC it took something like 500+ to supply a corps for a day and that only could be done within 50 miles of a railhead. Germany did not even have that many trucks in the army in 1914, again IIRC. Unless we are talking about delaying the war into the 1930's, where it would not be inconceivable to see light tanks and medium tanks adopted into the various offensive doctrines of the day (yes tanks were experimented with prewar), though armored cars are likely to get the majority of funding. It could create a VERY interest scenario.

But for a war in the 1910's, technology cannot and will not advance far enough to prevent trench warfare. Minimum it would take until 1925 if not later for technology to advance given restricted prewar budgets for R&D on the 'newfangled contraptions' like armored cars, bombers, and wireless radios. Honestly I think the last of these, the radio, is probably the most important of all to sustain an advance. The processing of information can change things dramatically even with a primarily foot bound infantry army.
 
There was earlier trench warfare to show the lessons that should have been (but were not) learned - the Russo-Japanese war. The siege of Port Arthur basically showed just what trench-style warfare would be like in Europe, and also that with machine guns now so prevalent that digging in was the only option for survival.


The problem with this is that the siege of Port Arthur was a siege and that's the same problem with the other oft-cited "ignored lesson" the Siege of Petersburg in the American Civil War.

The battles in the Russo-Japanese War like Mukden and Liaoyang, much like the battles in the two Balkans wars, were won by fire and movement, fire and movement which was able to either crush an enemy's fortified positions or otherwise force a withdrawal from the same.

When pre-WW1 observers looked at recent battles as opposed to sieges, they quite naturally drew different conclusions then we in after WW1 would do.

So you'd need observers of the war to recognise these facts, and be listened to, in order to start development of some way around it.

What was unrecognized was the density of force any armed clash in the region between Switzerland and the North Sea would experience.

It should be noted and appreciated by those claiming pre-WW1 planning was performed by idiots that the fighting in the eastern front where the density of forces was far lower much more resembled the type of fighting seen in the Russo-Japanese/Balkan wars and expected by European war ministries.

The Western Front during WW1 was an aberration create by geography and the industrialization of warfare. Expecting people to recognize an aberration before the fact is expecting too much.
 

Deleted member 1487

Expecting people to recognize an aberration before the fact is expecting too much.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_Gotlib_Bloch
Jan Bloch predicted it. But as a Jewish Polish Banker, was dismissed by just about everyone. However IIRC it was Kitchener that predicted a 3-4 year war, as did several people across the general staffs of all major European armies.

It wasn't so much faulty analysis, but rather the romantic notions of warfare and morale that painted the early battles as deciding the entire tenor of the war. The intellectual framework of the men planning for war is what caused them to dismiss evidence that war could bog down into a grinding struggle. Several men without these doctrinal ideologies were successfully able to predict what was coming, but were ignored for being outliers in the intellectual atmosphere of military thought at the time.
 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jan_Gotlib_Bloch
Jan Bloch predicted it. But as a Jewish Polish Banker, was dismissed by just about everyone.


One man out of tens of thousands in what was basically self-published book in very limited circulation. Jan Bloch is remembered because he was proved right well after the fact, his "predictions" weren't even well known before or during the war. It was only in the 1920s that Bloch's work was "rediscovered" and hailed as prescient.

However IIRC it was Kitchener that predicted a 3-4 year war, as did several people across the general staffs of all major European armies.
Kitchener did predict a longer war, three years IIRC, but only after the war began. If he ever explained why he believed the war would last longer, no one ever bothered to write those reasons down.

Our best guess regarding an explanation for Kitchener's prediction hinge on his "New Army" efforts. Recruiting, arming, training, "blooding", and the leading New Army formations in a war-winning campaign against Germany would take much of the time he suggested and, if you look at his preparations for the Sudan Campaign, you'll see similarities.

It wasn't so much faulty analysis, but rather the romantic notions of warfare and morale that painted the early battles as deciding the entire tenor of the war.
Leaving aside the politicians and other chicken-hawk cheerleaders, I seriously doubt that the majority of military professionals harbored romantic notions regarding war. By 1914 every European military had either been involved in decidedly nasty "little" colonial wars against the likes of the Boers, Herero, or Malagasy or had observed equally nasty "little" wars in Spanish controlled Cuba, the US controlled Philippines, the Balkans, or northeast Asia. For example, it was politicians aided by a few rosy-eyed morons in uniform who kept French troops in red pants and not the French Army.

Both the Russo-Japanese War and the Balkan Wars had "shown" that the side who was more prepared, the side who struck first, the side which struck harder, and the side which maneuvered to bring the most firepower to bear would prevail. Keeping the examples available pre-WW1 planners firmly in mind, their belief in intricate master plans doesn't seem so odd.

I point out again that WW1's western front was an aberration and that combat on the eastern front resembled pre-war expectations to a great extent.
 
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I read somewhere that the Entente could have potentially envelopd and destroyed von Kluck's Army of the Fifth of September, 1914, at the Battle of the Marne, with the BEF cutting off its supply lines with a determined cavalry thrust and forcing it to surrender.

However, I've just found my source, and it turns out to be Alan Clark's The Donkeys. So, tell me AH: where has he gone wrong this time?
 

Deleted member 1487

One man out of tens of thousands in what was basically self-published book in very limited circulation. Jan Bloch is remembered because he was proved right well after the fact, his "predictions" weren't even well known before or during the war. It was only in the 1920s that Bloch's work was "rediscovered" and hailed as prescient.
Supposedly he was pretty widely read by military professionals in every country and was routinely dismissed for being either non-military and therefore ignorant or disregarded because the offensive, regardless of losses was crucial, as was the morale effect of winning.

Kitchener did predict a longer war, three years IIRC, but only after the war began. If he ever explained why he believed the war would last longer, no one ever bothered to write those reasons down.

Our best guess regarding an explanation for Kitchener's prediction hinge on his "New Army" efforts. Recruiting, arming, training, "blooding", and the leading New Army formations in a war-winning campaign against Germany would take much of the time he suggested and, if you look at his preparations for the Sudan Campaign, you'll see similarities.
My understanding was that he made these comments when planning for war on the continent. But Kitchener is not my area of focus, so I will defer to your knowledge on the man.

Leaving aside the politicians and other chicken-hawk cheerleaders, I seriously doubt that the majority of military professionals harbored romantic notions regarding war. By 1914 every European military had either been involved in decidedly nasty "little" colonial wars against the likes of the Boers, Herero, or Malagasy or had observed equally nasty "little" wars in Spanish controlled Cuba, the US controlled Philippines, the Balkans, or northeast Asia. For example, it was politicians aided by a few rosy-eyed morons in uniform who kept French troops in red pants and not the French Army.
I mean Romantic, in the sense of German Romanticism as a intellectual rebellion against modernity and the machine age. Not romantic as in the 'heroics of war'. One of the defining principles of the age was the "Will to Power", which gave the side with the morale superiority, won in early offensive victories, an indefinable edge that guaranteed victory over machines and artillery.
It was in all militaries: the French had elán, crán, furor francais; the Germans furor teutonicus and the will to power; and the others some derivation of the above.

Both the Russo-Japanese War and the Balkan Wars had "shown" that the side who was more prepared, the side who struck first, the side which struck harder, and the side which maneuvered to bring the most firepower to bear would prevail. Keeping the examples available pre-WW1 planners firmly in mind, their belief in intricate master plans doesn't seem so odd.

I point out again that WW1's western front was an aberration and that combat on the eastern front resembled pre-war expectations to a great extent.

Aberration is a strong word, really it is more of a function of its circumstances. Otherwise I fully agree with you. These so-called principles of war held up even in trench warfare, but the means of exploitation were lacking thanks to the defender being able to rely on rail transportation to bring up reinforcements where needed, when needed.
 
Supposedly he was pretty widely read by military professionals in every country and was routinely dismissed for being either non-military...


I've yet to read anything written before the war by a ranking military professional, politician, or other "mover & shaker" which even mentions Bloch. He isn't even mentioned in order to be refuted.

Bloch being mentioned in publications after the war is another question entirely.

... and therefore ignorant or disregarded because the offensive, regardless of losses was crucial, as was the morale effect of winning.

Once again, I'll point to the "lessons" learned in the wars available to the military professionals at the time. From the Franco-Prussian conflict, through the Boer, Russo-Japanese, and Balkans wars, rapid violent assaults driven home by motivated troops regardless of immediate casualties won the day. Any war would be short and would feature a few battles in which one side or the other would be undoubtedly beaten because that was what had occurred for the last half century.

The force densities, industrial production, geographical constraints, and other considerations turned WW1's western front into an abattoir were not foreseen. No one planned on a stalemate because no one had seen one in the "modern" era.

My understanding was that he made these comments when planning for war on the continent. But Kitchener is not my area of focus, so I will defer to your knowledge on the man.

Kitchener became War Secretary a few days after war was declared and then only because he happened to be visiting Britain from his post as Consul-General of Egypt at the time. He was not involved in any pre-war planning for the war or even any of the few pre-war exercises like the 1912 maneuvers.

His three year war prediction was made during a cabinet meeting, never further expanded on or explained, and, as many suggest, had more to do than anything else with the time needed for raising and training the "New Army" the BEF casualty rates already suffered in France made necessary.

Kitchener wasn't "predicting" a trench stalemate as much as he was estimating the time needed to create a trained British army which would approach the size already fielded by the powers and necessary for the continental war.

It was in all militaries: the French had elán, crán, furor francais; the Germans furor teutonicus and the will to power; and the others some derivation of the above.

Agreed, but that belief seemed to be supported by the few "modern" wars prior to WW1.

Aberration is a strong word, really it is more of a function of its circumstances.

Strong but accurate, Id' say. The circumstances on the Western Front were unique even during WW1. Again, I'll point out that the fighting on the Eastern Front greatly resembled what had been predicted before the war.

Otherwise I fully agree with you.

And I with you.

I believe we're both saying it's not a case of "They were too stupid to see what was so very obvious" and more a case of "They made estimates based on the experiences and examples available to them"

These so-called principles of war held up even in trench warfare, but the means of exploitation were lacking thanks to the defender being able to rely on rail transportation to bring up reinforcements where needed, when needed.

Again, agreed. Tactical and operational mobility had not kept up with strategic mobility thus defenders could usually reinforce faster than attackers could exploit.
 

Deleted member 1487

I've yet to read anything written before the war by a ranking military professional, politician, or other "mover & shaker" which even mentions Bloch. He isn't even mentioned in order to be refuted.

Bloch being mentioned in publications after the war is another question entirely.

And I with you.

I believe we're both saying it's not a case of "They were too stupid to see what was so very obvious" and more a case of "They made estimates based on the experiences and examples available to them"



Again, agreed. Tactical and operational mobility had not kept up with strategic mobility thus defenders could usually reinforce faster than attackers could exploit.

On the Bloch issue "The Arming of Europe and the making of the First World War" indicated he was read and rejected. Of course the Wiki article also suggests the same, but remember the source.

As to everything else, thanks for the info about Kitchener, I learn something new every day on this forum.
And yes, we are in agreement, you've just expressed it much more eloquently.
 
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