Supposedly he was pretty widely read by military professionals in every country and was routinely dismissed for being either non-military...
I've yet to read anything written
before the war by a ranking military professional, politician, or other "mover & shaker" which even mentions Bloch. He isn't even mentioned in order to be refuted.
Bloch being mentioned in publications after the war is another question entirely.
... and therefore ignorant or disregarded because the offensive, regardless of losses was crucial, as was the morale effect of winning.
Once again, I'll point to the "lessons" learned in the wars available to the military professionals at the time. From the Franco-Prussian conflict, through the Boer, Russo-Japanese, and Balkans wars, rapid violent assaults driven home by motivated troops regardless of immediate casualties won the day. Any war would be short and would feature a few battles in which one side or the other would be undoubtedly beaten because that was what had occurred for the last half century.
The force densities, industrial production, geographical constraints, and other considerations turned WW1's western front into an abattoir were not foreseen. No one planned on a stalemate because no one had seen one in the "modern" era.
My understanding was that he made these comments when planning for war on the continent. But Kitchener is not my area of focus, so I will defer to your knowledge on the man.
Kitchener became War Secretary a few days
after war was declared and then only because he happened to be visiting Britain from his post as Consul-General of Egypt at the time. He was not involved in any
pre-war planning for the war or even any of the few
pre-war exercises like the 1912 maneuvers.
His three year war prediction was made during a cabinet meeting, never further expanded on or explained, and, as many suggest, had more to do than anything else with the time needed for raising and training the "New Army" the BEF casualty rates already suffered in France made necessary.
Kitchener wasn't "predicting" a trench stalemate as much as he was estimating the time needed to create a trained British army which would approach the size already fielded by the powers and necessary for the continental war.
It was in all militaries: the French had elán, crán, furor francais; the Germans furor teutonicus and the will to power; and the others some derivation of the above.
Agreed, but that belief seemed to be supported by the few "modern" wars prior to WW1.
Aberration is a strong word, really it is more of a function of its circumstances.
Strong but accurate, Id' say. The circumstances on the Western Front were unique even during WW1. Again, I'll point out that the fighting on the Eastern Front greatly resembled what had been predicted before the war.
Otherwise I fully agree with you.
And I with you.
I believe we're both saying it's not a case of
"They were too stupid to see what was so very obvious" and more a case of
"They made estimates based on the experiences and examples available to them"
These so-called principles of war held up even in trench warfare, but the means of exploitation were lacking thanks to the defender being able to rely on rail transportation to bring up reinforcements where needed, when needed.
Again, agreed. Tactical and operational mobility had not kept up with strategic mobility thus defenders could usually reinforce faster than attackers could exploit.