WW1: WI US Civil War experience was taken more notice of

The mere existence of trenches would not have prepared the Europeans. After all, the Russo-Japanese War, with far more industrialization, also featured trench warfare that was far more static than anything the ACW ever saw.

The force density in the ACW never approach the levels of the Western front, so there was always room to maneuver. The penultimate campaign in the East saw Grant repeatedly attempt to out flank Lee until settling down at Petersburg. If the Europeans were taking lessons then they're apt to take the wrong one- that you can still outflank and annihilate your enemy.
 
The force density in the ACW never approach the levels of the Western front, so there was always room to maneuver. The penultimate campaign in the East saw Grant repeatedly attempt to out flank Lee until settling down at Petersburg. If the Europeans were taking lessons then they're apt to take the wrong one- that you can still outflank and annihilate your enemy.
Thus why I originally said it was a brute slugging match, since in order to slug you had to move around.
 
The force density in the ACW never approach the levels of the Western front, so there was always room to maneuver. The penultimate campaign in the East saw Grant repeatedly attempt to out flank Lee until settling down at Petersburg. If the Europeans were taking lessons then they're apt to take the wrong one- that you can still outflank and annihilate your enemy.

Well, this is another problem: we're too tempted to think "WWI=Western Front". Maneuver and annihilation was still possible in the other theaters, so that's not entirely wrong, it was just too hard in the West where there were too many troops and not enough frontage.

Thus why I originally said it was a brute slugging match, since in order to slug you had to move around.

I don't think most people would interpret that wording that way, but that's semantics.
 
Thus why I originally said it was a brute slugging match, since in order to slug you had to move around.

Sorry, not sure why I quoted you. I agree actually.

Well, this is another problem: we're too tempted to think "WWI=Western Front". Maneuver and annihilation was still possible in the other theaters, so that's not entirely wrong, it was just too hard in the West where there were too many troops and not enough frontage.

I totally understand. However whenever this question is brought up it's normally with the Western Front in mind.
 
I think one lesson that both sides did not see was how firearms were effecting the horse cavalry. In the US we dropped lances and became the only horse mounted force to arm all troopers with revolvers. The Brits only started letting their officers use handguns in the 1890's. Many armies saw themselves in the mold of Napoleon's cavalry. What that meant was that the Europeans prioritized lances, sabers and then carbines. With the French, they wore the same type of chest plate armor that Napoleon's cavalry was using. They also issued the Berthier rifle Model 1907 carbine https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berthier_rifle, which fired 3 rounds and was inaccurate, mainly because they considered carbines the least important weapons. The French are the most extreme case, but every single European army was like that.

In the US, we moved from that to mounted riflemen, horses were modes of transportation to the front. We tried and dropped lances, after the civil war swords were rarely seen by cavalry forces here. We went carbine, revolver and sabre in order of importance.
 
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I think the most critical bit is the French-German war.

These were probably THE prime European armies, and look what they did - quick war of annihilation for one of the armies, and then it was all over but the professionals of the winners smashing the amateurs of the loser around for a bit. Sure, fixed positions held for enormous lengths of time, but they didn't decide anything, because those fixed positions were outflanked and isolated.

And WW1 started with much the same setup, so it makes sense they'd sooner look to the more-similar example than the less-similar ACW example.
 

Thomas1195

Banned
I think the most critical bit is the French-German war.

These were probably THE prime European armies, and look what they did - quick war of annihilation for one of the armies, and then it was all over but the professionals of the winners smashing the amateurs of the loser around for a bit. Sure, fixed positions held for enormous lengths of time, but they didn't decide anything, because those fixed positions were outflanked and isolated.

And WW1 started with much the same setup, so it makes sense they'd sooner look to the more-similar example than the less-similar ACW example.
Having Victor Michel not replace by Joffre and we would see something similar to ACW from day 1. His plan was some kind of active defense rather than offensives, and he did not plan to attack A-L.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
I assume the OP aimes at the question, why the 'great powers' at the outbreak of WW I weren't prepared for a long war and not prepared for a 'total' war aka their industries and economies not prepared for what eas to come.
... and why everybody 'thought' it might be a short war ("back when the leaves fall" or "back at christmas").


True the wars of 'real' powers up to and including 1870/71 were 'short' wars, though the last was already thought to be unduley long.
But these wars were also still fought and conducted in a 'napoleonic' manner : columns of troops manouvering over countries to finally meet at some point. ... wihtout much involvement of the rest of the countries involved (beside the actual battlefield and directly marched though regions).

Sidenote :
Exactly that, that suddenly non-military-trained persons were going into action and involved themself after Gambetta took power was what deeply shocked and embarressed the prussians/germans and caused their 'Franc-tireur'-trauma, that led to the 'belgian atrocities' in 1914 as well as the unnecessary bombardement of Kalizs.


But from then onwards almost every military leader in every country saw the danger and anticipated, that the next 'Big War' would be a total as well as a long war, as they would (have to) include ALL of a belligerents resources - of manpower as well as of economy as well as of the soaring industry.
Even Falkenhayn said during the July-crisis, to an US-interviewer IIRC, that the war would last at least 3-4 years.

They also very well anticipated, what such a war would do to their societies :
social unrest, upheaval, revolution, an almost complete turn-over of their society.
There was a substantial and very present 'red scare' in the opening years of the 20th century. The 'Socialists' popping up and growing tremendously fast, as fast as the industry.
In retrospect : they were complety right. No society emerged the WW I without heavy and hurting changes.

Therefore, the wish, to avoid exactly this gave birth to the 'short war' myth, that embraced virtually every participating power in 1914.
It could not be, what must not be.

Ofc the industry well agreed, that such a war (long one) would be desatrous to their emerging global economy.
And in that only underpinned, that a long war had to be avoided at all costs.

Therefore, the wishfull thinking, that a short war was/had to be not only short, but would/had to be also successfull gained so much atractivity opposite to the realistic and well anticipated outlook of a total war, which would leave the winner in an almost as bad condition as the looser, that it developed so much propagandistic momentum to brush away any thoughts for preparing for the 'real' stuff.
 

Deleted member 94680

How does the OP think that the lessons of the ACW would affect WWI?

Bearing in mind it was 50 years before the outbreak of WWI, the Germans had fought a War against France more recently and military technology was far advanced compared to that used in the ACW.

I honestly think all the technologies used in the ACW were so much further along that the lessons of the half-century old conflict were thought to be out of date.
 
Oh really?

[SNIP]
A quick search would suggest that those photographs are from the Siege of Petersburg, considering that the use of trenches to move your guns up into range and protect them from counter fire was something they were doing back in the Napoleonic Wars is it really comparable to the trench warfare of the Great War?
 
A quick search would suggest that those photographs are from the Siege of Petersburg, considering that the use of trenches to move your guns up into range and protect them from counter fire was something they were doing back in the Napoleonic Wars is it really comparable to the trench warfare of the Great War?

Grant didn't invent deep trench lines. They were ancient by time of the Siege of La Rochelle. It was the number of men that could be kept supplied in them

Around 36 miles of trenches in the Richmond and Petersburg area. Lee had approximately 3 men per foot of trench, and Grant twice as many.

It was the logistics to keep that many men in place for 9 months was the difference. In 1870 Moltke had to keep much of his force moving, he had to live off the French countryside, his logistics were not able to keep up, and that time of the siege of Paris was near half as long.

Siege of Sevastopol had similar amounts of men as 1865, but even Lee had a better logistics setup than the French and British had: the British had over 70% casualties from disease, from poor conditions and supply shortages.

It was the first 'Modern' war from a logistics standpoint, with the Telegraph and Railroads playing their part. Troops from that point on would not be able to live off the land and get by with small amounts of ammunition they could carry by themselves. What was needed for Fodder and Ammunition far outstripped what Napoleon could get by with.
 
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