WW1 WI: France & Russia stand alone

[La Rouge Beret]

Inspired by this thread here, what if the British did not intervene at the start of WW1?

How would this impact upon the performance of the French Army during WW 1?

 

[Cook]

The Entente would have collapsed sometime in or before 1916; most probably in the summer of 1915. Aside from the manpower that the British Empire provided (5.4 million men from Britain and the Empire served on the Western Front at some time during the war and the strength of British forces on the W.F. peaked at 2 million), there is also Britain’s industrial and economic contribution; the heartland of France’s heavy industry and mining was overrun in the first months of the war, lying as it did between Paris and Brussels; as the war progressed the British armaments industry became progressively more essential to the continuance of the Entente’s war effort. By 1916 the British were paying not only for their own war expenses, but also for two thirds of those of France and Russia, as well as all of Italy’s. Even if morale didn't collapse in the French army, and it probably wouldn't have until the very last moment, just as the morale of the German army didn't even after the disasters of August 1918, the French would simply not have been able to supply their army with enough artillery to withstand a German offensive in 1915.

 

[miguelrj]

the heartland of France’s heavy industry and mining was overrun in the first months of the war

Would it be overran, though?
One assumes that if Britain doesn't intervene it's because the Germans didn't invade through Belgium...

 

[Cook]

One assumes that if Britain doesn't intervene it's because the Germans didn't invade through Belgium...

The rapid spread of war, from the time of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum through to the German invasion of Belgium and France was virtually dictated by the German High Command’s adoption of the Schlieffen Plan; the plan demanded the defeat of France before the Russian army could mobilise, it therefore meant that if the Russian’s ordered a general mobilisation, that had to be considered as tantamount to the commencement of war. Because the Schlieffen plan intended to throw nine tenths of the German army against France and destroy her before Russia could intervene, if the Russians started, the clock was ticking and every day that the Germans hesitated meant another twenty-five miles of their Eastern Front that they would lose.

If Germany had still had the strategic plan of Moltke the Elder, Schlieffen’s predecessor, then the onset of war would have been very different, potentially it would have mean war would not have broken out. Moltke’s plan called for the deployment of the bulk of Germany’s forces on the Eastern front rather than not Western; the border with France would be held by a much smaller force which would remain on the defensive with the help of the large modern fortifications Germany had built in Alsace and Lorraine. Meanwhile the bulk of the German army would form up in the east, facing Russia, and if war broke out they would seize sufficient ground off the Russians for peace negotiations to be entered into from a position of strength. Note that Moltke the Elder’s plan did not involve the outright defeat of Russia or France, just a limited victory prior to beginning negotiations; it was consistent with the ‘quick wars’ that Prussia had fought with its neighbours in the latter half of the nineteenth century and also based on a more realistic assessment of Germany’s military capabilities than the Schlieffen plan was. If Moltke’s plan had still been the general mobilisation plan in July 1914 war may have been averted; the Russian mobilisation would have prompted a German mobilisation in response but not the rush to war; the Germans would have been mobilising to face the Russian build-up, and would have been doing so with a large part of the Austro-Hungarian army to support them; faced with that the Russians may have simply stood by while Serbia was occupied.

The point of all of this is that by 1914 there were only two options for Germany, concentrate in the west to attack France, or concentrate in the East to attack Russia. If it is against the Russians, then the war may never have spread beyond the Balkans; Austria’s invasion of Serbia would be remembered as the Third Balkans War of 1914. But if we stick with an expanded war, then it is most likely because the Germans opted for a move against France, and that, due to geography, meant invading through Belgium.

On 2nd of August 1914, the British Cabinet met to discuss the European crisis. It was the second Cabinet meeting on the crisis in as many days. At the time the Austrians were at war with Serbia and Germany had declared war on Russia in response to the Russian general mobilisation, however the German ultimatum to Belgium had not yet been delivered. At the meeting Prime Minister Asquith, Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty and Earl Crewe, the Colonial Secretary, all favoured an immediate declaration of war on Germany. The rest of the Cabinet were opposed to British intervention unless Belgium was attacked. It was then that a note arrived from Bonar Law, the Conservative Party leader, which read:

‘It would be fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture; and we offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any measures they may consider necessary for that object.’

It is clear then that without a German attack on Belgium the British would still have declared war on Germany. The only difference being that Asquith would have formed a coalition government with his supporters and the Conservatives. Belgium remaining neutral would not have been sufficient to keep Britain out of the war; some other factor was required to prevent British involvement, a factor that would have prevented Britain from intervening even if Belgium was invaded.

Such an issue did exist, and in fact it was on the verge of coming to a head when the war broke out and consequently it was postponed for a couple of years. That issue was Irish Home Rule and the Ulster Crisis. Had the bill been passed by parliament before war broke out in Europe, Britain may have been distracted by a civil war in Ireland, preventing her involvement in Europe.

 

[miguelrj]

The rapid spread of war, from the time of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum through to the German invasion of Belgium and France was virtually dictated by the German High Command’s adoption of the Schlieffen Plan; the plan demanded the defeat of France before the Russian army could mobilise, it therefore meant that if the Russian’s ordered a general mobilisation, that had to be considered as tantamount to the commencement of war. Because the Schlieffen plan intended to throw nine tenths of the German army against France and destroy her before Russia could intervene, if the Russians started, the clock was ticking and every day that the Germans hesitated meant another twenty-five miles of their Eastern Front that they would lose.

If Germany had still had the strategic plan of Moltke the Elder, Schlieffen’s predecessor, then the onset of war would have been very different, potentially it would have mean war would not have broken out. Moltke’s plan called for the deployment of the bulk of Germany’s forces on the Eastern front rather than not Western; the border with France would be held by a much smaller force which would remain on the defensive with the help of the large modern fortifications Germany had built in Alsace and Lorraine. Meanwhile the bulk of the German army would form up in the east, facing Russia, and if war broke out they would seize sufficient ground off the Russians for peace negotiations to be entered into from a position of strength. Note that Moltke the Elder’s plan did not involve the outright defeat of Russia or France, just a limited victory prior to beginning negotiations; it was consistent with the ‘quick wars’ that Prussia had fought with its neighbours in the latter half of the nineteenth century and also based on a more realistic assessment of Germany’s military capabilities than the Schlieffen plan was. If Moltke’s plan had still been the general mobilisation plan in July 1914 war may have been averted; the Russian mobilisation would have prompted a German mobilisation in response but not the rush to war; the Germans would have been mobilising to face the Russian build-up, and would have been doing so with a large part of the Austro-Hungarian army to support them; faced with that the Russians may have simply stood by while Serbia was occupied.

The point of all of this is that by 1914 there were only two options for Germany, concentrate in the west to attack France, or concentrate in the East to attack Russia. If it is against the Russians, then the war may never have spread beyond the Balkans; Austria’s invasion of Serbia would be remembered as the Third Balkans War of 1914. But if we stick with an expanded war, then it is most likely because the Germans opted for a move against France, and that, due to geography, meant invading through Belgium.

On 2nd of August 1914, the British Cabinet met to discuss the European crisis. It was the second Cabinet meeting on the crisis in as many days. At the time the Austrians were at war with Serbia and Germany had declared war on Russia in response to the Russian general mobilisation, however the German ultimatum to Belgium had not yet been delivered. At the meeting Prime Minister Asquith, Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty and Earl Crewe, the Colonial Secretary, all favoured an immediate declaration of war on Germany. The rest of the Cabinet were opposed to British intervention unless Belgium was attacked. It was then that a note arrived from Bonar Law, the Conservative Party leader, which read:

‘It would be fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture; and we offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any measures they may consider necessary for that object.’

It is clear then that without a German attack on Belgium the British would have declared war on Germany. The only difference being that Asquith would have formed a coalition government with his supporters and the Conservatives. Belgium remaining neutral would not have been sufficient to keep Britain out of the war; some other factor was required to prevent British involvement, a factor that would have prevented Britain from intervening even if Belgium was invaded.

Such an issue did exist, and in fact it was on the verge of coming to a head when the war broke out and consequently it was postponed for a couple of years. That issue was Irish Home Rule and the Ulster Crisis. Had the bill been passed by parliament before war broke out in Europe, Britain may have been distracted by a civil war in Ireland, preventing her involvement in Europe.

That's... comprehensive.
Considering that you're an old and prolific member of AH.com, either you're a very patient person or you have carefully archived model answers ready to be copy-pasted...

 

[Cook]

either you're a very patient person or ...

 

[Onkel Willie]

Inspired by this thread here, what if the British did not intervene at the start of WW1?

How would this impact upon the performance of the French Army during WW 1?

Great Britain and its Empire contributed a significant amount of manpower and resources. Besides that, neutral Britain=no blockade, which means the German war industry will perform much better and that morale will be higher since food shortages are absent.

Ignoring the why of British neutrality is difficult: I assume Germany goes east first, while France bashes its head against German border fortifications. Russian Poland falls faster, I presume, after which it's a matter of the Russian Army trying to fight an offensive war to help France like it did IOTL. That will go even worse since Austria-Hungary most likely doesn't have to worry about Italy.

 

[Viriato]

I think you would see Italy, Rumania and possibly Sweden and Spain entering the conflict once a Central Powers victory is certain. In OTL, the stalemate of the war, played a role in keeping countries neutral.

In OTL Italy and Rumania joined the allies in WWI in 1915 and 1916 respectively, however with a weaker entente they'd probably be opportunistic in satisfying irredentist claims. Sweden and Spain were neutral during WWI, though had a significant pro-German sentiment. Without the threat of a British blockade they may have thrown their weight against France and Russia.

Rumania's ruling class was divided prior to entry in the war, and though they had their eyes on Transylvania, many were still peeved at Russia's annexation of Bessarabia in 1878. Once it is clear that Germany and Austria-Hungary have the upper hand, I'm sure this area would have been invaded and annexed by Rumanian troops.

The Italians would have probably waited until France was near defeat and gone after Nice, Savoy, Corsica, Tunisia, French Somaliland and the department of Constantine in Algeria. Though Italian troops would have probably not made much difference, the Germans would be happy to acquiesce to Italian territorial demands just to punish and humiliate France.

In Sweden there were those who did wish to recover Finland and especially the Aland Islands. If it became clear the British would not intervene, the Swedes would have probably invaded Finland (especially once Russian defeat is certain). Perhaps the King of Sweden would have assumed the title of Grand-Duke of Finland, if they got really ambitious they could even take the sparsely populated, but mineral rich Kola Peninsula.

Spain is probably the least likely country to enter the fray out of the four countries mentioned, however there was pro-German sentiment in the Spanish government. However, once it becomes clear that France is on the verge of defeat, they could join the war and demand Roussillon as part of Catalonia. Also, they did want the rest of Morocco (perhaps the Germans would agree to this with German economic interests granted). They could demand the department of Oran, where the non-Muslim population was overwhelmingly Spanish, and perhaps even Algiers where Spaniards were also prominent. Finally, perhaps the Germans would allow the Spanish to expand Rio Muni a bit at the expense of French Equatorial Africa.

 

[tallthinkev]

I wouldn't think that Britain would let Spain to have control of both sides of the entrance of the Med.

 

[miguelrj]

I wouldn't think that Britain would let Spain to have control of both sides of the entrance of the Med.

Spain already controlled the 2 shores of the Strait minus International Tangiers and British Gibraltar.
Spanish gains against France wouldn't alter this...

 

[tallthinkev]

Spain already controlled the 2 shores minus International Tangiers and British Gibraltar.
Spanish gains against France wouldn't alter this...

Yes, I did know that, but it could just be the scale, would be too much.

 

[Viriato]

Yes, I did know that, but it could just be the scale, would be too much.

By 1914 Spain was no longer a great power. The Spanish did already control the shores to the entrance of the Med, except Gibraltar and Tangier. This would have been the least of Britain's worries.

 

[Perfidious Albion]

Cook, this is marvellously thorough and clearly well-read. There's merely one point in your analysis that I would look to dispute:

If it is against the Russians, then the war may never have spread beyond the Balkans; Austria’s invasion of Serbia would be remembered as the Third Balkans War of 1914. But if we stick with an expanded war, then it is most likely because the Germans opted for a move against France

I suppose it depends on interpretation of what you said; perhaps I failed in that. What I would argue is that it is perfectly possible for France to enter a war on Russia's side even with a Russia-first strategy on Germany's part, provided that France has political leadership similar to what it had IOTL. President Poincaré took a remarkably pro-Russian line right from the start. Not only did he urge the Tsar not to be too accommodating to Austria-Hungary, he said—to the very face of an Austro-Hungarian diplomat—that he didn't care what evidence he was presented with, he would believe nonetheless that it was a case of Austro-Hungarian lies to implicate Serbia (by reference to previous incidents where Austria-Hungary had done just that). Beyond even that, he explicitly threatened Austria-Hungary—as is corroborated in independent eyewitness accounts (Paléologue and Szápary)—that Russia would help Serbia, and France Russia, if Austria-Hungary took any action against Serbia.

That suggests to me that the President of the French Republic considered himself as having a perfectly good casus belli. Given the clumsiness of the Austro-Hungarian response and the pre-existing hostility and tension with Germany (I'm thinking Morocco more than Alsace-Lorraine), which gave French politicians reason to consider Germany an aggressive expansionist power, I don't think it at all impossible that he would have managed to persuade enough people for France to end up declaring war on Germany when Austria-Hungary and Germany attack Serbia and Russia.

If you merely meant that there's a higher chance of the war expanding with a France-first strategy than with a Russia-first strategy but that it isn't impossible even in the latter case, then I apologise for my error and withdraw the argument above.

 

[Viriato]

It would be interesting to see what effect this would have had on the United States. The significant German-American population of the Midwest could continue to speak German, and perhaps in isolated towns the language could survive to this day. After the Franco-Prussian War, Germany was seen in a positive light by Americans, with Bismarck, North Dakota being named after the German Chancellor in 1873. Also, without the need to resort to sinking merchant ships, and not invading Belgium, public opinion wouldn't turn so harshly against the Germans.

Though there were Anglophiles in America, if Britain were distracted by an uprising or Civil War in Ireland this could turn some public opinion in America against Britain (at least in heavily Irish American areas). There was admiration for France in some circles too, however it seems that there would be little sympathy for Russia, with over 90% of immigrants from the Russian Empire being Jews, Poles and to a lesser extent Finns.

If Italy and Sweden join the Central powers you now have the significant Italian, Swedish and Finnish populations in the U.S. looking favorably to the Central Powers. Also, the large Jewish community in the U.S. was composed mostly of recent arrivals fleeing the Russian Empire, though they might not be pro-Central Powers they certainly wouldn't be backing the Entente.

With a harsh peace treaty, France would have been forced to pay heavy reparations to the Central Powers. Stripped of most of its industrial regions and colonial empire, perhaps the United States would have agreed to purchase France's American territories, giving the Americans more islands in the Caribbean, French Guiana and the strategic islands of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon.

Another country that was an ally in WWI that would probably salivate at the opportunity to add more territory is Japan. In OTL they declared war on Germany to annex the Pacific Islands. However, once things start going badly for Russia, they can join the fray and annex the Northern Half of Sakhalin. I can also see them going after the sparsely population regions of Outer Manchuria and the Kamchatka Peninsula. This could be interesting as Japan would be turning its interests Northward and finally have the "living space" it desires. This area is also rich in minerals especially gold and could lead to Japan soon afterward annexing all of Manchuria with Germany's blessing.

Also, I can see the Japanese assisting the Germans in attacking French Indochina, however I have a feeling the Germans wanted this territory for themselves. The Japanese could assist German expeditionary forces in taking New Caledonia and French Polynesia, however, I believe the Germans would probably wait to annex these after the peace so as not to alarm the nearby British Dominions.

Portugal too could probably join the Central Powers if Spain does. The only reason being they fear Spanish invasion and would think its better to be on their side so that they aren't attacked. Though they wouldn't add much to the cause, the Germans could use the Cape Verde Islands and Portuguese Guinea as a springboard to invade and capture Dakar. The Portuguese could probably get the Germans to agree to respect the territorial integrity of Portugal's colonial empire since now Germany's imperial appetite would be satisfied at the expense of France and Russia and this would be considered a victory for the Portuguese Government. Also, economic concessions would probably be granted to the Portuguese and perhaps they can acquire a small amount of territory in the form of the Cassamance Region of Senegal that had been ceded by Portugal to France in 1888 and where Portuguese cultural influence was strong.

In the end, without the British and Japanese against them, most of Germany's colonies remain safe, with the exception being Togoland (which the French probably quickly overrun in 1914). However, Germany will be able to mount expeditionary expeditions in Africa and Asia with the help of its allies, and probably begin taking over French colonies. German East Africa would serve as a springboard for an invasion of the Comoros, Madagascar and Reunion, Kamerun for French Equatorial Africa. Finally, I can envision joint Spanish-German invasion of French Morocco and Algeria to aid the Italians to meet up with the Italians in Libya.

 

[miguelrj]

^^ That's a big anti-Serbo-Franco-Russian pile up over there...

 

[LordKalvert]

Would it be overran, though?
One assumes that if Britain doesn't intervene it's because the Germans didn't invade through Belgium...

An interesting point. But if the Germans don't invade Belgium is it because they try to pierce the fortress line or because they march East?

If its the first, the Germans are still likely to prevail. They might not wound France as much (though the suicidal French tactics probably ensure that) and still defeat Russia in the East. She would also have reasonable access to world markets and her supplies would be in much better shape.

In the second, Russia is probably pushed back and even French intervention becomes unlikely

In all likelihood, English neutrality would lead to Italian intervention on the German side. A German victory would be almost guaranteed in that situation

 

[Viriato]

^^ That's a big anti-Serbo-Franco-Russian pile up over there...

The medium-sized powers prior to WWI all seemed to be hungry for expansion and generally would join a war if they felt they could benefit from it. Hence the Balkan Wars. In OTL, the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria, Italy, Romania, Greece all jumped in hoping to make territorial gains, however, with a neutral Britain, I can see many more countries siding with the Central Powers.

Bulgaria wants Macedonia from Serbia, so they're definitely going to join in as in OTL. Though Italy wants territory from Austria, the irredentists still wanted Tunis, Corsica, Nice and Savoy, so I'm sure they'd jump in if they saw the French doing badly. They were overly dependent on British coal, and if the Brits stay out and its a short war, they're in. Same goes for the Romanians, they want Transylvania, but they also wanted Bessarabia back. With the Italians and Romanians, they probably take the attitude that they'll get what they can now and wait for a future opportunity to attack Austria-Hungary.

The Japanese were probably the biggest opportunists, and if they see Russia bogged down and they don't have to fear the Royal Navy, they'll make a jump at Northern Sakhalin and parts of Siberia. Again, they will wait till the Russians are doing badly in the West and strike the thinly populated regions of Siberia.

The Swedes might see this as an opportunity to liberate Finland. In OTL they were pretty pro-German, but obviously did not want a British blockade. Without the Brits, they're probably in once its clear Russia is losing.

The Spaniards as I mentioned are probably the least likely, but even here the ruling class was pro-German. If France losing, they can most likely get the Germans to agree to let them have some French territory in North Africa.

The Germans of course would look favorably on all of these new allies. They can easily acquiesce to the territorial demands of these countries, as they generally don't overlap with their own war aims.