WW1 WI: Allies land anywere else but Gallipoli

[gurgu]

It's a while i'm thinking about it. my best guess would be to make Bulgaria join entente( just promise to revise the treaty of Bucharest at least) than land massive forces in Alexandropole( 167 km from Gallipoli) and rush to Constantinople. Making Bulgaria join Entente would end the war much earlier:
-OE with no possible help from germane and enemy troops on land near Constantinople? capitulation before new year
-AH would have to put at least half it's forces on Serbia because all the entente would be able to resupply it's ally and help it( just Bulgaria can field 900k troops on that front imagine with french/english aid what would happen). in OTL AH wasn't able to defeat Serbs without Bulgarian help so ITTL they might even collapse and surrender by September 1916
- if by January 1917 Germany is alone, they would ask for peace

 

[Scotty]

You have absolute command of the sea, and want to invade a country with a med coastline that stretches for a couple of thousand miles (rough guess)

so you invade on a narrow peninsula

i get that you want a quick knockout blow, but this should have been the WW1 equivalent of the Allied Pacific campaign

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Aerial mapping was in its infancy and Photogrammetry was regarded as a 'toy'. Most of the mapping effort was going into Northern France and Belgium. After the campaign kicked off, Sampson had to bring his personal camera to take aerial photos before the landing.

....

The US Navy was making a complaint about something like this during the intervention over the former Yugoslavia a couple decades ago. The USAF had acquired responsibility for air photo recon. The USN complained they were not getting timely photos of the targets they'd been ordered to strike. Local wing commanders resorted to making their own photo flights using hand held cameras. (From US Naval Institute Proceedings.)

But I digress.

... Many problems were caused by a prewar policy of standardising the contour interval so the contours were reinterpreted. This had the result of flattening out the terrain so that features like the Razorback were depicted as a saddle not a narrow highlighted ridge that could only be crossed single file:

Data distortion is still a problem. We all wrestle with that daily. Single source/channel information flow is a nasty trap. I learned the hard way about cross checking what came in.

 

[sloreck]

While a landing elsewhere could have been done, perhaps with much better results, the problem is that landing in Alexandretta or elsewhere does not accomplish the goal of knocking the OE out of the war AND opening the Bosphorus/Black Sea route for supplying Russia. Having studied original documents concerning medical panning for Gallipoli (and having a published book chapter on this), the planning was really, really terrible. To be fair, this was the first amphibious assault of the modern military era with issues concerning reliable sea mines, machine guns, and breech loading artillery that more recent assaults (like Ft Fisher in the ACW) did not have to deal with. The big issue in many ways was dealing with the mines in the narrow spots, where the minefields were covered by shore based artillery - landing further up would have meant properly dealing with this. The naval attempt, doomed to failure with no land component and not dealing with minefields simply told the OE and Germans what they needed to do, and combined with the lack of OPSEC allowed for better defensive work.

In spite of making just about every possible mistake you can for an amphibious landing from lack of unity of command and clear responsibilities on down, had the folks on the ground in some instances moved with urgency, not in at least one case stopping an almost unopposed advance for a "brew up", this could have succeeded. Once this morphed in to a Balkan version of the Western Front and became a meatgrinder, it was simply throwing good money after bad.

Had it been properly implemented, or even with all the faults been aggressively pushed right away it could have succeeded.

 

[Tibi088]

It's a while i'm thinking about it. my best guess would be to make Bulgaria join entente( just promise to revise the treaty of Bucharest at least) than land massive forces in Alexandropole( 167 km from Gallipoli) and rush to Constantinople. Making Bulgaria join Entente would end the war much earlier:
-OE with no possible help from germane and enemy troops on land near Constantinople? capitulation before new year
-AH would have to put at least half it's forces on Serbia because all the entente would be able to resupply it's ally and help it( just Bulgaria can field 900k troops on that front imagine with french/english aid what would happen). in OTL AH wasn't able to defeat Serbs without Bulgarian help so ITTL they might even collapse and surrender by September 1916
- if by January 1917 Germany is alone, they would ask for peace

The problem with that is that in the 2nd Balkan war Bulgaria ended up fighting/was ganged upon by (depends on point of view) all of its neighbours. What Bulgaria wanted most in 2nd Balkan war was Macedonia - which ended up mostly in Serbia. So Bulgaria (if it takes a side) will always pick the side against Serbia. So If WWI starts per OTL, Austria vs Serbia than Bulgaria stays either neutral or joins the CP's.

 

[gurgu]

The problem with that is that in the 2nd Balkan war Bulgaria ended up fighting/was ganged upon by (depends on point of view) all of its neighbours. What Bulgaria wanted most in 2nd Balkan war was Macedonia - which ended up mostly in Serbia. So Bulgaria (if it takes a side) will always pick the side against Serbia. So If WWI starts per OTL, Austria vs Serbia than Bulgaria stays either neutral or joins the CP's.

actually the entente offered to revise the Macedonian question in favor of Bulgaria( or at least the Russian tsar offered so) and Bulgaria was going for it before the failure of Gallipoli and the incoming proposal of grab everything you want from the CP

 

[formion]

While a landing elsewhere could have been done, perhaps with much better results, the problem is that landing in Alexandretta or elsewhere does not accomplish the goal of knocking the OE out of the war AND opening the Bosphorus/Black Sea route for supplying Russia. Having studied original documents concerning medical panning for Gallipoli (and having a published book chapter on this), the planning was really, really terrible. To be fair, this was the first amphibious assault of the modern military era with issues concerning reliable sea mines, machine guns, and breech loading artillery that more recent assaults (like Ft Fisher in the ACW) did not have to deal with. The big issue in many ways was dealing with the mines in the narrow spots, where the minefields were covered by shore based artillery - landing further up would have meant properly dealing with this. The naval attempt, doomed to failure with no land component and not dealing with minefields simply told the OE and Germans what they needed to do, and combined with the lack of OPSEC allowed for better defensive work.

If the Alexandretta option had been chosen, the various planning problems wouldn't have mattered. Alexandretta and Cilicia were lightly garrisoned with no fixed defences of importance. The Allies could have probably seized almost immediately the port towns in the area. The Taurus, Antitaurus and Nur Mountains seal the area pretty well.

One aspect of the Alexandretta option that has not been discussed is the effect on the Amernian Genocide. In the Adana Vilayet there were 58.000 Armenians in 1914. In the neighbouring Aleppo Vilayet there were at least 75,000 Armenians. Barring a disaster and incompetence greater than the OTL landings, I see the frontlines to be along the mountains of the area, thus securing a lot of Amernians. The local population might be amenable in forming Armenian Legions as the OTL one, providing an auxiliary force with excellent knowledge of the mountainous terrain. I see also a lot of Amernians that are refugees from the massacres to try to reach the Cilicia haven. So, an Alexandretta landing might lead to the formation of an Armenian Cilicia, rich in minerals and agricultural land that can be an "Israel" for the Armenians after the end of WW1 and the Soviet occupation of Russian Armenia. A christian pro-French state in the Middle East will alter fundamentaly the 20th century for that region. Turkey would have the most to lose by having an active Cilician front after the WW1 with a hostile and well armed population that will make the subjucation of the region extremely tough, unlike the OTL Franco-Turkish War that took place after the genocide. Greece would have the most to gain by an allied christian Cilicia, along with the christian community of Lebannon. Lastly, the French would gain an important protectorate.

In a similar spirit to Cilicia, an Alexandretta landing would provide butterflies for Lebannon as well. The Maronites were subjected to a gruesome famine that killed half their population during WW1. With an Entente force in the north and the 4th Ottoman Army cut off, I see a Maronite uprising, perhaps with Anglo-French help. A Maronite community that is demographically stronger post-WW1 will produce interesting butterflies.

However, for such a senario to occur, the French need to give their consent for the operation, after being assured for their Levantine sphere of influence. Lastly, the British imperial strategy must regard the security of Suez more important than opening a channel to Russia, at least in the short-term (Spring 1915). Since it is before Gorlice–Tarnów, I don't think that it is ASB. From a pure military perspective the landing will cut off around 10 Ottoman Divisions ( out of the 36 divisions of the 1914 mobilization) from any meaningful logistical support. The new front would need several divisions to cover the Taurus and Antitaurus mountains while a few would be needed to guard the Straits ( at least the OTL 5-6 divisions). The end result would be an Ottoman Army fixed with few reserves to commit in any front. The British forces from Egypt and Basra won't face anihilation and can gradually grap Mesopotamia and the rest of the Levantine coast.

 

[formion]

Regarding the economic potential of Cilicia check this article:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07075332.2001.9640941

The French mercantile community was advocating the seizure of Cilicia since 1915. In 1914 there was a forecast that Cilicia would rival Egypt in cotton production, while mainintaing a decent yield of grains, olive oil and fruit. Moreover, the Taurus mountains in Cilicia were a prime source of chrome and post-WW1 the French steel industry needed all the help it could get. While chrome was the most important mineral, the mountains also had deposits of silver, copper, iron, lignite, and zinc.

 

[sloreck]

Any economic gains in capturing Cilicia would be long term, once the appropriate areas were secured they would need to be repaired/rebuilt and put back in to production. The idea behind Gallipoli is that it would provide a lifeline to Russia and potentially knock the OE out of the war rapidly. As far as landing in Cilicia or Alexandretta to aid the Armenians, at the time Gallipoli was being organized how much did the British and French know about what was happening to the Armenians? On top of that, how much did they really care - were they going to let the fate of the Armenians have any more than a peripheral impact on their war planning. Propaganda yes, war planning no. Look at the impact the Holocaust had on British/US war planning in WWII - essentially zero and the numbers of Jews, Romany, and Slavs were much larger.

 

[formion]

Oh but I agree! The Anglo-French care not a bit for the Armenians. The Armenian section of my post was addressing consequences of the landing rather than causes. When in 1916 the Verdun and Somme slaughter begins, then I guess that the Anglo-French would be grateful to provide Armenian and Maronite militias with weapons and instructors, if they can move a couple of divisions back to the Western Front. The Russian policy makers didn't overly like the Armenians, but they were happy to provide them with weapons.

What I consider valid though, is that the British care about the safety of Suez. In OTL a significant force was invested to protect it until 1916 when they went on the offensive. Regarding policy making I also believe the British cared about Mesopotamia, what's why the invested in the Kut offensive. Otherwise after securing Basra they could have sent more Indian troops to Egypt. The dividents of a French Cilicia were indeed the reason the French policy makers wanted it and they opposed any infringement of their sphere of influence in the Levant in OTL in spring 1915. At least the literature indicates such thing. The Maronites had been under the protection of the French since the 1860s. The ultra catholics in France had some sympathy for the catholics of Mount Lebannon who faced percecution. The need to open a way to Russia is right there but it is not as important as after Gorlice-Tarnov. The Russians were mauled in East Prussia yes but they almost reached the the Pannonian Plain. When talking about strategy formation during the 1914-1915 winter, the Russians don't seem to be in a tough position. Of course this view changes after May 1915 but at this point the Entente is committed to either Gallipoli or Alexandretta.

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

Oh but I agree! The Anglo-French care not a bit for the Armenians. The Armenian section of my post was addressing consequences of the landing rather than causes. When in 1916 the Verdun and Somme slaughter begins, then I guess that the Anglo-French would be grateful to provide Armenian and Maronite militias with weapons and instructors, if they can move a couple of divisions back to the Western Front. The Russian policy makers didn't overly like the Armenians, but they were happy to provide them with weapons.

What I consider valid though, is that the British care about the safety of Suez. In OTL a significant force was invested to protect it until 1916 when they went on the offensive. Regarding policy making I also believe the British cared about Mesopotamia, what's why the invested in the Kut offensive. Otherwise after securing Basra they could have sent more Indian troops to Egypt. The dividents of a French Cilicia were indeed the reason the French policy makers wanted it and they opposed any infringement of their sphere of influence in the Levant in OTL in spring 1915. At least the literature indicates such thing. The Maronites had been under the protection of the French since the 1860s. The ultra catholics in France had some sympathy for the catholics of Mount Lebannon who faced percecution. The need to open a way to Russia is right there but it is not as important as after Gorlice-Tarnov. The Russians were mauled in East Prussia yes but they almost reached the the Pannonian Plain. When talking about strategy formation during the 1914-1915 winter, the Russians don't seem to be in a tough position. Of course this view changes after May 1915 but at this point the Entente is committed to either Gallipoli or Alexandretta.

I'm not so sure about Mesopotamia. Believe that was "mission-creep" encouraged by the Government of British India (not just the GG) which had operational control at Basra. I doubt it even appeared on the War Office's radar once the oil supplies had been secured, until the prospect of taking Baghdad loomed and then Townshend got stuck in Kut.

 

[Dorknought]

Just use the Greek Plan. The British Naval Mission Head Adm Kerr had access to the details.

In early 1914 the Greek Navy envisaged a surprise attack of 160,000 men to hold strategic areas and then negotiate from a position of strength. The navy was to be bolstered with 2 ex US Navy Battleships that arrived in July 1914.

The main features of the plan were:

• 20,000 men land and hold Alexandretta cutting the railway to the south and isolating the 10 Ottoman Infantry Divisions of the 2nd, 4th and 6th Armies.
• 30,000 men land at Aivali on the Gulf of Adramyti to block the troops stationed in the Smyrna Fortified Area from going north.
• 2 Regiments land at the rear of the Kum Kale fort, taking it and turning its guns on the Sedd-el-Bahr fort on the Gallipoli side.
• 80,000 men land from Gaba Tepe south on the Gallipoli peninsula and take the forts from the rear. (20,000 ANZAC troops landed in the same area).
  
• 30,000 men with naval gunfire support, land and take the Belair lines at the narrow point of the peninsula. In 1914, these had crumbled and filled with water since they held the Bulgarians at bay in 1912.

The Ottoman 2nd Army was fixed on the Russian border and would take months to redeploy due to the lack of transport. The Bulair lines could only be attacked with whatever the Ottomans could spare from the perimeter facing the Bulgarians. The flaw in the plan was how the Bulgarians would react as the Greek plan relied of Bulgaria staying neutral.

Note that the ANZAC force was too small for Gallipoli but just right for Alexandretta. The French Intelligence officer (I can't recall his name) had excellent intelligence of the Peninsula in March-April 1915 and he described it as an 'armed camp' almost like a fort.

 

[formion]

@Coulsdon Eagle indeed you are right on the Kut offensive and I was wrong - I realized it after checking the Townsend book on the campaign.

 

[Aussie]

The area was a strategic waterway in a war zone (1st Balkan War), hardly a prospect for foreign officers to wander around collecting field observations. The maps they had were quite good for their time and had many very useful notations, like 'no water in the hills', 'very hard going', 'wells in valley'. Many problems were caused by a prewar policy of standardising the contour interval so the contours were reinterpreted. This had the result of flattening out the terrain so that features like the Razorback were depicted as a saddle not a narrow highlighted ridge that could only be crossed single file:

Aerial mapping was in its infancy and Photogrammetry was regarded as a 'toy'. Most of the mapping effort was going into Northern France and Belgium. After the campaign kicked off, Sampson had to bring his personal camera to take aerial photos before the landing.

The manuals were quite detailed and had notes on all the landing beaches that Hamilton actually used. They also had descriptions and zones much like modern geomorphology to show 'going' areas.

One stuffup was a force landing on S Beach (IIRC) marched unopposed into Krithia and then left! They then had the 1st 2nd and 3rd battles of Krithia to try and take the village with the result of thousands of causalities.

Going off topic a bit here:

The AWM photo above is not absolutely clear, but the dress style, and glasses, are very reminiscent of C.E.W. Bean.

Charles Bean spent a lot of time immediately post war, at Gallipoli, collecting artefacts for what eventually became the Australian War Memorial, of which he was the Founding Director.

His other great work is editing a multi - volume history of Australia in the Great War, many volumes of which are based on his personal knowledge, as the Official Historian.

 

[Dorknought]

The AWM photo above is not absolutely clear, but the dress style, and glasses, are very reminiscent of C.E.W. Bean.

According to the AWM site, it is Lester Lawrence, Reuter's correspondent (C.E.W. Bean is taking the photo.)
https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C327595

Here is a better view of him:
https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/G01411/

Yes, Bean wrote over a million words of Australian History by himself and created the 'Anzac myth' along the way.

 

[Gwachiko]

There was also the earlier offer by the Greeks to send 250,000 troops but the Russians would not hear of it as they had long considered the area in their sphere and did not want the Greeks anywhere near 'Constantinople'

See how that worked out for them!

So the Russians sealed their own fate as a result of their greed...

 

[History Learner]

Alexandretta, although the idea was opposed by the French

By far one of the biggest missed opportunities of the war for the Entente, as cutting the railways in this area would've forced the Ottomans out of Palestine and Syria.

 

[formion]

There was also the earlier offer by the Greeks to send 250,000 troops but the Russians would not hear of it as they had long considered the area in their sphere and did not want the Greeks anywhere near 'Constantinople'

See how that worked out for them!

Actually I think the Greeks offered a three-division corps (60.000 men). The 1915 mobilization provided 300.000-320.000 men so I doubt the Greeks would leave the border with Bulgaria virtually undefended. Even with a corps, there is an increase of 50% of the total initial landing force (9 divisions instead of 6). Moreover, the Greek divisions would be veteran ones from the recent Balkan wars. However, the most important thing would have be the British to utilize the detailed greek plans for the operation. That's the hardest part... I don't see that happening due to pride and dismissiveness towards the small balkan ally. Still with 3 more experienced divisions the operation might succeed.

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

IIRC the Ottomans were worried that the Entente Powers would land at Bulair, the neck of the Gallipoli peninsula, and so concentrated their defences (two divisions?) in that area. Hamilton knew this and some bloke named Bernard Freyberg (wonder what happened to him?) carried out a one-man strategic diversion in the Gulf of Saros for which he was awarded the DSO. The window of opportunity after the initial landings was as long as it took to move those Ottoman divisions south.

Incidentally if you ever do get the chance to visit Gallipoli, take it. Not only are the locals very friendly and the land is beautiful, you won't believe how horrendous was the terrain and how close the front lines were. Stay in Canakale and take the ferry between continents every morning.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Actually I think the Greeks offered a three-division corps (60.000 men). The 1915 mobilization provided 300.000-320.000 men so I doubt the Greeks would leave the border with Bulgaria virtually undefended. Even with a corps, there is an increase of 50% of the total initial landing force (9 divisions instead of 6). Moreover, the Greek divisions would be veteran ones from the recent Balkan wars. However, the most important thing would have be the British to utilize the detailed greek plans for the operation. That's the hardest part... I don't see that happening due to pride and dismissiveness towards the small balkan ally. Still with 3 more experienced divisions the operation might succeed.

Well at the time I believe that teh Ottomans had virtually nothing in the area and 60,000 trained / veteran troops working with the naval attempt to force the Straights might very well have worked.