WW1 what if: No invasion of Belgium

They attacked shipping to Britain OTL because that was their only means of hurting it directly and they couldn't win without Britain getting knocked out of the war somehow. If it's only France they're fighting, then it would be far simpler and less likely to blow up in their faces to just, well, beat France. It's not like food and weapons would drag things out on the Western Front anywhere near as much as, say, hundreds of thousands of British troops would. I don't even see how you make the comparison between this and OTL, the provocations are completely different and yet you insist that the solution must be the same. It's not the Germans ITTL would use OTL's WWI as a model for their WWI strategy.
 

Nietzsche

Banned
They attacked shipping to Britain OTL because that was their only means of hurting it directly and they couldn't win without Britain getting knocked out of the war somehow. If it's only France they're fighting, then it would be far simpler and less likely to blow up in their faces to just, well, beat France. It's not like food and weapons would drag things out on the Western Front anywhere near as much as, say, hundreds of thousands of British troops would. I don't even see how you make the comparison between this and OTL, the provocations are completely different and yet you insist that the solution must be the same. It's not the Germans ITTL would use OTL's WWI as a model for their WWI strategy.
^This here. Germany attacked British shipping in WW1 because it was at war with them, not merely because it was there.
 

Cook

Banned
Contrary to what another poster stated, the Ottoman objective in 1914 was not territorial gain, it was to normalize the relations of the empire with the rest of the world. It was concluded only Germany was prepared to treat the Ottomans equally, therefore, it was with Germany that the Porte was determined to win or lose.
The other poster was me, and Enver Pasha’s ambitions in this respect are well documented. And they remained the same throughout the war, leading to repeated Turkish offensives in the Caucasus and the bulk of Turkish resources being sent to that front even after the British had invaded Mesopotamia and Palestine.


The other members of the Troika had more modest ambitions, and the wider cabinet had been very reluctant to go to war at all, but it was Enver who decided matters.
 
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Cook

Banned
Belgium gave them a very clear reason to get in; it was no small thing, joining the war, and not just any flimsy pretext could sell the people on it.
The British cabinet had met in the morning of August the 1st, 1914 to discuss the crisis and what to do in the event of war. This was before the news had arrived from Russia that the Germans had declared war, at this stage as far as the British knew only Austria and Serbia were at war. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, was for immediate intervention alongside the French. Prime Minister Asquith and Grey, the Foreign Secretary were also in favour of intervention if France was attacked even if Belgian neutrality was not violated, but the rest of the cabinet was opposed to British intervention unless Belgium was invaded. The only member of the cabinet who was opposed to British intervention in the war under any circumstances was the Lord Privy Seal, John Morley, who threatened to resign if Britain declared war. Since he threatened to resign regularly none of the others were greatly worried by his statement and in the event only Morley and John Burns left the government rather than support the declaration of war.

The cabinet met again on August 2nd in the morning, by which time the news from St Petersburg and Berlin had been received but prior to German ultimatum to Belgium being delivered. At that meeting the cabinet was still divided; Asquith, Grey and Churchill were now all in favour of immediate intervention, Grey threatened to resign if the cabinet opted for a declaration of neutrality, but the rest of the cabinet were still opposed to declaring war if Belgium neutrality was not violated. But during the meeting Lloyd-George, the main figure in the Liberal Party after Asquith, passed Churchill a note that read ‘If you go softly on this you will get what you want’, which indicates that privately he had come around to Asquith and Churchill’s view, but needed a more subtle way of persuading the other reluctant members.

During the cabinet meeting a message arrived from the Conservative Party leader, Bonar Law saying:

‘It would be fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture; and we offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any measures they may consider necessary for that object.’

Law commanded 271 Conservative and Unionist seats in parliament. If both Asquith and Lloyd-George were both in favour of declaring war, it is very hard to see who dissenting Liberal back benchers would have rallied to, or that anywhere near enough of them would have abandoned the government to make a difference. If enough backbenchers did resign, then Asquith’s Liberals and Law’s Conservatives and Unionists would have formed a government of National Unity and declared war.

However, that was all based on the assumption that Germany was about to declare war on France. But in practical terms, if Germany honoured Belgian neutrality, there really was no credible way to invade France quickly, 1914 was not 1870; the French border towns were now heavily fortified. So if the Germans aren’t going through Belgium, then they are most likely opting for Molke the Ender’s plan; remain on the defensive in the west and go on the offensive in Russia, securing ground before entering into negotiations from a position of strength. That would have meant that it would have been France declaring war on Germany to support her ally Russia, and France going on the offensive. In those circumstances a much larger split in the Liberal party is likely, probably enough of a split to bring Asquith down. In that event Bonar Law becomes Prime Minister with Asquith and his supporters, including Churchill* and Grey, joining them in coalition but with a much smaller number of Liberals following them.


*Churchill not in cabinet though.
 
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The other poster was me, and Enver Pasha’s ambitions in this respect are well documented. And they remained the same throughout the war, leading to repeated Turkish offensives in the Caucasus and the bulk of Turkish resources being sent to that front even after the British had invaded Mesopotamia and Palestine.


The other members of the Troika had more modest ambitions, and the wider cabinet had been very reluctant to go to war at all, but it was Enver who decided matters.

I'm refering to recent Turkish scholarship here,

http://www.amazon.ca/The-Ottoman-Road-War-1914/dp/0521175259

It addresses Turkish policy using the Ottoman archives, arriving at the conclusion that the Ottoman decision for war was taken upon the conclusion that the Entente, and more specifically Russia, was intent upon the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and that the only chance for the Porte's 'normalization' of relations with Europe were through an alliance with Germany and victory over Russia. The decision for war was not Pasha's, it was not taken for any territorial motives, nor silly ideas of jihad dreamed up in Berlin, nor for other suggested myths popular in pop western scholarship, such as the seizure of a couple of dreadnoughts. The decision was taken on the cold calculation that if the Ottomans stalled their entry into the war for any longer, then Germany would terminate the alliance and all hope of using a German victory in WW1 to achieve 'normalization' of relations with Europe would be lost.
 
So someone is supplying your enemy with preferential tariff and you would do nothing about it? They did attack US convoy when they were still neutral this is no different.

Assuming Britain is neutral then Belgium has not been invaded by either side. If Belgium is neutral, then the French army is a helpless spectator to the war and Russia must be defeated. Whether this Russian defeat constitutes a quick war followed by a moderately imposing peace, or the harsh dismemberment of the Russian Empire at the hands of an increasingly large pack of bordering jackals - that could go either way. Whether this defeat is in 1915 or 1916, this is all immaterial. The point is that Russia is going down for the count no matter what.

Now, in the West, Britain has made a decision about the form of its neutrality. If Britain is selling both France and Germany weapons and is not interferring with German trade or naval movements, then British relations with Germany will be absolutely splendid and the tightest restrictions imaginable will be placed on German raiders and U-boats.

But if Britain is instead playing a double-game of weak intervention against Germany in the form of fake neutrality, then the situation is far more dangerous. This would come by the 2 August naval pledge to France, which amounted to a de facto blockade of Germany whereby the Royal Navy prevents German warships their right to access the high seas, and French warships run down German trade from behind the shield so provided. British policy could enhance this weak form of hostility by passing a law forbiding direct trade or loans to any power in Europe. Then, Britain trades with France (but not Germany) via the United States. All very easy.

In the case of a double-game, make no mistake on Germany's reaction. While Russia yet breaths, the Germans will meekly accept any form of humililation and duplicitious treatment the British care to deal out. But as soon as Russia is done, then the whole of 250 or 300 German and Austrian divisions will come at France straight through Belgium, and if Britain wants to send its tiny BEF to stand in face of that avalanche, then so be it. It would be war, and now that Britain has been foolish enough to allow Germany to dismember Russia, it will be a war on Germany's terms at Germany's leisure.
 
In otl Lg was reluctant to fight even after the invasion of Belgium. Asquith would not wreck his party for France and Russia

LG's conduct remains mysterious to this day. He may have been quite sincere in his reluctance, but his actions may also be that of a Trojan Horse - a member of the "France" party posing as a naysayer to help lead them into the PM's corner. Suffice it to say that, as an understatement, Lloyd George was capable of doing this.
 
The cabinet met again on August 2nd in the morning, by which time the news from St Petersburg and Berlin had been received but prior to German ultimatum to Belgium being delivered. At that meeting the cabinet was still divided; Asquith, Grey and Churchill were now all in favour of immediate intervention, Grey threatened to resign if the cabinet opted for a declaration of neutrality, but the rest of the cabinet were still opposed to declaring war if Belgium neutrality was not violated. But during the meeting Lloyd-George, the main figure in the Liberal Party after Asquith, passed Churchill a note that read ‘If you go softly on this you will get what you want’, which indicates that privately he had come around to Asquith and Churchill’s view, but needed a more subtle way of persuading the other reluctant members.

The significant event from this 2 August cabinet (taken before the German ultimatum to Belgium was delivered) was the naval pledge to France, which would have put Britain into a defacto state of war with Germany, and was probably not sustainable from a naval-security perspective. (That is to say, the 2 August pledge as written was probably too dangerous to the Royal Navy in practice to have been implemented).

During the cabinet meeting a message arrived from the Conservative Party leader, Bonar Law saying:

‘It would be fatal to the honour and security of the United Kingdom to hesitate in supporting France and Russia at the present juncture; and we offer our unhesitating support to the Government in any measures they may consider necessary for that object.’

However, that was all based on the assumption that Germany was about to declare war on France.



Nothing in the Law's unconditional note of support of France and Russia made any reference to Germany declaring war on France. By stating that Britain must support Russia, Law is basically indicating that whether France or Germany took the final act was not important, because Russia and Germany were at war.

But in practical terms, if Germany honoured Belgian neutrality, there really was no credible way to invade France quickly, 1914 was not 1870; the French border towns were now heavily fortified.

That held true for the reverse as well; if Germany honoured the 1839 Treaty there really was no credible way for France to invade Germany; the border was quite heavily fortified, hilly and forested, and France had little heavy artillery or doctrine to be assaulting such positions.

That would have meant that it would have been France declaring war on Germany to support her ally Russia, and France going on the offensive. In those circumstances a much larger split in the Liberal party is likely, probably enough of a split to bring Asquith down.



IMO, doubtful. With the DOW on Austria-Hungary, Grey took advantage of false French intelligence in order to state that this was the basis for the British DOW on Austria. Since France was not advancing into Germany prior to the historical British DOW on Austria-Hungary, the historical timeline exists to state with confidence that the same methods of French (false) accusations against Austria would be employed against Germany, thereby preserving cabinet unity for a DOW against Germany that would, only much later when it no longer mattered, be shown to have been incorrect.
 
You're aware that they were rather soundly defeated OTL, right? And that with no genuine 'western front' ever opening, both Germany, Austria and the Turks can bring all guns to bear on the Tsar?


I thought the post indicated a removal from the war in 1914, instead of the 3 years it will actually take.

All guns minus the half their army the germans would actually have to keep in the west to fight the French, and the half their army the AH lost in 1914.

Russia on defense from the beginning is a bitch.
 
I thought the post indicated a removal from the war in 1914, instead of the 3 years it will actually take.

All guns minus the half their army the germans would actually have to keep in the west to fight the French, and the half their army the AH lost in 1914.

Russia on defense from the beginning is a bitch.

The Germans required few forces to protect their common border with France. Belgian neutrality would be the death knell for Russia.
 

Cook

Banned
The significant event from this 2 August cabinet (taken before the German ultimatum to Belgium was delivered) was the naval pledge to France, which would have put Britain into a defacto state of war with Germany, and was probably not sustainable from a naval-security perspective. (That is to say, the 2 August pledge as written was probably too dangerous to the Royal Navy in practice to have been implemented).
The pledge was to protect the northern French coast, and the northern French coast is the English Channel, the artery through which the bulk of Britain’s maritime commerce travelled; there was never any possibility of the British permitting the German fleet a free run there. Since the British proceeded to defend the channel for the next four years, it is safe to say it was not unsustainable.
Nothing in the Law's unconditional note of support of France and Russia made any reference to Germany declaring war on France.
If you had actually read what I wrote, you would see that I was referring to the situation within the British Liberal Party and the extent of rebellion in the backbench, which would almost certainly have changed if the French had declared war on Germany in support of Russia rather than if Germany had declared war on France.
With the DOW on Austria-Hungary...
The British declaration of war on Austria-Hungary tells you nothing with regard to the debate about going to war, it was a follow on declaration of war against Germany’s ally; it was not conceivable way that Britain could have gone to war against Germany but not Austria-Hungary, nor would it have been practicable.

The fact remains, there were only two possible outcomes for the British in August 1914, either the Liberals remain solid and Britain goes to war with Asquith as prime minister, or the Liberals split and Britain goes to war with Law as prime minister. Either way, Britain was going to war.
 
ok, britain might be in the war no matter what to protect their 1000 years hereditary enemy and the dememocratic pacifists of russia from britains largest trade partner :)rolleyes:), but without belgium, or worse, a french invasion of belgium, it's going to be harder to sell it to the USA to get unsecured loans to buy things like ammo for artillery and fuel for the blockade (might not be needed as there a no large battles in the west, maybe).

if germany goes east, romania doesnt enter the war. italy still would enter, but there are plenty CP reserves to send into italy.

if russia drops the towel fast enough the blockade becomes meaningless as they get everything they need from russian reparations. next would be pushing italy out of the war, which shouldnt be too hard - their fortifications and army were a joke. 1914 is not the time of unconditional surrenders.
 
ok, britain might be in the war no matter what to protect their 1000 years hereditary enemy and the dememocratic pacifists of russia from britains largest trade partner :)rolleyes:), but without belgium, or worse, a french invasion of belgium, it's going to be harder to sell it to the USA to get unsecured loans to buy things like ammo for artillery and fuel for the blockade (might not be needed as there a no large battles in the west, maybe).

The facts on the ground in Belgium would not impact US policy on selling war materials to the Entente, because the United States did not impede sales to Germany on that basis. It was Entente sea control which prevented direct US trade with the Central Powers.

A French invasion of Belgium, if shown to be necessary, would have taken place only in the sparsely populated Ardennes, hardly of a nature to raise the hackles of the United States in a fashion analogous to the brutal German invasion of the whole country.
 
The pledge was to protect the northern French coast, and the northern French coast is the English Channel, the artery through which the bulk of Britain’s maritime commerce travelled; there was never any possibility of the British permitting the German fleet a free run there.

The pledge is contained in BD no. 487 and states,

"I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.”


The pledge states that the British agreed to protect the French "coast" and shipping from German warships. Note that French shippingcould be found far from French coasts. Also, the term, "northern" coast is not correct. The pledge applies to all of France's coasts, that is, the southern and western ones as well. This is drawn from the fact that the original used the pluralised form.


In no. 143 of the French Yellow Book, Cambon states Grey further clarifying as follows,


‘Sir Edward Grey explained to me that the notion of` an operation by way of the North Sea implied protection against a demonstration in the Atlantic Ocean.’

This eliminates the suggestion that the British were pledging only protection in the English Channel. Grey stated to Cambon that German warships attempting to "demonstrate" via the Atlantic Ocean would also be destroyed.


Since the British proceeded to defend the channel for the next four years, it is safe to say it was not unsustainable.

I said the pledge was probably too dangerous to the security of the British navy to implement as written. The specific problem was that the war anchorage of the Grand Fleet was Scapa Flow, and this was virtually undefended against any form of fleet attack in August 1914. The British pledge stated only German warships would be intercepted, meaning that German merchant vessels could be used as scouts in the North Sea to establish RN patrol patterns. Since Britain would otherwise remain at peace with Germany, German spies in the UK would rapidly locate the anchorage of the Grand Fleet and German merchant vessels could act as scouts to allow the High Seas Fleet to sortie to Scotland around RN patrols and catch the Grand Fleet at anchorage.

If you had actually read what I wrote, you would see that I was referring to the situation within the British Liberal Party and the extent of rebellion in the backbench, which would almost certainly have changed if the French had declared war on Germany in support of Russia rather than if Germany had declared war on France.

I was not referring to Liberal backbenchers. I was referring to the Conservative pledge of support of Britain’s allies which stated, “and Russia”. The inclusion of Russia in the Conservative letter meant that it mattered not to the Conservatives which of France or Germany actually took the step of declaring war, because Russia and Germany were already at war.

The British declaration of war on Austria-Hungary tells you nothing with regard to the debate about going to war, it was a follow on declaration of war against Germany’s ally; it was not conceivable way that Britain could have gone to war against Germany but not Austria-Hungary, nor would it have been practicable.

The British method of declaring war on Austria was by way of the use of false information supplied by France. That is a historical fact. Therefore, I contend that such a method could have been used against Germany, if it were proven necessary to do so.

The fact remains, there were only two possible outcomes for the British in August 1914, either the Liberals remain solid and Britain goes to war with Asquith as prime minister, or the Liberals split and Britain goes to war with Law as prime minister. Either way, Britain was going to war.


There was the possibility of a coalition government under Asquith's leadership as well.

My original point was that the assumption of the Liberal government falling does not take into account the ability of the French to supply false information on German troop movements, as it historically supplied false information on Austrian troop movements.

 
The Germans required few forces to protect their common border with France.

You know the French had 3 million men in the field in 1914 right? If you mean 2 million or so by few, then you would be right.

Belgian neutrality would be the death knell for Russia.
I never said it wouldn't be, only that it won't be a giant prancing cakewalk by germanic superheroes.
 

Germaniac

Donor
If Germany focuses specifically on russia the Russians have a short opportunity to go on the offensive, which they will because that is there policy(not wanting a repeat of Napoleon's invasion). They will likely follow the same plan however this time it won't just be a corp coming from the west, but several full armies. The German army will break the Russians early and will likely abandon Poland much earlier. Russia sues for terms as soon as the initial french attacks on Germany are repulsed with heavy casualties. Russia will agree to Poland's independence, as a puppet of Germany and possibly Finland. Austria will get some border revisions as will the ottomans.

Now Germany has to transfer its forces west. At this time they will probably bet that Britain won't declare war ans even if they do Germany is no longer as effected by the blockade. Germany invades across Belgium and with the french army focused on the offensive in a-l the Germans are able to inflict heavier losses in men material and territory. By the time any bef arrives it will be too late Germany will capture the channel ports and they will be trapped. Germany agrees to border adjustments taking all of a-l and Belgium as a puppet state. Britain now has no choice but to accept or face a Napoleonic situation again... this time with no allies
 
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