WW1 Western front reversed - France invades Belgium

[Perkeo]

I disagree with this. The whole thrust of British foreign policy from 1902-odd onwards until the outbreak of war was to draw closer to France and later Russia in order to contain Germany. They resolved virtually all their territorial differences with the two in the decade until 1914 - see for example the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907 delineating various spheres of influence in Persia. By 1914 Britain had nothing to worry about with regards to France and Russia. The recurring nightmare of British policy-makers was German control of the Channel ports, permitting a surprise invasion. A French defeat would not have sat well with the British Government at all - in fact it would probably engender a similar reaction to the fall of France in 1940 in the USA.

Both Germany's economic strenght and its below grade diplomaticy would have dampened the British enthusiasm to join the CP's, but not doing so would have seriously compromised some of Britain's key strategic interests, and nations tend to act upon interests, not sympathy.

Britain doesn't want German hegemony on the continent or German control of the channel ports, but neither do they want to serve either on a silver plate to France. The British Empire leaned towards France and against Germany because they correctly evaluated Germany as the greater thread to their strategic interests. That doesn't mean they would still stick to France when they were proven wrong.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

The PoD is not there not being a Schlieffen plan to begin with, but a different outcome to a historical conversation between Willhelm II and Motlke on August 1st 1914, assuming a better informed Kaiser.

That was an apocryphal story spread after the war. Basically it was trying to absolve the Kaiser of what happened but like Ludendorff's 'stabbed in the back' myth, it has not basis in reality. The Kaiser was up on the plan before the war and was on board. Moltke didn't "misinform" him at all about not being able to stop the war in the West, because the Kaiser wasn't opposed to it. Besides, ACTUALLY stopping mobilization would have cost German several more days in rewritting time tables. It would have been a disaster and everyone realized that, which is why no one was opposed to the war with France after the trains started to roll.

Moltke the Senior realised that the period of decisive battles was past, that the German Empire could not count on a rapid victory and would have to rely on securing a good defensive position on the Franco German border and in Russia and entering into negotiations.

Schleiffen believed that a decisive victory was still possible, even though the flaws in his plan were becoming visible before he’d retired.

Moltke the Younger just pretended the flaws in the plan didn’t exist and paid no attention to the consequences of entering Belgium and Britain entering the war.

Without the Schleiffen Plan Germany would not have faced the urgency at the start of August 1914 to declare war and defeat France once Russia started mobilising, more time would have been available for diplomacy to resolve things or at least contain them to the Balkans and prevent a general European war.

This neglects the differences between the plans: the elder Moltke's plan was DEFENSIVE solely and based on the idea that France and Russia attack Germany first unprovoked and Germany needs time to hold out and negotiate a peace deal. Schlieffen and Moltke's plan was OFFENSIVE and was predicated on the idea that Germany starts the war for political reasons. So you see the two plans were not even remotely related in the very most basic conception. The war was not caused by the Schlieffen plan being Germany's only option, rather it was the political thought that decided military action was the only political option open to Germany to solve her international and domestic problems. The problem you seem to be having is understanding Germany decided on war just like Austria and it was a function of politics, not military ideas that caused it. Germany wouldn't turn east and negotiate, because she needed to beat her enemies in quick battles and DICTATE the new peace and balance of power. THAT was the goal of 1914, NOT defending against aggressive acts by the Entente, who were all trying to avert war, especially Britain.

 

[Perkeo]

This neglects the differences between the plans: the elder Moltke's plan was DEFENSIVE solely and based on the idea that France and Russia attack Germany first unprovoked and Germany needs time to hold out and negotiate a peace deal. Schlieffen and Moltke's plan was OFFENSIVE and was predicated on the idea that Germany starts the war for political reasons. So you see the two plans were not even remotely related in the very most basic conception.

But that's the whole point: The Germans made a strategic mistake by chosing offense over defense.

The war was not caused by the Schlieffen plan being Germany's only option, rather it was the political thought that decided military action was the only political option open to Germany to solve her international and domestic problems. The problem you seem to be having is understanding Germany decided on war just like Austria and it was a function of politics, not military ideas that caused it. Germany wouldn't turn east and negotiate, because she needed to beat her enemies in quick battles and DICTATE the new peace and balance of power. THAT was the goal of 1914, NOT defending against aggressive acts by the Entente, who were all trying to avert war, especially Britain.

That's one of the issues where you ask four people and get at least five opinions. For every side you can find historians who claim that they deliberately chose war over peace and other historians who claim they tried everything to preserve peace. Neither of them can look into the heads of the nation's leaders.

But declaring war on Russia in response of a Russian DoW on Austria was pretty much unavoidable. Austria was not going to back down, and neither was Russia. And abandoning Austria wasn't an option either.

Even though I agree that Germany wouldn't consider abandoning Austria, it is a hell of a scenaro: Let AH run into its doom and then annex the German speaking parts. All they need is a reason to put the blame on Franz Joseph I.

It's quite an irony that the only party that held territory that Germany might want to conquer was Germany's only true ally.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

But that's the whole point: The Germans made a strategic mistake by chosing offense over defense..

There is no point to starting a war and then sitting on the defensive while negotiating for peace.

That's one of the issues where you ask four people and get at least five opinions. For every side you can find historians who claim that they deliberately chose war over peace and other historians who claim they tried everything to preserve peace. Neither of them can look into the heads of the nation's leaders..

No, the points are pretty clear. Germany declared war on Russia and then France. Everyone was trying to get Austria and Germany to relax and negotiate, but neither listened. In fact, it wasn't until Austria declared war on Serbia, against the direct threat of Russia, that Russia ordered mobilization. Germany gave Austria the blank check long before Austria was fixed on war. Austria was checking her options and Germany gave her complete support up to war, which is ultimately what both Germany and Austria wanted from the get go.

Even though I agree that Germany wouldn't consider abandoning Austria, it is a hell of a scenaro: Let AH run into its doom and then annex the German speaking parts. All they need is a reason to put the blame on Franz Joseph I.

It's quite an irony that the only party that held territory that Germany might want to conquer was Germany's only true ally.

NO. Germany wanted no part of Austria because it was Catholic. It would detract from the power of the Protestant Prussians and add more socialists in Vienna. That was the last thing the monarchy in Germany wanted. It fact, it was more interested in maintaining an ally than annexing more Germans into the Reich.

Also it was known that Austria would do NOTHING without Germany's support, because her military was too weak to take on Russia alone. The threat of Russian belligerence was too much to gamble on for the Austrians, which is why they asked for German support if they went to war over Serbia. They got the affirmative and continued drafting the ultimatum to Serbia. Without that they would not have proceeded.

 

[Uriel]

NO. Germany wanted no part of Austria because it was Catholic.

A certain group of German politicans thought that way. Although it was more fear to get into endless ethnic troubles (if they take it all) or leave the Balkans to Russia (if they take to few).

But there was hardly a clear line on this.

 

[I Blame Communism]

As usual, I agree with Wiking.

To the rather far-fetched idea that Britain would declare war on France, rather than simply finding ourselves stuck: never overestimate my country's commitment to treaty obligations. Seriously, we invaded Greece and overthrew their government just like that. We weren't playing international policeman, we were playing the same great-power game as everybody else.

And why does everybody always bring up Japan? Japan had a binding alliance with Britain, and what's more they did well out of the war, using the distraction of the European economies and diplomacy to expand their markets and expand their influence in China. What do they get from jeopardising their most important relationship and marching into MMBS (Miles and Miles of Bloody Siberia, as it is technically known by cartographers)?

So, suppose the Kaiser had known this and forced von Moltke to comply or resign?

I'd note that this kind of PoD ("X historical figure had knowledge nobody could have had at the time") necessarily makes this a hypothetical. Nothing wrong with hypotheticals, but I object to the serious use of such PoDs, which you see rather a lot.

(German troops threatening the Channel ports was a determining issue as far as I've understood).

That's simplifying a great deal. British strategic policy had moved on from the sailing age (the admiralty had officially ceased to be bothered about the Turkish Straits in 1903, for instance), and in the steam age (the age in which a fleet can reliable sail out and intercept another one) it's not the proximity of the ports that matters as much as the ability of a rival industrial power to build a mighty fleet. Germany was a threat in a way that France could no longer be, and Belgium was something in the nature of a pretext.

Without Belgium, Britain might well enter the war later, with more controversy within the cabinet; that depends on how the war goes. But certainly we will be more-or-less friendly to the Entente.

The German strategy was based, in fact, on the idea that since they were challenging our vital interests anyway, they might as well go all the way.

So suppose now it's spring 1916 - Britain is still neutral, as is Italy (not so eager to join the entente without Britain), half a dozen great French offensives against Alsace Lorraine have smashed themselves to pieces against the German trenches, and Russia is reeling on the brink of total defeat, it's western front collapsing and the Turks swarming all over the Caucaus.

Now, this is the bit of the premise I doubt. We have a really caricature picture of some aspects of the war, so:

1) The western front in 1914 was a damn near thing, and that was with approximately equal forces. Taking four German armies away is going to put the Germans in a tricky situation, even if they are standing on the defensive. The French did make gains in Alsace in 1914, and that was with considerable forces and reserves tied up in the battle that developed from the Belgian thrust. The full French army against about the same German forces in Alsace and Lorraine?

Remember, every step the French advance is cutting into one of Germany's plum industrial zones. The Germans, meanwhile, have not captured the enormously important industrial agglomeration of Wallonia, nor Brie, the loss of which crippled French production. The French are couple of million military-age males and one-and-a-half of Europe's prime industrial zones in the black; the Germans have lost Wallonia, they've lost Brie, and they're on the back foot in Alsace.

The French are going to bleed something awful, but this is not a one-sided contest.

2) So the Germans deploy much greater forces in Russia and adopt an attacking strategy? This presumably means that the ammunition crunch comes along earlier and the Russians have to start abandoning Galicia and their bit of Poland earlier - and then what? It didn't stop them in 1915. They'll do what they did IOTL: keep withdrawing and keep mobilising larger and larger armies until their social structure finally gives out. If you asked the tsar in late 1916, Russia wasn't losing. Russia didn't suffer "total defeat", it suffered implosion.

And is that collapse going to come any earlier? Much of Russia's appalling casualties were the fault of repeated rash offensives. Forced onto the defensive, Russia may actually be making better use of its own manpower. You can't force a decisive battle on a country the size of Russia; in that much German strategy was sound.

What do you think?

I think the French would only pull such a stunt if they had sounded us out first, and given our probably response, I think the French wouldn't pull such a stunt.

 

[I Blame Communism]

Actually, as worried as Britain was about German naval pretensions, it was equally worried about the colonial aspirations of France and Russia.

What, the colonial aspirations of France that we sat on in 1898 and the colonial aspirations of Russia that were checked by a Mere Asiatic Race rolleyes in 1905?

The British nightmare at the time was Russia invading India while France attacks in Africa.

What were the French going to attack, the Gambia? The Scramble was over and where there was a serious clash of interests, the valley of the Nile, the French had been brushed aside.

Now, Anglo-Russian relations could be pretty tense - the deal over Persia was basically a truce, and we were both constantly scheming to get around it - but the Indian Army planned an active forward defense of Afghanistan, which isn't exactly the best route of invasion in the world. The Russian threat to India was always overblown by our yellow press.

As I've said, in 1903 it was concluded that the straits didn't matter except symbolically. Is this a country mortally afraid of Russia, or merely one habitually suspicious?

I imagine a bloody French nose and a crippled Russia would actually not have sat too badly in Whitehall - as long as the Germans do not grow too powerful as a result.

Old phrase about cakes and eating...

By allowing Lenin a trip from Switzerland to Russia, like they did IOTL.

An effect, not a cause. By the time Lenin arrived, the Russian army was already starting to unwind. It did that gradually from February onwards.

The PoD is August 1st, 1914, when the Kaiser historically asked Moltke to stand on the defensive in the west and march east instead, because he was anxious about war with Britain. Moltke said it could not be done, and the Kaiser believed him. But assume he had talked with the chief of Military transport Gen. von Baad, who later proved it was perfectly feasible?

Then the poor man would have had to do a study that took him years in days, as the trains were a-rolling?

 

[Xgentis]

I completely agree with I Blame Communism.

 

[Deleted member 9338]

With a neutral Great Britain, it is possible that they do not seize the two Turkish battleships. And therefore not forcing the Ottoman Empire into the Central Powers.

Also you now have a SMS Goeben in the Mediterranean vrs only facing the French Navy.

 

[NHBL]

A few thoughts...

If Britain isn't brought into the war for a fewmonths, it may have bigger problems close to home: Armed rebellion. Home Rule for Ireland would have gone into effect, and the "Loyalists" had promised to fight against Britain for their right to remain part of the Empire. There's a possibility (not sure how much of one) that the British army would have been divided, and might have refused to enforce home rule. BIG mess really fast.

 

[Super Parker Brothers]

Is it true about the Germans using Turkish flags to attack Entente ships, which then caused the Entente to attack real Turkish vessels?

 

[Monty Burns]

Excuse me if this is a stupid question, but this France-into-Belgium thing comes again and again and I never understood the basic idea behind it:

Germany going through Belgium into France opens a new frontline several hundred miles long.

France going though Belgium opens an additional front of 60 miles. Add Luxemburg to that and you get 120 miles. In the Eifel/in the Ardennes - not necessarily good territory to stage an fast movement.

So, to go to my question: France taking a hold of Belgium industry as I-blame-communism mentions I can understand. But France invading Belgium with the goal to simplify a trust into the Ruhr, but NOT attacking the Dutch as well, is this reasonable at all?

Wouldn't the Dutch expect a thrust to the Ruhr the very moment the French enter Belgium and in turn join the Germans for help?

 

[Chengar Qordath]

Is it true about the Germans using Turkish flags to attack Entente ships, which then caused the Entente to attack real Turkish vessels?

Never heard of anything like that, unless you're referring to the whole Goeben and Breslau affair, but that was not exactly the sort of incident you're describing.

 

[David S Poepoe]

Is it true about the Germans using Turkish flags to attack Entente ships, which then caused the Entente to attack real Turkish vessels?

The Ottomans were apparently right on the edge of declaring war and the bombardment of Russian territory IIRC by the Goeben just forced them into the Central Powers camp - which they practically were in. Its entirely likely that Enver Pasha knew about it, but the Ottoman Government as a whole had to be forced into action.