WW1 Rehashed Differently: The Best Laid Plans

We've been introduced just recently to a member of the German General Staff who thought that preparing for a long war was the smart thing to do, and we've also seen P's excellent timeline that deals with a better-prepared French military.

What would the Great War have looked like if every nation that engaged in it was as well-prepared as it could have feasibly been? Understanding that an answer of "not fighting" is not an answer to my question, what would WW1 have looked like if all of the major combatants had a fairly decent grip on what could happen, and modified their plans as a result?

- Germany attacks Russia first, has defensive works and/or a limited offensive into France, and doesn't go into Belgium (unless you have a plausible reason for them to do so that doesn't involve a Schlieffen-level offensive).

-France is better-prepared, has decent artillery, and is prepared to thwart any German move into Belgium. A German invasion will be met with a quick advance into Belgium if at all diplomatically/militarily possible.

-Russia...doesn't suck as much?

-Austria-Hungary is not led by Conrad on any front? Well-planned and executed invasion of Serbia that subdues the Serbs quickly, while keeping the Russian front stable?

-Italy (assuming they join the Allies) moves quickly to secure Trieste (as they could have in OTL, according to Isonzo, nabs a bit of the Trentino and holds tight (unless there is another feasible route of advance against the Hapsburgs)?

-Britain (if involved) uses its troops intelligently: any Dardanelles-style attacks are well-planned and executed? Quick realization that bite-and-hold attacks work best (if engaged on Western Front)?

-The Ottoman Empire (if involved) has better organized and equipped troops?

I'm sure I'm adding stuff in there that doesn't make sense, or missing stuff that could otherwise shed light on the situation. What do you all think?
 

Susano

Banned
Well, I think the UK wouldve entered teh war anyways, but with Germany not violating Belgish neutrality later, which does buy the Central Powers some time...

Of course the problem is that IOTL the main faults with all plans was that the did not take into account what amount of defenses was needed. So if we change that, now all nations will have defensive plans. At least the first year of the war could be rather boring, at least on the western front, heh.

The problem with Italy is that it entered on the Allied side due to politcial manouvers, which took time. I think thats the problem, and the dictate of politics would remain even with competent and well-executed plans...
 
Well, I think the UK wouldve entered teh war anyways, but with Germany not violating Belgish neutrality later, which does buy the Central Powers some time...

Of course the problem is that IOTL the main faults with all plans was that the did not take into account what amount of defenses was needed. So if we change that, now all nations will have defensive plans. At least the first year of the war could be rather boring, at least on the western front, heh.

The problem with Italy is that it entered on the Allied side due to politcial manouvers, which took time. I think thats the problem, and the dictate of politics would remain even with competent and well-executed plans...

Oh yes, I realize that. I'm not suggesting that everything will be perfect for everyone, I'm just curious how people think things might have turned out if at least the militaries had (mostly) correct assumptions at the beginning of the war.
 

maverick

Banned
This is problematic...

If France expects a German invasion of Belgium but Germany invades Poland instead...

This leads France to built fortresses in northern France for an invasion that will not come...

Also, let's say that they get rid off the Rouge Pantaloons and other 1870s memorabilia...

Russia would need a unified command; for instance, when the Brusilov offensive was launched in 1916, the secondary attacks asked by Brusilov against the Germans in the Baltic provinces and Poland did not come because the other generals didn't really like Brusilov...

The Ottoman empire needs to stay out of the war or just attack Russia and never ever the British empire...remember the've been in war since 1911 (War against Italy, First and Second Balkans war)

And the only purpose the Italian army has ever served was to make the French army look good in comparison...
 

MrP

Banned
Best for everyone? Some thoughts for now.

General stuff (mostly hindsight or based on army composition in '17/'18):
  • Better infantry doctrine throughout army (e.g. Rommel's unit was very good, but the Kindermord demonstrates this was not the case throughout the army)
  • more medium and heavy artillery
  • trench mortars
  • more machine guns (and better ones where the OTL one sucks)
  • more grenades/rifle grenades
  • LMGs or SMGs at section (squad) level
  • light tanks and heavy tanks (the latter useful only during trench fighting, as they break down too much for open warfare)
  • better training for NCOs and platoon/company officers
  • more peacetime manoeuvres to test command system, strategy and tactics
  • better communication between infantry and supporting artillery
  • more high explosive shells for artillery to cut wire more easily
  • pre-war stockpiling of ammunition based on consumption rates seen in Russo-Japanese War
  • more advanced aeroplanes
  • Pre-war analysis of which jobs are strategically important to the conduct of a long war

France:
  • earlier devolution of power from government to army
  • sensible strategic plan that involves holding N France's strategic reserves
  • better fleet (requires slower turnover in French governments)

Germany:
  • better communication between government and military
  • at least two strategic plans, allowing for east or west deployment
  • either dump the HSF, reduce it amap or use it

Britain/Empire:
  • acceptance of the necessity of a mass army
  • convoy system

A-H:
  • armoured cars for scouting (A-H cavalry was exhausted by the demands of scouting at the war's opening)
  • proper staff talks with Germany to arrive at a real strategic plan for the east
  • faster initial strike on Serbia
 
Hmm.

Germans figure out in 1912 that challenging the Royal Navy is stupid, and sign the accord that Lord Haldane presents in Berlin. Britain now has a treaty commitment to "at least a benevolent neutrality" to Germany in any war where Germany "cannot be said to be the aggressor". Throw that on top of taking a defensive stand in the West instead of invading Belgium, and the British have a much harder time going to war at all.

France butts its head on the German defensive line in the west, while in the east, Russia can't help but fall back and Serbia gets crushed, even with everyone operating at maximum effectiveness. As the winter begins, Serbia is conquered, Congress Poland (roughly) is in the hands of the Central Powers, France is only a few miles into Alsace-Lorraine, and Britain isn't at war yet.

So, the Central Powers, wise enough to get out while costs have been low and victories are modest enough that the British are still neutral, approach Britain about a 19th Century-style Congress. The British wish Germany had taken a beating, sure, but they didn't, and it looks like a reasonable way to limit German gains. France and Russia don't have much choice but to go along with the British.

At the Congress of London, France cedes some colonies to Germany (maybe Morocco?). Serbia is split between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria (Russia is highly resistant to A-H annexing all of it, and A-H doesn't want any independent Serbia to exist). Congress Poland gets independence from Russia under King Karol (Archduke Charles Stephen of Austria-Teschen). Montenegro is absorbed by A-H.

France has failed in its quest for revenge, Germany now has a buffer state between itself and Russia, and Austria has won dominance of the Balkans. Russia undergoes another 1905-like spasm of revolution, which is put down.

Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire remain teetering, and disentigration in one of them will likely serve as the cause of the next war in somewhere between 5 and 20 years.
 
The Ottoman Empire did only attack Russia - the British immediately declared war.

This is problematic...

If France expects a German invasion of Belgium but Germany invades Poland instead...

This leads France to built fortresses in northern France for an invasion that will not come...

Also, let's say that they get rid off the Rouge Pantaloons and other 1870s memorabilia...

Russia would need a unified command; for instance, when the Brusilov offensive was launched in 1916, the secondary attacks asked by Brusilov against the Germans in the Baltic provinces and Poland did not come because the other generals didn't really like Brusilov...

The Ottoman empire needs to stay out of the war or just attack Russia and never ever the British empire...remember the've been in war since 1911 (War against Italy, First and Second Balkans war)

And the only purpose the Italian army has ever served was to make the French army look good in comparison...
 
-The Ottoman Empire (if involved) has better organized and equipped troops?

The Ottomans arguably had the best organized troops of any army at the beginning of WWI. Equipment was pretty good as well. They did after all beat the British until 1917.

The problem with the Ottoman army was a lack of NCOs and junior officers; that was not a problem easily solved, and that wouldn't be possible in just a couple of years. The other problem was lack of industrial infrastructure, another problem that couldn't be solved quickly - by the later part of the war, basics like barbed wire and even sandbags were not available. The final problem was a small population and a huge and dispersed territory, again not a problem that could be solved.

However, if it had been clear that the war would be really long, the Ottomans could have waited until the army had been fully rebuilt and the Baghdad RR completed. That would have allowed them to be far more effective, say spring 1915 for the army, probably 1916-17 for the Baghdad RR.
 
Best for everyone? Some thoughts for now.

General stuff (mostly hindsight or based on army composition in '17/'18):
  • Better infantry doctrine throughout army (e.g. Rommel's unit was very good, but the Kindermord demonstrates this was not the case throughout the army)
  • more medium and heavy artillery
  • trench mortars
  • more machine guns (and better ones where the OTL one sucks)
  • more grenades/rifle grenades
  • LMGs or SMGs at section (squad) level
  • light tanks and heavy tanks (the latter useful only during trench fighting, as they break down too much for open warfare)
  • better training for NCOs and platoon/company officers
  • more peacetime manoeuvres to test command system, strategy and tactics
  • better communication between infantry and supporting artillery
  • more high explosive shells for artillery to cut wire more easily
  • pre-war stockpiling of ammunition based on consumption rates seen in Russo-Japanese War
  • more advanced aeroplanes
  • Pre-war analysis of which jobs are strategically important to the conduct of a long war

These are the most generic ways of helping out the countries involved, but some of them could be the hardest to achieve.

How would you go about achieving these to the best of the countries' involved abilities, P?
France:
  • earlier devolution of power from government to army
  • sensible strategic plan that involves holding N France's strategic reserves
  • better fleet (requires slower turnover in French governments)

Perhaps no "Cult of the Offensive" could help for #2 (and maybe #1?), and these could both be helped by one possibility for #3, which is a consistently strong Radical government in France for 1905-1914? It appears the Radicals did pretty well in that period, and the Radical Doumer came close to achieving the Presidency in 1906. That way you could (at least, as I understand it, someone please come along to correct me!) have a completely Radical government from 1906 to 1913. Even better if you get a Radical to win in 1913, but by that point you've given the army and navy seven years of consistent budgets.

Germany:
  • better communication between government and military
  • at least two strategic plans, allowing for east or west deployment
  • either dump the HSF, reduce it amap or use it

Not sure how you would achieve #1, but perhaps keeping Bernhard von Bulow as chancellor would help, seeing as he had at least served in the army, and seems to have been on relatively good terms with the Kaiser, as well as being willing to say "no" to him?

#2 is a staff-issue, going about it might be tricky, though.

#3 is up in the air. For ease (and desire for capital ship actions), it might be easier to pick the "use it" option. How would that be different from the case in OTL, P?

Britain/Empire:
  • acceptance of the necessity of a mass army
  • convoy system

#2 seems to be a case of someone figuring it out earlier than in OTL, or was the convoy system really just that unheard of in 1914?

No idea for #1...any help on this?

A-H:
  • armoured cars for scouting (A-H cavalry was exhausted by the demands of scouting at the war's opening)
  • proper staff talks with Germany to arrive at a real strategic plan for the east
  • faster initial strike on Serbia

#1 shouldn't be too hard: wasn't the non-acceptance of armored cars in OTL due to some fluke like the KuK not liking the ruckus they made?

#2 and #3 require better cooperation with Germany. Conrad von Hotzendorf isn't in overall command, but perhaps he is arrayed against the Serbs (his nemeses) and is given more troops with which to conduct his personal vendetta. Who is in charge of the Austrian General Staff instead of Conrad? If we have a range of options, who is going to work with the Germans best? What is their plan in the East going to be, if the Germans intend to strike East while the Austro-Hungarians commit more troops to the Serbian front?
 
#1 shouldn't be too hard: wasn't the non-acceptance of armored cars in OTL due to some fluke like the KuK not liking the ruckus they made?
They scared his horses. He didn't quite get the logical conclusion ("hey, this might work against enemy horses too"). so the Austro-Daimler Panzerwagen went nowhere.
 

MrP

Banned
These are the most generic ways of helping out the countries involved, but some of them could be the hardest to achieve.

How would you go about achieving these to the best of the countries' involved abilities, P?

Infantry doctrine requires war experience by someone or other. Making it consistent requires a powerful training inspectorate. The British had different training systems all over the shop until Maxse turned up, for instance. So I'd say the best time to institute it is during Haldane's reorganisation of the army, with someone pointing out that in the event of a war Britain will have to scale up to a "million man army". Germany has a reasonable system, IIRC, but needs it to be more rigorously enforced, so that means cutting back on the power of battalion commanders, I suspect, and enforcing a top down system of training. France I need to do more reading on; ditto everyone else.

Someone needs to learn the lessons of the R-J War and really start churning medium and heavy artillery out. The French and British are especially weak here. The French because the 75 manufacturers are greedy and the British because they have a tiny army. Someone needs to get the RGA (Royal Garrison Artillery) to point out that in the event of a trench war, their mathematical and siege skills will be at a premium. Again, Haldane's tenure is probably easiest, although Boer War reforms are possibly also a good time, what with "Long Tom" and so on still in the public consciousness.

Trench mortars aren't a requirement for the Germans, who already have them, but they're essential for the British and French, who otherwise have to improvise sub-standard kit. Again, the R-J War seems a good occasion to have someone realise that infantry effectiveness will be enhanced if they have organic mini-artillery.

The same goes for machine guns. They are useful both defensively and offensively, since they can deny ground and perform barrages to cover an advance. They are ammunition hungry, and this will upset logistics types, but doubling their numbers will result in a very effective infantry.

Grenades and Rifle Grenades are a bit trickier, so I'm going to say Boer War or R-J War again, probably the latter. IOTL everyone assumed they were only for siege warfare, so the Germans stuck them in fortresses, and the British issued them to the Royal Engineers, which is useless to the infantry, really. However, the Germans had huge stockpiles they were able to redistribute swiftly. If the British have more paranoia about invasion, they could stockpile some in new "Martello Towers" or somesuch, and then send them out once the situation becomes clear.

LMGs or SMGs at low level requires both recognition that the RoF of a rifle is too low for close combat and acceptance that a section commander can be trusted with the responsibility of such a weapon. The Germans have a very easy time of this, since their NCO structure was very rigorous.

Light tanks, heavy ones and armoured cars can all sit in the same bracket. Although they sit in different spots both tactically and strategically. ACs are better for scouting and you can probably work light tanks into this, too, as up-armoured ACs. Heavy tanks mean one assumes any penetration of enemy lines will be very hard work, and so can either be up-armoured light tanks or completely new designs produced as infantry support weapons. Again, R-J War as the inspiration.

Better training for NCOs and low level officers means a recognition that the war will be low level. Tie this into increasing organic support for battalions and you've got a winner.

Even in countries with annual manoeuvres, they were too frequently rendered frivolous by interfering monarchs and the like. FF demanded a grand cavalry charge during the AH manoeuvres of '12, IIRC, and the Kaiser forever messed about with the German ones. The British manoeuvres of '12 are an example of a different problem: that while one army had a full peacetime staff (Aldershot), Grierson's chaps were a scratch formation. That should have showed the unreasonable nature of the situation, but Grierson succeeded despite the obstacles, and the problem was obscured. The French have similar problems in that their army/corps level headquarters are in their infancy compared to the Germans. That's because of governmental insecurity about the army's loyalty. Fix that sooner and there's more time to fix French problems.

Better communication between infantry and artillery means lots of telephone wire, telegraph poles, flares, semaphore, runners and so on. I honestly don't know how to put this in place pre-war. I suppose more evidence of exposed forward artillery being shot up in by infantry in a recent war, but even that might just lead to artillery being withdrawn to division command, further complicating things. I suspect the French have a fairly simple way around this, as they can claim it's a return to Napoleon's "battalion guns", and just attach the guns directly, then realise the dangers of them being up front simply by observation during exercises, and start working out communications systems pre-war.

Demands an awareness that there will be huge trench battles. There were lots of shells pre-war, but everyone stockpiled shrapnel, which was no use if it buried itself in mud. HiEx will pulverise everything. Again R-J War lessons is the way to go here. Sheer numbers of shells requires Kitchener types who recognise the war will be long. The Russians did realise they needed more shells, but IIRC they simply couldn't afford to bring the army up to that level of preparedness in peace, so they're perhaps a bit shafted.

More advanced aeroplanes simply means more chaps throwing money at them. An interruptor gear developed pre-war would go a long way to ensuring that once the Entente gain air superiority over the Western Front, they never lose it.

A sensible look at whether one should be in the army is tricky. It's something that seems obvious in retrospect, but not at the time. Even at the time, a manager complaining that his men have gone off to the army will look unpatriotic, so I'm not sure. Maybe someone like Geddes for the British, as he's very forward-thinking and has a good strategic brain.

Perhaps no "Cult of the Offensive" could help for #2 (and maybe #1?), and these could both be helped by one possibility for #3, which is a consistently strong Radical government in France for 1905-1914? It appears the Radicals did pretty well in that period, and the Radical Doumer came close to achieving the Presidency in 1906. That way you could (at least, as I understand it, someone please come along to correct me!) have a completely Radical government from 1906 to 1913. Even better if you get a Radical to win in 1913, but by that point you've given the army and navy seven years of consistent budgets.

I rather like this idea. There's always the problem one'll lose some good commander over politics (Catholics distrusted, for instance), but a good strategic plan in the first place should make up for that.

Not sure how you would achieve #1, but perhaps keeping Bernhard von Bulow as chancellor would help, seeing as he had at least served in the army, and seems to have been on relatively good terms with the Kaiser, as well as being willing to say "no" to him?

#2 is a staff-issue, going about it might be tricky, though.

#3 is up in the air. For ease (and desire for capital ship actions), it might be easier to pick the "use it" option. How would that be different from the case in OTL, P?

I suspect that #1 is tied to making German politicians grumpier with the army. So a disaster (like Isandhlwana was for the British) or two might be enough to get a consensus that the military needed more civilian oversight. Failing that, having the Kaiser actually bother to check what was possible before war broke out could well result in his demanding two war plans, solving #2, and if he has a row with the army chief, he can then institute #1. I'm wary of this, because he was generally deferential to the army, but I'm not aware of anything other than these two routes.

For the navy, she did succeed IOTL in tying down hundreds of thousands of Brits in defensive positions in the UK or in supporting the Grand Fleet. But the capital ships, post-Jutland, don't really do much. More harassing attacks on British towns are my thinking. A determined attack on the BEF crossing could be good, too. Even if it doesn't succeed, we're bound to see more army casualties, and a feeling that the Channel isn't safe, which may well push transport duties further west, making supply lines longer.

#2 seems to be a case of someone figuring it out earlier than in OTL, or was the convoy system really just that unheard of in 1914?

No idea for #1...any help on this?

No, it's about early on. I think the convoy system was tested in the Med '14 or '15, but the Navy ran some numbers badly, and so thought it wasn't cost effective. Replace the chap with the maths problem ITTL, and bingo!

For a mass army, you need a Kitchener type. The major problem is politics. Getting widespread pre-war acceptance of the idea of sending off millions of voters to die for a foreign country is going to be all but impossible, so I'd have someone doing all the work secretly - a Henry Wilson type - and then present it as a fait accompli. So subtly ready garrisons up and down the country, form corps of retired officers and NCOs who voluntarily keep up to date on tactics, and who can provide modern tactical instruction.

#1 shouldn't be too hard: wasn't the non-acceptance of armored cars in OTL due to some fluke like the KuK not liking the ruckus they made?

#2 and #3 require better cooperation with Germany. Conrad von Hotzendorf isn't in overall command, but perhaps he is arrayed against the Serbs (his nemeses) and is given more troops with which to conduct his personal vendetta. Who is in charge of the Austrian General Staff instead of Conrad? If we have a range of options, who is going to work with the Germans best? What is their plan in the East going to be, if the Germans intend to strike East while the Austro-Hungarians commit more troops to the Serbian front?

Aye, as Kabraloth says, #1 was an unlucky incident. For the others, Conrad isn't a bad chap; it's just that his strategic vision ignores tactical difficulties., and he's got that Redl chap passing stuff to the Russians. If you want another fellow, I'm not sure about '14 seniority, but Archduke Friedrich ran the AOK to December '16. In terms of other high ups, you've got a choice of Rohr, Archduke Eugen, Potiorek (whom I killed in PlC), Dankl von Krasnik, von Auffenberg-Komarow, Archduke Josef Ferdinand, von Frank, and Archduke Josef. I'm not well read on the Austrians, so I can't say who's good. I remember liking Dankl, but I honestly can't say how he stands up to the others.
 
Guys

On early introduction of convoys there were a number of problems. Some use of convoying early on, such as escorting the BEF and later supplies for France. However think rather a mess was made of things in the Med because there was no unity of command, with various national groups getting their oar in so everything very disorganised.

The main problems were a maths mistake due from what I've heard was mis-guided propaganda and probably also the attitude of the navy. A question was asked about sailings from the UK but worded such that it included sailing between local ports, which inflated the figures from about 120-200 trans-ocean sailings to 5000+ per week. As such it achived its initial purpose in deflating the apparent effectiveness of the early U-boat campaign but made it sound like numbers were so vast that convoying would be impractical. Coupled with concerns about the in-efficencies of convoys, having to wait until the ships were assembled, sailing at the speed of the slowest ship, about the abilities of marchant captains to keep station and the serious shortage of escorts it meant that only when the authorities accepted there was a crisis were thinks looked at again. Also I suspect there was probably a preference in the navy for agrressive action, taking the war to the enemy, failing to realise how effective convoys are in forcing the enemy to come to you.

On getting a much larger British army early on I can't see how that's possible. Given that the country had no real alliances with European powers and the tradition over nearly a century of laissez faire it would have been difficult to do more than some army groups secretly preparing plans for what they would need for a long attritional conflict. Given their lack of experience to work on, even with some examples from the Boer War and Russo-Japanese War there would be great scope for getting things wrong, even without internal factional politics in the forces possibly getting involved. Then you have to expand those plans into actual policies to be implemented, which means presuading the rest of the military to accept major changes, the political leaders that the short and minimally disruptive conflict they were expecting will have to be totally reversed and the business community to accept a massive degree of government interference not seen since the Napoleonic conflict. As such, barring major changes to British society at least a decade or two prior to the conflict I can't see Britain being able to move to a mass army much earlier.

Steve
 
I notice from your comments, P, that a lot of these things were visible in the Russo-Japanese War, but simply not looked into very deeply. Obviously, the Russo-Japanese War needs to become more important to the militaries of Europe, but what's the best way to do this without too many butterflies? Would it be better to make it longer? Would it be better for Russia to have its act together a bit more?
 
This kind of self-examination or "what are we doing bad, and how should we be better" is incredibly difficult to do in real life. That's what consults are for :)

A practical POD? During a diplomatic meeting in Paris 1904 the russian military attache (or "highest military officer") mentions to a bunch of other officers that Russia is going to whip the Japanese. He impulsivly invites the officers to visit Russia and the war. After some deliberation and premissions from home and Russia they set out. During the long, disgusting and deadly war no one wants to chicken out in front of the others, potential enemy, officers, so they stay the whole war. And they discuss the war with each others, what they have seen and how _they_ would have solved the problems seen. All survive the war (ok, a bit unlikely) and return to home with large documentation but also solutions/suggestions of improvements for their home militaries. And a warning: the Enemy will change their militaries, so we have to ...

To be frank I doubt that would be enough to change the fossils that were military leaders at that time, but it was the best POD I could think up.
 
Some interesting looks through stuff online leads me to the following for France:

A Radical government is going to mean that France's conscription law is limited in scope compared to Germany's: instead of being able to mobilize 3.5 million to Germany's 3.8 million, France will only be able to mobilize 2.4 million. This, of course, reinforces just how defensive France is going to be in 1914. Money not spent on those extra 1.1 million reservists, is, however, going to be able to go towards purchasing better infantry, building fortifications, etc. This assumes, however, that Poincare can kept out of the Presidency in 1913. If he doesn't, we get the awkward situation where France is prepared to fight a defensive war, and has an extra 1.1 million troops that aren't up to snuff by the time war hits in 1914, but I figure that can only help France's industries, especially if Germany goes on the offensive in the East.

France will therefore generally stick to Plan XV (1903), a defensive strategy along the German border, but will have been since upgraded to have two armies (reserves?) push through Belgium to hinder a possible German thrust that will, in TTL, never come. This leaves us with a sticky violation of Belgian neutrality...if that is going to be too much to keep Britain out, then these two armies will simply wait in expectation of a thrust that doesn't come, and will be well-poised to move through Belgium at a more expedient date.

In (correct, in TTL) expectation of a German offensive in the East, the Russian strategy, as it would have been in OTL if the Germans had gone east, will be to abandon the salient that makes up Poland, and wait until enough forces have been massed for a counter-offensive. This should avoid any Tannenburg-style disasters.

The Austrians will, in consultation with the German General Staff, use their plan which focused mostly on crushing Serbia quickly. The armies left facing the Russians will remain entirely on the defensive, which will work out quite nicely since that is what the Russians plan on doing as well.

The tricky part here is figuring out what exact form the German offensive in the East will take, and I hope the rest of you have some ideas as to how this would go!
 

MrP

Banned
I notice from your comments, P, that a lot of these things were visible in the Russo-Japanese War, but simply not looked into very deeply. Obviously, the Russo-Japanese War needs to become more important to the militaries of Europe, but what's the best way to do this without too many butterflies? Would it be better to make it longer? Would it be better for Russia to have its act together a bit more?

I think one can do it on a very low level, but one needs to do it quite a bit. Have foreign observers notice slightly different things or draw slightly different conclusions, which then magnify into having further reaching effects. A longer war would allow for more observers to turn up and draw such conclusions. A problem is that neither of the militaries involved are highly regarded, so other nations will be inclined to assume their troops' morale, marksmanship and so on are all better. I like your idea of a slightly better Russia - that gives more evidence to observers of the benefit of fortifications.

EDIT: Didn't see superkuf's post, but that sounds rather good, too.
 
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