WW1 Naval What If question

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Deleted member 1487

In this thread I wish only to talk about naval matters and coastal defenses.
With this in mind, what would the naval war in Europe look like if the German lines were based on the Somme river? This would mean that the entire coast from Abbeville to the Netherlands would be in German hands. What does this mean for the British, for the French, and for the Germans?
Is the High Seas fleet more active and based further forward? Is the Grand Fleet based in the Channel?

What kind of coastal defenses would the Germans need to protect the coast line and would the British try or even be able to land and open up a new front? Can Germany turn the Channel into a hunting ground? What about the Dover mine barrage; here it can't exist, so is something like it created in this scenario?
 
In this thread I wish only to talk about naval matters and coastal defenses.
With this in mind, what would the naval war in Europe look like if the German lines were based on the Somme river? This would mean that the entire coast from Abbeville to the Netherlands would be in German hands. What does this mean for the British, for the French, and for the Germans?
Is the High Seas fleet more active and based further forward? Is the Grand Fleet based in the Channel?

What kind of coastal defenses would the Germans need to protect the coast line and would the British try or even be able to land and open up a new front? Can Germany turn the Channel into a hunting ground? What about the Dover mine barrage; here it can't exist, so is something like it created in this scenario?

wiking

I can't see either power basing major forces in the channel as its too narrow and vulnerable. Not to mention not sure if any of the occupied French and Belgium coastlines have a suitable port for operating a sizeable chunk of a battle-fleet.

It would definitely make reinforcing and supplying France and British forces in France more difficult for the allies. Supply lines might be something like the Solent to LeHavre and they might be vulnerable to attacks by subs and light fleet forces [destroyers and cruisers]. Might be the potential for a lunge by say the German BCs to contest the region, although that could be risky but if they hit a major military convoy it might be worth the loss of a BC.

Actually, while such a situation is more difficult for the allies it might help them in a couple of ways. The German subs might be committed more to attacking warships in the channel and also the surface threat might push the allies to introduce convoying earlier.

In terms of a British landing on the occupied coast I know there were some plans to launch such an attack against Flanders in support of the 3rd Yepres. Not sure how effective such an operation might be. Could be a little easier with a greater length of coastline to defend but still going to be very difficult with the technology of the day and the fairly comprehensive railway network in the region, which would enable the Germans to reinforce any defensive positions a lot easier than the British could pump reinforcements in. Hence, unless they caught the Germans totally napping I suspect such a British attack would be a costly defeat.

Steve
 
I think the OTL Tirpitz battery of 4 x 11" guns would have been quickly emplaced at Cap Griz Nez to interdict through traffic which IOTL continued right through the war. Similary the OTL Kaiser Wilhelm II battery of 4 x 12" guns could emplaced where it could be used offensively. The rest of the coast could be fortified with whatever naval guns could be found, the purpose being to keep the sea within their range free from mines and defend against attack from the sea.

The forweard position could be home to cruisers and destroyers which could be used in conjunction with uboats to interdict and threaten the supply line to the BEF. I doubt capital ships would be based on the channel, but with the German dominating half of the Dpver St chokepoint it does raise the spectre of major warships appearing in the channel without prior molestation. Its too late catching a BC on the way back to Germany when it has already closed the channel to shipping and given the light forces lots of nice bunched backlog targets to attack.
 

Deleted member 1487

What about the effects on Britain of having the channel closed to it? The Thames is still protected and shipping can be routed around Scotland, but that means shipping will be coming in from one direction to London, making it easier to target.
 
I've mentioned it here before and had it vigoursly disputed but Adml Reginal Bacon in his book about the Dover Patrol says that London received much of its food imports directly up the Thames. And that if this was cut off by closing through channel shipping 1/3 of the population of London would have to be evacuated to where they could be more easily fed.

While I'm willing to scale back that claim as hyperbole I daresay there is a large kernel of truth to the claim, and that London would indeed go very short on imports if the Dover St was substantially closed. Perhaps a voluntary evacuation, some companies relocating to where they can get their raw materials more readily and taking their workers with them.
 
It all will take time. - Influence on land operations in 1914 would possibly be zero, although British supply to France will be more complicated.
By early 1915, the first German small craft and submarines (not too many, as there weren't many) might appear and fortification of the coast start.
The HSF will remain in Northern Germany, no way to station capital ships on the French and Belgian coast.
IOTL, the Germans did not energically attack shipping in the Downs, but ITTL by mid-1915, British shipping might be interdicted in the Dover-Calais straights. - But by then, the British also will have had time to organise supply of London differently.
Reaching around the British Isles with submarines will - however - be much easier. The Dover barrage was anything but really effective before 1918, but the Germans had only small submarines in Flanders IOTL. In this scenario, they certainly would also have large highseas boats stationed in Northern France. But there again is a time factor, only by 1917 a sizeable (but still too small) force of U-Boats was available.
 
The Channel will be the transit zone, I wonder how many uboat captains will get in a lucky shot on the way to or home from a patrol in the Atlantic.
 
The Road to Rouen

In Operation Unicorn I conservatively estimated a 3-4% negative impact on British war related productivity from a similar situation. They can imperfectly compensate for deceased traffic to the Port of London by increased use of rail but there is an inescapable efficiency loss.

There was a strange individual over at AHF who maintained very stridently that the KM could quickly knock both Britain and France out of the war by stationing the HSF at Calais simultaneously interfering with the mouth of the Thames and the mouth of the Seine. He was particularly obsessed with Rouen. Things like the excellent British and French railroad nets, French Atlantic ports and the fact that Calais is an unprotected anchorage unsuitable for capital ships (light forces are another matter) bounced off his stubbornness.
 
There was a strange individual over at AHF who maintained very stridently that the KM could quickly knock both Britain and France out of the war by stationing the HSF at Calais simultaneously interfering with the mouth of the Thames and the mouth of the Seine. He was particularly obsessed with Rouen. Things like the excellent British and French railroad nets, French Atlantic ports and the fact that Calais is an unprotected anchorage unsuitable for capital ships (light forces are another matter) bounced off his stubbornness.


Tom,

That's sounds similar in form, if not degree, to many of the claims made here about the same POD.

In earlier threads and in addition to other wild-eyed postulates, posters suggested Britain would require a million more troops thanks to the longer supply lines or that Germany would be able to routinely pass surface raiders down the Channel and into the Atlantic.

The truth of the matter is that the Channel would still be blocked to u-boats, that the effect on London would not be as great as certain post-war Cassandras made it out to be(1), and Germany's army would find itself presenting a seaward flank to Entente naval power that is not shielded by a myriad of constantly shifting islands sandbanks as is most of Belgium's coastline.


Bill

1 - The effects on London in this WW1 are brought into question by the effects of the loss of the Channel had on WW2 London, i.e. essentially none. As for Bacon's post-war book, military memoirs are notorious for inflating the writer's importance and/or the importance of the units they either commanded or served in; i.e. If it weren't for the brave men of the 201st Provisional Field Laundry, Saipan would have never been captured and the war lost!.
 

Blair152

Banned
In this thread I wish only to talk about naval matters and coastal defenses.
With this in mind, what would the naval war in Europe look like if the German lines were based on the Somme river? This would mean that the entire coast from Abbeville to the Netherlands would be in German hands. What does this mean for the British, for the French, and for the Germans?
Is the High Seas fleet more active and based further forward? Is the Grand Fleet based in the Channel?

What kind of coastal defenses would the Germans need to protect the coast line and would the British try or even be able to land and open up a new front? Can Germany turn the Channel into a hunting ground? What about the Dover mine barrage; here it can't exist, so is something like it created in this scenario?
Coastal defense flawed. German coastal defenses in Belgium were defeated by the British raid on Zebrugge.
 

Deleted member 1487

Tom,

That's sounds similar in form, if not degree, to many of the claims made here about the same POD.

In earlier threads and in addition to other wild-eyed postulates, posters suggested Britain would require a million more troops thanks to the longer supply lines or that Germany would be able to routinely pass surface raiders down the Channel and into the Atlantic.

The truth of the matter is that the Channel would still be blocked to u-boats, that the effect on London would not be as great as certain post-war Cassandras made it out to be(1), and Germany's army would find itself presenting a seaward flank to Entente naval power that is not shielded by a myriad of constantly shifting islands sandbanks as is most of Belgium's coastline.


Bill

1 - The effects on London in this WW1 are brought into question by the effects of the loss of the Channel had on WW2 London, i.e. essentially none. As for Bacon's post-war book, military memoirs are notorious for inflating the writer's importance and/or the importance of the units they either commanded or served in; i.e. If it weren't for the brave men of the 201st Provisional Field Laundry, Saipan would have never been captured and the war lost!.


This brings up a salient issue of this scenario: how many men would Germany require to hold down this open flank? Would the British then instead of attack frontally attempt to outflank the German positions by landing on the huge coast line?

I suppose in a wider sense one should also ask how the Belgians and Brits and Antwerp would respond to the German line stopping on the Somme river, either by evacuating at another port or creating a coastal enclave at Calais or somewhere else that they could then supply by sea, but is surrounded by German troops and siege artillery. Could such an enclave hold out or would it simply be a brutal fire-sack that simply wracks up casualties and disproportionate resources to hold for some strategic purpose? How vulnerable would the supply line be and could/would the Germans sortie to fleet to attack it?
 
This brings up a salient issue of this scenario: how many men would Germany require to hold down this open flank? Would the British then instead of attack frontally attempt to outflank the German positions by landing on the huge coast line?

I suppose in a wider sense one should also ask how the Belgians and Brits and Antwerp would respond to the German line stopping on the Somme river, either by evacuating at another port or creating a coastal enclave at Calais or somewhere else that they could then supply by sea, but is surrounded by German troops and siege artillery. Could such an enclave hold out or would it simply be a brutal fire-sack that simply wracks up casualties and disproportionate resources to hold for some strategic purpose? How vulnerable would the supply line be and could/would the Germans sortie to fleet to attack it?

The British records of amphibious landing's and advancing out of beacheads wasn't particularly impressive. What would make a landing behind the lines perform any better than Salonika or Gallipoli (which enjoyed the dubious distrinction of being thrashed by the Bulgarians and the Turks respectively for what would likely be regarded as a negative in the strategic sense)... if they landed in calais or belgium they would face GERMAN troops who would likely box them in and then stand off and beat the hell out of them with artillery... it would likely be a total mess
 
The German forces defending the long coast is an interesting concept. I would envision an army, if not a numbered army (Tenth Army in OU for a while) then at least an armee abteilung dedicated to this chore. Since this is likely a very passive front I see badly worn divisions in the trenches being rotated into this coastal defense army where they would rebuild and recover. This means the Heer will be doing more rotation than OTL (there are often criticized for not rotating enough). Supplementing these rebuilding divisions would be some cavalry and copious Landsturm plus armored trains, armored cars and fully motorized heavy artillery.
 
When the Allies held both sides of the Dover St they struggled to close it to uboats, they needed to raid Zebrugge in 1918 because of the problems it was causing. I wonder how they will close it when the Germans hold one whole side of it.

The supply lines to the BEF used a million men, and they were using the shortest routes possible. How many more men will this supply line need when the supply line is considerably longer. How many more ships and coal etc will this supply line need, and what will lose out to provide the resources.

Wht about port and rail capacity. Not only were the imports going into the westerly ports, with London and the Kent ports out of action these become the export ports as well. How will Britain cope with a large chunk of its port and rail net being unusable and the rest loaded to capacity, will overall capacity drop enough to reduce the number of divisions in the BEF.
 
When the Allies held both sides of the Dover St they struggled to close it to uboats, they needed to raid Zebrugge in 1918 because of the problems it was causing. I wonder how they will close it when the Germans hold one whole side of it.

The supply lines to the BEF used a million men, and they were using the shortest routes possible. How many more men will this supply line need when the supply line is considerably longer. How many more ships and coal etc will this supply line need, and what will lose out to provide the resources.

Wht about port and rail capacity. Not only were the imports going into the westerly ports, with London and the Kent ports out of action these become the export ports as well. How will Britain cope with a large chunk of its port and rail net being unusable and the rest loaded to capacity, will overall capacity drop enough to reduce the number of divisions in the BEF.

Initially Le Havre would be the primary substitute for the Channel Ports in supplying the BEF but by the end of 1915 I don't think it can handle it alone esp. as I see steady KM pressure on the mouth of the Seine. As we go along more and more of the supply ships would go to Cherbourg. Bottom line is I see only half of the second line Territorial Forces divisions ever going to France.
 

Deleted member 1487

The German forces defending the long coast is an interesting concept. I would envision an army, if not a numbered army (Tenth Army in OU for a while) then at least an armee abteilung dedicated to this chore. Since this is likely a very passive front I see badly worn divisions in the trenches being rotated into this coastal defense army where they would rebuild and recover. This means the Heer will be doing more rotation than OTL (there are often criticized for not rotating enough). Supplementing these rebuilding divisions would be some cavalry and copious Landsturm plus armored trains, armored cars and fully motorized heavy artillery.

Perhaps this then means that the capital ships under construction during the war in German shipyards are then not even focused on, as their guns could be better used from coastal defense and the steel and manpower used for smaller forces like torpedo boats and armored cars. How many naval divisions would then be created from the idle major ship crews to staff the coastal defenses of the captured territory? This could mean major changes that take the focus off fleet action and focus it on 'guerilla' naval actions.
 

Deleted member 1487

What about maintaining a coastal enclave? Would the British try and hold Calais to cut the German's ability to transfer forces into the Channel by holding on to a city like Calais? Or would this prove suicidal and be abandoned by 1915?
 
What about maintaining a coastal enclave? Would the British try and hold Calais to cut the German's ability to transfer forces into the Channel by holding on to a city like Calais? Or would this prove suicidal and be abandoned by 1915?

In OU either Boulogne or Calais (I think it was the former) tried to hold out with a brigade sized garrison but it did not work. In WWII OTL the Channel Ports were evacuated.
 
The problem of an enclave is that it would have to be big to have a reasonable part of it outside of artillery range. It would have to be a semicircle at least 20 miles in diameter just to have room for supply dumps, unloading facilities, R & R spaces and hospitals.

Since an enclave would have to face off against forces on all sides it would need prodigious amounts of supplies. So the supply lines surrounded by enemy held coastline would provide a target rich environment for every form of attack and the RN would have to fight like a demon to get supplies through.

Its this sort of thing that led to the decision not to fortify and defend Tobruk a 2nd time in WW2. Of course this was reversed at the last minute with disasterous results, but that's not the point.
 
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