WW1 Germany invests in raiders, not dreadnaughts

Without a powerful fleet to oppose the RN there is nothing to stop them sweeping the minefields on the German coast and skaggerak sending monitors to bombard the ports and other coastal targets. Any torpedo boats or u boats would be dealt with by the escort destroyers and gunboats.

What happened to all the coastal guns?
 
What happened to all the coastal guns?

The same thing that happened to all the coastal guns on the Belgium coast. The minefields were swept and 15" and even 18" monitors moved in and suppressed them, the Dover patrol even moored spotting towers on convenient shoals in the channel. It won't happen overnight but over months sure as the tide the RN will dominate the coastal seas off Germany.
 
The same thing that happened to all the coastal guns on the Belgium coast. The minefields were swept and 15" and even 18" monitors moved in and suppressed them, the Dover patrol even moored spotting towers on convenient shoals in the channel. It won't happen overnight but over months sure as the tide the RN will dominate the coastal seas off Germany.

No, they get sunk. They can't even effectively engage coastal guns firing indirectly from covered positions. The Germans can't cover the entire coastline, but there are good reasons why Admirals engaging same generation coastal defenses are referred to as fools.

The British did not force the Dardanelles with their navy and there was no major fleet opposition and obselescent coastal guns. Instead, they lost three pre-dreadnoughts and gave it up.

The escorts can try to deal with the submarines, but they will have a challenge. It is much harder to succeed with a submarine trying to catch a fleet moving across the open sea faster than the sub can travel. If the subs are defending a given area that they have to keep the fleet away from, the task gets easier as the targets come to them.
 
No, they get sunk. They can't even effectively engage coastal guns firing indirectly from covered positions. The Germans can't cover the entire coastline, but there are good reasons why Admirals engaging same generation coastal defenses are referred to as fools.

The British did not force the Dardanelles with their navy and there was no major fleet opposition and obselescent coastal guns. Instead, they lost three pre-dreadnoughts and gave it up.

The escorts can try to deal with the submarines, but they will have a challenge. It is much harder to succeed with a submarine trying to catch a fleet moving across the open sea faster than the sub can travel. If the subs are defending a given area that they have to keep the fleet away from, the task gets easier as the targets come to them.

Admiral Roger bacon was not a fool, he systematically reduced the defences off the Belgium coast until the RN owned the beach and hinterland and even planned a landing in 1917.

The attempt to force the Dardanelles was half arsed and failed as a result. A systematic approach could have been successful.

As for u boats, yes they are a risk but attacking guarded units isn't very profitable for them so committing them to a prolonged campaign to defend the coast will whittle their strength down in months or a year.
 
Britain's policy was not too allow any one power to dominate the continent. A strong Germany was the best candidate to dominate the continent and the natural target for British policy.

And yet Salisbury and Chamberlain tried repeatedly to obtain an alliance of some kind with Germany from the mid-1890's onward, despite the fact that "Germany was the best candidate to dominate the continent and the natural target for British policy."

No, it's striking that the Anglo-French Entente began being pursued in earnest at Whitehall a few years after Tirpitz began building capital ships in deadly earnest (the First and Second Naval Laws).

If you remove the battleship race, you remove the biggest thorn in Anglo-German relations. That may not be enough to forge an Anglo-German Alliance (Wilhelm II being Wilhelm II, after all) but it does remove a lot of the incentive for anything with France beyond a detente. The colonial agreement likely still happens around 1904, but anything beyond that becomes much less likely - Britain now has an alliance with Japan and reasonably good relations with the U.S..
 

LordKalvert

Banned
And yet Salisbury and Chamberlain tried repeatedly to obtain an alliance of some kind with Germany from the mid-1890's onward, despite the fact that "Germany was the best candidate to dominate the continent and the natural target for British policy."

Chamberlain maybe, though at times he favored a deal with Russia, but Salisbury definitely not. Salisbury would never agree to an alliance with any European power believing that Britain's interests required the ability to play the European powers off against each other. It is after all, the British that break off the talks with the Germans in 1901 and they do so after Salisbury's memorandum

The Germans develop a distinct dislike to British policies starting toward the end of Roseberry's administration. There is the Congo treaty, the failure to aid Italy in Eritrea, Samoa, the double cross during the Triple Intervention and the Transvaal.

Above it all, is the drastic policies pursued by Britain during the Armenian crisis which destroys all basis of cooperation between Britain and Germany. The Austrians and Germans come to the conclusion, correctly, that the British could no longer be counted on to defend Turkey and oppose a Russian advance in the Balkans.

Finally, Chanberlain's main desire in seeking an alliance with Germany is to protect British interests in the Far East but these interests run directly counter to Germany's. Where Britain seeks to contain Russia in the Far East, Germany seeks to divert Russia to the Far East

The German fleet is built as much as a response to the cavalier attitude of Chamberlain and Salisbury as anything else

No, it's striking that the Anglo-French Entente began being pursued in earnest at Whitehall a few years after Tirpitz began building capital ships in deadly earnest (the First and Second Naval Laws).

If you remove the battleship race, you remove the biggest thorn in Anglo-German relations. That may not be enough to forge an Anglo-German Alliance (Wilhelm II being Wilhelm II, after all) but it does remove a lot of the incentive for anything with France beyond a detente. The colonial agreement likely still happens around 1904, but anything beyond that becomes much less likely - Britain now has an alliance with Japan and reasonably good relations with the U.S..

Perhaps but the reason for the British to pursue the Entente isn't related to the German threat. The British burn their fingers badly in South Africa and the rise of the American, Russian and Japanese fleets destroy the basis of British naval hegemony. The British realize that they can no longer afford so many enemies and begin to settle with everyone- except the Germans. In fact, the British make nice with France at the expense of German interests and rights in Morocco
 
Admiral Roger bacon was not a fool, he systematically reduced the defences off the Belgium coast until the RN owned the beach and hinterland and even planned a landing in 1917.

The attempt to force the Dardanelles was half arsed and failed as a result. A systematic approach could have been successful.

As for u boats, yes they are a risk but attacking guarded units isn't very profitable for them so committing them to a prolonged campaign to defend the coast will whittle their strength down in months or a year.

The Belgian coast isn't the German coast. I expect the Germans would try harder for their own coast. They would certainly try harder around their ports. Given that competent coastal defenses will result in first or second round hits, from guns that are behind terrain features and are not visible from the sea, I really don't see how ships are expected to survive. It gets worse when you consider that ships typically have 15-20 foot rangefinders, where shore batteries can have rangefinders with 200 yard baselines.

Yes, they can run past them, like the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, but dueling them is unwise. The odds are the ships will end up like the Blucher in Oslofiord.

As for the U-boats, if the British choose to send capital ships through U-boat coastal infested waters I think the British will run out of capital ships before the Germans run out of U-boats. There are lots of reasons the British did not try a close blockade in WW1. The presence of a German Fleet was not the main reason.

They didn't try it because it would expose their fleet to unnnecessary risks. The loss of HMS Audacious was just one example.
 
The Belgian coast isn't the German coast. I expect the Germans would try harder for their own coast. They would certainly try harder around their ports. Given that competent coastal defenses will result in first or second round hits, from guns that are behind terrain features and are not visible from the sea, I really don't see how ships are expected to survive. It gets worse when you consider that ships typically have 15-20 foot rangefinders, where shore batteries can have rangefinders with 200 yard baselines.

Yes, they can run past them, like the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, but dueling them is unwise. The odds are the ships will end up like the Blucher in Oslofiord.

As for the U-boats, if the British choose to send capital ships through U-boat coastal infested waters I think the British will run out of capital ships before the Germans run out of U-boats. There are lots of reasons the British did not try a close blockade in WW1. The presence of a German Fleet was not the main reason.

They didn't try it because it would expose their fleet to unnnecessary risks. The loss of HMS Audacious was just one example.

The OP says the Germans don't have dreadnaughts, so how can they 'try harder' when minesweeping efforts are covered by everything from gunboats and subchasers up to the Home Fleet's battleships? The coast wouldn't be bombarded by capital ships but by monitors, and ITOL against the Belgian coast these monitors were assisted by spotting towers moored in shoals.

A close blockade wouldn't be mounted by battleships, it would be mounted by older destroyers and cruisers keeping a continuous watch on the exits to port in small numbers. They only have to watch and engage raiders and blockade runners and guard the offensive minefields the RN lays after all. If the Germans try to escalate then the Home Fleet will be called upon with its dreadnoughts, cruisers and destroyers. The reason why the RN didn't run a close blockade of Germany in OTL WW1, a decision made as late as 1913, was because the German would win the battles just off the port exit shipping channels.
 
The OP says the Germans don't have dreadnaughts, so how can they 'try harder' when minesweeping efforts are covered by everything from gunboats and subchasers up to the Home Fleet's battleships? The coast wouldn't be bombarded by capital ships but by monitors, and ITOL against the Belgian coast these monitors were assisted by spotting towers moored in shoals.

Doesn't look like it had much of any effect on U-boat operations.
 
A Guerre de Course strategy (aka raiding) is an admission by the nation using it that they cannot compete at sea with their opponent. It is a spoiler rather than a winning strategy.

In WW 1 the German's best course of action given the size of their fleet relative to that of Britain was simply to engage the RN and accept a war of attrition. The RN cannot afford to lose at sea. Britain is a sea power and will have to accept battle to retain control of the sea.

For Germany, a fleet in being sitting at anchor is nothing but a waste. Germany is a land power. Their having a sizable fleet that is at least competitive with the British would indicate that they should use it and even use it up.

Now, if Germany didn't build a large fleet in the years prior to WW 1 their best course would be the Guerre de Course and put considerably more effort into building up their army. A defeat of France in 1914 rather than a stalemate pretty much ends WW 1 before it begins. Germany could then turn East and take out Russia.

That leaves Britain without means to pursue the war other than by blockade.
 
Doesn't look like it had much of any effect on U-boat operations.

The war in the Channel fought by the Dover Patrol was the naval equivalent of trench warfare and nothing like the climactic naval battles of the era such as Jutland. For example there had been 88,000 crossings of the Channel in 2 years to 1918 for the loss of 6 ships and the sinking of 2 u boats. Keyes took command in January 1918 and sank 5 u boats in a month with new tactics, given a strength of 44 or so u boats and the rule of 3-3-3 that's a big hit in a month.
 
Keyes took command in January 1918 and sank 5 u boats in a month with new tactics, given a strength of 44 or so u boats and the rule of 3-3-3 that's a big hit in a month.

ASW was primitive in 1914, and first sinking of a sub via depth charge was in early 1916. Before that, Mines, ramming and Q ships was the effective tactic.

WWI kills on U-Boats

Mines 58
Depth charges 30
Submarine torpedoes 20
Gunfire 20
Ramming 19
Bombs 2

Active Sonar wasn't deployed till after WWI
 
ASW was primitive in 1914, and first sinking of a sub via depth charge was in early 1916. Before that, Mines, ramming and Q ships was the effective tactic.

WWI kills on U-Boats

Mines 58
Depth charges 30
Submarine torpedoes 20
Gunfire 20
Ramming 19
Bombs 2

Active Sonar wasn't deployed till after WWI

True, but 6 sinkings for the loss of 2 u boats in 1916-17 with 88,000 Channel crossings doesn't leave a stellar impression of u boat brilliance. Especially when a change in tactics in January 1918 lead to 5 u boat losses in a month.

My general point is that when the RN took the war to the enemy occupied coast, bristling with mines, coastal guns, u boats and even destroyers they got to a point where landings were planned, mines were swept, shipping losses were minimal, u boat were losses high, coastal guns suppressed and raids such as Zebrugge were attempted. Without the HSF the RN would be to try the same sort of thing against the German coast itself as well as the Skagerrak and possibly the Baltic.
 
The war in the Channel fought by the Dover Patrol was the naval equivalent of trench warfare and nothing like the climactic naval battles of the era such as Jutland. For example there had been 88,000 crossings of the Channel in 2 years to 1918 for the loss of 6 ships and the sinking of 2 u boats. Keyes took command in January 1918 and sank 5 u boats in a month with new tactics, given a strength of 44 or so u boats and the rule of 3-3-3 that's a big hit in a month.

As I just said, the measures you talked of - monitors and such - didn't look to have had much effect on the capacity of U-boats to conduct commerce warfare from ports in Flanders. This, despite overwhelming RN surface superiority.

My general point is that when the RN took the war to the enemy occupied coast, bristling with mines, coastal guns, u boats and even destroyers they got to a point where landings were planned, mines were swept, shipping losses were minimal, u boat were losses high, coastal guns suppressed and raids such as Zebrugge were attempted. Without the HSF the RN would be to try the same sort of thing against the German coast itself as well as the Skagerrak and possibly the Baltic.

Not even Fisher and Churchill were rash enough to contemplate such a campaign, which would have resulted in high levels of attrition upon RN forces for no coherent operational purpose.
 
A Guerre de Course strategy (aka raiding) is an admission by the nation using it that they cannot compete at sea with their opponent. It is a spoiler rather than a winning strategy.

It's not a question of admitting anything. Either a country can or can not challenge for naval superiority directly, and if it cannot, then concentration for decisive battle is entirely pointless and the options become dispersion (commerce warfare) or inactivity.


In WW 1 the German's best course of action given the size of their fleet relative to that of Britain was simply to engage the RN and accept a war of attrition. The RN cannot afford to lose at sea. Britain is a sea power and will have to accept battle to retain control of the sea.
During the age of sail the fleets of the outclassed Empires, such as was Germany's position in WW1, did not seek out and engage the Royal Navy, because that would be suicide. Rather, they operated to continue vital trade with their overseas possessions, attempting to slip by the RN, (for example, the annual Spanish silver convoys from the Americas, trying to cross the Atlantic to Spain without being intercepted).

Similarly, for Germany in WW1, one useful activity would have been the continued import of high-value low-tonnage commodities such as rubber, nitrates, etc. (It doesn't even have to get to Germany, it has to get to Norway, then the material can cross to Germany via the Baltic or Denmark).

For Germany, a fleet in being sitting at anchor is nothing but a waste. Germany is a land power. Their having a sizable fleet that is at least competitive with the British would indicate that they should use it and even use it up.
Yes.

Now, if Germany didn't build a large fleet in the years prior to WW 1 their best course would be the Guerre de Course and put considerably more effort into building up their army. A defeat of France in 1914 rather than a stalemate pretty much ends WW 1 before it begins. Germany could then turn East and take out Russia.
I think a case can be made for a smaller fleet with the savings used to fortify the western frontier (including along the Belgian border), to neutralize the French army and allow the bulk of the German army to concentrate with the Austrian on taking out Russia.

That leaves Britain without means to pursue the war other than by blockade.
Yes, if Britain had one or no continental swords remaining, her war effort fails. Germany's path to victory was therefore to pick off Britain's allies one by one on the continent, while Britain's was to keep the pressure on Germany's coalition with as many partners on as many fronts as possible.
 
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