WW1 Delayed Until 1916

[Sarthak]

Just a quick note on the Ottomans, the Ottomans were planning a war plan against Greece if Greece attacked them after or during the procurement of the Dreadnoughts. Ottoman Intelligence from the OSO had discerned some talking in the Greek Navy regarding that, which was such a plan was being drawn up. If Greece does not attack, then neither will the Ottomans. The Ottoman's plan as @Dorknought mentioned in another set of threads was to sit and wait until they could build up a balanced and trained fleet.

On the training aspect I'd note that in the Balkan Wars the Ottoman performance was terrible, not sure they'd be much better? But yes the fleet in being makes landing hard.

I'm not sure how the crews would perform considering we never the Ottoman Fleet in ww1 in anything but staying at port besides the black sea raid, but the Ottoman Naval Crews had been undergoing British and German-led intense training and recruitment after the 1st Balkan War. The Ottomans rightly believed that their over dependence on the army and negligence of the navy had been one of the major reasons why they lost the 1st Balkan War and wanted to right all the wrongs of Abdulhamid II's idiocratic naval policy.

 

[Tibi088]

The Ottomans lack the balanced fleet- destroyers, submarines and cruisers. The Russians can also dissemble, send to the Black Sea and reassemble their older smaller craft.

The point is that such a strong ottoman fleets makes russian landing operations impossible.

In the interim, we need to remember that Russian Ottoman relations are pretty good undér the last two Tsars. The Russians prefer the Ottomans keep the straits thanthw Bulgarians or Greeks get them.

Really? Wasnt the Balkan Alliance that conquered most of European Turkey created under the leadership of Russia? I would also recommend reading Sean McMeekin's THe Russian Origins of the first World War. His theory is that WWI was basically the newest Russian play on the straits (The road to Constantinople goes through Berlin and Vienna). His arguments did not convince me but reading him makes it pretty evident that the ottoman-russian relationship was evrything but friendly. The 2 have also been mortal enemies for a very long time.

Ottoman war designs are more aimed at Britain (Egypt, Cyprus) and France (the capitulations) than Russia.

And the territories lost to Russia in Anatolia and aims in the Caucasus.

Really, by 1914 there's little the Ottomans have that Russia wants. The Balkans have been lost to both

The straits and Turkish Armenia. Remember that during the Balkan Wars and the Italian-Ottoman wars the Sraits have been closed by the Ottomans. This was a gigantic blow to the russian economy. With the incredible development of Ukraine beside of the symbolic and religious importance of Constantinople the straits were becoming the economic lifeline of Russia. Look at russian demands in regards of the Ottomans during WWI - and according to McMeekin russia started talking about the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire to France before the ottomans joined the war.

The Russians have done much to overhaul their navy and it performs respectably.

I dont know - as I said its plausible that Russia might regain the naval supremacy ower the Black Sea but not to an extent that they could risk an amphibious attack on Constantinople.

 

[Dorknought]

I dont know - as I said its plausible that Russia might regain the naval supremacy ower the Black Sea but not to an extent that they could risk an amphibious attack on Constantinople.

Russian plans were that they were to be ready to take the Straits IF a general European war broke out AFTER 1917. As part of the plan they were to have the lift capability (for an Army Corp) in the Black Sea AND have a Mediterranean Squadron including Baltic Fleet battleships based on Bizerte (part of a Franco-Russian 1912 Naval Agreement) to operate in the Aegean. The Ottoman Fleet would have difficulty covering both seas at once.

 

[Sarthak]

The point is that such a strong ottoman fleets makes russian landing operations impossible.

Actually not really. The Two Dreadnoughts would have been easily countered with the Imperator Nikolai and Imperatsa class Battleships that were in construction in the Black Sea, and the Russian Destroyers and Cruisers outnumbered the Ottomans by a ratio 3:1 when lucky for the Ottomans and near 5:1 on unlucky terms. A landing anywhere anyhow during this time period is going to be hard, but in terms of naval superiority, Russia will have the advantage for years to come. The Ottomans recognized this which was they kept their naval goals medium-ranged during the 1913 Naval Plan: build a fleet enough to overpower Greece and coastal defense.

Really? Wasnt the Balkan Alliance that conquered most of European Turkey created under the leadership of Russia?

Well, no that happened independently it was later that the Russians supported it diplomatically, but yes you are correct that the Russians did not have a good opinion of the OE

makes it pretty evident that the ottoman-russian relationship was evrything but friendly. The 2 have also been mortal enemies for a very long time.

Actually, Russo-Ottoman relations between 1881 - 1909 were extremely close, economically and militarily, with the two cooperating on many occasions and matters. In 1909 the pro-Russians in the OE government were voted out of power and by 1911 a new governmental purge so pro-Ottoman officials in the Russian government purged out. So this statement would be slightly wrong.

The straits and Turkish Armenia. Remember that during the Balkan Wars and the Italian-Ottoman wars the Sraits have been closed by the Ottomans. This was a gigantic blow to the russian economy.

Actually in 1911-12 the Ottoman Empire closed the straits to warships and all ships belonging to the belligerents. Neutral shipping was slowed down and delayed due to Ottoman checks on the ships, which did create a mild downturn in the Black sea economy, but Russian trade through the straits went on.

 

[Tibi088]

Actually not really. The Two Dreadnoughts would have been easily countered with the Imperator Nikolai and Imperatsa class Battleships that were in construction in the Black Sea, and the Russian Destroyers and Cruisers outnumbered the Ottomans by a ratio 3:1 when lucky for the Ottomans and near 5:1 on unlucky terms. A landing anywhere anyhow during this time period is going to be hard, but in terms of naval superiority, Russia will have the advantage for years to come. The Ottomans recognized this which was they kept their naval goals medium-ranged during the 1913 Naval Plan: build a fleet enough to overpower Greece and coastal defense.

except that it would be 3 Dreadnoughts for instance - and whatever else the Ottomans might buy in the meantime.

Well, no that happened independently it was later that the Russians supported it diplomatically, but yes you are correct that the Russians did not have a good opinion of the OE

It did not. The original agreement between Bulgaria and Serbia could not fully agree on the territorial division of Macedonia so they included a territory along the Vardar the fate of which would be decided by Russsia. Russia helped to create the alliance, and new of its plans reagrding the Ottomans. I also have a strong suspicion if the Ottomans had won and were near Sofia or Belgrad the Russian would have jumped in to bail them out.

Actually, Russo-Ottoman relations between 1881 - 1909 were extremely close, economically and militarily, with the two cooperating on many occasions and matters. In 1909 the pro-Russians in the OE government were voted out of power and by 1911 a new governmental purge so pro-Ottoman officials in the Russian government purged out. So this statement would be slightly wrong.

Actually in 1911-12 the Ottoman Empire closed the straits to warships and all ships belonging to the belligerents. Neutral shipping was slowed down and delayed due to Ottoman checks on the ships, which did create a mild downturn in the Black sea economy, but Russian trade through the straits went on.

McMeekin's The Russian Origins of the first World War, page 29:
"When, in summer 1912, the Porte had briefly closed the Straits to shipping during the Italian-Turkish War, Russia’s vulnerability had been painfully exposed: the volume of Black Sea exports dropped by one-third for the calendar year 1912, and revenue likewise dipped 30 percent, from 77 million pounds sterling (or nearly 800 million rubles) to 57 million (less than 600 million rubles). Heavy industry in the Ukraine, dependent on supplies imported directly through the Straits via the Black Sea, had nearly ground to a halt. Although the Straits remained open for commerce during the two Balkan wars, the general disruption to trade was already so damaging that Russia’s export revenue in 1913 was still 20 percent lower than in 1911. Because this revenue paid for the imports of manufactured components on which Russian industry increasingly depended, not least in the Ukraine and south Russia, the evaporation of the Black Sea export trade had devastated Russia’s recently favorable trade balance, with a surplus of some 430 million rubles in 1910 plummeting to 200 million in 1913. At this pace, Russia’s balance-of-payments surplus threatened to erode within a year or two, which would undermine her industrialization drive and, with it, her goal of remaining a great power.
To understand the overriding importance of the Straits question for Petersburg, however, we must go beyond numbers. Russia’s principal Black Sea export was grain. Over 20 million tons was shipped in both 1911 and 1912, of which nearly 90 percent was exported through the Bosphorus to world markets: the health of her entire agricultural economy now depended on unfettered Straits access. Stimulating grain production was, moreover, the key to Stolypin’s social reforms, which envisioned the creation of a stable class of successful peasant producers who would serve as a bulwark against anarchic social revolution. Ever since 1907 (and particularly following Stolypin’s death in 1911) these reforms had been overseen by Stolypin’s star protégé, Agriculture Minister Krivoshein. Krivoshein was universally believed to be the most powerful policymaker in Petersburg in 1914."

I would not call that a "mild downturn".

 

[Sarthak]

except that it would be 3 Dreadnoughts for instance - and whatever else the Ottomans might buy in the meantime.

The Battleship ordered from Brazil was a pre-dreadnought by European standards, and in any case, the Ottoman naval plan was to deploy the Dreadnoughts in the Aegean and Eastern Med, not against Russia

It did not. The original agreement between Bulgaria and Serbia could not fully agree on the territorial division of Macedonia so they included a territory along the Vardar the fate of which would be decided by Russsia. Russia helped to create the alliance, and new of its plans reagrding the Ottomans. I also have a strong suspicion if the Ottomans had won and were near Sofia or Belgrad the Russian would have jumped in to bail them out.

The Bulgarians and Serbians unilaterally declared the Tsar of Russia to be the arbitrator of the territorial disputes between Sofia and Bulgaria. Зафиров, Д., Александров, Е., История на Българите: Военна история, София, 2007 by Zafirov mentions that Nicholas II and the Duma were befuddled as they found out about the arbitration declaration after the war started. Russians did play a part in the formation of the Balkan League but the Russian Government hadn't. They knew very few about anything. To quote Zafirov - "The government had heard rumors of a general anti-Turkish alliance during the Italo-Turkish War, but such rumors cropped up every so few years, leading the Russian intelligence to disregard such rumors. When the Balkan League turned out to be a real creation that warred against the Turks, the Russian government was caught totally unprepared on how to act."
If the Ottomans had neared Sofia or Belgrade, the Ottoman Government itself would have stopped. All Ottoman Officers had the order to stop at the Maritsa and Juzna Morava Rivers.

McMeekin's The Russian Origins of the first World War, page 29:
"When, in summer 1912, the Porte had briefly closed the Straits to shipping during the Italian-Turkish War, Russia’s vulnerability had been painfully exposed: the volume of Black Sea exports dropped by one-third for the calendar year 1912, and revenue likewise dipped 30 percent, from 77 million pounds sterling (or nearly 800 million rubles) to 57 million (less than 600 million rubles). Heavy industry in the Ukraine, dependent on supplies imported directly through the Straits via the Black Sea, had nearly ground to a halt. Although the Straits remained open for commerce during the two Balkan wars, the general disruption to trade was already so damaging that Russia’s export revenue in 1913 was still 20 percent lower than in 1911. Because this revenue paid for the imports of manufactured components on which Russian industry increasingly depended, not least in the Ukraine and south Russia, the evaporation of the Black Sea export trade had devastated Russia’s recently favorable trade balance, with a surplus of some 430 million rubles in 1910 plummeting to 200 million in 1913. At this pace, Russia’s balance-of-payments surplus threatened to erode within a year or two, which would undermine her industrialization drive and, with it, her goal of remaining a great power.
To understand the overriding importance of the Straits question for Petersburg, however, we must go beyond numbers. Russia’s principal Black Sea export was grain. Over 20 million tons was shipped in both 1911 and 1912, of which nearly 90 percent was exported through the Bosphorus to world markets: the health of her entire agricultural economy now depended on unfettered Straits access. Stimulating grain production was, moreover, the key to Stolypin’s social reforms, which envisioned the creation of a stable class of successful peasant producers who would serve as a bulwark against anarchic social revolution. Ever since 1907 (and particularly following Stolypin’s death in 1911) these reforms had been overseen by Stolypin’s star protégé, Agriculture Minister Krivoshein. Krivoshein was universally believed to be the most powerful policymaker in Petersburg in 1914."

I would not call that a "mild downturn".

My apologies, thank you for the numbers. But I will have to point out that is the failure of the Russian economy - the Ottomans hadn't closed the straits to Russian ships at all. They were however delayed and then lowered in scale due to the Aegean being an active warzone. The Ottomans had only banned any passage of warships.

 

[Augenis]

The Black Hand would not exist by 1916 if a war had not broken out in 1914. They and the Serbian government were on direct trajectory towards conflict and it was not the Black Hand who held the cards.

Two more years of peace means two years of Crown Prince Alexander as Regent, and not only did he despise the Black Hand, he had his own secret loyalist military clique to fight against it, the White Hand. Pašic and almost all of the Serbian political establishment was on his side. The Black Hand, meanwhile, was a paper tiger - in our timeline, when the Serbian government moved against it in the Solun process, Apis and the rest of his clique were swept out almost instantly, with little to no counterattack (though it did get some Black Hand members to turn Communist, lol). Maybe, in peace conditions, you'd see some assassination attempts against Pašic or even the Crown Prince but they wouldn't hold on without starting a war.

With no Black Hand, the larper weirdos in Bosnia who even Black Hand members thought were stupid would have no backing, and so fade into obscurity, or become national poets or something, they had lots of poets among them.

 

[Belisarius II]

except that it would be 3 Dreadnoughts for instance - and whatever else the Ottomans might buy in the meantime.

It did not. The original agreement between Bulgaria and Serbia could not fully agree on the territorial division of Macedonia so they included a territory along the Vardar the fate of which would be decided by Russsia. Russia helped to create the alliance, and new of its plans reagrding the Ottomans. I also have a strong suspicion if the Ottomans had won and were near Sofia or Belgrad the Russian would have jumped in to bail them out.

McMeekin's The Russian Origins of the first World War, page 29:
"When, in summer 1912, the Porte had briefly closed the Straits to shipping during the Italian-Turkish War, Russia’s vulnerability had been painfully exposed: the volume of Black Sea exports dropped by one-third for the calendar year 1912, and revenue likewise dipped 30 percent, from 77 million pounds sterling (or nearly 800 million rubles) to 57 million (less than 600 million rubles). Heavy industry in the Ukraine, dependent on supplies imported directly through the Straits via the Black Sea, had nearly ground to a halt. Although the Straits remained open for commerce during the two Balkan wars, the general disruption to trade was already so damaging that Russia’s export revenue in 1913 was still 20 percent lower than in 1911. Because this revenue paid for the imports of manufactured components on which Russian industry increasingly depended, not least in the Ukraine and south Russia, the evaporation of the Black Sea export trade had devastated Russia’s recently favorable trade balance, with a surplus of some 430 million rubles in 1910 plummeting to 200 million in 1913. At this pace, Russia’s balance-of-payments surplus threatened to erode within a year or two, which would undermine her industrialization drive and, with it, her goal of remaining a great power.
To understand the overriding importance of the Straits question for Petersburg, however, we must go beyond numbers. Russia’s principal Black Sea export was grain. Over 20 million tons was shipped in both 1911 and 1912, of which nearly 90 percent was exported through the Bosphorus to world markets: the health of her entire agricultural economy now depended on unfettered Straits access. Stimulating grain production was, moreover, the key to Stolypin’s social reforms, which envisioned the creation of a stable class of successful peasant producers who would serve as a bulwark against anarchic social revolution. Ever since 1907 (and particularly following Stolypin’s death in 1911) these reforms had been overseen by Stolypin’s star protégé, Agriculture Minister Krivoshein. Krivoshein was universally believed to be the most powerful policymaker in Petersburg in 1914."

I would not call that a "mild downturn".

If that was true why didn't Russia threaten the Ottomans with war? A blockade is an act of war, under international war. What power would have defended Them?

 

[Tibi088]

If that was true why didn't Russia threaten the Ottomans with war? A blockade is an act of war, under international war. What power would have defended Them?

I cant find the actual treaty (was it still the Paris treaty that applied?) but im pretty sure the Ottomans were allowed to close the strairs when they were threatened. During both the Italian war and the Balkan wars the Ottomans were fighting navally superior powers so closing the straits as a mesure to defend the Capital was likely allowed for them.

And actually thats one of McMeekin's main arguments: he states that after this disruptions Russia came to the conclusion that the turks can no longer be trusted with the Straits and for the russians WWI was about acquaring the straits (but to do that they first have to defeat Austria and Germany). He also stresses the effect of the Liman Sanders mission on Russia.