WW1 Ceasefire

Before the U.S. enters WW1 European leaders come to their senses and propose a ceasefire realizing that an offensive by either side will eventually fail without foreign aid (US) as both sides have "bled out" and are seemingly impregnable by the other side. Possibility of war resuming after both sides have licked their wounds (possible alternate WW2 in 1939) however this would take years to do. Would you see the rise of the same political parties and groups of radicals that did in OTL?
 
Like most Great War AH proposals this one is so open ended it instantly crawls off in 360 directions. Need to clarify who the leaders are so we can make some assumptions about their post was decisions, how long they might hold power, ect... Also the nature of the armistice accords, the subsequent peace treaties structure, ect... ect...
 
One of the big issues with this type of proposal was that Germany would be conducting any discussions on the strength of holding near all of Belgium and a fair chunk of France.

The Entente would not be willing (read governments survive) to compromise and deal from a position of weakness and the Central powers would not want (read governments survive) to surrender some or all of its hard won territory.
 
Scenario for a cease fire:

Germany does not do unrestricted submarine warfare.

No USA entry means shortage of funds means no Major English or French attacks on the western front after a certain point.

However British and French armies are fine for defense. Allies will continue to rely on blockade and pick on Turkey.

However the Kerensky government, without USA entry, instead of launching a offensive, seeks a cease fire, this is granted by Germany in June 1917 as it relieves pressure on Turkey and Austria. German, Austrian and Turkish POWs are released. Russian POWs are released but Germans hold on to officers. Russians evacuate areas of Turkey they occupy, but otherwise front lines are kept, Russians are to assist mine sweeping in Baltic and Black seas. No official peace is made so no official trade occurs. Romania is forced into a cease fire as well and is forced to open the Danube to the Black sea for Central powers shipping.

Note: Greece remains neutral in this scenario as well.

Significant German and Austrian forces are released, however there is no pressing timetable to force an offensive because there is no USA in the war.

A Central powers major offensive in October 1917 (more than OTL) in Italy, takes Venice and forces a cease fire. Italy is required to evacuate Albania, Allies evacuate Salonika and Corfu to focus on Palestine and France.

Austria and Bulgaria are no longer really involved in the war although Austria sends a few good divisions to France.

1918 looms but Britain and France are still able to maintain a blockade and focused on defense for a year and without wasting offensives are able to hold off the German offensives which make progress but fail to take any key objectives like Amiens.

1919 rolls around and the Germans are really getting short of rubber and other strategic supplies. The lack of rubber alone means the inability to make good gas masks which may mean a surrender at some point in the future. There is some concern about the political situation in Germany as well.

June 1919. Allies agree to cease fire. POWs are exchanged. Germany evacuates most occupied territory without demolitions but keeps Liege, Namur and Briery and Longwy basins occupied until conclusion of a general peace. Germany allowed to import food only.

All powers meet in Netherlands to work out a general peace.
 
Scenario for a cease fire:

Germany does not do unrestricted submarine warfare.

No USA entry means shortage of funds means no Major English or French attacks on the western front after a certain point.

However British and French armies are fine for defense. Allies will continue to rely on blockade

Except that without US participation the blockade will be a lot less effective than OTL. US belligerency meant that exports to the Northern Neutrals could be controlled at source, which was what really made the blockade watertight.


1918 looms but Britain and France are still able to maintain a blockade and focused on defense for a year and without wasting offensives are able to hold off the German offensives which make progress but fail to take any key objectives like Amiens.

How can they "focus on defense for a year" absent US participation? With every bargaining chip that matters a hoot firmly in CP hands, a stalemate is no use. The Entente must at least dislodge the CP from France and Belgium in order to get a tolerable peace, and that requires more offensives, not less. Not that defensive battles were noticeably less costly than offensive ones.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Scenario for a cease fire:

Germany does not do unrestricted submarine warfare.

No USA entry means shortage of funds means no Major English or French attacks on the western front after a certain point.
The USW was only one point, that lead to the entry of the USA. IMHO the Zimmermenn-telegram was much more important to tip the tide against germany in USA.

However the Kerensky government, without USA entry, instead of launching a offensive, seeks a cease fire, this is granted by Germany in June 1917 as it relieves pressure on Turkey and Austria. German, Austrian and Turkish POWs are released. Russian POWs are released but Germans hold on to officers. Russians evacuate areas of Turkey they occupy, but otherwise front lines are kept, Russians are to assist mine sweeping in Baltic and Black seas. No official peace is made so no official trade occurs. Romania is forced into a cease fire as well and is forced to open the Danube to the Black sea for Central powers shipping.
After the February revolution the Lwow-goverment was fond of a peace with the CP "without annexiations and contributions". The Kerenski Offensive was meant to get into a better position for bargaining such an armistice/peace.
Therefore it would have happened anyway. ... IMHO

Note: Greece remains neutral in this scenario as well.
Difficult to achive. Only the King was really fond of helping the CP with staying out of the war (he did NOT wanted to enter on their side). And the offers of the Allies ... were just too tempting as well as a victoriuos Bulgaria wasn't the must wished for situation.

Significant German and Austrian forces are released, however there is no pressing timetable to force an offensive because there is no USA in the war.
The pressing timetable for germany was not only the USA entry but also (maybe even more important) their own deteriorating economic situation.

A Central powers major offensive in October 1917 (more than OTL) in Italy, takes Venice and forces a cease fire. Italy is required to evacuate Albania, Allies evacuate Salonika and Corfu to focus on Palestine and France.

Austria and Bulgaria are no longer really involved in the war although Austria sends a few good divisions to France.

1918 looms but Britain and France are still able to maintain a blockade and focused on defense for a year and without wasting offensives are able to hold off the German offensives which make progress but fail to take any key objectives like Amiens.
Fair enough your thoughts for 1917.
But ... keeping up the blockade without USA ... and were should they get the money (USA loans) for keeping their OWN troops going with enough supply ?

With amost a year of preparation - without further losses in the east - the german spring offensive of TTL 1918 would IMHO become devastating for the Allies, who by then would run on much shorter supply than OTL.
Good chances for germany to take Amiens as well as reach the channel coast, cutting off BEF from France proper with a second thrust against Paris then.

But ... beside, what I've said about Russia and Kerensky ...
as with every WW I ATL, the main problem is to really keep the USA out of the game, which is more complicated to achive, than one might think of in the beginning.
 
Except that without US participation the blockade will be a lot less effective than OTL. US belligerency meant that exports to the Northern Neutrals could be controlled at source, which was what really made the blockade watertight.




How can they "focus on defense for a year" absent US participation? With every bargaining chip that matters a hoot firmly in CP hands, a stalemate is no use. The Entente must at least dislodge the CP from France and Belgium in order to get a tolerable peace, and that requires more offensives, not less. Not that defensive battles were noticeably less costly than offensive ones.

I see what you are saying, but.

I am thinking the while the blockade would be looser, but take Rubber, were not all the sources under Allied control, even in 1916, before USA entry, the shortage of copper for fungicides, turnip winter, and the general low calories. At some point that really starts to have an impact if its 1919, 1929 or 1921. Its the Allies best bargaining chip, that and they control all the German colonies, if they can force the war to be long, time is still on their side.

As far as focusing on defense, I am thinking the fact that the Allies aren't doing offensives because they have less shells for the barrage, less tanks, so they are taking less casualties, perhaps spending 1917 building trench systems with defense in mind. At least the allies have suffered less shipping losses without unrestricted submarine warfare, and aren't trying to subsidize a Kerensky government or maintain a Salonika bridgehead or even subsidize Italy after a point so there are some savings there.

Britain, the leading player just has to ensure at a minimum, after the war, that Germany isn't installed on the Belgian coast and that France is a strong independent power still, seems like some bargaining room, even if the Germans end up with Liege and Lithuania. Britain might even be able to pick up a colony or two and southern Iraq in the deal.
 
With amost a year of preparation - without further losses in the east - the german spring offensive of TTL 1918 would IMHO become devastating for the Allies, who by then would run on much shorter supply than OTL.
Good chances for germany to take Amiens as well as reach the channel coast, cutting off BEF from France proper with a second thrust against Paris then.

That is the basic question of no USA in the war scenarios, can the Allies hold out against a bigger German army, with less funds of their own. Can anyone really know that for sure?

How many more offensive capable divisions with ample artillery could the Germans create? The still have to maintain some forces east to watch whatever is happening in Russia and the Austrians wouldn't contribute much even if unoccupied. Perhaps the Germans try George (Georgette) as the first attack in this TL, since waiting until April wouldn't matter so much, perhaps they wouldn't get lucky with the timing of the removal of the Portuguese corps. It seems where ever the Allies were ready in strength in the important areas, (Arras) the offensives went badly.
 
The USW was only one point, that lead to the entry of the USA. IMHO the Zimmermenn-telegram was much more important to tip the tide against germany in USA.

The primary point of the Zimmermann note was to inform their ambassador in Mexico of the resumption of USW. Without said USW, there would be no note, and no proviso about siccing the Mexicans on the US.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
The primary point of the Zimmermann note was to inform their ambassador in Mexico of the resumption of USW. Without said, USW, there would be no note, and no proviso about siccing the Mexicans on the US.
As far as I got it this message was mainly an offer to Mexico to enter the war on CP side and attack USA on land ... a thought present in the foreign office in Berlin for some time already.
... before decision for restarting USW
 
As far as I got it this message was mainly an offer to Mexico to enter the war on CP side and attack USA on land ... a thought present in the foreign office in Berlin for some time already.
... before decision for restarting USW

Nope, here's the text in full:

"We intend to begin on the first of February unrestricted submarine warfare. We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you. You will inform the President of the above most secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States of America is certain and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, invite Japan to immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves. Please call the President's attention to the fact that the ruthless employment of our submarines now offers the prospect of compelling England in a few months to make peace." Signed, ZIMMERMANN

Note the first two sentences; ideally, they'd have kept the US out of the war while still pursuing USW. The alliance with Mexico was just a stupid idea floated in the event that they found themselves at war anyways. Self-fulfilling prophecy, basically.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Ok, got your point about the telegram.

However I would assume, that this
"... Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. ...."
part had much more of an impact on public opinion in the US at that time, than the part of submarine warfare, that was already around for some years and ... maybe even expected by a large portion of the public - at that time.
 
Ok, got your point about the telegram.

However I would assume, that thispart had much more of an impact on public opinion in the US at that time, than the part of submarine warfare, that was already around for some years and ... maybe even expected by a large portion of the public - at that time.

Well, yeah, that was the clincher. Still, like I said, the telegram was primarily about USW, so without that, the more offensive parts of the telegram are also butterfly bait.
 
I see what you are saying, but.

I am thinking the while the blockade would be looser, but take Rubber, were not all the sources under Allied control, even in 1916, before USA entry, the shortage of copper for fungicides, turnip winter, and the general low calories. At some point that really starts to have an impact if its 1919, 1929 or 1921. Its the Allies best bargaining chip, that and they control all the German colonies, if they can force the war to be long, time is still on their side.

1919 is irrelevant as there's no way the war goes more than a few weeks into it. Whichever side thinks they are losing is certain to launch an offensive no later than 1918

As far as focusing on defense, I am thinking the fact that the Allies aren't doing offensives because they have less shells for the barrage, less tanks, so they are taking less casualties, perhaps spending 1917 building trench systems with defense in mind. At least the allies have suffered less shipping losses without unrestricted submarine warfare, and aren't trying to subsidize a Kerensky government or maintain a Salonika bridgehead or even subsidize Italy after a point so there are some savings there.
The absence of USW wouldn't necessarily reduce shipping losses, which were already rising fast even before it commenced. It just means that fewer (if any) American ships get sunk by torpedo, so that (as the torpedoes won't be wasted) a correspondingly greater number of Allied ones will be. The total tonnage sunk won't necessarily fall, and if the absence of the USN leads to convoying being delayed, it might even increase. But in any event the absence of unsecured US loans will curtail Allied imports far more than the U-boats ever could.

As to standing on the defensive, that only became an option after April 6, 1917. If the Entente see themselves running out of shells or other essentials, they will throw what they have into an attempt to get a knock-out while they still can. To do otherwise would be to admit that they couldn't win on the battlefield, and lead to a collapse of morale, as it did OTL in Germany. [/quote]
 

Perkeo

Banned
The more I think about it the less I understand why no party ever made serious attempts to offer a peace short og the total destruction and humiliation of their enemies. What was the reason for that?

There was no real ethnical, religious or ideological dispute (those who say it was Democracy vs. Autocracy may kindly explain the allegiance of Czarist Russia...), no reason to reject a white peace that all bellingerents could sell as a successful defense.

Neither side could hope to put down their respective enemies for good. France was there, Britain was there, Russia was there and Germany was there, all had a strong economic potential and would remain so in the long term. So why not accept that?

There were lots of reasons to expect WWI would end exactly as it did, with irreparable damage to all of the war party, victors and loosers alike.
 
The more I think about it the less I understand why no party ever made serious attempts to offer a peace short og the total destruction and humiliation of their enemies. What was the reason for that?

There was no real ethnical, religious or ideological dispute (those who say it was Democracy vs. Autocracy may kindly explain the allegiance of Czarist Russia...), no reason to reject a white peace that all bellingerents could sell as a successful defense.

Neither side could hope to put down their respective enemies for good. France was there, Britain was there, Russia was there and Germany was there, all had a strong economic potential and would remain so in the long term. So why not accept that?

There were lots of reasons to expect WWI would end exactly as it did, with irreparable damage to all of the war party, victors and loosers alike.


The late AJP Taylor put it in a nutshell "What was compromise for one [side] represented defeat for the other."

For the CPs, just handing back all their conquests without getting anything in return would look like defeat. For the Entente, allowing the CP to keep their conquests (or having to buy them out with major concessions elsewhere) represented defeat.

And both sides had been maintaining morale by whipping up their populations into a "feeding frenzy" of hate for the enemy, and presenting victory as essential to national survival. So having to admit failure was likely to mean political ruin or worse for the leaders concerned.

So neither side could consider compromise until they had given up all hope of victory - and then of course their compromise proposals would be rejected by the other side. Quoting Taylor again "The military success necessary for a compromise peace would, in fact, be followed by a dictated peace".
 

Perkeo

Banned
The late AJP Taylor put it in a nutshell "What was compromise for one [side] represented defeat for the other."

For the CPs, just handing back all their conquests without getting anything in return would look like defeat. For the Entente, allowing the CP to keep their conquests (or having to buy them out with major concessions elsewhere) represented defeat.

And both sides had been maintaining morale by whipping up their populations into a "feeding frenzy" of hate for the enemy, and presenting victory as essential to national survival. So having to admit failure was likely to mean political ruin or worse for the leaders concerned.

So neither side could consider compromise until they had given up all hope of victory - and then of course their compromise proposals would be rejected by the other side. Quoting Taylor again "The military success necessary for a compromise peace would, in fact, be followed by a dictated peace".

But why? WWI was not the first time in history when two equal parties were fighting with a war of attrition that was obviously leading to mutual destruction unless someone says the 3 magic words: status quo ante

So why did no one say them?

AFAIK, the Entente was no more willing to consider a white peace when able to continue the war than Germany was
 
But why? WWI was not the first time in history when two equal parties were fighting with a war of attrition that was obviously leading to mutual destruction unless someone says the 3 magic words: status quo ante

So why did no one say them?

People seldom did.

Pre-1914 I can't think of a case since the War of 1812.


AFAIK, the Entente was no more willing to consider a white peace when able to continue the war than Germany was

Once in a position to win the war, it didn't need to. Had it been losing it would have needed to - but then Germany wouldn't have agreed.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
In late 1916, early 1917, the goverments of both sides, CP as well as Entente were caught so deep in their own propaganda and mobilizing civil society - home front for the only solution - victory, that they were blatantly unable to go for a peace without tangible assets won.

Yeah there were exemptions, like the "Peace Resolution" of the Reichstag. But nothing to 'impress' the mayority of the people.

From late 1914 onwards the officials were praying :
"All our beloved lost ones ! Don#T let their death be futile !"

And with the casualties not ending to pile up they only raised this debt against the 'people' to make their deaths and suffers pay.
In the thoughts of the 'leaders' it played a big role : if I don't adress this 'debt' I won't be leader for any much longer ...
 
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