WW1 Cavalry-Mechanized Group?

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Deleted member 1487

For 1918 could the Allies have put together a sort of cavalry-mechanized group for their Hundred Days offensive? The Soviets were able to make use of them quite effectively in 1944-45, including in the Manchurian Offensive.

Clearly tanks won't be an option for exploitation due to the technology issues, but how about motorized infantry+towed artillery and armored cars coupled with artillery after 'shock' army of tanks+heavy artillery+infantry have ruptured the German force lines, like at Amiens in August 1918?
British armored cars and cavalry were important to the Palestine Offensive, which is often considered a proto-'Blitzkrieg':
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southern_Palestine_Offensive

Cavalry was even used coupled with motorized units in the Syria-Lebanon campaign of 1941:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria–Lebanon_Campaign#British_plan_of_attack

Thoughts?
 
WW1! I'm not sure the mechanical half could keep up with the equine half in that time frame. By WW2, the armored cars and light tanks were more reliable, but, WW1...that's questionable.
 

Deleted member 1487

WW1! I'm not sure the mechanical half could keep up with the equine half in that time frame. By WW2, the armored cars and light tanks were more reliable, but, WW1...that's questionable.
In the 1917 Palestine Offensive they did.
 
Precisely. The operations in Palestine were a precursor to light mobile forces in many armies of the 1920s & 1930s.

The trick, in 1918 Flanders or elsewhere in France is getting the rupture, & then the timing for deploying this cavalry force. A exploitation force needs to have the fire power & depth to deal with likely enemy reserves.1939-45 the various armies made this work, but with the use of medium tanks of sufficient numbers.
 

Deleted member 1487

Precisely. The operations in Palestine were a precursor to light mobile forces in many armies of the 1920s & 1930s.

The trick, in 1918 Flanders or elsewhere in France is getting the rupture, & then the timing for deploying this cavalry force. A exploitation force needs to have the fire power & depth to deal with likely enemy reserves.1939-45 the various armies made this work, but with the use of medium tanks of sufficient numbers.
Sure. It seems like there were chances for that to work in 1918 during the Hundred Days, but for the lack of effort in that direction given that every time they had tried to create a rupture for cavalry they had failed...then proceeded to create the opportunities in 1918 then not followed up on them due to not having an exploitation force ready.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rolls-Royce_Armoured_Car
The RR armored car did have reliability and utility to be useful for exploitation assuming the Cavalry Corps was still intact and ready to go in 1918 on the Western Front, perhaps during the Battle of Amiens or during the breaking of the Hindenburg Line. They'd have to have so mission tasked air support I'd think.
Fuller did have the idea for Plan 1919:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_1919
Fuller's plan had three elements. The first was a fast attack by medium tanks and aircraft against the German headquarters, removing its ability to control their forces. Then the main assault by heavy tanks, infantry and artillery would make break the German lines. Finally cavalry, light tanks and infantry mounted on trucks would follow the retreating Germans preventing them from reforming or counterattacking.[4]
 
Still, sounds like a waste of cavalry until the mech side catches up on reliability. Smacks of special ops level planning and support, pre-deployment, then limited staying power after surprise and novelty wears off.
 

Deleted member 1487

Still, sounds like a waste of cavalry until the mech side catches up on reliability. Smacks of special ops level planning and support, pre-deployment, then limited staying power after surprise and novelty wears off.
For 1916 yes, but in 1918 by August and increasingly so later on in the year, the German army was broken and ripe for even just a cavalry force moving forward quickly to prevent the line from solidifying again and German reserves getting a chance to delay the advance or the retreating army to recover it's willing resist.

Edit:
apparently in 1919 there would have been the mechanized reach:
https://translate.google.com/transl....wikipedia.org/wiki/Medium_Mark_D&prev=search
 
Please note that in 1918/19 the fastest way to got a rifle man cross country was by horse

Cavalry in WW1 - well British Cavalry anyway - were 'dragoons' ie horse mounted riflemen - the Horse was simply to get them from A to B much faster than walking and with less fatigue

They were not Lancers etc - not intended to charge at their enemies

The disadvantage of a 'Cavalry' Battalion was that it was only 2/3s the strength of an Infantry Battalion further compounded by every 4th man being used to look after 3 other troopers horses after they had dismounted for combat and retire away from the actual combat to a position of relative safety - effectively reducing the unit fighting strength to half that of its Infantry Equivalent - indeed for much of the war Cavalry Brigades rotating into the front lines provided a single composite infantry Battalion pulled from its 3 Cavalry 'Regiments' and would take over a portion of the line that their parent Division/Corps was holding.

The Communication and tribal knowledge necessary for the exploitation of such a force on the Western Front was in its infancy in WW1 and it was only when the Germans were Crumbling in the 2nd half of 1918 that they might have made this work!
 

Deleted member 1487

Please note that in 1918/19 the fastest way to got a rifle man cross country was by horse

Cavalry in WW1 - well British Cavalry anyway - were 'dragoons' ie horse mounted riflemen - the Horse was simply to get them from A to B much faster than walking and with less fatigue

They were not Lancers etc - not intended to charge at their enemies

The disadvantage of a 'Cavalry' Battalion was that it was only 2/3s the strength of an Infantry Battalion further compounded by every 4th man being used to look after 3 other troopers horses after they had dismounted for combat and retire away from the actual combat to a position of relative safety - effectively reducing the unit fighting strength to half that of its Infantry Equivalent - indeed for much of the war Cavalry Brigades rotating into the front lines provided a single composite infantry Battalion pulled from its 3 Cavalry 'Regiments' and would take over a portion of the line that their parent Division/Corps was holding.
Sure, but their mobility and ability to have horses carry heavier weapons, like say extra Lewis guns and ammo, gives them an advantage over foot infantry marching to battle. Remember in WW2 motorized divisions had only 6 battalions to a foot division's 9, yet they were more powerful because of their mobility and firepower.

The Communication and tribal knowledge necessary for the exploitation of such a force on the Western Front was in its infancy in WW1 and it was only when the Germans were Crumbling in the 2nd half of 1918 that they might have made this work!
Sure, which is exactly what I'm proposing.
 
Sure, but their mobility and ability to have horses carry heavier weapons, like say extra Lewis guns and ammo, gives them an advantage over foot infantry marching to battle. Remember in WW2 motorized divisions had only 6 battalions to a foot division's 9, yet they were more powerful because of their mobility and firepower.


Sure, which is exactly what I'm proposing.

Yes On both counts - I'm in full agreement (PS - the British Armoured division had only 4 Infantry Battalions by 44!)
 
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