WW1 Breakout into the north sea?

. A crew which has been operating in "long winter nights in stormy weather", for much longer than they are used to, is fully aware the fleet is running low on supplies, and can see the extent to which their ships efficiency has been degraded by the weather- maybe they balk when asked to try and make the run up the Channel, take command from the officers, and sail the ship to Spain to be interned instead.


That would be an awesome timeline, worthy of a turtledove. Someone should write it.
 
The Royal Navy has more battleships than the German Navy. If the German Navy manages to get some of their battleships into the North Atlantic, the Royal Navy still has more battleships than they do.

When hunting raiders, the defender is always obliged to commit disproportionate resources to have any chance for success. Since the RN did have more dreadnoughts, the only possible way for the HSF to even the field in the North Sea in preparation for operations there would be to compel the RN to detach a disproportionate number of ships.

The HSF has no idea what choice has been made: They don't have an effective spy network, they don't have signal intelligence, they don't have anything but guesswork.

Welcome to naval warfare 101. Both sides would be operating in an intelligence vacuum, trying to distinguish where and when to strike. On the German side, the problems are well known. On the British side, the uncertainty as to the size of a raiding fleet and the large volume of sea it could disappear into was paramount, because both would be barriers to responding efficiently. In the North Sea, the German navy always retained the initiative for the offensive, and for Jellicoe the nightmare was that the HSF would exercise that capacity for initiative at the moment most inconvenient for him - while his own fleet was dispersed and weakened. Hence his strong resistance at all times to requests for detachments.

The biggest ship the Germans managed to get through the Northern Blockade was a 23,000 ton passenger liner sailing on its own. If they try and send three capital ships plus destroyers and a fleet train, the British will notice

The convoy principle says something completely different.

One of the other bits of your scenario which I was struggling with is more pertinent: how the Germans are going to secure numerical superiority at any point,

But the HSF did not require numerical superiority to justify a battle. Something near parity would do just fine. On the other side, the RN did not want to engage in a fleet action with less than a 50% superiority in numbers.

Particularly if the crew realises that the longer they stay out, the less chance they have of actually making it back.

Break-in operations should be less risky than break-out operations for a number of reasons.

Lower decks are a terrible place for rumours to spread....

Catching and killing raiders without suffering undue losses is what would end any German aggressive tactics, and cause the HSF to revert to inactivity. Then again, the HSF was as capable of the mission of doing nothing with 10 dreadnoughts rusting as with 17, right?
 
In the aftermath of the Dogger Bank debacle, the German Navy mistakenly believed that the reason as to why the British were so well prepared for them was because an enemy agent was relaying movements of HSF ships, although they also did consider the possibility that their codes had been breached. So, to me that is a 50/50 chance that the Germans might get it right.

Perhaps they decide instead of the erroneous idea that spies are watching the Fleet bases, that their codes are being read and they change them. That ups their game right there does it not? Although, perhaps the Brits will be more squeamish in facing Germany if they don't know what the HSF is up to and are afraid of getting caught in a trap. Or I could be wrong, and events will still unfold in some form as otl with Jutland. As I have mentioned before, sacking von Ingenohl was a stupid move on the part of the Kaiser; perhaps Tirpitz could intervene to save his career, convincing Wilhelm that the loss at Dogger Bank was not von Ingenohl's fault.
 
In the aftermath of the Dogger Bank debacle, the German Navy mistakenly believed that the reason as to why the British were so well prepared for them was because an enemy agent was relaying movements of HSF ships, although they also did consider the possibility that their codes had been breached. So, to me that is a 50/50 chance that the Germans might get it right.

Perhaps they decide instead of the erroneous idea that spies are watching the Fleet bases, that their codes are being read and they change them. That ups their game right there does it not? Although, perhaps the Brits will be more squeamish in facing Germany if they don't know what the HSF is up to and are afraid of getting caught in a trap. Or I could be wrong, and events will still unfold in some form as otl with Jutland. As I have mentioned before, sacking von Ingenohl was a stupid move on the part of the Kaiser; perhaps Tirpitz could intervene to save his career, convincing Wilhelm that the loss at Dogger Bank was not von Ingenohl's fault.


If they know their codes are being read, it presents them with a golden opportunity. Less so if they merely suspect it.

Maybe have something that occur that gives the German Admiralty 100% (or as near to it as possible) certainty that their codes have been broken and are being read by the British. Perhaps a British defector (however far fetched that is :p)

That way they could actually do what they'd always dreamed of, cook up a way to divide the British fleet and then destroy it in detail separately.
 
If they know their codes are being read, it presents them with a golden opportunity. Less so if they merely suspect it.

Maybe have something that occur that gives the German Admiralty 100% (or as near to it as possible) certainty that their codes have been broken and are being read by the British. Perhaps a British defector (however far fetched that is :p)

That way they could actually do what they'd always dreamed of, cook up a way to divide the British fleet and then destroy it in detail separately.

I suppose they could do something akin to a Midway, but most likely you would need somebody with the balls to probably lie about the risk to the Fleet. Unless you keep von Ingenohl, you need the Kaiser's permission for any engagement involving the heavy ships of the Navy, and Wilhelm was quite concerned about "his" dreadnoughts being sunk. A foolish attitude really, but there you go.
 
Perhaps Churchill pushes for the Royal Navy to penetrate the Baltic? The Kattegat would be a hell of a bad place for the Navy to pass through and undoubtedly even worse for a battle to take place. Maybe before Jutland Churchill decides the Navy needs another adventure like Gallipoli? Thoughts?
 

BlondieBC

Banned
The German navy did not require dreadnoughts for those missions.

They require some even if we see prestige as unimportant. Just not as many as were built. You can look at A-H versus her opponents in WW1 to see the need for these capital ships.

First you have coastal guns, but these can be overwhelmed at least temporarily. So it helps to have the ability to send larger ships to help. It also gives you the ability to react. It makes the opposing admirals job much harder.

It also makes it much harder to clear minefields with smaller ships. There is a pattern where you tend to send in destroyers to cover the mine clearers. The other side can defeat you by bringing in cruisers. You can counter with the capital ships and fight major battle. At your advantage. You do need capital ships, just in case.

You can also look at amphibious landings of both the Germans and UK to see how capital ship strength helps. You need them to protect transports. To deal with shoreguns in small areas.

Now the problem was the Germans built too much big stuff, not its short range. From memory, the Germans had about 55% of the size of the UK capital fleet, but only 30% in cruiser and smaller. Move this to more like 45% capital and 40% smaller ships, and you get a much better fleet for the Germans. And lower tensions.

I did not do it because I wanted a U-boat T-L, but I can write a TL where the Germans vastly overperform OTL with no extra U-boat capability by building fewer BB and spending the money on ALMOST anything else. Coastal guns, mines, marines, torpedo boats, long range cruisers, short range cruisers, air planes, etc. But you tend to have so many butterflies because you start out with a POD 10 years before WW1, you don't get OTL WW1.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
It's a pity no one told them that then:p

I know you are joking, but RN admirals told them that repeatedly. PreWar. They called it the "second class" navy strategy. And they were right. While it may be hard to believe, all I did for my TL was follow the recommendations of British Admirals for the German Navy. All these recommendations were 1903 to 1913 time frame.

While it looks bizarre in hindsight, having lightly fortified ports with cruisers, torpedo boats, marines, and U-boats around the world would have made sense to the British Admirals. These ships would have been hugely useful in a war against France both by protecting (in a limited way) German merchant ships and by harassing French trade.

The UK simply would not have reacted to 2-3 additional fortified German ports in colonies. Each with a battalion or two of marines, 3-6 light cruisers, 12-24 torpedo boats and 6-18 submarines. In fact, you can look at the German ships at Tsingtao and the location of UK ships at the start of WW1 to see how little they cared about the Germans overseas ships. And the capital ships that ended up in the Ottoman Navy were on there way to China via the Suez. So even putting a few capital ships overseas would not always upset the UK.

Don't confuse post war CYA stuff by British Admirals for their real positions prewar or in 1914.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Told them that coastal artillery and mines were the primary means to defend coasts? They already knew that.

They are part of the solution, just like tank barriers and infantry with anti-tank weapons are a PART of the solution to enemy tanks. You also need your own armor formations to have a good land military.

The same is true of 1914 navies. You need BB, CA, DD, Torpedo boats, submarines, supply ships, marines, coastal guns, and mines. The question is what ratio maximize any given great power budget.

The items you list alone will simply not work. You need the complete package for any hope of stopping a determined attack.
 
Building...

No matter the plans and schemes of the times, Germany HAD to have a decent number of dreadnoughts. Even a Kaiser that didn't give a darn about the navy needs some. In the prewar era, they were a symbol of being a major power. Given a need for them, the challenge becomes what to build, and how many. (This is my opinion of the minimum fleet for prewar politics, NOT a military assessment.)

There is a minimum figure for how many. It's not a hard number, but a comparison to other nations. IMVHO, anything less than number three would be unacceptable, since Germany is one of the major powers of the world. My reasoning: Britain has been number one, and is primarily a naval power. No political need to come close to them, and plenty of political reasons not to. Challenging Britain's dominance is an existential threat to Britain--and presenting an empire with an existential threat is never a good idea...

USA: Strategically unimportant--seen as not playing the Great Game--and by then, smart folk wouldn't want to get the USA interested in playing. The naval direction of the USA isn't important unless it looks like waking up.

Everyone else is a second rate industrial power compared to Germany, and a superior fleet drives home that message to everyone in Europe. A fleet better than Russia and France combined might be desirable. Quiet communications with Britain could convey that Germany is NOT out to challenge the Royal Navy.

What to build is another story, and one I'm not awake enough to contemplate right now.
 
They require some even if we see prestige as unimportant. Just not as many as were built. You can look at A-H versus her opponents in WW1 to see the need for these capital ships.

But AH actually had no military need for capital ships, as the near complete inactivity of its few battleships demonstrated during the war. Austria's long Adriatic coast was defended mostly by way of the fact that the rugged terrain and lack of communications or anything important there made landings somewhat pointless. Austria's battleship fleet was symbolic, a prewar political gesture to signify that, because it could construct battleships, it was a Great Power.

It also makes it much harder to clear minefields with smaller ships. There is a pattern where you tend to send in destroyers to cover the mine clearers. The other side can defeat you by bringing in cruisers. You can counter with the capital ships and fight major battle. At your advantage. You do need capital ships, just in case.
The German navy, without a single capital ship sortie in four years, managed to defend the Belgian coast with nothing but seaplanes, coastal guns and minefields. The approaches to and from the submarine bases there were never effectively blocked. This was accomplished because battleships were neither useful nor required for coastal defence. Conversely, the British *were* able to fortify the Dover Straights because, in 1914, when the German army had its only chance to take it, Moltke had no idea that Calais and Boulogne were important objectives. Why? Because the German navy had not done its job and told him. Why did the German navy overlook so obvious a positional advantage? Because its mission and doctrine were rubbish and it was not paying attention to crucial details, like Antwerp as a major forward base and the implication of coastal artillery covering the Straights of Dover.

Now the problem was the Germans built too much big stuff, not its short range. From memory, the Germans had about 55% of the size of the UK capital fleet, but only 30% in cruiser and smaller.
For capital ships, the problem was neither the range of the ships, (Kaiser's 8000nm cruise range in deep load was adequate) nor the numbers. The problem was that the German Navy had serious doctrinal problems from the top down and in many respects was not actually a fighting force, but rather a trophy or prize on display. People often think of the Kaiser's meddling and the fleet's timid inactivity, but it went deeper than that. In reading Massie's Dreadnought, it is striking that virtually !all! the technical and doctrinal innovations in the pre-war period were introduced by the British Royal Navy. There were no industrial or technical reasons for that. Rather, it went to the "trophy wife" nature of the political culture within the German Navy.

The German submarine navy, apparently/ironically, due to its comparatively low status managed to avoid the corruption that plagued the command and control of the surface navy, hence evolved into a decent fighting force capable of accepting the level of attrition that politics prevented the surface fleet from accepting, (ie, 50%-75% of dreadnoughts sunk in combat during the war).

Move this to more like 45% capital and 40% smaller ships, and you get a much better fleet for the Germans. And lower tensions.
A war navy would have done well to shift tonnage to light cruisers, but a 'trophy wife' navy demands battleships. The way I see it, of the capital ships, the Deutchland Class was a huge mistake and should never have been built. The Nassau Class was acceptable with reciprocating engines as a transitional design, but should have been limited to two ships and 12" guns, while the Heligolands should have been with turbines. The ratio of BC's to BB's should have been 50/50. By the time of the Kaisers, Tirpitz had no doctrinal excuse not to have figured out that his dreadnoughts had to be both 2kt faster than a British dreadnought and with 13.5" guns, not 12" guns. Had one of the Kaiser Class been sacrificed, I think the navy could have taken on 8 ships of well rounded designs of 8x13.5" guns each,
heavy armour, and 23kt. Once the war broke out, all capital ship long lead construction, (Baden, etc) should have been terminated and focus placed on light cruisers intead. With respect to light cruisers, these should have been with 6" guns much earlier, and a couple thousand tons heavier for better flexibility.

I did not do it because I wanted a U-boat T-L, but I can write a TL where the Germans vastly overperform OTL with no extra U-boat capability by building fewer BB and spending the money on ALMOST anything else. Coastal guns, mines, marines, torpedo boats, long range cruisers, short range cruisers, air planes, etc. But you tend to have so many butterflies because you start out with a POD 10 years before WW1, you don't get OTL WW1.
You don't need a POD 10 years beforehand. All you need is a navy that is willing to fight, and innovate to do so. Want more range and at sea refuelling? Remove Konig's center turret and replace it with a coaling facility, and convert an ocean liner to be able to conveyor coal straight into the hole while underway in the North Atlantic.
 
Last edited:
The items you list alone will simply not work. You need the complete package for any hope of stopping a determined attack.

The German navy's war in Belgium 1914-1918 is completely inexplicable save for the fact that nothing beyond minesweepers, artillery, mines, seaplanes and infantry, backed by a good rail service, was required for effective coastal defence.
 
Last edited:
The UK simply would not have reacted to 2-3 additional fortified German ports in colonies. Each with a battalion or two of marines, 3-6 light cruisers, 12-24 torpedo boats and 6-18 submarines. In fact, you can look at the German ships at Tsingtao and the location of UK ships at the start of WW1 to see how little they cared about the Germans overseas ships. And the capital ships that ended up in the Ottoman Navy were on there way to China via the Suez. So even putting a few capital ships overseas would not always upset the UK.

The HSF investing in overseas bases, IMO, was a losing strategy all the way, because the capacity to exercise seapower in its amphibious form lay with the British, and any German base, (fortified or otherwise), could become a target for invasion should it prove to be a real thorn in the lion's paw. The Japanese siege of Tsingtao, a base which did not recoup the investment made in it, would have been repeated elsewhere.

What the HSF needed was constant training in North Atlantic/North Sea heavy weather conditions, better doctrine for the exploitation of Norwegian, Danish, etc., neutrality, more investment in specialised fleet train support, a sense of economic purpose in the navy's mission with respect to blockade tactics, and a clear understanding of what direction international law should have taken in order to support the fleet's strategic aims. Had its construction program actually been tailored to support the achievement of a proper war strategy, even better.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Let's say the Germans get four capital ships out into the Atlantic. Let's further assume that the Brits send out twelve capital ships in return.

Okay...
Now the German plan part two comes into action. A battle with the Grand Fleet!
Except...
Why, precisely, does the Grand Fleet need to engage at the moment of greatest disadvantage, when at most a wait of two or three days will see things back to how they were?
Unless the German plan is to somehow get a complete amphibious invasion across the North Sea under what will still be a considerable numerical disadvantage in battle line (in which case, sure, both sides take a few dings and scratches but the Germans most likely lose a large land force...) then the Grand Fleet can just... wait.
 
Let's say the Germans get four capital ships out into the Atlantic. Let's further assume that the Brits send out twelve capital ships in return.

Okay...
Now the German plan part two comes into action. A battle with the Grand Fleet!
Except...
Why, precisely, does the Grand Fleet need to engage at the moment of greatest disadvantage, when at most a wait of two or three days will see things back to how they were?

My guess would be along the lines of something like that the entire High Seas Fleet had just been sited closing in on Scapa Flow and would soon be within artillery range of the anchorage? (The idea of a landing is interesting, but why mess around with half measures? If the numbers said, 'go', and the HSF knew the numbers were favorable, then Scheer should just cut to it and go for the jugular at Scapa, shouldn't he?)
 
Rule of unintended consequences here i think. Most of the HSF torpedo boats did not have the range to make Scapa and back, so such an action may well give the RN a decisive advantage in Torpedo attack capability, and then there are the minefields.

Be awesome if the HSF bait force get home to find out they are all that is left.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
My guess would be along the lines of something like that the entire High Seas Fleet had just been sited closing in on Scapa Flow and would soon be within artillery range of the anchorage? (The idea of a landing is interesting, but why mess around with half measures? If the numbers said, 'go', and the HSF knew the numbers were favorable, then Scheer should just cut to it and go for the jugular at Scapa, shouldn't he?)
What the christ?

Why would they even...
Scapa's well defended! Also there's the traditional advantages of operating close to base - torpedo boats as mentioned.
There's a good reason the RN never tried to blow Kiel or Wilhelmshafen to bits, except by using aircraft.
 
My guess would be along the lines of something like that the entire High Seas Fleet had just been sited closing in on Scapa Flow and would soon be within artillery range of the anchorage? (The idea of a landing is interesting, but why mess around with half measures? If the numbers said, 'go', and the HSF knew the numbers were favorable, then Scheer should just cut to it and go for the jugular at Scapa, shouldn't he?)
I take it then that room 40 has vanished into a vacuum never to be heard from???

Seems that the German navy had a habit of reporting it's position on a daily basis(to be repeated by the uboats of ww2) and the British had a habit of intercepting and decoding all these messages on a regular basis,and locating by RDF.

So sneaking up on Scapa just ain t going to happen,and as the RN knows where the decoy force is going and it's makeup then only one sufficient force would be sent to intercept them.
Likewise when the HSF moves on Scapa the rest of the Grand Fleet will already be out and about.:eek:
 
What the christ?

Why would they even...
Scapa's well defended!

We should let Massie know to revise Castles of Steel, and that Jellicoe was actually wrong to fear submarine or massed destroyer attacks on his virtually defenceless base of Scapa during the winter of 1914/1915. Jellicoe no doubt would be quite bemused to discover his decision to rebase the Grand Fleet at Lough Swilly while the worst of the defence deficiencies were rectified was unjustified.

Also there's the traditional advantages of operating close to base - torpedo boats as mentioned.

Sorry, my bad. I thought we were discussing whether the HSF could seek the annihilation of a large chunk of the Grand Fleet in a sudden offensive action during a period of temporary advantage, and assumed that since a major deterrent to attacking the GF was inferior battleship numbers, the HSF could seek out the GF fleet back "at its place" without hesitation should the situation prove favorable.

In terms of torpedo boat radius,

http://germannavalwarfare.info/01gnw/hw7/inet0/023x.JPG

Is the distance of the 1918 HSF sortie to Norway. Ballpark for Scapa.
 
Top