I agree about the Hundred Days. Since the Germans were standing deep in Entente territory, an offensive (or in this case counteroffensive) was plainly necessary in order to expel them.
In the Russian case, though, it was not the German advance of Feb 1918 which defeated the Russian army. That had ceased to exist already, because the troops had had a bellyful and "voted with their feet" against continuing the war.
I feel you confuse military and political issues. Defeating the army is not the objective, it's a prerequisite to the objective, which is to end the war; to return to normality and to exploit the gains won. History clearly shows that the advance was required to end the war in the east in a sensible timeframe.
OTL it was far easier and more effective to home brew the nitrates
Why would the British have any vessels on station at American ports?
Any German merchantman making a run for Germany can only go in one direction very slowly - directly towards the Grand Fleet and the heart of British Naval power. The only hope any German ships have to survive such a journey is to avoid detection, something that is extraordinarily unlikely if you tether a Garman warship squadron to a slow moving flotilla of merchant ships.
In 1914 around 60% of British calories were imported and during WW1 the vast majority of those imports were from North America. If the US does not extend unsecured credit to the Entente, any alternative sources of food would require 200-300% more shipping resources, which as previous mentioned, the Entente did not have. It was not just the Entente war effort that was dependent on US imports.
In terms of British naval power, the GIUK gap and the English Channel are, in Grand Fleet naval terms, two very different locations. The Grand Fleet cannot be in both at once and the High Seas Fleet is strong enough that a Channel raid could be very damaging. If it is in the GIUK gap searching for blockade runners, then what shall prevent the High Seas Fleet from entering the English Channel? Nothing, save for uncertainty in the location of the Grand Fleet. If the Grand Fleet is in the North Sea preventing the High Seas Fleet from making a nuisance of itself in the Channel, then what prevents a blockade running convoy from getting through? Nothing. By challenging the blockade to the north of Scotland, the HSF would have improved its local prospects as well. Is a convoy going to run the GIUK gap in the next two weeks? Then the HSF should be active in the North Sea.
I sort of agree, the Germans used fleet movement to cover the transfer of destroyers to Flanders and other things. The problem is that the Northern Patrol, 10 armoured cruisers in August 1914, wasn't really part of the GF battle fleet and kept up it's patrol duties regardless of GF sorties into the Heliogoland Bight or whatever. So a convoy would have to run the gauntlet of multiple patrol lines , hounded by AMCs and warships that could warn the GF to get into an interception position once whatever task it was doing was completed.
In addition the GF was comfortably larger and more powerful than the HSF, so every time the HSF sortied it was at risk of getting destroyed in battle. I doubt there are many trade convoys valuable enough to lose a bunch of captial ships for.
Interesting plan. But, how does the HSF or even just the Scouting Force, get to the GIUK gap without running into the Grand Fleet? Or for that matter, without running out of fuel.No doubt some convoys would be intercepted and destroyed, others would get through, and plenty of patrolling AMC`s and AC`s would meet their end along the way as well, (not like Hipper can`t come out to the GIUK gap to say `hi`). But, for the Grand Fleet, if they`re trying to pursue a convoy running the Denmark Straight eastward, then they`re getting into a long chase into the Greenland Sea, (the convoy doesn`t have to head straight for Norway if tailed through the Denmark Straight, it can turn north and run for the Artic and hide out there for a while). If the Grand Fleet enters the Greenland Sea looking for a convoy, the Western Approaches get pretty exposed. And between the Greenland Sea and Western Approaches, the Germans will have the weather advantage. The potential was there, but the German fleet lacked the energy to fight for real and the German army in 1914 had no idea how potentially valuable Pas de Calais was to fleet operations.
Being a landpower, the HSF was worth losing if in being sunk Germany imported it`s weight in sunken warships in vital commodities such as nitrates, metals, rubber. As Mike suggests, if the blockade doesn`t defeat Germany and the US remains neutral, Germany could very well win the war. Being a landpower meant that sacrificing the surface fleet was a good move if Germany`s landpower was enhanced along the way. Germany did not require a single surface warship to survive the war in order to win it. It only required its army to defeat its enemies on the continent.
That being said, the British weren`t exactly made out of battleships either, and if the Grand Fleet destroyed a convoy and three or four escorting warships, but in exchange their Channel Fleet of eighteen or twenty pre-dreadnoughts was annihilated outright, then the British have suffered a strategic catastrophe while the Germans have lost a replaceable convoy and a few replaceable escorts. So, it`s not like the risk factor was all one way. Any time the GF goes north, the British were taking a big risk too.
Hand waving. Lots and lots of hand waving...Interesting plan. But, how does the HSF or even just the Scouting Force, get to the GIUK gap without running into the Grand Fleet? Or for that matter, without running out of fuel.
That being said, the British weren`t exactly made out of battleships either, and if the Grand Fleet destroyed a convoy and three or four escorting warships, but in exchange their Channel Fleet of eighteen or twenty pre-dreadnoughts was annihilated outright, then the British have suffered a strategic catastrophe while the Germans have lost a replaceable convoy and a few replaceable escorts. So, it`s not like the risk factor was all one way. Any time the GF goes north, the British were taking a big risk too.
Interesting plan. But, how does the HSF or even just the Scouting Force, get to the GIUK gap without running into the Grand Fleet? Or for that matter, without running out of fuel.
In 1918 Scheer executed a fleet sortie to Norway hunting for a convoy, that the Grand Fleet had no idea was underway until SMS Moltke broke radio silence. What causes you to suppose the HSF couldn't do what it actually did?
In terms of the fuel range of HSF dreadnoughts and cruisers, the GIUK arena was doable. The hurdle was the psychological factor of the Grand Fleet at Scapa, between the German warships and Germany.
The HSF got into the convoy route, (Bergen-Methil) off the Norwegian coast without detection by the Grand Fleet. So, they got to about Bergen, Norway and then Moltke broke radio silence and the GF sortied.
1) What Scheer said - how far was this sortie to the Norwegian coast from its bases?In 1918 Scheer executed a fleet sortie to Norway hunting for a convoy, that the Grand Fleet had no idea was underway until SMS Moltke broke radio silence. What causes you to suppose the HSF couldn't do what it actually did?
In terms of the fuel range of HSF dreadnoughts and cruisers, the GIUK arena was doable. The hurdle was the psychological factor of the Grand Fleet at Scapa, between the German warships and Germany.
Perhaps rather than psychological factors deterring the HSF from such an operation it was unwillingness to let a numerically superior force be able to get between it and its home anchorage?
In that case, that seems not quite as far as the GIUK gap, unless you go very close to Scotland.
The issue is whether the Grand Fleet based at Scapa Flow can or cannot reliably intercept warships exiting the North Sea from the direction of Germany, which would not approach Scotland while doing so. In 1939-1940 the RN proved unable to do so even with long range patrol aircraft and radar. In 1914-1917 the RN had neither. When Norway fell in 1940 the situation became quite difficult, but recovered in 1941 thanks to better radar, signet, and airpower.
The big question is the attitudes of Denmark, Sweden and Norway towards the Entente and Germany. Germany would benefiet from certain Scandinavian policies, Britain by others. Which side can better get their way in these neutral capitals?
In 1914 the northern patrol line was between Scotland and Norway, making an attempt to break it to bring covoys in and out feasible more or less. But in 1915 the northern patrol lines were moved further north and west out into the Atlantic and thus well beyond the reach of the HSF given the GF could not even bother to stop the attack on the patrol line and covoy escorts, but instead cut off its route back to Germany and destroy it in battle as it came home low on fuel.
The issue is whether the Grand Fleet based at Scapa Flow can or cannot reliably intercept warships exiting the North Sea from the direction of Germany, which would not approach Scotland while doing so. In 1939-1940 the RN proved unable to do so even with long range patrol aircraft and radar. In 1914-1917 the RN had neither. When Norway fell in 1940 the situation became quite difficult, but recovered in 1941 thanks to better radar, signet, and airpower.
The big question is the attitudes of Denmark, Sweden and Norway towards the Entente and Germany. Germany would benefit from certain Scandinavian policies, Britain by others. Which side can better get their way in these neutral capitals?