Ww1 blockade of Germany

[Glenn239]

It's worth noting that years supply of nitrates were captured on ships and warehouses in Antwerp. If they were not captured it would have had a severe effect on fertiliser ammunition and explosive production before Haber process was able to be ramped up.

Nitrates. Germany should have worked with an American corporation, which would buy up nitrates as a US company in Chile and ship them to the US using US shipping, rail it over to New York, and from there the German navy would break convoys out from New York to run for Norway. At Norway, offloaded and shipped by rail to Sweden, then to Germany via merchant ship.

What if no rails from Norwegian ports into Sweden? They should have been built before the war. And, Germany should have pressed Sweden for a treaty that stated if any Power invaded Norway, Sweden would at least allow Germany to use Swedish soil to repulse the invasion, if not enter the war themselves. That sort of thing.

 

[vizzer]

Nitrates. Germany should have worked with an American corporation, which would buy up nitrates as a US company in Chile and ship them to the US using US shipping, rail it over to New York, and from there the German navy would break convoys out from New York to run for Norway. At Norway, offloaded and shipped by rail to Sweden, then to Germany via merchant ship.

What if no rails from Norwegian ports into Sweden? They should have been built before the war. And, Germany should have pressed Sweden for a treaty that stated if any Power invaded Norway, Sweden would at least allow Germany to use Swedish soil to repulse the invasion, if not enter the war themselves. That sort of thing.

Then the British consul telegrams the departure date & either the ships are intercepted or the HSF has to come out to escort them at a time known to the RN.
If the Germans are escorting convoys from New York where are they basing these escorts?

 

[Riain]

The Americans devastated Japanese convoys with air attack in 1944/45 the Germans and Italians tried the same in the Artic and Mediterranean but were eventually defeated by the RN's carrier aviation, surface attack was the second best option.

Air attack wasn't an option in WW1, surface attack was the only option to destroy or scatter a convoy in WW1.

1) The Germans had no interest in attacking the convoys to Holland, they would have had to make up for any major shortfall in Dutch Coal supplies that resulted and the benefited from the food carried in.

The very first task of the Flanders uboat flotilla when it was formed in early 1915 with coastal UB and UC boats was to attack the commercial traffic between Britain and Holland.

2) The Germans winning the race to the sea would merely have resulted in a channel barrier a little further down the coast. the channel fleet was always stronger than the forces facing it, unless the Germans had dared to put the High seas fleet into the Channel the problem being what if the grand fleet gets between the channel and the Jade.

Firstly; merely? The RN struggled to blockade 50km of Belgian coastline and the 33km Dover Narrows when facing patrol TBs and coastal uboats. The task of blockading several hundred km of French channel coastline and the 100km 'narrows' between Cherbourg and Portland Bill will be an orders of magnitude greater task.

Secondly, the reason the Channel Fleet (and I assume you also mean the Harwich Force and Dover Patrol) were stronger than the forces facing it was because in effect there were no forces facing it until mid 1916, which IMHO was the biggest strategic naval mistake the Germans made. While the Belgian coast was fortified against naval attack by very early 1915 no fast, modern destroyers were stationed there in Feb 1916 when 3 V25s arrived to form the half flotilla, a full year wasted. These were reinforced by another 10 modern destroyers in June 1916 for a few weeks and by late 1916 20 destroyers were stationed in Flanders. In contrast the Channel Fleet which was created on 8 August 1914 ceased to exist by early 1915, its ships sent to distant patrol stations or the Eastern Med. The reinforced Flanders forces were contained by the enlarged Harwich Force and Dover Patrol.

Thirdly, the KM doesn't need to put capital ships into the channel, merely do what they did from mid-late 1916 a year and a half earlier; send destroyer flotillas back and forth from the HSF, perhaps bolstered by some light cruisers. These movements could be incorporated into wider events, such as when the Baltic Freezes in winter it's ships could be sent to Flanders. Of course that presupposes competence on the part of the German Naval command.

3) the Germans did indeed successfully intercept Convoys to Norway in 1917 but that's not a war winning strategy for them. (but probably influential in admiralty thinking to abandon Norway in 1940)

Attacking convoys to Norway isn't a war winning strategy by itself, its an example of the potential use the huge surface fleet that otherwise sat idle. Attacking merchant shipping with surface warships whenever and wherever Germany can get to it is a net strategic positive for Germany.

4) The admiralty introduced convoys in the western approaches in mid 1917 after seeing losses of unescorted merchant ships reach catastrophic proportions. no consideration of Atlantic raiders were involved. In WW2 Convoys were introduced at the start of the war, with ocean convoy escorts being a feature from the start. again no Fear of surface raiders inhibited their thinking.

Apart from single disguised raiders British shipping in the Atlantic was unreachable by German surface raiders, but in WW1 coastal shipping was much more prevalent than by WW2 and much closer for surface warships to attack.

 

[BooNZ]

It's worth noting that years supply of nitrates were captured on ships and warehouses in Antwerp. If they were not captured it would have had a severe effect on fertiliser ammunition and explosive production before Haber process was able to be ramped up.

No, the Germans captured sufficient nitrates to cover several weeks at best. Haber mentioned the captured nitrates as being only incidental and stated Germany would have had to sue for peace in spring 1915 if Bosch and his team had not been successful in getting industrial production underway, which was around April/May 1915.

...But they started to sort things out and reorganize from the change of 1914/15 (reorganizing shell production as well as supply as well as contrating and general war-contract conditionas well as distribution of labour, etc.) and were running -more or less- smoothly from the first quarter of 1916.

The dearth of pre-war planning aside, the Germans scrambled far less terribly than the other great powers, promptly securing whatever strategic resources were available and facilitating the industrial production of nitrates on a timely basis.

I am curious about your opinion on the German industrial production of nitrates. Haber has stated the feasibility of industrial production of nitrates was still uncertain as late as September 1914 and it was ultimately the miraculous efforts of Bosch and his team that Germany was able to sustain the war beyond the first year. Elsewhere the German scientific endeavor and application of resources in the industrial production of nitrates has been compared to the Manhattan Project.

However, in September 1914 the German industrialists were still haggling over securing resources and remuneration, so from a business perspective, it would make sense to talk up the difficulty of an endeavor to maximize their share relating thereto. Further, the optimum catalyst for the industrial production for nitrates was only identified in July 1914. So was the German industrial production of nitrates less of a miracle and more of a case of war profiteering and good timing?

 

[BooNZ]

the convoy system was introduced for ocean going Shipping without recourse to American resources its effects were unknown and it was not tried until it was the last possible option. It was a drain on the light forces of the Royal navy an caused shortages of destroyers for escorting the Grand fleet. However it produced an immediate and decisive effect when it was introduced

No, the British revised (downward) estimate was the introduction convoy system would require 75 destroyers, of which only 43 were available. The USN immediately made 6-7 destroyers available when the convoy system was initially introduced in May-1917, increasing to 35 by August 1917. Further it is difficult to imagine how convoys could be efficiently/ effectively loaded, coordinated and escorted without the close cooperation of the port authorities.

There were indeed lots of projections that fuel would reach crisis levels in 1917 however these fears were not realised. The oil crisis was solved by the simple method of transporting oil in the double bottoms of cargo ships, along with the adoption of Convoy on the tanker routes from America. Oil stocks reached a minimum of 593,000 tonnes in June 1917 and rose monthly thereafter to more than 800,000 tonnes by October*. Unless the US was planning to stop selling oil, then the oil crisis would not cause a failure of the Entente in 1917 or 1918.

The multiple fuel crises were a long time coming based on actual consumption and reserves from 1914. The use of double hulled cargo ships still required the conversion of scarce shipping resources, which were also reaching critical levels prior to the intervention of the US.

How exactly is the Entente expected to continue to buy US oil when British and French liquidity had already been substantially spent by the end of 1916?

a lot of the moves oil crisis was moves by the British and the French to Prioritise Shell and what became BP so as to give some security of supply from Non American Sources after the war (and to preserve Asian markets from Standard oil.)

No, the key reasons for reliance on US oil was location and quality. The alternative sources of oil had to be sourced from significantly further away and the general shortage of shipping was especially acute in respect of tankers. The qualities of Iraqi oil were also recognized as inferior and plans to create refining capacity within Britain were not completed before the end of the war.

 

[BooNZ]

Then the British consul telegrams the departure date & either the ships are intercepted or the HSF has to come out to escort them at a time known to the RN.
If the Germans are escorting convoys from New York where are they basing these escorts?

I assume Arcadia or some other fantasy realm. Pegasi would also be a welcome addition to the Kaiserliche Marine...

 

[NoMommsen]

No, the Germans captured sufficient nitrates to cover several weeks at best. Haber mentioned the captured nitrates as being only incidental and stated Germany would have had to sue for peace in spring 1915 if Bosch and his team had not been successful in getting industrial production underway, which was around April/May 1915.

Well, "incidental" ... ? The Chile-Salpeter stocks in belgian harbours were well known to the "interested", producers of ahells, fuses and ammo in general like ... Rathenau.
His knoweledge about these nitrate stocks was at least one reason for him to contact the war ministry in early August 1914.

The dearth of pre-war planning aside, the Germans scrambled far less terribly than the other great powers, promptly securing whatever strategic resources were available and facilitating the industrial production of nitrates on a timely basis.

That's MO a misperception. The germans suffered (almost) as much as the Entente powers,
BUT
1. The Rathenau KRA for handling resources actually was established already at 14.08.1914. When did the Entente powers started to seriously look into resources and economics ?
The germans were just quicker to adress this problem of "war economy"
2. The "shell-crisis", happening in Germany as well as everywhere, was MUCH more publically covered in the Entente countries, also or still after the war, than in Germany.
There is and was just less talk around such crises in Germany than the Entente-countries.

And about "resources" in general :
At the beginning the germans - including "thinkers-about" as Rathenau and Moellendorff - just had no idea of what resources there actually were in Germany, as many factories producing export consumer goods were not thought of - like Faber-Castells production of pencil-sharpeners (there are hundreds of other producers and products).
Only their turn towards the war ministry, asking for contracts - as their former export contracts could now not be delivered due to the blockade - made them and their stocks of resources known and available for the war efforts.

I am curious about your opinion on the German industrial production of nitrates. Haber has stated the feasibility of industrial production of nitrates was still uncertain as late as September 1914 and it was ultimately the miraculous efforts of Bosch and his team that Germany was able to sustain the war beyond the first year. Elsewhere the German scientific endeavor and application of resources in the industrial production of nitrates has been compared to the Manhattan Project.

However, in September 1914 the German industrialists were still haggling over securing resources and remuneration, so from a business perspective, it would make sense to talk up the difficulty of an endeavor to maximize their share relating thereto. Further, the optimum catalyst for the industrial production for nitrates was only identified in July 1914. So was the German industrial production of nitrates less of a miracle and more of a case of war profiteering and good timing?

Well, the captured nitrates of Antwerp gave the industrialists the time for bickering with the war ministry. Initially they were less than inclined to start the necessary production, which included building the necessary factories as well.
They still "hoped"/"planned" for a short war in which case they rendered their investment into such factories as lost money ... if not payed "properly". And that's, what Haber meant with "unfeasible industrial production" : its economical sensibility at the time given. Bigger part of Bosch's workings to make it happen, was to convince the war ministry to set up contracts with guaranteed ammounts taken by the "market".

 

[NoMommsen]

A 'lil sidenote on "nitrates" :

Everybody talks about the Haber-Bosch method, that reached a peak of production in 1918 of about 100.000 t per annum, used almost exclusivly for ammo.
Who talks about the Cyamide- or Franko-Caro process ? ... Haber had to compete with as an already established method ? Calcium Cyanamide is potent fertilizer and acts at the same time as herbizide and plant protection agent and could be used directly on the fields. ... And Germany produced about 500.000 t annually in 1918. The contracts for this rise in fertilizer production were signed the same time as the contracts for the Haber-Bosch method.
So late due to the same "economical bickering" as described above.

 

[Glenn239]

Then the British consul telegrams the departure date & either the ships are intercepted or the HSF has to come out to escort them at a time known to the RN.

Or, just thinking out loud here, the German ships sit in port loaded and ready to sail for weeks or months at a time, every day getting ready to sail, then not sailing, then suddenly, and quite without warning, at 3am some morning 50 days after the merchant ships were first ready to sail, the German warship squadron show up off New York, blows away the three or four British AMC's on station, and the ships in port go to sea.

If the Germans are escorting convoys from New York where are they basing these escorts?

Germany, obviously. A Kaiser Class battleship can't get to New York and back? Hey, how about if you pull out 2 turrets and fill the holes with 4,000 tons of extra coal, so that the ship has 8,000 tons of fuel. Can it get there and back now on a cruising range of 16,000 miles? Or, let's say you take an 8,000 ton merchant vessel, armor it up with a 4" to 6" belt, put a dozen 5" guns on it with 6,000 tons of fuel. Could that defeat a patrolling AMC? And why New York? The US has plenty of ports where ships can be loaded by rail, then break out.

 

[Glenn239]

I assume Arcadia or some other fantasy realm. Pegasi would also be a welcome addition to the Kaiserliche Marine...

In addition to common sense tactics like loading more coal at the expense of armament or converting merchant ships to long range escorts, (like the historical raiders), the other option was not so much waiting for magic pixies as it was to bring 16kt or 18kt coaliers along for the ride and find some cove in Greenland or the north coast of Iceland to refuel. Also, during the winter months, (ie, the season for breaking in and out of European waters due to long winter nights and crappy weather), the Artic ice pack moves south, and along its edges the ice acts like a floating port, calm enough for coaling even at sea. Heard of Titanic? It sank because it ran at 23kt smack into the millpond calm waters of an ice flow.

But, you can't get any of that done in a navy that sits in port waiting for its pay check. Ships have this funny way of leveling the risk between officers and men. Fighting is dangerous, for even admirals. Best for a peacetime admiral posing as a fighting admiral to claim "bargaining chip" status, make excuses about ship range, sit in port and let the serfs fight on the Western Front instead.

 

[hipper]

No, the British revised (downward) estimate was the introduction convoy system would require 75 destroyers, of which only 43 were available. The USN immediately made 6-7 destroyers available when the convoy system was initially introduced in May-1917, increasing to 35 by August 1917. Further it is difficult to imagine how convoys could be efficiently/ effectively loaded, coordinated and escorted without the close cooperation of the port authorities.

The Six Destroyers in Queens town were no doubt useful but the lack of them would not have prevented the Admiralty from introducing Convoys. The effect of no US navy to the Anti submarine war would have been marginal rather than decisive.
It’s quite easy to imagine how the British would have organised Convoys without the co operation of the US port Authorities. They would have done it in Halifax as they did in the first years of WW 2.

The multiple fuel crises were a long time coming based on actual consumption and reserves from 1914. The use of double hulled cargo ships still required the conversion of scarce shipping resources, which were also reaching critical levels prior to the intervention of the US.

The fuel Crisis was caused by a Increase in Demand and sinkings of tankers by U boats. It was solved by increasing the proportion of Shippping devoted to oil. Shipping resources were reaching critical levels due to sinkings from U boats. When Convoy stopped these sinkings the problem was reduced to manegable levels.

American mass production methods did produce a great number of Merchant Ships and Destroyers. However both were too late to influence the war.

How exactly is the Entente expected to continue to buy US oil when British and French liquidity had already been substantially spent by the end of 1916?

No, the key reasons for reliance on US oil was location and quality. The alternative sources of oil had to be sourced from significantly further away and the general shortage of shipping was especially acute in respect of tankers. The qualities of Iraqi oil were also recognized as inferior and plans to create refining capacity within Britain were not completed before the end of the war.

If you had argued that if America had cut itself of from the world economy in 1917 That would have severely affected the Eintente’s war making potential I would agree the war might have ended in 1917, However american money was vital, American men and ships were merely useful.

 

[BooNZ]

The Six Destroyers in Queens town were no doubt useful but the lack of them would not have prevented the Admiralty from introducing Convoys. The effect of no US navy to the Anti submarine war would have been marginal rather than decisive.

I will restate those numbers for you. The British Admiralty's reduced estimate required at least 75 destroyers to implement the convoy system. The British only had 43 available, a shortfall of at least 32 destroyers! For a British Admiralty looking for an excuse not to implement the convoy system, an ongoing shortfall in escorts of over 40% would be compelling.

OTL the initial six US destroyer division in Queenstown was joined by an additional two divisions of US destroyers in May 1917 and a further US destroyer division in early June, resulting in a total of 28 US destroyers available for convoy duty before the end of June 1917, which increased to 35 US destroyers by the end of August 1917.

The relative USN contribution towards the implementation of the convoy system far exceeded the BEF's relative contribution on the continent in the opening years of the war, but the French would not be so arrogant as to suggest the British contribution was 'marginal'.

It’s quite easy to imagine how the British would have organised Convoys without the co operation of the US port Authorities. They would have done it in Halifax as they did in the first years of WW 2.

The synchronized supply and loading of dozens of ships over multiple ports for a rendezvous at Halifax might be quite easy to imagine, but in reality very difficult to execute efficiently without considerable experience. The use of Halifax is a possible work around, but like any work around, its going to be a less efficient use of increasingly scarce shipping and escort resources.

American mass production methods did produce a great number of Merchant Ships and Destroyers. However both were too late to influence the war.

By virtue of geography, alternatives to North American supplies would require twice the shipping capacity, which was simply not available to the Entente. The OTL unlimited credit extended to the Entente cause, averted an unsustainable increase in Entente shipping requirements.

As outlined above, an almost immediate contribution of over 40% of the initial convoy escort requirements was also influential.

If you had argued that if America had cut itself of from the world economy in 1917 That would have severely affected the Eintente’s war making potential I would agree the war might have ended in 1917, However american money was vital, American men and ships were merely useful.

If the US maintains neutrality, what would possess US creditors to advance the British or French unsecured loans? Why would US suppliers continue to supply materials to the Entente for no payment? Even if limited credit was extended to the Entente, it would be on increasingly onerous terms and cease altogether as Russia started to collapse.

Without the OTL access to unlimited US funds, the systemic crises in men and material become impossible for the Entente to remedy without direct US intervention.

 

[BooNZ]

For example, under international law it was the case that warships could not use a neutral power's territorial waters for military purposes, and could not purchase coal for use in warships.

No, the Hague Convention restricted refueling of belligerent warships at neutral ports to sufficient fuel to return to home ports, but in practice this was interpreted by some neutral powers to enable an unrestricted refuel/ coal once every three months.​

Germany should have pressed for a slightly different case. That if a power was acting illegally to interdict a neutral's shipping, the neutral ceased to have any obligation to prevent warships from coaling in its territory or purchasing coal in its ports. So, take Norway for example. If the British illegally interdict their shipping, Germany should at least try for a set of international rules that say Norway now has no obligation to police its own coasts for German warships, if Germany is acting according to international law.

For a number of reasons, this makes no sense:
1. If Germany is acting according to international law, there would be nothing for Norway to police (or ignore);
2. Germany does not have the power to set international law, let alone demand foreign powers ratify such legislation;
3. The OTL international conventions represented by the London Declaration were very favourable to Germany and strongly endorsed (but not ratified) by Britain and the USA, but when push came to shove, USA did nothing when Britain decided to ignore the London Declaration. How do your suggestions change anything?

On the latter point, the Germans permitted a set of rules whereby the Americans loaded up British transports to the gunwales with war materials bound for Europe, amassing billions in war purchases, but Germany, heaven forbid the Americans sell them a ton of coal for a warship.

No, the vast majority of imports from the US during WW1 were raw materials, not war materials.

The Germans failed to anticipate that the British would do what the British were obviously going to do. Why this was so, I think, is that their naval leadership from the Kaiser, to Tirpitz, downward, were strategy hacks with no real understanding of what they were doing or why. The British, in contrast, did understand the problem of blockade and had a set of assumptions that, when built upon in the early war years, took them in the right direction.

In 1912 the British abandoned the concept of a close blockade. In 1912 the Germans abandoned the dreadnaught race. OTL by the end of 1916 the British economy was almost insolvent and without the entry of the USA, would not have been able to maintain the war effort though 1917. OTL Germany survived 1917 despite the US joining the other side and managed to knock Russia out of the war during the same period.

It was the German military's responsibility to identify military threats to Germany, and blockade was a military threat in which the counter was also a better naval doctrine and stockpiling.

The Blockade was principally an economic threat, not a military threat. Despite the lack of preparation, the German war effort was scarcely impaired for a lack of guns or munitions.

In which case the German navy scarcely required to exist at all. The only assumption of any merit for the German navy was that the British would obey no laws and cow the neutrals using its whip hand - naval power.

Any idiot could have told them that, and at least one did:

" ...The British Navy is to us a necessity and, from some points of view, the German Navy is to them more in the nature of a luxury...." Churchill, First Sea Lord, 9 February 1912 ​

Dunno what Germany expected from the United States, but the fact that Germany didn't even bother to get an international law about East Indiamen enshrined into the rules on naval warfare - a concept with longstanding legal validity - suggests the Germans misplayed their hand before the war.

I think the Germans might have expected some pushback from the USA in defense of the rights of neutral shipping, but the reality was the Germans were not even dealt a hand before the war, so had no cards to play.

 

[hipper]

I will restate those numbers for you. The British Admiralty's reduced estimate required at least 75 destroyers to implement the convoy system. The British only had 43 available, a shortfall of at least 32 destroyers! For a British Admiralty looking for an excuse not to implement the convoy system, an ongoing shortfall in escorts of over 40% would be compelling.

OTL the initial six US destroyer division in Queenstown was joined by an additional two divisions of US destroyers in May 1917 and a further US destroyer division in early June, resulting in a total of 28 US destroyers available for convoy duty before the end of June 1917, which increased to 35 US destroyers by the end of August 1917.

The relative USN contribution towards the implementation of the convoy system far exceeded the BEF's relative contribution on the continent in the opening years of the war, but the French would not be so arrogant as to suggest the British contribution was 'marginal'.
.

You are making the common mistake of equating escorts with destroyers, far more than 75 escorts were used in convoy operations and the use of American destroyers was not essential to the introduction of convoy. Trawlers were the most common convoy escort in WW1. The convoy system would have been introduced if America had not entered the war and would have been successful however many escorts were used. Indeed they could have learned that the number of escorts made a small contribution to the safety to a Convoy (no wolf pack attacks in WW1).

America could indeed have chosen to plunge itself in to a recession in 1916 as the supply of Securities dried up for Loans. however there were powerful political forces moving in the other direction so I don't see it as very likely. In any case Oil would have been the last good that the allies economised upon.

as to the Oil crisis I'll just point out that the allies in 1917 increased the amount of Oil taken from Shell as opposed to Standard Oil. They did this on commandeered British flagged Standard oil tankers. If the oil crisis had been serious these tankers would have been used to take Oil from the US not the DEI.

 

[Glenn239]

If the US maintains neutrality, what would possess US creditors to advance the British or French unsecured loans? Why would US suppliers continue to supply materials to the Entente for no payment? Even if limited credit was extended to the Entente, it would be on increasingly onerous terms and cease altogether as Russia started to collapse.

Without the OTL access to unlimited US funds, the systemic crises in men and material become impossible for the Entente to remedy without direct US intervention.

That seems a bit too harsh of a judgement. Without lenient US credit, the Entente purchases in the US would have to meet their available funds, so be less in overall scale. But still, a valuable source of supplies. (Once Russia folds, the Entente do not need to keep on the offensive on the Western Front, they could revert to the defensive and play the blockade game into 1919 or 1920).

 

[Glenn239]

No, the Hague Convention restricted refueling of belligerent warships at neutral ports... ​

The situation as it developed under the rules that Germany agreed to was that the "neutral" United States supplied 10 billion dollars of war material to the Entente through direct trade, and only a fraction of that to the Central Powers - mostly through other neutral ports. Whereas a British freighter could legally pull out of New York with 50,000 artillery rounds aboard, a German naval squadron could not purchase even a fraction of that value as war supplies.

For a number of reasons, this makes no sense:

1. If Germany is acting according to international law, there would be nothing for Norway to police (or ignore);
2. Germany does not have the power to set international law, let alone demand foreign powers ratify such legislation;
3. The OTL international conventions represented by the London Declaration were very favourable to Germany and strongly endorsed (but not ratified) by Britain and the USA, but when push came to shove, USA did nothing when Britain decided to ignore the London Declaration. How do your suggestions change anything?

1. Under the international laws that the United States, Germany, Britain and Norway all agreed to, the High Seas Fleet could not use Norwegian territorial waters for refuelling operations and the Norwegians could not let them do so, or supply them with coal. What would have been better for Germany is, under international law, had the United States, Norway and Germany all agreed that Britain was in violation of international law by illegally intercepting Norwegian shipping, that Norway would no longer be required to police its waters against German warships or prevent the sale of supplies to them, but it would be required to police its waters against the warships of the powers in violation of international law.
2. The rules of naval warfare were set down by conference between the neutral powers before the war, of which Germany was one of the Powers and had every right to table proposed rules, which may or may not have been incorporated.
3. If, for example, let us say under a different set of international laws that Norway - still a neutral power - could have responded to an illegal British blockade by legally ceasing to patrol its own waters against German warships refuelling there. What are you suggesting the United States would need to do to make Norway take that decision? That is to say, if legally, under international law in response to an illegal British blockade, five Kaiser Class battleships were allowed by Norway to enter into Trondheim and load 10,000 tons of coal and depart, what is it that you think the United States would have to do to make that happen?

No, the vast majority of imports from the US during WW1 were raw materials, not war materials.

The rules that Germany had agreed to allowed for Entente merchantmen to load war supplies in American ports while CP warships could not. Germany would have been better off with international law stating that a neutral could sell or trade with any ship of any warring power, (merchant or warship), provided that equal right of access was granted to all powers, and basing or repair rights were not granted to warships.

The Blockade was principally an economic threat, not a military threat. Despite the lack of preparation, the German war effort was scarcely impaired for a lack of guns or munitions.

There is no question in my mind but that tactics of blockade was a military threat that the German military was responsible to identify an propose countermeasures to, in conjunction with civilian authority. The failure of the German military (army or navy) to do so was a failure in military leadership.

Any idiot could have told them that, and at least one did:

" ...The British Navy is to us a necessity and, from some points of view, the German Navy is to them more in the nature of a luxury...." Churchill, First Sea Lord, 9 February 1912 ​

The German navy was far from a 'luxury', as its ineffective use during the war was in part the cause of Germany's eventual defeat. Certainly the emphasis on U-boat warfare was a political, followed by economic then military, disaster.
​

 

[Riain]

The German navy was far from a 'luxury', as its ineffective use during the war was in part the cause of Germany's eventual defeat.

A large part in my opinion.

 

[Mikestone8]

(Once Russia folds, the Entente do not need to keep on the offensive on the Western Front, they could revert to the defensive and play the blockade game into 1919 or 1920).

What "blockade game"?

The blockade did make life miserable for a lot of Germans (though Germany's own economic mismanagement was more important) but there was never any prospect of Germany collapsing from the blockade alone at any foreseeable date, and afaik no one on the Entente side was expecting such a thing. And the other CPs won't collapse as long as Germany is there to prop them up.

And "standing on the defensive" would be seen as a confession of defeat. The Germans stand on Entente territory virtually everywhere, and cannot be dislodged from it except by an offensive. To stay on the defensive with the Boche deep inside France etc would in effect be an admission that they could not be defeated, and once that notion spreads among the troops, morale will collapse. As I once heard it put, a soldier who is not expected to defeat the enemy can scarcely be blamed for seeking to avoid him altogether. And the civvies, whose war-hysteria had been whipped up to a fever pitch, would scream blue murder if their governments adopted such a "defeatist" policy. They'd have no choice but to go on the attack.

 

[BooNZ]

Well, "incidental" ... ? The Chile-Salpeter stocks in belgian harbours were well known to the "interested", producers of ahells, fuses and ammo in general like ... Rathenau.
His knoweledge about these nitrate stocks was at least one reason for him to contact the war ministry in early August 1914.

Do you have a English language source? I do not recall reading this anywhere else, so you may have a fresh info source (for me) on a rather patchy subject.

That's MO a misperception. The germans suffered (almost) as much as the Entente powers,

I expect the Germans suffered much more than the Entente, given the both the French and the British enjoyed vastly superior financial resources. Geography and naval dominance meant both France and Britain also had access to vast colonial resources denied to Germany. The German economy could not have survived dropping the ball as badly as the Entente.

BUT
1. The Rathenau KRA for handling resources actually was established already at 14.08.1914. When did the Entente powers started to seriously look into resources and economics ?
The germans were just quicker to adress this problem of "war economy"
2. The "shell-crisis", happening in Germany as well as everywhere, was MUCH more publically covered in the Entente countries, also or still after the war, than in Germany.
There is and was just less talk around such crises in Germany than the Entente-countries.

The Germans were initially inflicted with victory disease, which was only brought under control by the Battle of Marne. I don't think the key German decision makers started to seriously address resources and economics until October 1914.

Well, the captured nitrates of Antwerp gave the industrialists the time for bickering with the war ministry. Initially they were less than inclined to start the necessary production, which included building the necessary factories as well.

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They still "hoped"/"planned" for a short war in which case they rendered their investment into such factories as lost money ... if not payed "properly". And that's, what Haber meant with "unfeasible industrial production" : its economical sensibility at the time given. Bigger part of Bosch's workings to make it happen, was to convince the war ministry to set up contracts with guaranteed ammounts taken by the "market".

My understanding was discussions/negotiations on the industrial production of nitrates did not commence in earnest until October 1914. Haber definitely asserted the industrial production of nitrates on such a short timescale was uncertain and Bosch and his team definitely had to cover technically difficult new ground.

On balance, I agree the greatest uncertainty facing Bosch in October 1914 was the commercial viability of the new plant and the release of his team from military service. That said, what Bosch and his team were attempting was at the bleeding edge of technology and could easily have suffered sufficient setbacks to force Germany to the negotiating table very early.

A 'lil sidenote on "nitrates" :
...
So late due to the same "economical bickering" as described above.

Interesting, although I think the timing may have been more about the decision makers coming out of a victory disease induced stupor

 

[Riain]

Its been said a couple of times in the thread that the British blockade wasn't very good at the start.

Can anyone quantify that? How many ships got through, or carried on ither trade activities in 'the not very good' period and when did it tighten up?