Ww1 blockade of Germany

[Ultima770]

I started watching the YouTube series; The Great War. It mentioned that the blockade didn't have the anticipated affect that the British wanted.

I feel it was a little vague, and I was hoping further elaboration from people who may know a little more.

Such as; the show says that Germany's industry to wage war was unaffected to an extent. Is this because they are self sufficient or learned to be self sufficient to meet demands?

Also I know they had neutral nations where they could take in imports.

 

[Riain]

Did the doco say what the expectations of the blockade were?

 

[Riain]

Such as; the show says that Germany's industry to wage war was unaffected to an extent. Is this because they are self sufficient or learned to be self sufficient to meet demands?

Also I know they had neutral nations where they could take in imports.

There was a bit of everything in there, and much of it was unexpected. Many industries that catered to civilian production were able to turn their hand to war work, reducing the need for imports of certain items. Rationing reduced the demand for many items, enabling some things to be avoided and other materials diverted to war production and the likes of Ober Ost was self sufficient in food for its troops and able to send some food back to Germany.

 

[rast]

There were quite many people in France and Russia, including folks in top positions, who believed Germany would have to sue for peace within four months because of the British blockade. In Britain, expectations were less exalted. The Brits (or at least a good portion of the responsible lot) new that it was a slow process and would take time. In fact, the British never succeeded in getting the blockade tight, until the US entered the war, and goods destined for the Central Powers were no longer shipped in US ports. - The Germans were importing from neutral countries: the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland; this trade increased significantly during the war. And they were looting the occupied countries: Belgium, Northern France, Russian Poland, Serbia, Romania. - The item really missing was rubber. German scientists succeeded in manufacturing artificial rubber in 1918, but the stuff still wasn't suitable for making tyres. - Without the crop failure of 1916 (bad harvest in the whole northern hemisphere, exacerbated by potato blight in Germany, leading to the infamous Turnip Winter of 1916/17), the blockade would only have shown first effects in 1918, so, it weren't four months, but rather a long-winded process producing initial impact after four years (and only because the US had joined the Entente war effort).

 

[Catsmate]

There were quite many people in France and Russia, including folks in top positions, who believed Germany would have to sue for peace within four months because of the British blockade.

That wasn't completely unreasonable given the nitrate situation.

 

[rast]

That wasn't completely unreasonable given the nitrate situation.

True. However, the first plant working with the Haber-Bosch process had become operational in 1913. Hence, they could have known it wouldn't work that easily. - Nevertheless, nitrate in the form of fertiliser remained an issue. While the plants produced sufficient quantities for manufacturing explosives, adequate amounts of fertilisers for agricultural use became never available. Lack of workers, lack of horses, lack of fertilisers - it was a slow but persistent downward spiral for German agriculture.

 

[Catsmate]

True. However, the first plant working with the Haber-Bosch process had become operational in 1913. Hence, they could have known it wouldn't work that easily. - Nevertheless, nitrate in the form of fertiliser remained an issue. While the plants produced sufficient quantities for manufacturing explosives, adequate amounts of fertilisers for agricultural use became never available. Lack of workers, lack of horses, lack of fertilisers - it was a slow but persistent downward spiral for German agriculture.

True. Though given that the 1913 plant produced ~20 tonnes of ammonia per day and annual consumption was ~1,000 tonnes of sodium nitrate per day before the war it could still appear that anrtifican nitrogen fixation wouldn't help Germany that much.

 

[Ultima770]

Was this an experience that helped the Germans re arm for ww2? Such as getting the experience to switch over industries, stockpiling, making home prroduced goods and other wartime needs, etc?

 

[DaveBC]

I started watching the YouTube series; The Great War. It mentioned that the blockade didn't have the anticipated affect that the British wanted.

I feel it was a little vague, and I was hoping further elaboration from people who may know a little more.

Such as; the show says that Germany's industry to wage war was unaffected to an extent. Is this because they are self sufficient or learned to be self sufficient to meet demands?

Also I know they had neutral nations where they could take in imports.

Let's back up here just so that you understand the context. Sorry if I'm repeating things you already know but just to be clear on what's happening here.

1. The British blockade is effective (weirdly, under international law, this also makes it legal -- unlike the U-boat campaign). Germany is not an island nation so obviously not as dependent on sea trade as Britain, but it does have a modest empire and it does need global trade to be a viable economy. This blockade doesn't attract as much excitement as the German U-boats because, understandably, not many captains want to run a blockade imposed by the largest navy in the world operating more or less freely in the open ocean. An effective blockade should look like nothing at all because nobody is daring to run it. In this sense, the blockade was effective and achieved its operational goal: shipping didn't reach Germany.

That blockade was imposed early in the war and was maintained until Germany accepted the Versailles Treaty. It was not lifted on armistice in 1918.

2. Much like trade embargos nowadays, proponents of blockades tended to have wildly optimistic projections that the enemy's civilian morale would collapse, that they would be forced out in a matter of months, etc., etc., etc. Much like trade embargos nowadays, what instead happened was that the target nation had to get creative and had to compel its population to survive on less. When you try to take people's food away, strangely, they do tend to blame you rather than their own government, no matter what you tell them as you do it. In this sense the blockade was not as effective as was hoped.

3. Having said that, Germany did have increasingly serious problems arranging necessary raw materials for industry and agriculture, and by 1916 there were serious food shortages in both Germany and Austria-Hungary. It would be an exaggeration to say this was what eventually forced them out of the war, but at the very least, they had to devote a lot of effort to quelling potential food riots and the shortages exacerbated the political instability that eventually did contribute to the collapse of Austria-Hungary and the almost-collapse of Germany. So in this sense the blockade was still important even if it didn't rise to quite the level some people hoped.

 

[MichaelWest]

My understanding is that the pre-war thinking was that Germany might face a so-called "close" blockade, in other words the Royal Navy would sit just off the ports and interdict shipping, thus the High Seas Fleet is designed to break this by fighting close into Germany. The actual blockade was in part conducted far off in the open seas but more directly imposed by pressuring neutrals to simply not ship to Germany, the British in part bought the goods, blacklisted shippers from selling to the Entente or applied other pressures versus the home country, the shipping line or their business. It is inexcusable that the German high command failed to take into account the reality of a blockade and prepare Germany for shortages. That said I understand that no one thought the blockade would be workable, especially as it played out or the war would last long enough to matter. But I think you will find that any scenario of war before 1914 quickly hits the nitrate wall (just like oil becomes the critical one 20 years later).

At the time the majority of nitrates were supplied from guano mined in South America and it was that trade that I believe the Battle of the Platte was in part driven by as the British both bought up nitrates and attempted to stop supplies moving towards Germany. In one of my departures I have the Albanian crisis in 1913 get Russia mobilizing for war, thus sparking a Triple Alliance versus France and Russia (with Serbia) war. With a more aggressive Russian opening I can argue for British non-belligerence but the French can likely interrupt nitrates going to Germany, it should cause a lull in the war if not halt it. The ability to cut Germany from her critical foreign trade is a well argued but often glossed topic since it really does impact the ability for Germany to wage modern war.

Thus I think anytime one wants to steer the war away from a German defeat or even to a win, one must get the blockade either leakier or not occurring. I do not think it defeated Germany but it did snatch any victory away.

 

[DaveBC]

My understanding is that the pre-war thinking was that Germany might face a so-called "close" blockade, in other words the Royal Navy would sit just off the ports and interdict shipping, thus the High Seas Fleet is designed to break this by fighting close into Germany. The actual blockade was in part conducted far off in the open seas but more directly imposed by pressuring neutrals to simply not ship to Germany, the British in part bought the goods, blacklisted shippers from selling to the Entente or applied other pressures versus the home country, the shipping line or their business. It is inexcusable that the German high command failed to take into account the reality of a blockade and prepare Germany for shortages. That said I understand that no one thought the blockade would be workable, especially as it played out or the war would last long enough to matter. But I think you will find that any scenario of war before 1914 quickly hits the nitrate wall (just like oil becomes the critical one 20 years later).

At the time the majority of nitrates were supplied from guano mined in South America and it was that trade that I believe the Battle of the Platte was in part driven by as the British both bought up nitrates and attempted to stop supplies moving towards Germany. In one of my departures I have the Albanian crisis in 1913 get Russia mobilizing for war, thus sparking a Triple Alliance versus France and Russia (with Serbia) war. With a more aggressive Russian opening I can argue for British non-belligerence but the French can likely interrupt nitrates going to Germany, it should cause a lull in the war if not halt it. The ability to cut Germany from her critical foreign trade is a well argued but often glossed topic since it really does impact the ability for Germany to wage modern war.

Thus I think anytime one wants to steer the war away from a German defeat or even to a win, one must get the blockade either leakier or not occurring. I do not think it defeated Germany but it did snatch any victory away.

Although I agree with most of this, I'm not sure your judgement on the inexcusable lack of preparation is entirely fair. I mean, from Germany's perspective, the point of having a short, decisive war is that that way you don't have to worry about these long-term supply and industrial problems. That said I agree with your point more broadly.

Also the distinction between a close blockade and a distant blockade is just that the British didn't want to risk having their blockade ships shot up by the Germans. I don't think it affected either the legality or the effectiveness, ultimately. Going by Tirpitz's theory, the HSF didn't have to defeat the RN in battle, just inflict such severe losses that the RN would lose its preeminent status, and that would be enough to deter the British. Oops.

 

[BooNZ]

Let's back up here just so that you understand the context. Sorry if I'm repeating things you already know but just to be clear on what's happening here.

1. The British blockade is effective (weirdly, under international law, this also makes it legal -- unlike the U-boat campaign). Germany is not an island nation so obviously not as dependent on sea trade as Britain, but it does have a modest empire and it does need global trade to be a viable economy. This blockade doesn't attract as much excitement as the German U-boats because, understandably, not many captains want to run a blockade imposed by the largest navy in the world operating more or less freely in the open ocean. An effective blockade should look like nothing at all because nobody is daring to run it. In this sense, the blockade was effective and achieved its operational goal: shipping didn't reach Germany.

Except the British did not declare a formal blockade, instead relying on a doctrine of retaliation. Maybe the British legal advisors did not share your interpretation of international law.

 

[Riain]

I think the big difference is that most of the British blockade was conducted without violence, by managing shipping traffic throughout the world by agents and physically at choke points controlled by Britain. Whereas the German blockade was conducted almost solely with force, the German ships and subs had to stop ships at sea and sink them, or just sink them, there is no acceptable solution for a ship owner.

It would be interesting to see how the blockades would have played out if Germany held Cap Griz Nez and could provide an alternative route into the North Sea for shipping.

 

[BooNZ]

I feel it was a little vague, and I was hoping further elaboration from people who may know a little more.

Conventional thinking in the early 20th century was modern rail networks made the blockade of continental powers no longer practical, which is reflected in the back story to the London Declaration 1909. The Declaration was strongly supported by Edward Grey, despite the fact it would severely restrict the potential use of naval blockades - traditionally a key weapon of the Royal Navy.

Britain's confused naval thinking is further illustrated in the belated abandonment the close blockade concept in 1912. 1914 found the Royal Navy ill prepared to impose anything resembling an effective blockade on Germany, despite the disparity of naval and financial might and the geographical advantages enjoyed by Britain. Similarly, despite a widespread expectation in Germany of a long war, there appears to have been few (if any) efforts by Germany before the war to stockpile strategic resources.

Germany was the first to belatedly recognize its vulnerability and after the war started promptly organized for strategic resources to be secured, both domestically and through neutral powers. The production of nitrates rates a special mention. Prior to the war the German production of synthetic nitrates was not even close to providing sufficient nitrates to support the German war effort, with the catalyst used in the most efficient industrial production only being identified in July 1914. The subsequent successful German effort to mass produce nitrates has been compared to the Manhattan Project in terms of scientific endeavor and application of resources.

Some have suggested Britain was calmly working through a master plan in 1914, but that does not reconcile with the confusion within the British Admiralty regarding the purpose of the increased German activity in the South Atlantic in late 1914, which suggests the British had not even identified nitrates as a strategic resource.

 

[rast]

The effectiveness of the blockade depended heavily on the willingness of the neutrals to go along with it. In that, the British were exceptionally lucky, because the biggest neutral, the US, wasn't neutral at all (see Coogan 'The End of Neutrality', classing the US as de facto ally of the Entente since February 1915). Had the US insisted on executing her rights as a neutral country, the whole thing would have remained a farce. But because President Wilson believed the War of 1812 had been all wrong, ranging the US at the side of the bad guy, Napoleon, against the good guy, Britain, he didn't want to repeat that error - and was ready to accept all kind of British impertinence. And this attitude met well with the stance of big business, as there was much more to be earned by delivering unending quantities to the Entente, instead of delivering some moderate supplies of this and that to the Central Powers.

 

[Dupplin Muir]

The effectiveness of the blockade depended heavily on the willingness of the neutrals to go along with it. In that, the British were exceptionally lucky, because the biggest neutral, the US, wasn't neutral at all (see Coogan 'The End of Neutrality', classing the US as de facto ally of the Entente since February 1915). Had the US insisted on executing her rights as a neutral country, the whole thing would have remained a farce. But because President Wilson believed the War of 1812 had been all wrong, ranging the US at the side of the bad guy, Napoleon, against the good guy, Britain, he didn't want to repeat that error - and was ready to accept all kind of British impertinence. And this attitude met well with the stance of big business, as there was much more to be earned by delivering unending quantities to the Entente, instead of delivering some moderate supplies of this and that to the Central Powers.

The US couldn't complain about the blockade because the British were doing nothing that the Union hadn't done in the Civil War - in fact the UK had deliberately allowed the North to expand the scope of their blockade knowing that it would come in handy later.

 

[Shadow Master]

The US couldn't complain about the blockade because the British were doing nothing that the Union hadn't done in the Civil War - in fact the UK had deliberately allowed the North to expand the scope of their blockade knowing that it would come in handy later.

On the same token, though, the USA could have been building ships to supply Germany with in the role of blockade runners/armed merchant cruisers, or trade submarines, and the UK couldn't have complained about that, because they were doing that themselves during the ACW. Just saying.

 

[Riain]

@BooNZ , how much of that muddle could be explained by the shortcomings in the British Naval High Command echelons?

While the First Sea Lord was the professional head of the RN and responsible for strategy there was no Naval War Staff to assist him until January 1912. I imagine that turning the ideas in Jackie Fisher's head into concrete plans for operations from first principles, complete with ship dispositions, supply organisations and all the other crap of a WW1 era Navy, would have been a large and time consuming task taking up much of the time between its formation and the start of WW1.

In Churchill the RN had a hyperactive and interventionist First Lord of the Admiralty, who ideas had to be listened to, dealt with and/or acted upon. This would have distracted the Naval War Staff and Sea Lords from their task of formulating and discharging a coherent naval strategy.

 

[Dain]

I started watching the YouTube series; The Great War. It mentioned that the blockade didn't have the anticipated affect that the British wanted.

I feel it was a little vague, and I was hoping further elaboration from people who may know a little more.

Such as; the show says that Germany's industry to wage war was unaffected to an extent. Is this because they are self sufficient or learned to be self sufficient to meet demands?

Also I know they had neutral nations where they could take in imports.

You already received a lot of general answers, but I'd like to add something particular:

As you said, you are watching The Great War which chronicles the progress of the war as it happened 100 years ago week by week (well worth the time, an awesome channel, which is just now getting into the endgame).

I assume you mean the early episode about the blockade describing the state of sometime in late 1914/early 1915 - and as previous responses already mentioned, at that early stage the blockade indeed failed to be very effective since the UK had organized it ad hoc at the outbreak of war, without much preparation. Consequently it was still full of holes. In the following years the blockade would get increasingly tighter as the UK actively tried to eliminate these holes and world opinion turned against Germany, with the US entry marking the point at which it went from endurable to crippling.

So instead of a sudden complete cessation of imports Germany was faced more with a gradual drop - while far from perfect, that gave them a generous time frame (probably the best possible under these conditions) for dealing with the problems as they arose and implementing solutions if possible.

 

[MichaelWest]

Although I agree with most of this, I'm not sure your judgement on the inexcusable lack of preparation is entirely fair. I mean, from Germany's perspective, the point of having a short, decisive war is that that way you don't have to worry about these long-term supply and industrial problems. That said I agree with your point more broadly.

Also the distinction between a close blockade and a distant blockade is just that the British didn't want to risk having their blockade ships shot up by the Germans. I don't think it affected either the legality or the effectiveness, ultimately. Going by Tirpitz's theory, the HSF didn't have to defeat the RN in battle, just inflict such severe losses that the RN would lose its preeminent status, and that would be enough to deter the British. Oops.

Every combatant had a determined lack of sobriety on just how long a modern industrial war might last and the true hardships it imposes upon the nation. What I find truly shocking is just how ill-defined are German strategic objectives. "A place in the Sun" is a slogan not a plan. And I do think the General Staff woefully failed the nation in not having a plan for more than roll the dice and hope we win. It reminds me of our Assured Destruction thinking under Lemay, nothing short of extermination is the plan despite a world full of dangers less than going full tilt for. But I concede that the Generals were not yet experienced in the sort of war that they found themselves in.

Once we assume the "encirclement", Germany needs to secure its lifelines and allies, it should have prepared for the worse rather than blindly gamble on a conveniently short war. The Soviets made similar plans to drive hell bent across Germany before the logistical and operational math catches up. I expect better from the Generals.

And this is the flaw in Tirpitz's thinking, a fleet in being or a fleet designed to break a blockade had to be balanced against the diplomatic effort to keep Britain out of France's court, that was the genius of Bismarck, he isolated France, the only nation with a score to settle and the only one that had to go to war to get what it wanted from Germany. The Kaiser was playing billiards, knocking balls about, while Bismarck played chess, he moved for moves not yet taken. Tirpitz then fails to actually build or use the fleet to gain his decisive victory, Jutland should have been all or nothing, the HSF was built to risk and then rusted away in fear of loss. Add to this the lack of coordination between the Army and Navy and we see that the Germans are well armed for a fight but have no idea why to fight, what is victory or how to get something from the effort. And it is in that fray that we go off to play. And why as I spin my thoughts on an alternative I always fail to find the omnipotent juggernaut of propaganda, the Germans were as feeble, as deluded, as foolhardy and as flawed as any of their opponents, but is that not more interesting to ponder? If we fail the blockade that gives us a different mess rather than a clean future.