Wrapped in Flames: The Great American War and Beyond

I disagree. Britain was balls deep in the US in 1812, and they still didn't get that much territorial concessions, in fact, they didn't get any at all. Britain is going to have to bleed the US dry if they want to have that much American land as you said in your example, and I doubt there's enough political will to keep this war going for as long, specially if the Americans suck up their pride and give away the Washington Territory, which is a very big piece of land.
Britain doesn't have to bleed America, they just have to exercise some soft power in Europe and get Confederate recognition, or get the ball rolling and do it themselves. That's the ultimate trump card and why peace is dangerous, if Britain isn't wholly satisfied they'll just increasingly back the south.
 
Britain doesn't have to bleed America, they just have to exercise some soft power in Europe and get Confederate recognition, or get the ball rolling and do it themselves. That's the ultimate trump card and why peace is dangerous, if Britain isn't wholly satisfied they'll just increasingly back the south.
Recognition per se aren't going to win the war for the CSA.
 
Britain doesn't have to bleed America, they just have to exercise some soft power in Europe and get Confederate recognition, or get the ball rolling and do it themselves. That's the ultimate trump card and why peace is dangerous, if Britain isn't wholly satisfied they'll just increasingly back the south.
That’s a very dangerous game for Britain to play, though. If they threaten to recognize the CSA, the US can threaten to support Irish or Indian independence movements (while Ireland might not be taken seriously, the Mutiny will still be large in Britain’s memory). It also leaves a terrible precedent if they recognize a breakaway state for political gain, opening themselves up to a similar act down the road by other great powers. After all, the British didn’t try and leverage Polish independence against the Russians during the Crimean War despite unrest there.
 
That’s a very dangerous game for Britain to play, though. If they threaten to recognize the CSA, the US can threaten to support Irish or Indian independence movements (while Ireland might not be taken seriously, the Mutiny will still be large in Britain’s memory). It also leaves a terrible precedent if they recognize a breakaway state for political gain, opening themselves up to a similar act down the road by other great powers. After all, the British didn’t try and leverage Polish independence against the Russians during the Crimean War despite unrest there.
How is America going to back any independence movements when she can't project power beyond her own borders? Her fleet is smashed, her economy in tatters and a third of the country is seceding. In the future she might, but that's decades away.
Recognition per se aren't going to win the war for the CSA.
It might not win the war, but it makes it that much more difficult for America to win. Especially if Britain keeps fighting.
 
How is America going to back any independence movements when she can't project power beyond her own borders? Her fleet is smashed, her economy in tatters and a third of the country is seceding. In the future she might, but that's decades away.
Ignoring or protecting the Fenian Brotherhood, looking the other way while Americans violate the Neutrality Act, sneaking weapons aboard merchant vessels, allowing American territory to be a haven for pro-independence groups, constructing private vessels that happen to have a sizable self-defense capability, pro-independence propaganda, giving diplomatic legitimacy to independence groups. It’s not that hard for a nation to support rebels of another nation, even if it’s hard to make that support something as concrete as arms or an army.
 
Ignoring or protecting the Fenian Brotherhood,
This is OTL you realize?
looking the other way while Americans violate the Neutrality Act, sneaking weapons aboard merchant vessels,
That is.........unlikely. Britain and her colonies had the strictest security rules for smuggling in the 19th century. 1848 was a great nothing in the UK for a good reason. Smuggled weapons were all caught.
allowing American territory to be a haven for pro-independence groups
hate to break it to you, that is otl as well. Sikh nationalists were given refuge in California in the early 1900s
constructing private vessels that happen to have a sizable self-defense capability
OTL. Look at the Fenians. They built their weapons and got their war materials in America through private means
pro-independence propaganda
OTL. See - Fenians, IRA links in USA, Coptic Organization for Egyptians in America, The Jamaican Front etc
giving diplomatic legitimacy to independence groups.
How? Diplomatically recognizing a few disparate groups of people living in exile? Unless a real rebellion breaks out, that is seriously not going to alter anything but create more bad relations. It also took 4 Irish nationalist groups clamped down upon and destroyed, 2 contentious Irish home rule bills being cut out, and the third one passing but being put on hold indefinitely, having their countrymen killed in droves, and then having several cities burned to the ground before the Irish finally had enough and revolted. That situation is far far away and by this point butterflied. The Indian nationalists, majority of them anyway, steered clear of violent struggles to get rid of the British after 1857 because of the fact that the Princely States were not afraid of sending their armies to clamp down on indian nationalism, and committed some of the worst atrocities of the 1857 War.

Frankly, i find it harder and harder to stomach the idea that the USA would be revanchist with the UK for the sake of it. Economics - 48% of foreign investment lost, security having to maintain a large force and navy that the USA economy would not be able to fund for a long time in the late 19th century, and the fact that the UK controls all of the major trade routes makes this idea that the USA would remain permanently revanchist highly unlikely and a major economic loss if the USA does. It would basically halt half of the economic progress the USA made otl after the civil war. The USA ITTL will certainly not like the UK, but open revanchism is not likely or even economically worthwhile. It would more or less be the UK-Russian Relation of otl from 1860 - 1910. 'Ok We Hate you and you hate us, but we need to trade with you and you need to trade with us, so what say you and I don't openly become hostile with one another capiche?'.

Also this idea that the USA won't forgive their country being split in half doesn't stand; pretty sure Mexico, Panama and Colombia, Peru-Bolivia, Argentina, Ireland, Catalans, Basques, Russians, Arabs, Pashtuns, Indians, Nepalese, Siamese, Virtually all of Africa have and had forgiven the powers which split them apart within a good few decades, not particularly because they liked the splitting nation, but because of sheer economic and military pragmaticism.
 
This is OTL you realize?

That is.........unlikely. Britain and her colonies had the strictest security rules for smuggling in the 19th century. 1848 was a great nothing in the UK for a good reason. Smuggled weapons were all caught.

hate to break it to you, that is otl as well. Sikh nationalists were given refuge in California in the early 1900s

OTL. Look at the Fenians. They built their weapons and got their war materials in America through private means

OTL. See - Fenians, IRA links in USA, Coptic Organization for Egyptians in America, The Jamaican Front etc
You do realize that the USA merely tolerated those groups and didn’t provide them active support, right? That the USA arrested members of the Fenian Brotherhood
How? Diplomatically recognizing a few disparate groups of people living in exile? Unless a real rebellion breaks out, that is seriously not going to alter anything but create more bad relations. It also took 4 Irish nationalist groups clamped down upon and destroyed, 2 contentious Irish home rule bills being cut out, and the third one passing but being put on hold indefinitely, having their countrymen killed in droves, and then having several cities burned to the ground before the Irish finally had enough and revolted. That situation is far far away and by this point butterflied. The Indian nationalists, majority of them anyway, steered clear of violent struggles to get rid of the British after 1857 because of the fact that the Princely States were not afraid of sending their armies to clamp down on indian nationalism, and committed some of the worst atrocities of the 1857 War.

I was asked how the US could support British independence movements, I gave an answer. Of course things depend on context, that should be obvious, but that doesn’t mean they aren’t a possibility. We could make huge amounts of desalination plants if we wanted to, but we don’t because there’s no. Does that mean we can’t?
Frankly, i find it harder and harder to stomach the idea that the USA would be revanchist with the UK for the sake of it. Economics - 48% of foreign investment lost, security having to maintain a large force and navy that the USA economy would not be able to fund for a long time in the late 19th century, and the fact that the UK controls all of the major trade routes makes this idea that the USA would remain permanently revanchist highly unlikely and a major economic loss if the USA does. It would basically halt half of the economic progress the USA made otl after the civil war.

You remember that time the Germans shot their economy in the face in the 1920s? How the Germans decided to attack their largest trading partner in 1941? How the Japanese doubled down on war despite it crippling their economy in the 1930s and 40s? How the Greeks fought on despite the economic ruination of their country in their war of independence? How Paraguay got two thirds of its men killed in the War of the Triple Alliance?
Humans aren’t always rational, expecting them to be is an exercise in frustration.
The USA ITTL will certainly not like the UK, but open revanchism is not likely or even economically worthwhile. It would more or less be the UK-Russian Relation of otl from 1860 - 1910. 'Ok We Hate you and you hate us, but we need to trade with you and you need to trade with us, so what say you and I don't openly become hostile with one another capiche?'.
And as I have stated before, I also see this as a possibility. But it doesn’t require open war to screw with another country. Last time I checked, neither nukes nor planes have flown against Russia for 2016.
Also this idea that the USA won't forgive their country being split in half doesn't stand; pretty sure Mexico, Panama and Colombia, Peru-Bolivia, Argentina, Ireland, Catalans, Basques, Russians, Arabs, Pashtuns, Indians, Nepalese, Siamese, Virtually all of Africa have and had forgiven the powers which split them apart within a good few decades, not particularly because they liked the splitting nation, but because of sheer economic and military pragmaticism.
Forgive, or unable to do anything? France, in this same time period, certainly didn’t forgive Germany for taking Alsace-Lorraine despite being weaker than them. China is still sore about the Century of Humiliation even though it was unable to do anything about it at the time. Japan was extremely bitter about Versailles, enough to go batshit crazy a decade later.
Countries don’t always act rationally, and often hold grudges even if they can’t act on them. Using relationships with a larger power imbalance than the 1860s USA and UK as proof the USA wouldn’t do anything to the UK is absurd and is merely cherry-picking points to support you.
 
You do realize that the USA merely tolerated those groups and didn’t provide them active support, right? That the USA arrested members of the Fenian Brotherhood
You wrote ignoring or protecting the Indepencia groups. Tolerating them, and ignoring them is basically the same thing. There is no difference. Members of the Fenians were not arrested due to their links with Britain rather their breaking of US laws. As long as US laws weren't breached, the US was more than happy to let them stay. It was only due to internal dissension and a growing lack of enthusiasm that the Fenians dissolved.
I was asked how the US could support British independence movements, I gave an answer. Of course things depend on context, that should be obvious, but that doesn’t mean they aren’t a possibility. We could make huge amounts of desalination plants if we wanted to, but we don’t because there’s no. Does that mean we can’t?
Partially yes. Desalination plants destroy several surrounding environments and maritime eco-diversity. As such, it destroys the local fishing industries. Therefore, yes we can't build Desalination plants in a good many areas. And in context of colonial separatism, the same context of OTL basically still applies here, considering these events happened before the PoD.
You remember that time the Germans shot their economy in the face in the 1920s?
They didn't shoot their economy because they knew it would start to hyperinflate. The Germans decided to use a disparate theory of Supply and Demand and began to create more and more monetary circulation in the market, which backfired on the Germans because they had more money printed than what German commodities were worth. This more a matter of economic misappropriation than that of Economic Revanchism. So your point?
How the Germans decided to attack their largest trading partner in 1941? How the Japanese doubled down on war despite it crippling their economy in the 1930s and 40s? How the Greeks fought on despite the economic ruination of their country in their war of independence? How Paraguay got two thirds of its men killed in the War of the Triple Alliance?
Humans aren’t always rational, expecting them to be is an exercise in frustration.
Frankly comparing the USA to dictatorships is not going to be a good argument. Unless the USA goes on full authoritarian with a cult of personality around a single dictator, like what happened in all of the nations you listed, that is simply not happening. The USA would still be answerable to the people, to the Treasury, and to the Economic Commission, unlike your listed countries, which were dictatorships. Unless you are arguing that the US will, then sure, go ahead.
And as I have stated before, I also see this as a possibility. But it doesn’t require open war to screw with another country. Last time I checked, neither nukes nor planes have flown against Russia for 2016.
Indeed, which is what I am saying, your point? There is a very large difference between Revanchism and engaging in trade conflicts with other countries. Even with good relations the USA and UK did that routinely from 1870 - 1935 which were just as if not more crippling than the Russian sanctions.
France, in this same time period, certainly didn’t forgive Germany for taking Alsace-Lorraine despite being weaker than them.
This is a massive trope i wish would die and burn in hell. Alsace Lorraine was a dead issue by 1900, and was only briefly returned to the spotlight because Boulanger made a big issue out of in the 1890s. By the 1902, 1906, 1910 and 1914 Legislative Elections, Alsace Lorraine was brought up thrice only, and all during the 1902 elections, by Jacques Piot, who tried to garner the former Boulanger supporters. After that it was pretty much a dead issue in France. It caused anti-german feeling yes, but fun fact, France and Germany remained highly integrated with one another economically until 1913, when relations started to sour and France started to withdraw its economic investments in Germany and so did Germany vice versa.
China is still sore about the Century of Humiliation even though it was unable to do anything about it at the time.
And........does nothing about it other than whining and murmuring a few years of the year. They aren't invading Arunachal Pradesh anytime soon, and neither are they trying to seize Mongolia, Russian Tuva and the Russian Far East and in fact enjoys extremely good relations with Russia, Mongolia and retains a mix of 'in public we hate each other, but in private we do good economic deals with each other' kind of relation with India. See my point?
Japan was extremely bitter about Versailles, enough to go batshit crazy a decade later.
Elise K. Tipkon in her book Society and the State in Interwar Japan, Thought Crime: Ideology and State Power in Interwar Japan by Max Ward, Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period all put the 1922 Anti-Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the 1924 fall of government and the 1929 Great Depression as the main reasons of Japanese militarism. Versailles was and is a very minor point that led to Japanese militarism.
Countries don’t always act rationally, and often hold grudges even if they can’t act on them. Using relationships with a larger power imbalance than the 1860s USA and UK as proof the USA wouldn’t do anything to the UK is absurd and is merely cherry-picking points to support you.
In all of the examples you listed, all are dictatorial and authoritarian nations. And frankly, even in the worst case scenario of USA losing horribly and losing the CSA, and losing some western land and the pre-1818 Maine Border with Canada, i will find it very very hard to make the USA a authoritarian and dictatorial country,
 
Also sorry to double-post but @EnglishCanuck what's going on in the rest of the British Empire as a result of this war? French Canadians taking part in the war will inevitably bring up the Catholic Question in Ireland and the Scottish Highlands again (despite emancipation, they remained systematic discriminated), as well as the troop placements means that the Indian Subcontinent (ahem.....Sikh Empire.....ahem), and the Great Game in Afghanistan and Persia will be interesting indeed. The Austrians also sold heavy amounts of ammunitions and weapons to the USA otl in the Civil War which they won't have ittl, which could mean a more heavily armed Austrian Army in time for the Austro-Prussian War (if it happens) which will certainly be interesting. With America even more distracted, Napoleon III should be.....for the lack of a proper term,.......prancing around in Mexico with all he has.
 
These were the original British demands to avoid war.

Man am I so glad you remembered this! I can assure you, TTL Washington has not forgotten it and it will play a role in how the US attempts to shape the coming negotiations.

Both sides are way beyond this now so there should be room to negotiate what would appear to the public (on both sides) as Not A Loss if not an outright win: The US gets Portland back but perhaps cede enough Maine territory to protect the Grand Trunk Railway. Britain also returns it's West Coast conquests but gets the border it wants for British Columbia. The USA returns south of the Canadian border and the Richelieu River corridor is not to be militarized by either side. What guarantees would be acceptable to Canada for a future peaceful coexistence - no naval yards on the Great Lakes? Repudiation of ever trying to take Canadian territory in the future? Maybe England gets sole rights to exploit the Sandwich Islands? Or maybe England sells their West Coast to the USA at a premium?

The Canadians are rather unusually in a good position to see they get a lot of what they want. Not only is the military and political opinion on their side, but the three organs of government that oversee it, The War Office, The Foreign Office, and the Colonial Office, are all in accord that something needs to be done to further secure Canada. So there will definitely be concessions made to the men on their negotiating team.

I honestly don’t see the US accepting any treaty that includes ceding land at this juncture. They’re literally fighting a war to keep the South, ceding territory to the British is just asking for trouble on the home front. A demilitarized border is much more plausible, as is signing away Hawaii to the British (although I highly doubt that will stop filibusters down the line unless Britain outright annexes the island).

Lincoln and all certainly don't want to lose any territory, as that would be a pretty bitter pill. However, the question is what will the British ask for? Too much and you're undoubtedly right that Washington may simply decide to fight on because doing anything else would be, politically speaking, just as bad. However, Washington doesn't have too good a finger on the pulse of the foreign situation thanks to the blockade, and absent that they're very worried about how the broad consensus in Europe is. The victories in 1863 will help - and with the Siege of Washington lifted that's quite a position to be starting negotiations from - but the ever important question is, will it be enough?

I disagree. Britain was balls deep in the US in 1812, and they still didn't get that much territorial concessions, in fact, they didn't get any at all. Britain is going to have to bleed the US dry if they want to have that much American land as you said in your example, and I doubt there's enough political will to keep this war going for as long, specially if the Americans suck up their pride and give away the Washington Territory, which is a very big piece of land.

In 1814 the British sent what can only be described as their "B Team" to negotiate at Ghent. Even after the news of Baltimore and Plattsburgh, the negotiators had pretty good leverage to take some not insubstantial gains at the table. It speaks to both how distracted Britain was and how much of a sideshow they regarded that war that they, in effect, negotiated down for a what amounted to a white peace. Here, the British will definitely not be sending their B Team and the group of negotiators I've put together is probably well rounded enough that Britain is going to get their pound of flesh.

Britain doesn't have to bleed America, they just have to exercise some soft power in Europe and get Confederate recognition, or get the ball rolling and do it themselves. That's the ultimate trump card and why peace is dangerous, if Britain isn't wholly satisfied they'll just increasingly back the south.

This is something that Lincoln is aware of. The win at Washington is, at the very least, just as much political as it is strategic. Had Washington fallen you would have called that game over as the CSA has captured the American capital, forced the Union's largest army to surrender, and left much of the East Coast open. Recognition would have been just a matter of time then. Now though, Lincoln can point to foreign powers that the Union is still in the game, the war is not over, and maybe in 1864 the Confederacy will be getting its own back.

However, Britain isn't the only game in town when it comes to recognition. In Paris, there's a certain gentleman who has ambitions of his own...

You do realize that the USA merely tolerated those groups and didn’t provide them active support, right? That the USA arrested members of the Fenian Brotherhood

This is true to an extent. The Johnson administration had to walk a very fine line between giving the not-politically-insignificant Fenians the right to organize and campaign, but also not go too far in the other direction and flop so badly in surveilling them that the situation escalated. The 1866 invasion (and just how much surplus military material it seems unscrupulous officers were willing to sell) was a bit of a flop for the State Department, but the US acted diligently in moving to disperse and arrest the Fenian militants after the fact. Much smoother than the Van Buren administration dealt with the Hunters Lodges in 1837-38.

The Fenians will have a very, very interesting time in the post-war world.
 
Also sorry to double-post but @EnglishCanuck what's going on in the rest of the British Empire as a result of this war? French Canadians taking part in the war will inevitably bring up the Catholic Question in Ireland and the Scottish Highlands again (despite emancipation, they remained systematic discriminated), as well as the troop placements means that the Indian Subcontinent (ahem.....Sikh Empire.....ahem), and the Great Game in Afghanistan and Persia will be interesting indeed. The Austrians also sold heavy amounts of ammunitions and weapons to the USA otl in the Civil War which they won't have ittl, which could mean a more heavily armed Austrian Army in time for the Austro-Prussian War (if it happens) which will certainly be interesting. With America even more distracted, Napoleon III should be.....for the lack of a proper term,.......prancing around in Mexico with all he has.

There's been some covered in Chapter 43, but I confess that like the politics of the CSA, I've been a bit lax in British politics too. I know I've scattered some stuff in the various narrative posts, mostly about Poland, Greece and the Med, but in 1862-63 not too, too much has changed overall in terms of politics, Palmerston has too much of a firm hand to let things rattle too much, even in war time. Though I'm going to address some of the issues in the upcoming chapter dealing with British politics. He's got a problem in the War Cabinet.

The Empire as a whole though hasn't changed too much. India is still stable, the men withdrawn for the California expedition were largely taken from sectors quiet during the Mutiny. The battalion from New Zealand will not be missed...yet, but Britain is less involved in the Taiping Civil War. I'll cover that in a bit more depth in the "1863: A Year in Review" chapter after I catch up on all the politics. One big change is that there's going to be no Chinese Gordon TTL, but I did mention he has some fun somewhere in the Pacific.

In Europe, I've laid the groundwork for a few major changes, and there's going to be some surprises for people, though the year 1863 is going to look broadly similar to OTL. Austria has still sent weapons to the Union - it was very much a, get them if you can but we're taking your money deal - while they are a little better armed. Russia though, has more diplomatic movement, and is crushing the Poles with relative impunity. It's making very sympathetic noises towards the Union, but the most their doing is exerting some soft power to try and dissuade any of the true neutrals, like Prussia and Austria, into taking up the cause of recognition.
 
You wrote ignoring or protecting the Indepencia groups. Tolerating them, and ignoring them is basically the same thing. There is no difference. Members of the Fenians were not arrested due to their links with Britain rather their breaking of US laws. As long as US laws weren't breached, the US was more than happy to let them stay. It was only due to internal dissension and a growing lack of enthusiasm that the Fenians dissolved.
Toleration is allowing them to operate on your own soil, ignoring them is just what it says: ignoring their actions. While you can base yourself out of somewhere, that’s far less valuable than being allowed to campaign for support there. Considering the Fenian were arrested OTL, I highly doubt the US simply let them do whatever they wanted.
Partially yes. Desalination plants destroy several surrounding environments and maritime eco-diversity. As such, it destroys the local fishing industries. Therefore, yes we can't build Desalination plants in a good many areas. And in context of colonial separatism, the same context of OTL basically still applies here, considering these events happened before the PoD.
My point is just because the necessary factors aren’t available to make it practical at the current moment doesn’t mean they don’t exist. Even without water shortages, we can build desalination plants. Even if there is no active revolt as of yet, the US could still provide any such revolt .
They didn't shoot their economy because they knew it would start to hyperinflate. The Germans decided to use a disparate theory of Supply and Demand and began to create more and more monetary circulation in the market, which backfired on the Germans because they had more money printed than what German commodities were worth. This more a matter of economic misappropriation than that of Economic Revanchism. So your point?
The Germans did shoot their economy in the foot in order to try and worm their way out of paying reparations. They not only knew that mass printing money would lead to hyperinflation, that was the entire damn point. People do stupid things, don’t expect them to act rationally.
Frankly comparing the USA to dictatorships is not going to be a good argument. Unless the USA goes on full authoritarian with a cult of personality around a single dictator, like what happened in all of the nations you listed, that is simply not happening. The USA would still be answerable to the people, to the Treasury, and to the Economic Commission, unlike your listed countries, which were dictatorships. Unless you are arguing that the US will, then sure, go ahead.
I mean, if you ignore the democratic examples I put in, sure, there’s only authoritarian ones. I explicitly mentioned democratic examples because I knew only relying on authoritarians wouldn’t be a very good comparison. Just because you snip out the examples doesn’t mean I didn’t mention the French, 1920s Japan, or the Greeks (who most definitely were a popular movement).
Indeed, which is what I am saying, your point? There is a very large difference between Revanchism and engaging in trade conflicts with other countries. Even with good relations the USA and UK did that routinely from 1870 - 1935 which were just as if not more crippling than the Russian sanctions.
You’re the one who ignores what I already said upthread, don’t “what’s your point” me.
This is a massive trope i wish would die and burn in hell. Alsace Lorraine was a dead issue by 1900, and was only briefly returned to the spotlight because Boulanger made a big issue out of in the 1890s. By the 1902, 1906, 1910 and 1914 Legislative Elections, Alsace Lorraine was brought up thrice only, and all during the 1902 elections, by Jacques Piot, who tried to garner the former Boulanger supporters. After that it was pretty much a dead issue in France. It caused anti-german feeling yes, but fun fact, France and Germany remained highly integrated with one another economically until 1913, when relations started to sour and France started to withdraw its economic investments in Germany and so did Germany vice versa.
So... two powers can be economically linked to each other and still end up going to war? Who would have known?
And by the by, just because something isn’t a driving force in politics doesn’t mean it’s nonexistent. If Alsace-Lorraine was causing anti-German sentiment, as you admit, it was having an effect on relations.
And........does nothing about it other than whining and murmuring a few years of the year. They aren't invading Arunachal Pradesh anytime soon, and neither are they trying to seize Mongolia, Russian Tuva and the Russian Far East and in fact enjoys extremely good relations with Russia, Mongolia and retains a mix of 'in public we hate each other, but in private we do good economic deals with each other' kind of relation with India. See my point?
Pretty sure that has more to do with the nuclear umbrella instead of lack of will, considering how much effort they expended in Korea and in the Sino-Soviet Border War.
You also seem to be working super hard to twist my argument from “The US will be nursing an anti-British grudge and will be able to do something nasty back to Britain if they recognize the CSA” into “The USA is going to kill those Brits, AMERICA, FUCK YEAH!”, which is a sentiment I have not expressed anywhere.
Elise K. Tipkon in her book Society and the State in Interwar Japan, Thought Crime: Ideology and State Power in Interwar Japan by Max Ward, Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period all put the 1922 Anti-Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the 1924 fall of government and the 1929 Great Depression as the main reasons of Japanese militarism. Versailles was and is a very minor point that led to Japanese militarism.
Versailles set the Japanese onto the path of militarism by showing them the Europeans didn’t respect them. While it may not have given the same opportunities as the Great Depression, ignoring its effect on the Japanese national psyche is like saying the Enlightenment wasn’t important to the French Revolution because it was the American Revolution that bankrupted France.
In all of the examples you listed, all are dictatorial and authoritarian nations. And frankly, even in the worst case scenario of USA losing horribly and losing the CSA, and losing some western land and the pre-1818 Maine Border with Canada, i will find it very very hard to make the USA a authoritarian and dictatorial country,
As I already said, just because you choose to ignore the democratic examples brought up doesn’t make them any less real. But since you seem to be so hung up on the supposed lack, here’s three more: Korea and Japan are still, almost some 80 years later, disputing the ownership of the nearly lifeless Liancourt Rocks, with both countries having temporarily withdrawn their ambassador from the other in the past two decades over the dispute, the last occasion being in 2012. Romania created a holiday for the unification of Romania and Bessarabia in 2017 and recent polls have shown a majority of the population supports unification with Moldova despite it being nearly 80 years since it was last part of the country and Moldavians not supporting unification. The Kingdom of Greece spent a decade between 1912 and 1922 fighting its neighbors for irredentist claims. Are those enough to convince you that democratic nations are just as capable of being irrational and holding onto old ideas as authoritarian ones?
 
In Paris, there's a certain gentleman who has ambitions of his own...
If we come to that, things could look interesting in France.

Another factor beyond waiting for the British to move on the question of CSA recognition was also that the American civil war reflected politically on the French political landscape. Globally, the left to moderate opposition, from republicans and socialists to Orleanists were pro Union (Prince Philippe and Prince Robert did serve in Union army), anti slavery (you'd see often the supporters of Poland in the same circles). At the same time, you'd have business circles, probably legitimists too (but I'm not sure), in the Confederates side. And while Napoléon III was going through implementing a series of political reforms since 1860, he had to be careful balancing each of the forces in presence to not upset the foundation of his regime (though from 1865 onwards, when his illnesses became increasingly debilitating, that didn't go well enough).

But if there is someone I would bet you refer as this gentleman, it would the Duke of Morny, Napoléon III's half brother. He was pretty much single handedly responsible for taking France into the Mexican adventure, was in cahoots with industrial and business circles and had large influence over his half-brother policies. I didn't get to read a biography of him, but what I got from biographies of other Second Empire figures in relation to him makes me think he would probably have a not small stake about how French policy is run regarding the American civil war.
 
If we come to that, things could look interesting in France.

Another factor beyond waiting for the British to move on the question of CSA recognition was also that the American civil war reflected politically on the French political landscape. Globally, the left to moderate opposition, from republicans and socialists to Orleanists were pro Union (Prince Philippe and Prince Robert did serve in Union army), anti slavery (you'd see often the supporters of Poland in the same circles). At the same time, you'd have business circles, probably legitimists too (but I'm not sure), in the Confederates side. And while Napoléon III was going through implementing a series of political reforms since 1860, he had to be careful balancing each of the forces in presence to not upset the foundation of his regime (though from 1865 onwards, when his illnesses became increasingly debilitating, that didn't go well enough).

But if there is someone I would bet you refer as this gentleman, it would the Duke of Morny, Napoléon III's half brother. He was pretty much single handedly responsible for taking France into the Mexican adventure, was in cahoots with industrial and business circles and had large influence over his half-brother policies. I didn't get to read a biography of him, but what I got from biographies of other Second Empire figures in relation to him makes me think he would probably have a not small stake about how French policy is run regarding the American civil war.

The politics of the Second Empire will become increasingly relevant I assure you! The particulars of why we shall explore, but Napoleon III is someone who will loom very large in 1864 in Washington, Richmond and London. There was some support for the Confederacy amongst the industrialists and more conservative aspects of the French political elite, the Bonapartists were partial to a Confederate victory, and as Napoleon dug himself deeper in Mexico he would be one of the most strident voices in pro-Confederate sentiment, and did help bring on the very real conversations about recognizing the CSA in 1862 and 1863.

The Duke of Morny is a gentleman who has played a very large role in the Mexican adventure, and he and the Empress share something of a determination on that front to keep that particular exercise going. I'm not sure what OTL influence he had on Nappy III on the CSA, but I can venture to guess that TTL he will play a role alongside de Lhuys in nudging the Emperor towards Richmond rather than Washington.
 
Don't forget Prince Napoléon, his cousin, the "Red Bonaparte". He was rather isolated politically, but when he spoke out, he was heard, and he was second in line to the throne.
 
I disagree. Britain was balls deep in the US in 1812, and they still didn't get that much territorial concessions, in fact, they didn't get any at all. Britain is going to have to bleed the US dry if they want to have that much American land as you said in your example, and I doubt there's enough political will to keep this war going for as long, specially if the Americans suck up their pride and give away the Washington Territory, which is a very big piece of land.

In 1814 the British sent what can only be described as their "B Team" to negotiate at Ghent. Even after the news of Baltimore and Plattsburgh, the negotiators had pretty good leverage to take some not insubstantial gains at the table. It speaks to both how distracted Britain was and how much of a sideshow they regarded that war that they, in effect, negotiated down for a what amounted to a white peace. Here, the British will definitely not be sending their B Team and the group of negotiators I've put together is probably well rounded enough that Britain is going to get their pound of flesh.

This is a very significant point indeed which bears repeating. In 1815, Britain had been on-again-off-again fighting France, first as a republic and then an empire, for over 20 years. The nation had bankrolled the war efforts of several other empires and both the leadership as well as the general populace was largely tired of war. Both sides had also been making peace overtures since pretty much the war's beginning. The British diplomatic A-team was still dealing with the treaty of Fontainebleau. I would say that the B-team was likely also there, to make sure that if any of the top diplomats fell ill or otherwise incapable, someone was present to serve British inerests in forging the treaty which had immediate global impact. Thus, I'd say that the treaty of Ghent likely got the C-team, although there was a timegap between Fontainebleau and Ghent, so some people likely were present for both treaties.

However, Britain isn't the only game in town when it comes to recognition. In Paris, there's a certain gentleman who has ambitions of his own...
I am wondering about Spain and it's colonies, actually. Slavery is still present in many of them, so Spain recognizing the Confederacy if there seems to be a benefit in doing so does not seem implausible and the more pro-Union nations are unlikely to affect Spain much.
 
Toleration is allowing them to operate on your own soil, ignoring them is just what it says: ignoring their actions. While you can base yourself out of somewhere, that’s far less valuable than being allowed to campaign for support there. Considering the Fenian were arrested OTL, I highly doubt the US simply let them do whatever they wanted.
And is that why they were able to build submarines for usage against Britain in the USA? Was that why Sikh Militant groups managed to gain funds from several American companies?
And I am going to quote Patrick Stewart's The Fenians: Irish Rebellion in the North Atlantic World, 1858–1876 from chapter 28 for this,
"In the 1870s, several members of the Fenian Brotherhood were arrested under the orders of President Grant, under the severe threat from the British government that war would break out if the Fenians were allowed to conduct their operations in the states without governmental oversight of them. The British government under Gladstone, were under pressure from the Canadian Confederation and the Tories to do something about the repeated raids into British North America, and Gladstone contacted the American government, bluntly telling Belknap and Fish that should several more raids be conducted into the interior of the British North American territories through American soil, then the government of London would not be able to stop a declaration of war passing through accompanied by a declaration of economic blockade. The sole threat of war with Britain and the British Empire stopped the wilful disregard and ignorance that Grant and his administration had shown to the Fenians and forced them to arrest several members of the brotherhood, most prominently being the arrest of John O'Neill."
So yes, the US government did wilfully ignore Irish rebel activity on their soil unless it meant war.
My point is just because the necessary factors aren’t available to make it practical at the current moment doesn’t mean they don’t exist. Even without water shortages, we can build desalination plants. Even if there is no active revolt as of yet, the US could still provide any such revolt .
Being defeated in war frankly is bound to have economic repercussions. And seeing as how CSA independence is more and more likely in the past chapters, in the timeline, frankly i am going to have ask where the USA get the money to fund rebellions? Everyone uses the term 'fund rebellions' like it is a charm or something but seem to forget that 99% of all funded rebellions in the 19th century failed to even get off the ground. The British funded Central Asian Revolt in Russia failed in 1853, the Russian funded rebellion in India in 1854 failed, the French planned rebellion in Argentina during the 1830s and 40s failed, the Austrian planned Catholic uprising in Prussia in 1866 failed, the American funded and planned revolt in Oaxaca during the Mexican-American War failed, the US funded small unionist uprisings in Texas and Louisiana in the CSA failed, the UK funded revolts in Ashanti succeeded but failed to get off the ground, the Ottoman funded revolt in Crimea failed in 1853 and the Russian funded rebels in Pontus failed in 1854. the Ottoman rebellion in Nis in 1841 funded by the Russians and Austrians failed, the Mexican funded slave rebellion in Texas failed during the American-Mexican War, the Austrian funded rebellion against joint Russo-Ottoman authority in Wallachia and Moldavia in 1841 failed, and according to the Long Nineteenth Century by Getz, that is around 85% of all planned rebellions during the 19th century that failed. And all of these were funded when these respective countries were economically stable. I very very very much doubt that an economically unstable country after losing a war will be able to successfully stabilize inflation in the short time, much less fund rebellion in other countries.
The Germans did shoot their economy in the foot in order to try and worm their way out of paying reparations. They not only knew that mass printing money would lead to hyperinflation, that was the entire damn point. People do stupid things, don’t expect them to act rationally.
Frankly you're making this up. Germany was going to pay the reparations, they had already paid the first hard check, and the the 1922 Payment date was also partially paid by the government. Germany was trying to worm itself out of reparations, however that didn't have anything to do with the hyperinflation of the 20s, other than amplify the diplomatic and political spectrum of economic nationalism in Germany at the time.
Frankly having done my economic thesis on the economic history of Europe, your statements are a fallacy. the crisis had already started in 1914, with inflation rising steadily. It then rapidly grew from 1919 due to the worthlessness of the reparations sent to the allies due to the depreciating amount of value that the Mark had after ww1. And the Germans didn't believe that the Mark was depreciating and continued to use it as a normal currency, which set off the hyperinflation crisis in 1922-23 when London had enough and sent the so-called London Ultimatum to meet the reparation's economic balance, which was being destroyed by the depreciating Mark. The attempts to stabilize the Mark, by using the Mark itself led to hyperinflation because monetary resources being used were far outstripping what Germany actually had in economic hard terms creating an imbalance of proper demand and supply in Germany at the time.
I mean, if you ignore the democratic examples I put in, sure, there’s only authoritarian ones. I explicitly mentioned democratic examples because I knew only relying on authoritarians wouldn’t be a very good comparison. Just because you snip out the examples doesn’t mean I didn’t mention the French, 1920s Japan, or the Greeks (who most definitely were a popular movement).
The particular post i was replying to said this:-
You remember that time the Germans shot their economy in the face in the 1920s? How the Germans decided to attack their largest trading partner in 1941? How the Japanese doubled down on war despite it crippling their economy in the 1930s and 40s? How the Greeks fought on despite the economic ruination of their country in their war of independence? How Paraguay got two thirds of its men killed in the War of the Triple Alliance?
Humans aren’t always rational, expecting them to be is an exercise in frustration.
Where is France may i ask? So Germany was a democracy in 1941? Japan was a democracy in the 1930s and 40s? Paraguay was a democracy under Lopez's Dynasty? Greece in 1821 - 27 was not a democracy. Please spare me that spiel. The 2nd National Assembly, 3rd National Assembly were all un-elected oligarchs running the show, and they were not elected and the Greek people didn't have a say in whether they supported the actions of the assembly or not.
You’re the one who ignores what I already said upthread, don’t “what’s your point” me.
Last time i checked......
he USA ITTL will certainly not like the UK, but open revanchism is not likely or even economically worthwhile. It would more or less be the UK-Russian Relation of otl from 1860 - 1910. 'Ok We Hate you and you hate us, but we need to trade with you and you need to trade with us, so what say you and I don't openly become hostile with one another capiche?'.
To which you replied
And as I have stated before, I also see this as a possibility. But it doesn’t require open war to screw with another country. Last time I checked, neither nukes nor planes have flown against Russia for 2016.
To which i then replied:-
Indeed, which is what I am saying, your point? There is a very large difference between Revanchism and engaging in trade conflicts with other countries. Even with good relations the USA and UK did that routinely from 1870 - 1935 which were just as if not more crippling than the Russian sanctions.
I haven't ignored what you have stated, till now. Please show me an example. I specifically agreed with on this point, asking how your point differs from mine. Do i have to elaborate more?
So... two powers can be economically linked to each other and still end up going to war? Who would have known?
Pot met kettle. The one who says I have been ignoring his points seems to ignore the very fact that explicitly writes France and Germany remained highly integrated with one another economically until 1913 when relations started to sour and France started to withdraw its economic investments in Germany and so did Germany vice versa. By the time war happened between France and Germany both countries had reduced 81% of their trade and investment with one another to the point that they weren't economically linked before.
And by the by, just because something isn’t a driving force in politics doesn’t mean it’s nonexistent. If Alsace-Lorraine was causing anti-German sentiment, as you admit, it was having an effect on relations.
Politics affect foreign policy. Today Nepal has huge anti-Indian sentiments, yet it is an Indian ally. Ireland had huge anti-British sentiments, but it is de-facto a British ally, the Central Asian states and Armenia don't particularly like the Russians and Armenia in particular even has a huge russophobia present in the country yet it is a Russian ally. Greece and Turkey both have massive phobias with one another, and yet they are allies with one another. the UK and Spain have massive disputes with one, which has led to severe anti-British sentiments in Spain and anti-Spanish sentiments in the UK, yet they are allies. Mongolia has extremely high anti-Chinese sentiments, and yet it is a Chinese ally.
The issue of Alsace-Lorraine didn't even come up during the Zabern Affair where the Germans brutally clamped down upon Alsatian and Lorrainer protestors and shot them. France shrugged and told them to do whatever they wanted in their territory. The very same party that said that won the 1914 elections in a landslide. Alsace-Lorriane had ceased to become an issue since 1902 and not even the far-right parties in the French Republic spoke about it. During the 1906, 1910, 1914 Legislative Elections, 1904, 1907, 1910, and the 1913 Canton and Departmental Elections, it didn't come up once, and 1904, 1908 and 1912 Municipal Elections it didn't create a single mention, and the candidate that did in 1912 in the Amien Department got a total.....of 0.84% of the vote. I am going to quote July 1914: Countdown to War by Sean McMeekin here

"In the event of the French decision-making process during the entire July crisis, the issue of Alsace-Lorriane did not come during political and diplomatic meetings even once. The military spoke of it, but only for military decisions regarding a probable offensive into the region to capture its vital metallurgical resources. It seems like an anomaly to us, who have been told that Alsace-Lorraine became an issue of revanchism and war among the French populace before the war, however, none of the decision-makers in France during the crisis ever spoke of it, not even the rightist opposition, who was the most bellicose and belligerent of all French political society. Throughout French society, war was not a prospect that many accepted, and socialists, who made up the majority of France's political spectrum in society at the time staged several protests. Even when war broke out, the newspaper Le Parisien noted that the atmosphere reeked of 'aiding our ally' rather than actual revanchism among French society, which seems to have been overly exaggerated in the past few decades after the war."​

Pretty sure that has more to do with the nuclear umbrella instead of lack of will, considering how much effort they expended in Korea and in the Sino-Soviet Border War.
Sure, the nuclear umbrella makes any attempt with Russia and India a full stop and does play a part, but what's stopping them with Mongolia, Burma, Vietnam and Laos then? They don't have a nuclear umbrella and as far as the Russians and Americans are concerned, they would make some noisy remarks, economic sanctions and then do nothing if China moved on them. Also, you fundamentally misunderstand the Century of Humiliation for the Chinese, having lived there. They smart against the economic exploitation and political exploitation of China and not the loss of land overall. It is a good portion of it yes, but Chinese irredentism on the Century of Humiliation comes from economic, political and territorial exploitation. All three, not simply territorial and being split off from their former territories.
You also seem to be working super hard to twist my argument from “The US will be nursing an anti-British grudge and will be able to do something nasty back to Britain if they recognize the CSA” into “The USA is going to kill those Brits, AMERICA, FUCK YEAH!”, which is a sentiment I have not expressed anywhere.
And i have argued that there isn't much they can do other than some diplomatic cold shoulder and economic trade wars. If you would please kindly point me where i stated you were stating that you argued 'The USA is going to kill those Brits, AMERICA, FUCK YEAH!' that would be very much appreciated, because the last time i read, i did not insinuate that. I specifically wrote that from during this time the measures you wrote down were almost all OTL, and they didn't do anything to the UK other than some brief annoyances, and that was with an economically united America, a broken and torn off America is simply not going to have the economic or diplomatic authority behind them to even try and conduct the measures they did otl, to even think about trying ittl. Economically it makes no sense, and other than Russia, which is itself economically devastated by the Crimean War, and does not recuperate until 15 years away from the date we are in in this timeline, has no allies. Spain, France and Prussia all remained neutral leaning on pro-Confederate and Austria remained decisively neutral selling to both sides to the highest bidder and that it would not be economically or diplomatically or political pragmantic for both USA and UK to hold a grudge with one another.
Versailles set the Japanese onto the path of militarism by showing them the Europeans didn’t respect them. While it may not have given the same opportunities as the Great Depression, ignoring its effect on the Japanese national psyche is like saying the Enlightenment wasn’t important to the French Revolution because it was the American Revolution that bankrupted France.
Frankly no. This roundabout way of spouting all of the 1914-45 tropes and stereotypes gets extremely old. To quote from the book i sourced earlier, Society and the State in Interwar Japan by Elise K. Tipkon (chapter 16)

"The issue of Versailles had been smoothened over with Japan in 1921 when the British signed a series of agreements with the Japanese in Ryuku and Tokyo, highlighting the diplomatic and economic importance, as well as the societal impact of the Japanese in the Great War. It was seen as a great victory for the Japanese that the British had gone behind the backs of the USA to acknowledge the Japanese which they had not been afforded in the Great War and the Conference of Versailles. With that agreement, the military who were clamouring with old doctrines such as honour and war were reined in by the governments under Viscount Kato and Viscount Takahashi. However, the death of Viscount Kato one week before the Great Kanto Earthquake and the non-renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty destroyed the stability of the government and left Japan diplomatically isolated and also allowed the military to reassert control and the nationalization measures after the Great Kanto Earthquake allowed the military to subsume more power in their hands. The ascension of Inukai as Prime Minister led to the military being stemmed in once again, however, the economic disparity after the Great Depression only allowed the Military to gain more influence in Japanese society and after the economic and political disasters of 1922-23, as well as the Economic downfall in 1929 and the assassination of Inukai in 1932, allowed the military to finally take over after a decade long on and off battle with the civilian government."​

Versailles played a very minor role in Japanese militarism, considering said militarism pre-dated Versailles and the fact that the military was weak in 1921 and not able to use Versailles as a card of propaganda after the government's stability fell.
As I already said, just because you choose to ignore the democratic examples brought up doesn’t make them any less real. But since you seem to be so hung up on the supposed lack, here’s three more: Korea and Japan are still, almost some 80 years later, disputing the ownership of the nearly lifeless Liancourt Rocks, with both countries having temporarily withdrawn their ambassador from the other in the past two decades over the dispute, the last occasion being in 2012. Romania created a holiday for the unification of Romania and Bessarabia in 2017 and recent polls have shown a majority of the population supports unification with Moldova despite it being nearly 80 years since it was last part of the country and Moldavians not supporting unification. The Kingdom of Greece spent a decade between 1912 and 1922 fighting its neighbors for irredentist claims. Are those enough to convince you that democratic nations are just as capable of being irrational and holding onto old ideas as authoritarian ones?
The bolded part - are they going to war? Are they engaging in economic trade wars? Nope. They aren't. That is my basic point, despite the want to do so, they don't engage in anything else other than some diplomatic and political off-playing with one another and don't pursue means of force to get what they want. And frankly let us be honest. SK and JP won't go to war with one another relations and economic relations are to high for that, and neither Russia nor America could give a care about if Romania invaded Moldova or not, considering the country has alienated both East and West.
Italic part - From Freris, A. F., The Greek Economy in the Twentieth Century, St. Martin's Press 1986, Greece's Major Trade Partners in 1910 in order of trade volume: (1) UK, (2) USA and France, (3) Russia, (4) Germany, (5) Austria, (6) Italy, (7) Spain, (8) Portugal, (9) Sweden, (10) Serbia, (11) Ottoman Empire, (12) Sweden, (13) Bulgaria
Greece chose its enemies well, they weren't economically integrated with Bulgaria and the Ottomans to the extent that they would lose a noticeable economic capital, and Greece entered ww1 after UK and France began subsidizing their economy to stave off the effects of losing Germany and Austria as partners.

However considering that the thread is already getting slightly heated and off topic, i will not be really replying after this. If you wish to continue this debate please PM me.
There's been some covered in Chapter 43, but I confess that like the politics of the CSA, I've been a bit lax in British politics too. I know I've scattered some stuff in the various narrative posts, mostly about Poland, Greece and the Med, but in 1862-63 not too, too much has changed overall in terms of politics, Palmerston has too much of a firm hand to let things rattle too much, even in war time. Though I'm going to address some of the issues in the upcoming chapter dealing with British politics. He's got a problem in the War Cabinet.

The Empire as a whole though hasn't changed too much. India is still stable, the men withdrawn for the California expedition were largely taken from sectors quiet during the Mutiny. The battalion from New Zealand will not be missed...yet, but Britain is less involved in the Taiping Civil War. I'll cover that in a bit more depth in the "1863: A Year in Review" chapter after I catch up on all the politics. One big change is that there's going to be no Chinese Gordon TTL, but I did mention he has some fun somewhere in the Pacific.
British support was monetary and naval during the Taiping Rebellion mostly, so i would say a few batallions out of Taiping would not be missed by the Chinese as long as supervisors stay.
In Europe, I've laid the groundwork for a few major changes, and there's going to be some surprises for people, though the year 1863 is going to look broadly similar to OTL. Austria has still sent weapons to the Union - it was very much a, get them if you can but we're taking your money deal - while they are a little better armed. Russia though, has more diplomatic movement, and is crushing the Poles with relative impunity. It's making very sympathetic noises towards the Union, but the most their doing is exerting some soft power to try and dissuade any of the true neutrals, like Prussia and Austria, into taking up the cause of recognition.
Austria and Prussia will certainly be very interesting!
The politics of the Second Empire will become increasingly relevant I assure you! The particulars of why we shall explore, but Napoleon III is someone who will loom very large in 1864 in Washington, Richmond and London. There was some support for the Confederacy amongst the industrialists and more conservative aspects of the French political elite, the Bonapartists were partial to a Confederate victory, and as Napoleon dug himself deeper in Mexico he would be one of the most strident voices in pro-Confederate sentiment, and did help bring on the very real conversations about recognizing the CSA in 1862 and 1863.

The Duke of Morny is a gentleman who has played a very large role in the Mexican adventure, and he and the Empress share something of a determination on that front to keep that particular exercise going. I'm not sure what OTL influence he had on Nappy III on the CSA, but I can venture to guess that TTL he will play a role alongside de Lhuys in nudging the Emperor towards Richmond rather than Washington.
The Duke of Morny was also supportive of a soft pro-Confederate policy in France. If the CSA is recognized by Britain, then the CSA will be recognized by France, and if they win, i would wager that the 1863 or 1869 French elections could see an increased Bonapartist majority in the chamber of deputies. Ollivier would also be looking at the events closely. He was a moderate republican, ready to work with Napoleon III if the empire truly became 'liberalist empire' as he called it. Berryer and the Legitimists and Orleanists will be the most interesting in the elections as their base of affairs in the Mexican Adventure and the ACW wasn't really clear cut.
This is a very significant point indeed which bears repeating. In 1815, Britain had been on-again-off-again fighting France, first as a republic and then an empire, for over 20 years. The nation had bankrolled the war efforts of several other empires and both the leadership as well as the general populace was largely tired of war. Both sides had also been making peace overtures since pretty much the war's beginning. The British diplomatic A-team was still dealing with the treaty of Fontainebleau. I would say that the B-team was likely also there, to make sure that if any of the top diplomats fell ill or otherwise incapable, someone was present to serve British inerests in forging the treaty which had immediate global impact. Thus, I'd say that the treaty of Ghent likely got the C-team, although there was a timegap between Fontainebleau and Ghent, so some people likely were present for both treaties.
There's also the fact that when the British diplomats in Ghent opened up negotiations by bluntly demanding a native buffer state and Maine, Clay and the USA diplomatic team almost gave in, and only changed their minds due to the news of the victory at Baltimore and Plattsburgh. If C-Level Diplomats could almost incite the USA to lose so many territories then the A-team are certainly going to be much harder.
 
I am wondering about Spain and it's colonies, actually. Slavery is still present in many of them, so Spain recognizing the Confederacy if there seems to be a benefit in doing so does not seem implausible and the more pro-Union nations are unlikely to affect Spain much.

Spain is, as per OTL, trying to expand and secure its colonial empire in the Caribbean again. They occupied Dominican in 1862, and that is having all the lovely effects of OTL. I'll have more to say about Spanish ambitions for sure. They're watching events with just as much interest.

British support was monetary and naval during the Taiping Rebellion mostly, so i would say a few batallions out of Taiping would not be missed by the Chinese as long as supervisors stay.

Most likely not no. I don't think the single battalion (99th) I've relocated from China will have too much effect. The longer life of the mercenary Ward may be another matter.

Austria and Prussia will certainly be very interesting!

Oh I think people will be pleasantly surprised!

The Duke of Morny was also supportive of a soft pro-Confederate policy in France. If the CSA is recognized by Britain, then the CSA will be recognized by France, and if they win, i would wager that the 1863 or 1869 French elections could see an increased Bonapartist majority in the chamber of deputies. Ollivier would also be looking at the events closely. He was a moderate republican, ready to work with Napoleon III if the empire truly became 'liberalist empire' as he called it. Berryer and the Legitimists and Orleanists will be the most interesting in the elections as their base of affairs in the Mexican Adventure and the ACW wasn't really clear cut.

OTL I know that pro-Confederate support was more of an upper class (and then Normandy, Cherbourg, and textile worker affair) but the politics of the ACW didn't really effect France as a whole. I think that once the Mexican affair grows more serious in 1864 that is bound to change. Napoleon III jumped in with both feet, and in any TL where he looks like he can get away with more in North America, I don't think he's going to not try and take an advantage.

There's also the fact that when the British diplomats in Ghent opened up negotiations by bluntly demanding a native buffer state and Maine, Clay and the USA diplomatic team almost gave in, and only changed their minds due to the news of the victory at Baltimore and Plattsburgh. If C-Level Diplomats could almost incite the USA to lose so many territories then the A-team are certainly going to be much harder.

Well they had those general instructions, and basically stuck to their guns until the British Cabinet decided that signing the treaty was worth more than pushing. In a situation where Britain doesn't really have to back down, well that's another matter.
 
Chapter 74: Dash the Waves
Chapter 74: Dash the Waves

“Those officers and men who were immediately under my observation, evinced the greatest gallantry, and I have no doubt that all others conducted themselves as became American officers and seamen.” From the report of Oliver Hazard Perry on the Battle of Lake Erie, September 13th, 1813.

“The peculiar ship Alligator was a subject of intense discussion in American naval circles from the beginning of the war, until well after its end. Almost being consigned to the dustbin of history, it would wind up being an important contributor to later American naval efforts in the 20th century.

It was, however, not the first submersible in American history. That title belonged to the USS Turtle designed by David Bushnell in the Revolutionary War. Made for similar reasons to the Alligator, it was hoped that a submerged vessel would be able to place explosive charges on British ships blockading North American harbors and ease the strain placed on American economics by the Royal Navy blockade. Though the Turtle sunk no ships, it would have an unofficial legacy in its later sister.

Designed by the French engineer Brutus de Villeroi, who had constructed submersibles before the war in France and for private contract to carry out salvage duties, it was the first submersible to go into the American arsenal in nearly a century. She was about 47 feet long, with a beam of 4 feet 8 inches and height of 5 feet 6 inches. Made of iron with several watertight compartments, including an ‘air lock’ to allow a diver to swim out and attach the subs main armament, a limpet mine, to an unsuspecting vessel. Her original propulsion system was a series of sixteen hand powered paddles, pushed by her crew of 18 men. She earned the name “Alligator” from the greenish color of her metal frame, and the name stuck, not only in the presses, but in the navy.

In her original testing in the summer of 1862, the vessel proved to be unsatisfactory, prompting observers to label it a failure, and she was returned to the naval yard. It was at this point Rear Admiral Francis Dupont intervened. Having observed the tests in 1862, he requested that further upgrades to the submersible be undertaken. In July of 1862 a hand-cranked screw propeller replaced the cumbersome oars, and increased Alligator’s speed to 4 knots. Six further months of upgrades and work was undertaken, but in March of 1863 she was tested again and, at invitation, President Lincoln was personally on hand to witness the testing. He was fascinated by the technology, and would personally recommend that not only should it be used, but that a sister ship be built, greatly pleasing de Villeroi and Dupont.

By August 1863 Alligator’s sister the new USS Turtle was two thirds underway to being complete but delays in completion came from shortages of iron needed in other projects. The want of experienced pilots was also a problem as now only two men, the original civilian worker Samuel Eakins and a military engineer, Robert Danby who had been fascinated with the machine at its 1862 testing, were skilled to pilot the craft. With little choice, Dupont commissioned both of them into service to the “Second Delaware Flotilla” which, at that point, consisted of only one submersible.

Under pressure from the naval department to provide proof of concept after over a year of work, Dupont was ordered to mount some kind of attack on the British fleet.

Dupont’s squadron was composed of Wabash(42), Juanita(11), Monongahela(10), the converted steamers Pocahontas(6) and Isaac Smith(6), and the gunboats Ottawa(5), Seneca(5), Pembina(5), and Penguin(5). He retained little desire to go out and fight the British like he had the year previous, and instead saw the submersible as a much better option.

Alligator would go with her tender ship, the tug Fred Kopp, to mount an attack on the British blockaders. The assault would take place at naval twilight, and try to engage the British at anchor in order to cause maximum confusion. The first outing was called off due to bad weather. In the second attack, Fred Kopp steamed to Cape Henelopen and released the submersible from tow, sending it towards the British anchorage at the Harbor of Refuge. The goal was to sink the British ship Immortalité, but for whatever reason, the submersible went off course, and when it released her diver, he incorrectly attached the mine to the gunboat Steady.

The proof of concept attack was, at the very least, spectacular. The explosion of the limpet mine tore a gaping hole in the side of Steady, and the confused crew not killed or wounded from the blast panicked, and half fled the ship. By the time her junior officers could sort out the confusion, the damage was done and Steady slipped beneath the waves. British records from the time show that, rather than suspecting a submersible, they were convinced that a rowboat had been able to get among them and plant some sort of mine, and increased their night watches accordingly.

Considered a rousing success, Alligator was again ordered out two weeks later to try for the British frigate again. The attack started as before, Alligator setting out for her target, but though observers on shore would look for an explosion, or any sign of the submersible, none ever came. After sixteen hours, Alligator was considered lost with all hands. Though Turtle would eventually mount her own sorties, this was the end of the storied little vessel which had started the program.

Alligator had a somewhat outsized legacy for her short history. Many said it had an influence on the Nautilus from Jules Verne’s 1870 serialized Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea, and it did manage to capture the imaginations of contemporary illustrationists. Though briefly experimented with by the Navy Department under Robeson, the project was later abandoned. In more concrete terms, it did earn its fame enough that in 1908, upon proof of concept, the first three Alligator class submarines (Alligator, Turtle, and Narwhal) would be constructed and launched under the direction of then Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt. They were joined eventually by their dozen other sisters and the much more refined Porpoise class in 1915. However, for its youth, it would prove its worth in the Caribbean and Atlantic.”– The Ugly Submarine USS Alligator, Brandon Shrutt, The American Naval Gazette, August 1981 issue.


USS_Alligator_0844401.jpg

Contemporary image of Alligator
“Ever since Farragut’s victory at Little Gull Island the previous year, he had been keen to try and replicate the success. However, the British were keen merely on bottling up his fleet or enticing it into the open waters where their greater firepower could be brought to bear absent interference from the forts in New York. Neither side would acquiesce to the other's desire however, and what a stalemate existed in the waters off New York.

By late 1863 though, Farragut felt he had acquired enough of an edge that he could risk engaging one of the British squadrons decisively.

Since the last battle his squadron had been joined by three new sloops, the Adirondack(9) and Lackawanna(12) and Ticonderoga(14) augmenting his own already powerful fleet. The greatest additions though, were the two ironclad frigates the USS New York(36) and the USS Maine(36). Originally laid down by the William H. Webb shipyard for the Italian government[1], the United States government had seized the vessels arguing that, in light of their own existential crisis, the need was greater and offering to pay for their replacement.

The two vessels would be the largest ironclads in American service, but their rapid construction had left them with teething problems. Constructing the armor for them had pulled iron from across the United States and tied up orders for ironclad vessels from the Mississippi to Vermont. They did however, represent powerful symbols for American naval dominance, and when they were hastily commissioned at the beginning of September, it was greeted with much fanfare.

In late September 1863 then his squadron fully consisted of, New York[Flag], Maine, Hartford(28), Pensacola(25), Richmond(22), Adirondack(9), Ticonderoga(14), Oneida(10), Dacotah(8), and the converted gunboats Jackson(6), and Westfield(6). This main force was supported by the smaller gunboats Istaca, Cayuga, Katahdin, Pinola, Kineo, Kennebec, Wissahickon, Sciota, Owasco, Vernon and Winona, as well as the sidewheel gunboats, Octorora(8) and Port Royal(8).” – The First Admiral: The Life and Battles of David Glasgow Farragut

“By the time of the September action, the British squadron, still under Sotheby, consisted of Conqueror(101[Flag], Arethusa(51), Raccoon(21) Ariande(26), Jason(21), Rattler(17), Rifleman(5), Sparrow(5), Hyena(4). They also had the ironclad Terror(14) and the newly converted ironclads Bulwark(36) and Royal Alfred(36). They had largely been engaged in patrol and interdiction, and Sotheby had come under some scrutiny not only for the events of 1862, but in the general embarrassment of the escape of Mohican, the loss of gunboats in a major skirmish in June, and the running of the raider Shamrock in May.

Since early 1863, the British had been in the habit of using Sandy Hook to rest their vessels and monitor Lower Bay. Even Farragut’s feints could not draw them out and they had established an ad hoc fortified position, with a naval brigade using cannons to cover the inlet. It seemed a secure annexation of New York’s soil to the domain of the Royal Navy. Farragut’s aim was to change this.

Leaving the slower monitors to keep watch on Long Island Sound with the majority of his gunships, Farragut maneuvered his fleet to Lower Bay with the intention of making an attack “as decisive as Lake Erie” on the British fleet where it lay in supposed safety. On the morning of the 25th of September, Farragut’s nine largest vessels (New York, Maine, Hartford, Pensacola, Richmond, Adirondack, Ticonderoga, Oneida, Dacotah,) steamed towards Sandy Hook, with his second division, composed of Lackawanna, and the gunboats Octorora, Kineo, Kennebec, Wissahickon, Sciota, and Owasco.

British lookouts on the shore spotted them, and at first Sotheby was perplexed as Farragut would rarely challenge large detachments of British ships in this manner, especially not under his guns at Sandy Hook, but he obliged the American commander and, save for the gunboats Sparrow and Hyena, moved his own squadron to intercept. The two squadrons met at 10:44 am.

Moving in an arrowhead formation, Farragut skillfully deployed the ships of his first division to engage the line of battle Sotheby drew his own vessels up in. Sotheby had placed Conqueror in the center of his line, with his ironclads supporting, supported by his smaller vessels at each end, Ariande and Racoon lead, while Arethusa, Jason and Rattler trailed behind. Farragut had placed his ironclads at the head of his arrow, while his wooden warships formed the flanks. Hartford, Richmond and Adirondack on the left, with Penascola, Ticonderoga, Oneida and Dacotah on the right.

This at first resulted in an excellent British firing position, but on a pre-arranged signal, Farragut's non ironclad vessels broke formation, veering into a line and allowing the two ironclads to go straight through the British formation.

It was especially inopportune for Sotheby’s Conqueror which was rammed near the stern by Farragut’s New York, causing desperate damage to the larger vessel, and leaving her bowsprit impaled in her side like a medieval lance. The maneuvering needed to clear each ship lead to a near melee as sailors and marines on each vessel fired on one another before Farragut maneuvered his ship clear, and turned once again to engage the larger vessel. Maine meanwhile, would engage the Royal Alfred, turning that section of the line into a vicious ironclad engagement as the two opened up broadsides on one another. This engagement would lead Bulwark to wheel about, and move to support her sister, trusting the weight of Conqueror’s guns to deal with New York.

While the engagement in the center of the British line became general, it allowed the front end of Sotheby’s line to become separated, which pushed Ariande, and Racoon into the waiting arms of the three ships on Farragut’s left. In the rear, Arethusa, Jason and Rattler had to scramble around their larger ironclad sister, leading to a general melee between those vessels and the four vessels of Farragut’s right.

The conflict in the center was of the greatest significance however. New York was unceasing in its pounding of Conqueror, and the other ironclads having chosen to concentrate on Maine left Conqueror alone to the fight. While she had the greater weight in guns, Farragut’s opening attack had left her badly listing, and further punishing broadsides soon had the larger battleship holed in three places. Half an hour of fighting would see the flagship listing alarmingly, and Sotheby would desperately signal his ships to move to his aide.

Bulwark and Royal Alfred were committed to the action with Maine however. In this action, the two ships bracketed their American counterpart, and while Maine fought desperately, her rushed construction began to show her flaws. Her armor was long strips of thin rolled iron, and was much heavier than her British opponents, but weaker as well. Her greatest flaw though, was her steering. The weight of fire from the British ironclads soon disabled her already improperly installed rudder, managing to rip the wheel from its housing, and the Maine was left veering wildly in circles. Bulwark took this opportunity to emulate Farragut's own earlier ramming attack and maneuvered to do the same to her opponent. Calculating his attack perfectly, the commander of Bulwark managed to strike Maine amidships, even though that left his vessel open to raking fire all the way. It was a success, and his ship managed to smash a hole in Maine’s armor, putting the American warship in a precarious position. She would continue to circle helplessly until 1pm when her captain decided the ship could not be saved and abandoned her.

However, while this victory over the American ironclad was good news, the two ironclads unintentionally allowed Conqueror to be lost, and it would only be their intervention at 12:02 which saved Sotheby from falling into enemy hands, and eventually forcing Farragut to move New York to support his squadron at 1pm.

The fighting on the flanks was a mixed bag. In the lead of the British line and on the American left, Ariande and Raccoon were engaged by the three American vessels Hartford, Richmond, and Adirondack. The Americans had the weight of metal, and managed to inflict early casualties on the two British ships. Racoon took the brunt of this early assault, while Ariande moved to protect her smaller sister, attempting to interpose herself between Racoon and Hartford and Richomd. Adirondack maneuvered to engage Raccoon solely, firing on the smaller vessel and maneuvering by the British frigate.

While the exact series of events is unknown, the men of the Richmond reported that at approximately 11:30 a fire broke out on Ariande, ten minutes later the British frigate exploded, showering the smaller Racoon with fire and debris, and was lost with all hands. Fearing for the lives of his crew, Captain Count Gliechen surrendered his ship lest it too explode and be lost. Though the American vessels would accept the ships surrender, they were forced to scuttle her lest she be recaptured by the British squadron. This would, effectively, end the battle on the left.

Meanwhile, on the far flank, the smaller American ships Penascola, Ticonderoga, Oneida and Dacotah engaged the British stragglers, Arethusa, Jason, and Rattler. The first half hour of the engagement would go the Americans way as Jason had the singularly poor luck to divert northwards, around the ironclads, and fall prey to the full weight of guns from the four American ships who pursued her southwards. She would be badly damaged by American gunnery, but her consorts soon moved to her defence. Arethusa’s interference prevented anything like a repeat of the weight of metal which would effectively destroy the British line ahead, and turned the battle in favor of the Royal Navy on this front.

The first casualty of this would be the ever unfortunate Dacotah, ending up engaging the frigate, Arethusa’s 51 guns simply overpowered the smaller vessel. Even with the combined weight of the whole American squadron, Dacotah would be an unfortunate victim, shot to silence, and holed multiple times, she would sink below the waves later that evening. However, her smaller consorts managed to engage the British vessels and slowly drive them back to Sandy Hook. They were soon joined by the Second Division’s gunboats, shepherded by Lackawanna. The disparity in firepower told, the British vessels were soon faring poorly, running for the safety of their batteries. However, Farragut regrouped his ships, and charged towards the protected anchorage.

Sotheby, now aboard Bulwark as his flag, determined he had little choice but to pull his squadron further out to sea and seek support from the squadron at Long Island Sound. Using his ironclads to shield the flight of his ships, he hurriedly evacuated the naval brigade that had been occupying Sandy Hook and by 3pm was retreating. Farragut gave chase, and in the hard run the gunboat Hyena fell behind her consorts and was disabled by the American squadron. However, Sotheby would evacuate his ships to the open sea and Farragut would not follow.

It was the greatest naval defeat for the Royal Navy between the Battle of Grand Port in 1810 and the Battle of the Falklands in 1915.While the battle proved to be a tactical American victory, strategically, it was irrelevant. Despite many congratulatory proclamations that “the spell of Trafalgar is broken!” the British blockade remained in place. The remaining vessels operated out in the seas, and Farragut was unable to repeat his attack immediately in Long Island Sound, as his squadron had incurred significant damage in the fighting.

Fully half of Sotheby’s squadron would be withdrawn for repairs and he himself would lose command of the squadron, which had to be considerably reinforced. The close blockade of Lower Bay would not be restored until November with the arrival of Corchane’s Particular Service Squadron, and throughout October many blockade runners would have good fortune. The loss of Conqueror however, would prove to be a persistent embarrassment to London.

While not as conclusive as the Battle of Key West, the Battle of Sandy Hook was bloodier by far with nearly 3,000 casualties, 1,718 British and 1,276 American. Four British ships were lost for two American and almost every other ship in the engagement would sustain severe to moderate damage.” – Troubled Waters: The Anglo-American War at Sea, Michael Tielhard, Aurora Publishing, 2002

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1] This is in essence the Re d'Italia class built for the Italian Navy which historically took part in the Battle of Lissa.
 
okay so america is gonna fight in WW1 era conflict from the start in its backyard with a very high chance its against britian.and Argentina is going ti be involved and actually competent somehow.
that's basically confirmed now and says a lot about the future.
you know naval warfare was always hard to visualize in my head but you give a very good description.
RIP the alligator may its memory and legacy live on.
 
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