Unable to field a regular air force due to the terms of the Versailles Treaty, the new Nazi regime in Germany started to improvise ways to develop a different type of air arm - an air force mainly designed to cover and support ground troops engaging in rapid maneuvers. That this newly designed air arm lacked the vital strategic component can be attributed to several reasons. Mainly that the early Nazi military doctrine of employing rapid panzer formations in open fields would require the use of much of their available air assets in a support role, is the one most attributed to this shortcoming, but there was another, less reported situation that ended up costing the Luftwaffe more than it's doctrine. There have been many reports and papers written about the strategic shortcomings of the Luftwaffe, but seldom did these papers mention the name of Walther Wever - yet, if he would had lived, his strategic vision might have altered the course of World War II. Wever was a fierce proponent of strategic bombing. He possessed both the vision and the willpower to built a strategic air fleet out of the Luftwaffe - fortunately for the Allies he died before the war started. If not, one can just imagine what aircraft and tactics Wever could have employed in the Battle of Britain or in the invasion of the Soviet Union. (...)
Even before Adolf Hitler sealed the fate of Germany by going to war, Wever understood that the next armed conflict would be a tactical as well as a strategic one. Adhering to his vision, Wever steered the German air industry into developing what he saw as its most precious asset in the next war: a four-engined heavy bomber. The bomber Wever envisioned would have been able to carry a payload of some 3,300 pounds to a distance of at least 1,240 miles. In developing the concept for such an aircraft, Wever had only one enemy in mind: Soviet Russia. He understood what many of his peers and eventual successors failed to see. In order to take the war into the Russian industry, buried deep behind the Ural Mountains, Germany needed an aircraft able to subject those industries to a heavy bombardment that could disrupt the flow of aircraft, tanks, truck, artillery pieces and other tools of war; into the frontlines - the destruction of the enemy's means of war production. He clearly saw that in order to defeat the air force of a country such as Russia, where the sheer amount of aircraft available to them could had overwhelmed Germany's fighter force, they would need to destroy the industry that made those aircraft, instead of shooting them out of the skies. Here was the British Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Frederick Sykes's strategic vision at its most basic. The objectives of the new German air force would not only be concentrated on the support of its ground and naval forces, although Wever was a passionate believer in a mixed-mission and completely independent Luftwaffe, but it would take the tools of war to the enemy's nerve centers, the troop staging areas, rear bases, their industries and in the end, their population as a whole. This concept of total air war was first promulgated by Sykes in December 1918.
For all of his vision, strategies and directions, Wever's views were in the minority in the German air force. The most senior Luftwaffe commanders saw little need for the development of a strategic heavy force, although they changed their minds when the British and American heavy bombers began to pound their beloved country. Following Wever's lead, Germany's air industry began to conceive plans for the design and production of a fleet of heavy bombers. Two proud German companies, Junkers and Dornier put forward design sketches for a heavy level bomber in late 1934. On January 3rd, 1935, Junker's chairman, Dr. Heinrich Koppenberg; reported to Colonel Wilhelm Wimmer, head of the Luftwaffe Technical Department and fierce backer of Wever; that a preliminary design for the new bomber, designated Ju 89, had been completed. Dornier followed a couple of months later. On a clear morning in October 28th, 1936, the much anticipated Do 19 made its maiden flight. The Ju 89 followed two months later. But by this time, fate had intervened. On June 3rd, 1936, Wever was in Dresden addressing a gathering of Luftwaffe cadets when he received the news of the passing of a World War I German hero. He decided to leave the city immediately in order to attend the funeral. Wever took off on his He 70 airplane. As the plane started to climb, one wing tipped on the ground propelling the aircraft into a mad tailspin that ended with a fiery crash. Wever and his flight engineer died immediately. With his prematurely passing, his dream, that of a well balanced tactical and strategic Luftwaffe; also died. Without Wever's vision and relentless drive to pursue, Germany fell behind its main adversaries in the development of a heavy bomber platform.