Would Walther Wever have made a difference for the Luftwaffe?

Hendryk

Banned
This may not be a very original question, but I'd like to know the opinion of those more knowledgeable than myself on German military history: would it have made a difference in the Luftwaffe's priorities if Gen. Walther Wever hadn't died in a plane crash in 1936?

The following is quoted from Aeroflight:

Unable to field a regular air force due to the terms of the Versailles Treaty, the new Nazi regime in Germany started to improvise ways to develop a different type of air arm - an air force mainly designed to cover and support ground troops engaging in rapid maneuvers. That this newly designed air arm lacked the vital strategic component can be attributed to several reasons. Mainly that the early Nazi military doctrine of employing rapid panzer formations in open fields would require the use of much of their available air assets in a support role, is the one most attributed to this shortcoming, but there was another, less reported situation that ended up costing the Luftwaffe more than it's doctrine. There have been many reports and papers written about the strategic shortcomings of the Luftwaffe, but seldom did these papers mention the name of Walther Wever - yet, if he would had lived, his strategic vision might have altered the course of World War II. Wever was a fierce proponent of strategic bombing. He possessed both the vision and the willpower to built a strategic air fleet out of the Luftwaffe - fortunately for the Allies he died before the war started. If not, one can just imagine what aircraft and tactics Wever could have employed in the Battle of Britain or in the invasion of the Soviet Union. (...)

Even before Adolf Hitler sealed the fate of Germany by going to war, Wever understood that the next armed conflict would be a tactical as well as a strategic one. Adhering to his vision, Wever steered the German air industry into developing what he saw as its most precious asset in the next war: a four-engined heavy bomber. The bomber Wever envisioned would have been able to carry a payload of some 3,300 pounds to a distance of at least 1,240 miles. In developing the concept for such an aircraft, Wever had only one enemy in mind: Soviet Russia. He understood what many of his peers and eventual successors failed to see. In order to take the war into the Russian industry, buried deep behind the Ural Mountains, Germany needed an aircraft able to subject those industries to a heavy bombardment that could disrupt the flow of aircraft, tanks, truck, artillery pieces and other tools of war; into the frontlines - the destruction of the enemy's means of war production. He clearly saw that in order to defeat the air force of a country such as Russia, where the sheer amount of aircraft available to them could had overwhelmed Germany's fighter force, they would need to destroy the industry that made those aircraft, instead of shooting them out of the skies. Here was the British Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Frederick Sykes's strategic vision at its most basic. The objectives of the new German air force would not only be concentrated on the support of its ground and naval forces, although Wever was a passionate believer in a mixed-mission and completely independent Luftwaffe, but it would take the tools of war to the enemy's nerve centers, the troop staging areas, rear bases, their industries and in the end, their population as a whole. This concept of total air war was first promulgated by Sykes in December 1918.

For all of his vision, strategies and directions, Wever's views were in the minority in the German air force. The most senior Luftwaffe commanders saw little need for the development of a strategic heavy force, although they changed their minds when the British and American heavy bombers began to pound their beloved country. Following Wever's lead, Germany's air industry began to conceive plans for the design and production of a fleet of heavy bombers. Two proud German companies, Junkers and Dornier put forward design sketches for a heavy level bomber in late 1934. On January 3rd, 1935, Junker's chairman, Dr. Heinrich Koppenberg; reported to Colonel Wilhelm Wimmer, head of the Luftwaffe Technical Department and fierce backer of Wever; that a preliminary design for the new bomber, designated Ju 89, had been completed. Dornier followed a couple of months later. On a clear morning in October 28th, 1936, the much anticipated Do 19 made its maiden flight. The Ju 89 followed two months later. But by this time, fate had intervened. On June 3rd, 1936, Wever was in Dresden addressing a gathering of Luftwaffe cadets when he received the news of the passing of a World War I German hero. He decided to leave the city immediately in order to attend the funeral. Wever took off on his He 70 airplane. As the plane started to climb, one wing tipped on the ground propelling the aircraft into a mad tailspin that ended with a fiery crash. Wever and his flight engineer died immediately. With his prematurely passing, his dream, that of a well balanced tactical and strategic Luftwaffe; also died. Without Wever's vision and relentless drive to pursue, Germany fell behind its main adversaries in the development of a heavy bomber platform.
So, the author's opinion is that Wever would have made a difference. But would it really? Weren't the priorities of the Luftwaffe already set by 1936?
 

Hendryk

Banned
If Germany pushes strategic bombing, it doesn't have the resources for tactical bombing ... and that's a bad thing for combined arms.
Yeah, resource allocation is a bitch. I'm aware that this was pretty much a zero-sum game for Germany, and that the resources and manpower invested in developing a strategic bomber force would have to be taken from another program. Still, couldn't Wever's ideas have had at least a limited impact?

Michelle over at SHWI has done this (and very well personally).
Do you happen to have the link?
 
Mike Spick wrote a book called "Luftwaffe Victorious" were the entire premise was the survival of Weaver and the development of reliable 4 engined German bombers. The Germans do somewhat better than OTL but get their asses nuked.

Strategic bombing wasn't decisive in ww2. It was merely a factor and the Germans were able to achieve plenty of spectacular victories without the capability. IMO they may actually do worse because strategic bombing in ww2 was fraught with super high losses
 
I just dont see how strategic bombers would help a lot.
the BoB didnt realy need them, the range was short enough for the medium bombers. Long range bombers cost more, so youd have fewer.
They would allow longer range attacks into Russia, but hadnt the Russians rebuilt their factories a LONg way east..? And again, less medium bombers, so less help to the offensive.

Strategic bombers were needed by the allies due to the long distance to useful targets, Germany never really needed them in the same way. And there is an argument that teh allies didnt either...!!:eek:
 
Strategic bombers would have been very useful against Britain during the Blitz/Uboat Happy-Time. Wever's bombers could have conducted long range sea patrols and ship attack missions and heavily attack west coast ports like Liverpool. However I thnik Britain is somewhat of a special case due to its need for large imports, bombing doesn't work nearly as well against a continental power.
 
There is a major difference between long range heavy bomber aircraft such as the Piaggio P.108 and a strategic bomber offensive as conceived in Britain and the U.S. Italy possessed an aircraft, and flew a dozen or so bombers off to Gibraltar to dump explosives. A real campaign required a national will and industrial capabilities not present in Germany at the time. Aircrew training alone was a vast undertaking. And yet the British effort, while stripping all other commands of production capacity, and reducing Coastal Command's effectiveness against U-boats, was, largely propagandized as being better than it was. The American effort was doomed to failure, suffering massive losses, until the serendipitous Merlin Mustang arrived. Germany had no Mustang.
 
Strategic bombers would have been very useful against Britain during the Blitz/Uboat Happy-Time. Wever's bombers could have conducted long range sea patrols and ship attack missions and heavily attack west coast ports like Liverpool. However I thnik Britain is somewhat of a special case due to its need for large imports, bombing doesn't work nearly as well against a continental power.

I takeit this is unlike the real bombing of Liverpool they did with their existing planes? :rolleyes:
 
Yeah, resource allocation is a bitch. I'm aware that this was pretty much a zero-sum game for Germany, and that the resources and manpower invested in developing a strategic bomber force would have to be taken from another program. Still, couldn't Wever's ideas have had at least a limited impact?

How about these 2 ideas:


1. Resource reallocation. Cut down resources for the Kriegsmarine. No Bismark and no Tirpitz for starters.

2. Redesign the planes. The Luftwaffe medium bombers were supposed to be dive bombers too. That's why excellent designs like the Ju88 suffered from additional weight, that was necessary in order for them to be able to dive-bomb too. How about eliminating this capability, making them simple mid-size level bombers? That could mean a serious improvement in performance for them.
 
As I see it, Wever was a 'professional' i.e. he was able to think through a problem.
Whilst, Udet would have still had the impact with the Ju-87, I don't see him under Wever, having the influence and power in OTL he had, so no as others have suggested no requirement for the Ju-88 to dive, much less for the He-177.
Production capacity for the 'heavy bomber'? With the production of the Do-19, Dornier doesn't build the Do-17, and with a four-engined aircraft available - no need to convert an airliner - so no Fw-200.
Its replacement is then a four-engined He-177.
 
One most also take into account the intense crew needs of 4 engine bombers... the german pilot and crew replacement system was almost non existant. if they took heavy losses it would be very draining on an allready crappy system
 
One most also take into account the intense crew needs of 4 engine bombers...

And add in the huge amounts of fuel these bombers would require, fuel Germany simply doesn't have. I'm thinking less fuel for the Kriegsmarine and in particular less fuel for Italy. This is going to create a _lot_ of butterflies...
 
Each original Ju-88 was supposed to be a fast 7.7 ton "schell bomber" with shallow dived bombing capability, but ended up being a slower 12 ton medium slant bomber.

http://www.economicexpert.com/a/Junkers:Ju:88.htm

http://www.aviastar.org/air/germany/ju-88.php



The Ju-89 was a 21 tons level bomber.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Junkers_Ju_89

So for every three Ju-88A1 built, you could manage a Ju-89 and two lighter Ju-88 V5 schnell bombers/fighters.

To increase overall production convert all long range seaplanes production into more Ju-88/89 production so the navy can get sufficent air cover to support Uboat ops. Plus as mentioned above role the Fw-200 and Ju-90 production into one enlarged bomber programme.
 
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