Would the US have allowed the rise of a South American rival power?

Manifest Destiny. Maybe some racism, specially early in the 20th Century. Also, I'm not sure the USA is a rational actor when seeing other countries as enemies (ie, Hillary willing to risk war with Russia over Assad).

Does Manifest Destiny even apply to a powerful Brazil/Argentina, though -- or in South America, for that matter? IIRC the maximum extent of Manifest Destiny was the entirety of Mexico, and the idea itself started to fizzle out after the Mex-Am War and the Civil War. Manifest Destiny was technically achieved after the cession of Texas, Nuevo Mexico and Alta California -- so why would, say, the Grant administration use the pretext of Manifest Destiny to justify cooling of tensions between them and whatever regional power came to be in SA at the time?

(Also, current politics are best left in Chat, no offense. Just throwing it out before something bad happens and CalBear starts looking for a free thread to eat :p)
 
Does Manifest Destiny even apply to a powerful Brazil/Argentina, though -- or in South America, for that matter? IIRC the maximum extent of Manifest Destiny was the entirety of Mexico, and the idea itself started to fizzle out after the Mex-Am War and the Civil War. Manifest Destiny was technically achieved after the cession of Texas, Nuevo Mexico and Alta California -- so why would, say, the Grant administration use the pretext of Manifest Destiny to justify cooling of tensions between them and whatever regional power came to be in SA at the time?

(Also, current politics are best left in Chat, no offense. Just throwing it out before something bad happens and CalBear starts looking for a free thread to eat :p)
Manifest Destiny as an expansion doctrine, probably not. Manifest Destiny as a national identity, definitely, it covers the entire world.
 
I'm not sure what all the talk about the hypothetical world war with über Brazil/Argentina/La Plata/Colombia/etc thrown into the mix. Really, the point of divergence would be eliminating those exact circumstances arising.

Manifest destiny, in the end, was mostly achieved by 1. Reaching the Pacific and claiming ports, and 2. Achieving territorial domination of the North American continent. By doing this, the metropole of the United States was secured. There were arguments over different parts of Mexico, along with Canada, but what the US did OTL accomplished those two steps.

Part of the problem is that the US had decades longer to create their own nation. The colonies were already a well-integrated unit before revolution, having relatively short distances between the various major cities, and had a large base population. And, most importantly, the US has a 40 year head start. 1783, counting from the end of the war, until the 1820s when Spain lost most of its empire. The US had used that time to expand, end a few minor rebellions, stalemate in a war against a (very distracted) major power while starting it with virtually no military... So by the time that the Spanish and Portuguese nations of the New World are independent and charting their own course, they are years behind the US and playing catchup. All the while, the South American nations are disunited and have separatist problems exacerbated by their lower population and not-as-developed infrastructure

The best solution might be to have the South American states be liberated sooner, with them not having to play catchup for as long a period of time. If we assume that the PoD is after the initial set of revolutions, then it is going to be decades before which those nations will be able to compete. Let's take the example of a Gran Colombian intervention in a possible Mexican-American war. If we compare the trajectory of the US leading up to the War of 1812, its first major war against a major power. It took the US nearly 30 years from independence to that war, during which it performed relatively poorly. (Considering the state of its army at the start...) Gran Colombian interventionism in such a war would propose that they transport an army far from home, possibly overseas as there is less risk of exposure than marching through Central America, all in support of the nation which is a major rival in Central America and the Caribbean. A Mexico that integrates all of its northern territory is arguably more of a threat than the US would be.

Of course, it is killing a lot of butterflies to assume the various wars break out nearly the same, but it isn't too unlikely for these to be similar. But, really, so long as the US mainland wasn't threatened, they wouldn't care too much. while they may be annoyed at Colombian influence in Central America/the Caribbean, Mexico and Canada will always be more pressing concerns, as they were OTL.

So, for a great power developing in South America? For most of the 19th century, the US wouldn't do anything as it wouldn't have an interest. It may or may not develop an imperialistic attitude as it did towards the end. If one of the South American powers grows large enough, they may start claiming a few Pacific islands or, in Brazil and the Southern Cone's case, Africa. This may spur the US to make good on some of its claims. (See: the Line Islands). So that may be the start of a soft competition between the two. But, as long as none threaten the US mainland, they will probably leave well enough alone.

And, considering the trouble that Europe gets up to so often, it is more likely than not that both will agree that they don't want that type of warfare coming to the Americas. (The Civil War was that bad for the US, so they are quite aware of the costs involved with large wars.) So, while they won't see eye to eye, there'll be no direct opposition unless you have completely radicalized governments.

The Monroe Doctrine was also about preventing the European system of Alliances from entering the Americas, so the US will take pains to ensure that does not happen. That may end up requiring a few concessions on both sides.

Note: The US navy stagnated after the Civil War as there were no peer competitors; Mexico didn't have one, Great Britain relations drastically improved after the Alabama claims were settled. There was simply no need to expand the navy, although it was neglected as well; the purchase of the large warships by the ABC powers did eventually spur them into constructing their own, if I recall correctly. At least it was that combined with interests in Spanish territory.
 
That's all besides what longsword says. If there is a South American Great Power in the early to mid 20th centuries (arguably there were a few that were close early on, but they faded away), then world diplomacy is likely to be different, so there might not even be a Cold War or possibly even a World War II to begin with. You mention that this power might have joined World War II before the Americans, which is likely to have a big effect against the U-boats--don't you think that could affect the post-war world? And that's not even getting into the effect it might have on World War I, again by easing shipping and perhaps providing useful industrial and manpower resources to the Entente (or the Central Powers! But probably the Entente, considering).

Probably the South American country closest to being a Great Power, in terms of having a strong economy and regional presence, was Argentina in the first half of the 20th century. That country was not subjected to invasions or proxy wars or anything of the kind. There was a rivalry, but things were not nearly that bad. Even in the later 20th century, when Argentina had begun its slide down, the United States tended to try to use Argentina as a partner, most notably (and disgustingly) in the 1970s against Communists and the left throughout Latin America.

In a timeline where Argentina, or Brazil, or some other country or combination of countries, had become a great power and this status had lasted, I really do not see the United States being more aggressive than OTL. In the 19th century, the United States and this hypothetical Great Power will be much too concerned with internal development and their immediate neighbourhoods to strike out against the opposing hemisphere. In the 20th century, it would be too late for the US to try to sabotage this Great Power, even if it wanted to.
 
Argentina was a developed nation. It was just as rich as most European nations during the late 19th century and early 20th century. period. Still, it lacked the natural resources and the manpower to exert power elsewhere.

Brazil was the only nation capable to be a second-tier power (alongside Italy, Spain or the Ottoman Empire, for instance) and there's pretty much nothing that the US can do to change it during the 19th century. South American nations are just too big and under strong influence of British capital up until the Great War. If the Caribbean and the Gulf were American lakes, there's pretty much nothing that the US can do against the stronger nations of the continent for the obvious reasons already mentioned, the best it can do is to diplomatically support one nation against the other (Chile vs Argentina vs Brazil).

Again, this is the "Before 1900" forum. 20th century history is something else.
 
In any case, you're not answering the devil's advocate. To paraphrase: What can Gran Columbia gain from a war so far away from the still-struggling homeland?
To reply - how does the distance Bogota to Texas compare to distance Boston to Texas? What can New England gain from a war so far away?
 

ben0628

Banned
Uh, how can you be a developed nation when your annual steel production amounts to exactly zero grams?

Does developed nation really mean industry? By the late 19th/early 20th century, Argentina had one of the highest GDP per capitas in the world, was in the top of certain fields in scientific development, and had a booming economy and a highly educated population, as well as a shit ton of immigrants streaming in from Europe. That sounds pretty "developed" to me.

If you can solve the industry problems in Argentina, as well as the corrupt politics, it has a decent chance of becoming the master of its continent.
 
If you can solve the industry problems in Argentina, as well as the corrupt politics, it has a decent chance of becoming the master of its continent.
Assuming you consider NA and SA different continents(definitely a surprise so many years ago when I learned so much of the world was weird that way) not a decent chance it would become so, the issue is actually solving those problems. Though I certainly give it better odds than Brazil doing so, not that says much considering how implausible that is.
 
To reply - how does the distance Bogota to Texas compare to distance Boston to Texas? What can New England gain from a war so far away?

To reply - whatever complaints New England has in a war over Texas can be heard and resolved within an already-established institution of a single government, i.e. Congress, that represents other governments in regions like New England. As an addendum, its complaints can be overwritten by the desires of other states in regions like the Midwest and the Deep South. In a declaration of war, the many states of the US essentially act as a single entity, and whatever reservations any Senator or Congressman might have over a conflict with Mexico can be rendered moot by will of a 2/3rds majority in both houses of Congress. We're not talking about a patchwork confederacy of former British colonies here; this is a US that has at least partially centralized itself, as it has shown with the way the Nullification Crisis was handled, and with a well-developed national identity. Thus, it can act as a single entity if and when it needs to, up to and including a war with a foreign power.

Again, please answer my previous, previous question instead of deflecting it with a red herring. It can be one of many questions that a prospective statesman of the Gran Colombian opposition will ask when faced with the prospect of intervening in the Mexican-American War. If the question isn't even given a sufficient answer, then what hope is there for a declaration of war to even be drafted at all?
 
Gran Colombia itself was pretty much a dead idea only held together by Bolivar's will. Federalism was a huge problem for unity in South America
 
As someone above noted, Japan has hardly any useful natural resources of any kind, and yet has become one of the world's top industrial powers.

That said, their lack of resources led them to get embroiled in a nasty colonial war that brought the world's leading rising superpower in against them, and also ultimately the leader of the rival Leninist bloc, with the remaining world capitalist superpowers also arrayed against Japan by the endgame of WWII.

So, being an industrial power without domestic resources is not an easy or comfortable position to be in.

I wonder whether Argentina aggrandizing itself, to get control of Chile and up the coast to monopolize the South American guano mines, would also bring in enough other resources that the southern cone power would not need to import too many vital strategic materials?

Getting the guano monopoly, in an era before the Haber process, would surely be a great asset--but trying to get it, or holding it weakly, would put them in a dangerous position especially relative to Britain.

I guess we need a resources map or series of them listing vital resources--coal or some alternative power material (oil is anachronistic but I suspect a country lacking coal or ample timber to burn would precociously learn how to exploit petroleum if they knew it was there, and could extract it economically); iron; other materials.

Suppose we had something develop early in South American revolutionary history whereby Chile and Argentina were united from the beginning, and incorporated Uruguay, Paraguay, as well as Bolivia and if possible Peru. Something like Thande's UPSA in Look To the West, which was formed by some sort of populist grassroots alliance of low-status creoles and Indians. If one can come up with a sociological basis for a radical democratic-populist movement that has enough literate and educated supporters to be sociologically comparable to say Virginia without slavery, and explain how come the scattered and separated population centers unite and stay united rather than hive off into half a dozen smaller states. Would that terrain include enough natural raw materials, especially any accessible iron deposits?

South America may lack coal but going up toward the equator, there would be a whole lot of timber. I don't know how many subtropical and tropical trees growing in the southern reaches of Amazonia are suitable for construction or shipbuilding, nor which would be best for burning. I think, although it would be difficult and might involve developing some scientific knowledge and engineering techniques, that it should be possible to substitute wood for coal, with considerable inefficiency to be sure; there should be a way to process timber to yield pure enough carbon to function as coke. Then, given iron mines, a South American power with access to the jungles of the Amazon or Orinoco as well ought to be able to manage a steel industry of some level--it might be uneconomic compared to purchasing British steel, but an autarkic regime with an eye to avoiding upper dependence on seaborne imports might rationally subsidize some reserve capability.

Off hand I know that Bolivia and I believe Peru have some important mining, of tin certainly and perhaps copper as well, or is that Chlie? The saltpeter monopoly beckons for any power capable of defying the wrath of the British; perhaps they can even leverage diplomatic support of Britain in some crisis for tacit permission to monopolize the resource with an understanding that Britons (including colonials) would have access to it at fair prices comparable to those prevailing in the domestic market of the power. The north tier of South America, on the Caribbean, has oil. I suppose quite aside from the fact that the IC engine families all need to wait until 20th century tech levels develop to be practical, that petroleum is hard to extract without that level of tech, although some deposits are seeping right up to the surface. (In Trinidad and Tobago--but that's British territory--was it already in 1800 though?) If oil can be gotten cheaply, I would think that with some science and engineering ingenuity, it too could be substituted for coal, inefficiently, as a carbon source for steel making. And of course could simply be burned as a fuel, to run steam engines, as well as other perhaps more ingenious ways to use it without necessarily having the capability to make Otto or Diesel cycle engines yet. A Stirling engine might be more efficient than steam if we have a concentrated petroleum derivative flame (gasoline, kerosene, heavy oils, in a pinch even lighter tars might do). Tar of course was feedstock for the German chemical industry OTL, so a South American power with oil might compete with the Germans on that front too, if they can jump start a scientific/technical community.

In LTTW, Thande had the UPSA become a welcoming liberal refuge for European radicals such as Joseph Priestley, who helped promote and develop a high tech orientation in the republic.

So--if some such liberal power were to engross all of Spanish speaking South America, with sweeping claims to Amazonian resources at Brazil's expense as well, would that power then command enough strategic resources to compete with the USA and the more established European powers without undue dependence on exports? I haven't even considered yet that certain globally strategic resources are in fact derived from South America or can be grown there--rubber, coffee, sugar, chocolate.
 
Does developed nation really mean industry? By the late 19th/early 20th century, Argentina had one of the highest GDP per capitas in the world, was in the top of certain fields in scientific development, and had a booming economy and a highly educated population, as well as a shit ton of immigrants streaming in from Europe. That sounds pretty "developed" to me.

If you can solve the industry problems in Argentina, as well as the corrupt politics, it has a decent chance of becoming the master of its continent.
In which scientific fields was Argentina at the top?

It didn't yet have high literacy either at that time. Public mandatory free elementary schools started by the 1870-80s and that took time to educate the workforce. The number of Patent applications, for instance, was well below that of the USA and so was literacy.

A hundred years ago, the only thing Argentina's economy was a growing agrarian frontier and the embryo of a service focused urban middle class.

I also think an often underestimated factor in Argentina's growth potential is logistics. While the Parana river had (and still has) untapped potential, many areas of the country are separated from the nearest port by the same distance there is between Paris and Warsaw, only that instead of heavily populated plains, a large part of that distance is a sparsely populated semidesert.
 
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ben0628

Banned
In which scientific fields was Argentina at the top?

It didn't yet have high literacy either at that time. Public mandatory free elementary schools started by the 1870-80s and that took time to educate the workforce. The number of Patent applications, for instance, was well below that of the USA and so was literacy.

A hundred years ago, the only thing Argentina's economy was a growing agrarian frontier and the embryo of a service focused urban middle class.

I also think an often underestimated factor in Argentina's growth potential is logistics. While the Parana river had (and still has) untapped potential, many areas of the country are separated from the nearest port by the same distance there is between Paris and Warsaw, only that instead of heavily populated plains, a large part of that distance is a sparsely populated semidesert.

By the very beginning of the 20th century, Argentina had a literacy rate of 65 percent, it was the 5th largest exporter (mostly agriculture exports though), it was ahead of its time in the field of medicine (inventing the blood transfusion and bypass surgery) and it possessed almost 20,000 miles of railroad, which did a lot to connect the large nation.

It has vast quantities of natural resources, it has vast quantities of immigrants entering it's country to provide the large work force nessecary for industrialization, and it had the railroads. Argentina's biggest obstacle at this point was simply poor government and the very late unification of its nation.

The creation of a earlier, stable federal government in Argentina combined with a few more decent presidents during this time period would really go a long way to help them achieve major power status.
 
Argentina does have a formidable amount of resources inside its borders, true, but not the ressources necessary to develop a decent heavy industry (as Juan said, steel). The coal and iron reserves are just too far from the population centers and/or each other. Even Japan had a decent amount of coal and iron to start its modenization. Argentina's quick development was due to rapid development of agro-industry during the late 19th and early 20th century, mutatis mutandis, one can compare 19th century Argentina with the today's gulf nations, for instance.

The only area in South America that have the necessary natural ressources for an early industrialization is South/Southeastern Brazil and unfortunatedly it simply didn't have the necessary social network to quickly industrialize (as Argentina could).
 
...The only area in South America that have the necessary natural ressources for an early industrialization is South/Southeastern Brazil and unfortunatedly it simply didn't have the necessary social network to quickly industrialize (as Argentina could).

Could the latter factor be changed?

Supposing for instance during the period when the Spanish crown also ruled Portugal, that the Spanish authorities integrated Brazil into the Spanish administrative system, and encouraged Castilians to settle there. We might even postulate maybe that Portugal never regains independence from Spain and all Portugal's colonies are absorbed into the Spanish holdings permanently.

Could this set up a situation leading to a very broad and socially deep (including poorer mestizos and some Native peoples, as in Paraguay) revolutionary crisis in South America whereby a sufficiently broad region rises up against Spanish rule in a coordinated patriot movement, that unites a sufficiently resources-endowed region, perhaps with some post-revolutionary annexations?

Could the social gap between Spanish and Portuguese speaking peoples be bridged by common resentment and common struggle?

Say, the Portuguese speakers are divided on whether they wish to see a restoration of rule from Portugal or not, some agreeing with a great number of Spanish speakers (and Indian allies) that they'd sooner have a republic they control democratically, others being Luso-royalists--but the radical republicans are willing to work with the latter if it mobilizes enough popularity for success?

I have a rather wooly scenario in mind whereby a pretender to the Portuguese throne is offered the support of the South American revolutionaries, who will offer to enlist the Southern nation as part of his nominal domain, provided he agrees not to interfere in South American autonomy--they will be a dominion under his crown, but ruled by a continental parliament; they will first of all aid his bid for the throne in Lisbon by distracting the hell out of Spanish authority with their revolution, and upon gaining control of liberated territory divert some manpower and other resources to Portugal to assist in his taking power there, and post-crisis will pay a share of national taxes to Lisbon and otherwise aid Portuguese policy--building a local navy that will combine with Portuguese forces (assuming that in addition to continental autonomy the dominion gets a say in foreign policy set in Lisbon of course), vote armies to assist in Portuguese operations elsewhere, notably Africa while beefing up strength in outposts like Goa, Macao, and Timor and of course add greatly to his general glory. The revolution is successful. Maybe this Hispano-Portuguese speaking dominion remains a tail increasingly wagging the Portuguese dog forever (perhaps at a later date, the understanding that the Portuguese monarchs do not actually visit their South American domain is relaxed in return for Portugal, with the regions below the equator (South American, including Brazil, but also perhaps a Congo coming under de facto SA control, or a local largely African regime demanding and getting strong autonomy on similar terms to the South Americans) becoming increasingly decisive, and therefore acquiring a stronger stake in maintaining a strong comprehensive global Portuguese empire?

Or vice versa--the union of Spain and Portugal leads to a dynastic situation wherein a Portuguese dynasty gets control of the whole thing in Iberia, and imposes ATL policies that set up large swathes of the Empire of the Indies for patriotic revolution, again crossing linguistic lines, with a unified revolutionary movement combining support from both, again resulting in a strong South American multilingual, multicultural republic, or some other form of federation--a locally based strong and popular monarchy, maybe on Bonapartist lines?

I am too weak in understanding the details of Latin American politics, especially in this era, to be very decisive about what configurations of power might result in a long-standing union. It could be very authoritarian, it could be very clerical with the regional Catholic hierarchy coopted to support it, or anti-clerical with Jacobin sentiments leading to a culture war the radicals win, and perhaps fear of a conservative backlash helps keep the union together?

Again, which regions would have to be united to give the whole a good resource base, and how crucial is control of strategic resources to success? If the union has a friend in the USA, then anything they lack could be imported from the USA--barring determined British opposition, which might be a matter of treaties, punctuated with the occasional war in which the British are forced to make concessions, such as a policy of non-interference with trade.

I'd like to see a liberal power, whether a radical republic or perhaps a constitutional monarchy, under local or Iberian kingship nominally might not matter much. Such a regime would ban slavery and (to enable continental unity) have a decent policy regarding Native peoples who might thereby become bastions of the union. With such policies in place before abolition of slavery in the USA, one could anticipate antagonism, on an ideological level anyway--sheer distance probably protects them from direct clashes with the USA unless the union fronts on the Caribbean, as it might of course.

So which regions would need to be included, and what would it take to unite them? A strong Napoleonic emperor, if the basis of that sort of regime even exists? A widespread ideological radicalism that does not favor regional separatism?

It seems that including Brazilian claims is pretty important--if so, how much? Is just the southern portion of heavy early colonization, united to Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Chile sufficient? Or must Bolivia and Peru be included? For that matter, is union across the Andes at all plausible? On the map the regions look contiguous but in terms of practical transport and communications the links between Atlantic and Pacific are weak, so either brute force or ideological unity are needed to bridge the gap, clearly.

On the Atlantic, are links between the southern cone including the Portuguese zone and "New Granada," the Caribbean region now including Colombia and Venezuela plausible? OTL they were separated by Amazonia and the coastal colonies of Britain, France and the Netherlands--annexing these would make for stormy geopolitics for the early union, whereas of course Amazonia is much more a barrier than a link. Should we stick with an Atlantic coast southern cone power--Argentina plus southern Brazil plus the small nations there, and leave incorporation of Chile, other Pacific regions, upper Amazonia, the three northwest European colonies, or the Caribbean "Spanish Main" to future aggrandizement? Or should we be focusing on New Granada, perhaps with extensions incorporating Peru or points south, including perhaps a swathe of Amazonia? A northern focus puts the region at immediate odds with both European Great Powers and the USA--but if it can weather these storms it might be strong indeed, and eventually engulf the whole continent by annexation.

I suppose to make any of these configurations plausible we need a POD well before the US revolution, and note that the OP premise assumes a USA of some kind exists in the former British colonies--it might not match OTL US borders or even have the same Constitution, although I think the OP presumes close correspondence with OTL on these matters.

Given a pool of sufficient resources, plausible means of transportation to pool them physically, and a political background making union plausible, the premise can be accepted, though obviously we'd want detailed answers to all these questions which would define the character of the union. Is it republican, liberal, democratic, populist, multi-racial in governance? Is it instead authoritarian, slave-holding, tied to European dynasties or in rivalry with them, or what?

Anyway, even if the center of power does lie on the Caribbean (which suggests to me it is as likely to expand north, taking control of islands and moving up Central America perhaps to OTL Mexican border, or even beyond it, conceivably annexing Mexico wholesale, or with Mexico being a founding member of the union even) then confrontation with the USA is still likely long delayed. Even if the region must wait until say the 1820s to form, if it holds widespread areas and its central powers are not too tied down forcing union on unwilling subjects, then it can command large armies and even acquire a strong navy if it can foster any industrialism, and by the time the USA confronts it face to face, its strength may be far stronger than say Spain in the late 1890s, even if it only has one or two generations of existence by the 1860s or '80s.

In that case, the USA is not going to regard it as a small power that can be overridden with a few Marines backing some corrupt local faction. The USA will treat it as a regional power, more respectfully than Mexico was treated.

We should recall of course that before the USA would be projecting power very far overseas in general, once a foothold on the Pacific is taken, presumably in Oregon, the USA now has a strong interest in South America based on freedom of passage around the southern tip to move ships back and forth between the oceans; the alternative being maintaining separate merchant and naval fleets and communicating between them overland in the narrow isthmuses of central America.

Thus a Southern Cone power would be of some interest to the USA, but mutual common interests would probably make relations friendly for the most part, even if the southern country is very liberal and has abolished slavery, while perhaps adhering strongly to Roman Catholicism--both would be obnoxious to some Norteamericanos or other, and between them might alienate a majority, with Northerners having more of a problem with "Papism" and Southerners with abolitionism. But the distance is too great to fight about it whereas correct relations ease communications with the West coast. Later, even if this southern state adds to its "sins" monarchism and annexation of territories farther north, by the time Yankees (having presumably by then abolished slavery themselves) confront them more closely, their power would be formidable. If the southern power does not annex Panama and Nicaragua, I suppose even if relations are cool to hostile, the US course would be to get a canal built and control it--which might motivate the southern power to get its own canal built too. So--Yankee or British controlled canal in Nicaragua, southern controlled one in Panama.

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Suppose we hold to a lot of parallelism in defiance of mere butterflies, and that therefore sometime around 1914 a situation exists similar to OTL in Europe, with a Franco-British alliance including Russia confronting a Central power German-dominated alliance. In that case I see little reason to assume either the USA or the South American power, whatever its history and ideology, to be directly involved except as trade partners with Europe--and given the southern power is strong and independent, its situation would be very parallel the USA. Perhaps they too have gotten into the game of global imperialism, to a limited extent--I'd think the Southern power would be diverted toward Africa, perhaps with an in on extorting Portuguese colonies, so it controls Congo and/or Angola. They still might remain neutral in the early Great War, and as OTL the appeal of Entente versus CP is not symmetrical, because the British and French combined dominate the sea ways and would presumably have dominated both trade and capital investment in the south as well as in the USA. Britain in particular would see both in a similar light--lacking the bond of common language and culture with South America to be sure, but maybe aspects of SA culture are more appealing than some of Yankee. Aristocracy for instance; suppose the SA power has a working aristocracy along British lines, lordships for merit; intermarriages of poor noble houses in Britain with richer ones from SA might offset the Catholicsm of the Latins and seem more suitable than marriage to commoner Yankees. Not to the point the latter cease; the Yanks (most rich ones) are after all Protestant, English speaking, "whiter" for what that matters (a successful SA despotism or strongly aristocratic regime would probably have to be meritocratic so its nobles will be drawn on a more colorblind basis from the populace I'd think--or it would not be strong and independent if burdened with traditional Castilian racist hierarchal notions). Whatever--the bottom line is, such a south American regime, on whatever social basis, would like the USA be a place where big profits can be made with reasonable likelihood of success, although unlike colonial or third world investments the investing power cannot extort a guaranteed return--they must rely on the honesty, sound business practices, and integrity of local governmental bodies they cannot control of the big nation. But on the whole investment there would have been paying off, for British, French and other European investors; financial ties would exist and would probably be reinforced by family ones at high social levels as with the USA. To be strong and successful, the Latin American power would surely have considerable industrial development even if some resources must be imported.

Therefore in a Great War scenario parallel to OTL, the Entente, Britain in particular, would be favored by business interests in both American Continents* both fiscally and culturally, with the Germans having few to no ties save via immigrant populations--a strong South American state might draw in more immigration, diverting some from the USA, depending on cultural factors.

The big difference would be that Britain would not be courting the support of one transAtlantic power but two. Even if the southern power is substantially less strong than the USA, it would be worth a lot to get its support, whereas any German policy of trying to isolate and starve out Britain would be antagonistic to the southern nation's interests as to the USA, and liable to create incidents to mobilize support for the Entente.

Britain being able to solicit deals from either would not be in as poor a bargaining position as OTL. Entente powers would have bigger lines of credit, since they'd have it from South American investors as well as US ones, and could borrow more before needing a formal alliance on American terms. They would be drawing, for munitions and other war materials, on two pools of material resources instead of one. Conceivably the Entente might win the war without either American nation formally joining it, and have more lenient terms for paying back war debts. Or they might concentrate on drawing in whichever one is weaker first, presumably the SA power, and trading that nation having a privileged place at the peace talks for more lenient repayment terms; the South American power joining the Entente while the USA sits it out profitably enough means inviting a less overwhelming American partner in leaving the Europeans more in control post-war.

If we then continue the parallel "rinse and repeat" with a coming Great Depression, the question would be whether the Southern power would be likely to go Bolshevik or not (assuming ATL Russia did)--if we presume no it won't then the WWII situation again is different because again Britain can court both American nations again, while being somewhat richer to begin with. Would the southern nation be more likely to join the Axis than favor Britain? I think no, it would not be more likely to actually become fascist itself, though the question is open whether it has in fact been some sort of right-wing authoritarian power all along may be relevant. But in terms of self-interest regardless of ideology, it would not be rational to tie itself to the Nazis, at least not until Hitler appeared to be winning, and even then the regional interest would be to cooperate with the power most able to project power in its own region--that is, again, Britain. If it has not already gone Communist itself, then it will share US interest in checking both the Axis and the Soviet bloc. It is likely therefore to eventually support the Allies/United Nations side, and to have a very large say in the post-war order, probably being deemed a regional power dominating South America in Churchill's scheme of federated spheres of interest, which would carry them over to become a Security Council permanent member and veto power, having at least as strong a claim to it as either France or China. In the postwar setup, it will be in the Western sphere and at least as influential as Britain in western councils.

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*I am a Yank and was raised to think of them as separate, and ask this--if it is irrational to split the Americas at Panama, why is it sane to regard Africa as a different continent than Asia, let alone the division of Europe from Asia that is clearly a purely cultural, hardly geographic matter? If North and South America are one continent, surely then there are only 4 in the world--America, Antarctica, Australia and EurAfrAsia?

Viewed culturally rather than in terms of technical isolation, one might argue there are three Americas instead--South America south of the Orinoco ranges, North America with the USA on its southern border, and Central America/Caribbean between them. Then again Mexico has strong ties to the continent it is clearly a peninsula of so perhaps the border on land lies at the southern Mexican border, or even includes Central America down to say Costa Rica and Panama, these two being properly seen as Caribbean so there is no middle continent but an island region removing parts of the other two to it culturally?

Just dividing the two at Panama and the south Caribbean shore seems sensible enough to me.
 
One improbable set of PODs is a Portuguese monarch relocating to Brazil as the result of the 1580 Portuguese succession crisis Brazil then offers asylum to French Huguenots who settle is the Sao Paulo area. This provides Brazil with a population base which includes craftsmen and a mercantile class. Seeing the economic the benefit migrants brought the Brazilian monarch allows Jews and Moriscos expelled from Spain to settle in southern Brazil. Offering refuge to those fleeing the religious wars in 17th century Europe can further increase Brazil's population base.
 
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