Would the lack of a Schlieffen Plan help or hinder the CP?

What's your opinion?

  • It would be a benefit for the CP to cancel the plan

    Votes: 54 85.7%
  • It would be a hindrance for the CP to cancel the plan

    Votes: 9 14.3%

  • Total voters
    63
Weren't the Germans also plagued at the Marne by both logistics and lack of coordination, though?
I can't remember. They had telegraphs and primitive radios, to say.
I hear that most of the logistical problems of the Schlieffen Plan came from the resistance on part of the belgians, such as saboteurs destroying rail lines. But, IMO, sending two divisions west could have helped as much, as the structural damage was still light in 1914 and the germans faced a problem with an exposed flank at the Marne.
 
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Someone asked about the Italian position last page, and it occurred to me that while their decisions would be at least partially contingent on the course of the radically different WWI, if the British entered anyways and came to them with the offer, "Attack Austria-Hungary and we'll send entire armies to back you up", something they and the French could easily do if the Germans sat defensively in the West, then that offer becomes near impossible to refuse.
 
Weren't the Germans also plagued at the Marne by both logistics and lack of coordination, though?

Yes, and coordination is the simplest to fix. With better coordination comes the opportunity to cut off and encircle large bodies of enemy troops, which will help the logistics.

In addition someone said earlier that if Germany sent most of its army east bla bla........ The 1912 plan for the east, the last one published, had a maximum of 42 divisions in the east or about 40% of the army and even then one army was going to arrive late.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Could Joffre really get away with bashing into a brick wall repeatedly without success? I'd expect him to be cashiered before long if he kept that up, since most idiot generals aren't as lucky as Cadorna.

Obviously Joffre would not be held responsible for the inevitable offensive disasters. When Joffre introduced his offensive doctrines from 1912, he ensured he was increasingly surrounded by like minded French Generals and "between August 2 and September 6 Joffre relieved two army, ten corps and thirty-eight divisional commanders". Pyrrhic Victory

Joffre could reasonably argue the French were compelled to make every effort to attack the Germans in accordance with their agreements with the Russians. Further, it might not be immediately apparent to all concerned the out come of such engagements are lop sided against the French. Joffre would not have the OTL political immunity afforded to him by the "Miracle at Marne", but he would have more than enough time at the helm to leave the French army in tatters.

Would it, though? From what I understand of 1914, the Russian First and Second Armies advanced too far without the support of other armies that Stavka wanted, allowing them to get destroyed in detail. The coordination between armies on the defensive wouldn't be as incoherent, and they'd also have significant fortifications to fall back on.

The German rail infrastructure in the east could only support the Germans initially deploying 3 armies, which was about the maximum number of Germans the Russians expected under their existing offensive strategy. Therefore is difficult to imagine anything that would cause the Russians to abort the early advance of the Russian first and second armies, even if the Russians had perfect reconnaissance. Clearly the Russian First and Second armies against 3 German armies are going to be destroyed very quickly.

When you look at how many fortress guns they had compared to field guns, it seems like a Russian army on the strategic defensive would be an altogether different beast than what the Germans had to deal with in East Prussia.

As outlined above, there is no plausible way to halt and prevent the destruction of the Russian first and second armies. Without those field armies, any Russian troops used to defend Polish fortresses will be isolated and eliminated after the siege trains from the west arrive. The best possible strategy for the Russians following the inevitable destruction of the first and second armies is a hasty and long retreat to avoid further armies being enveloped and destroyed. This would still be disastrous, but there are no good options.

So, to summarize, the French would be far better off here,
Yes and no. French territory and industry would be intact, but the French are likely to lose similar numbers of troops. Those losses are likely to include a greater proportion of France's most disciplined troops, since those are the ones needed to execute Joffre's offensive vision. Ultimately Joffre's position will become more vulnerable as he is forced to use more second tier troops, who are more likely to question the madness.

the British would be better off financially for not having to subsidize France quite as much
, Plus they do not have to build/replace armies for the western front under urgency.

the Germans would be better off but maybe not by much,
The Germans will be vastly better off. In the west, instead of assaulting Belgium fortresses and fighting battles with strained logistics, they will be fighting battles behind increasingly robust defenses against ill conceived French offensives with insufficient artillery support. In the East they Germans can engage in a war of maneuver against outnumbered and outgunned Russian forces.

the Russians might be worse off, but maybe not if they preserve the armies that invaded East Prussia IOTL,
The Russians will certainly be far worse off initially, but if the loss of the First and Second armies result in an immediate retreat, then the Russians will not be locked in a attritional arm wrestle with A-H over 1914/15 winter. Some Russian armies would also have to abandon vast quantities of equipment in an immediate retreat to avoid total annihilation.

and the how much better off the Austrians are depends on how well they manage their own defenses as much as anything.
This is an extended wank for A-H since it avoids initial devastating defeats from Russia, a Russian strategic withdrawal means A-H not locked in devastating battle of attrition over the 1914/15 winter, improved CP performance means Italy remains neutral and an increased and prolonged German presence on the eastern front lifts the load from A-H.

All in all, it just doesn't seem like it'd be any more likely to produce a decisive outcome compared to the OTL plan, and whereas OTL everybody probably overestimated the Russian steamroller, this plan underestimates it by assuming that Russia's failures IOTL were inherent to its military, when a lot of them were the result of flawed strategy and operations instead, strategy that needs to go out the window when facing the brunt of German efforts.

How can you underestimate the Russian abilities? There are almost no examples where the Russians demonstrated competence against the Germans (offense or defense), without significant numerical advantages. In this scenario the CP powers will consistently outnumber the Russians from start to finish.
 
I think the gist of the question here is two things:
1. How badly was A-H hurt in the opening months of WW1?
2. Will a German focus on the East avoid most if not all of the damage?
Because when you get down to it, considerations about when and with how much enthusiasm the UK will enter, the propaganda war, French army politics, etc etc are of secondary nature to this basically being a trade-off of less damage to France in exchange for less damage to A-H.

I don't know about the situation of A-H to answer those two questions myself. One thing I am sure of, though:
IF both:
1. France throws the full might of it's army against only the smaller portion of the German one without getting anywhere and taking high losses trying.
2. A-H LOOKS much stronger than in OTL. Remember politics is about perception, rather than fact.
Then Italy will stay neutral, no matter what the Entente offers. No one in Italy will believe the Entente is in any way capable of delivering on it's promises even if their intentions are honourable ;) .
 

NoMommsen

Donor
The best option would be to execute the plan better, there is nothing in the east that can lead to a quick victory or crushing blow. Nothing at all.
There is no possibility of a quick victory - neither with the "Schlieffen-Plan" nor without.
Logistics make it impossible in the west as well as in the east(quick victory as in "home by christmas" ... or at least easter).
About a "crushing blow" ... if it doesn't lead to victory aka someone asking/suing for peace it's worth noting. And France being attacked with such a "crushing blow" would very likely very fast remember Leon Gambetta, making all of France a guerilla-Franctireurs-zone of death for the germans for a long time - with or without Britain.

I have my doubts that the British would have stayed out had the Germans not gone through Belgium ...
Please explain : how ?
Grey more than Asquith needed some good and strong reasoning getting their nation to war. Reasoning to persuade other politicians at home as well as worldwide from their 'just cause', to persuade their economical leaders as well as especially the common people of their 'just cause', as they would have to pay the price in money and blood.
Neither Grey nor Asquith of 1914 are Mao-Hitler-Stalin-Pol Pot-like autocrats, who can 'just' order their nation to do so without having to care what others say or think. Politics of that time just don't work that way.

As outlined above, there is no plausible way to halt and prevent the destruction of the Russian first and second armies. Without those field armies, any Russian troops used to defend Polish fortresses will be isolated and eliminated after the siege trains from the west arrive. The best possible strategy for the Russians following the inevitable destruction of the first and second armies is a hasty and long retreat to avoid further armies being enveloped and destroyed. This would still be disastrous, but there are no good options.
Only that there is (to my knowledge) virtually not one single russian officer or politician (not ot speak of generals), who in 1914 after the defeat of 1st and 2nd army devised so IOTL or would have done ITTL.
IOTL they rather put whatever they had, knowing that it was less than they could have had especially on a shorter front after retreat, into the egg-basket/trap "polish salient" for an offense. Only to be once again being outpaced by the germans and attacked and decimated by numerical lesser forces.
This counts for the battle for Lodz with its two phases as well as for Gorlice-Tarnow with wich they finally had to accept the Great Retreat but mainly because they had exhausted their forces piecemeal beforehand.


Therefore abandoning the "Schlieffen-Plan" can do IMO the CP only good - even if we count in some more bad Hötzendorf decisions or some less bad Joffre decisions.

However, all in all : a "short war" (below 24 month) IMHO is impossible at all.
(And I would still love to see someone comming up with a plausible (not handwaving) way of getting Britain into the war without the "rape of poor little Belgium".
I'm desperatly looking for one.)
 
Not attacking through Belgium halves the Battle front - the modern border being 450 KMs long! It works for and against both Germany and France.

France has a number of Fortifications along this border - that OTL had large numbers of Guns removed to provide heavy artillery for the French armys fighting further north - even then during the Verdun Battles of 1916 despite the forts having large numbers of their guns removed was a bloodbath for both sides.

There is also a large part of the border that has terrain 'unsuitable' for massed modern warfare.

So with that in mind I would suggest that a WW1 with no "Rape of Belgium" then the British do not get involved at least not initially but there is far less need for the BEF (which was initially very small relative to the rest of the army's) in the first place.

However Britain not at war with Germany would still be a friend of France and would very likely be providing weapons, ammo and supplies as well as bank rolling them

What is better for Germany is that ITTL France would be far more willing to negotiate without a large chunk of 'it' as well as almost all of Belgium being occupied which OTL would have forced any such negotiation being conducted by the Entente (whomever they might be at the time) from a position of weakness.

Therefore the French would be more willing to talk as it is very unlikely that any of its land is occupied and both nations would suffer far less than OTL.

Also assuming that this all happens before Britain joins the fight then Germany's colonial possessions have not fallen to the British and Japanese.
 
Without Schleiffen, the war never gets started.

I agree with other posters that the major problem for the CP is AH performance in 1914. That is where you easiest improvements can be made.
 
There is no possibility of a quick victory - neither with the "Schlieffen-Plan" nor without.
Logistics make it impossible in the west as well as in the east(quick victory as in "home by christmas" ... or at least easter).
About a "crushing blow" ... if it doesn't lead to victory aka someone asking/suing for peace it's worth noting. And France being attacked with such a "crushing blow" would very likely very fast remember Leon Gambetta, making all of France a guerilla-Franctireurs-zone of death for the germans for a long time - with or without Britain.

The whole home by Christmas was a pipe dream that nobody in power really believed, if they did the Marine Division wouldn't have been set up to fight the Klienkrieg against Britain in August 1914. The aim was, much like the Franco-Prussian war, to win big victories in the battles of the Frontier so the follow on campaigns could be fought with 60% of the army rather than 90%. The encirclement of destruction of one or more armies was most certainly within the logistical capability of Moltke's plan given that fleeting opportunities appeared between the 20th and 25th of August. What's more a halt to movement to actually reduce an encircled army would be a benefit as it would allow railway repair teams to catch up to a stationary rather than constantly moving front.

In contrast the destruction of the Russian 1st and defeat of the 2nd Army followed by the capture of several fortresses and several months later the ejection from Poland and Great Retreat did not lead to a rapid collapse of Russia that would allow a large scale effort against France. The mobilisation schedule for plan 19G and the 1914 variant meant that a German mobilisation offensive would take place against a mere fraction of Russia's forces and couldn't lead to major victories based on German strengths of fast mobilisation and general competence.

But we've been on this merry go round before.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Yes, and coordination is the simplest to fix. With better coordination comes the opportunity to cut off and encircle large bodies of enemy troops, which will help the logistics.

All the great armies had the aspirational goals of battles of maneuver/annihilation. However, it was only on the eastern front where this had any prospect of success, due to the room to maneuver and the disparity in quality between the German and Russian forces.

In addition someone said earlier that if Germany sent most of its army east bla bla........ The 1912 plan for the east, the last one published, had a maximum of 42 divisions in the east or about 40% of the army and even then one army was going to arrive late.

Agreed, which is why the Russians will not adjust their offensive stance until the complete annihilation of the Russian 1st and 2nd armies by 3 superior German armies

The encirclement of destruction of one or more armies was most certainly within the logistical capability of Moltke's plan given that fleeting opportunities appeared between the 20th and 25th of August.
When and where - without the benefit of perfect hindsight, multiple contrived PODs and multiple mulligans.

In contrast the destruction of the Russian 1st and defeat of the 2nd Army followed by the capture of several fortresses and several months later the ejection from Poland and Great Retreat did not lead to a rapid collapse of Russia that would allow a large scale effort against France. The mobilisation schedule for plan 19G and the 1914 variant meant that a German mobilisation offensive would take place against a mere fraction of Russia's forces and couldn't lead to major victories based on German strengths of fast mobilisation and general competence.

The destruction of the Russian 1st army and defeat of the Russian 2nd army was not ultimately decisive because the Germans lacked the numbers in the east to exploit those victories. The critical difference in this scenario is not the annihilation of both those Russian armies, but the ongoing presence of 4 German armies in the east, which can take advantage of those circumstances.

The Russians simply do not have the forces remaining to hold 4 German armies. Unless Russia immediately abandons Poland and rapidly retreats to the east, multiple Russian armies risk being trapped and annihilated. Even if the Russians commit to retreat immediately, they still have to effectively disengage A-H forces and somehow delay German advances to cover the withdrawal from Poland. If the Russians delay the decision to retreat, their prospects get darker by the day.

The OTL 'liberation' of Poland and its fortresses was delayed due to lack of German troops in the east. In this scenario, the Russians will lose the resources of Poland much earlier, including the substantially intact munition caches in the Russian fortresses, which would further limit the Russian field armies ability to resist the CP forces. In the planned OTL 1915 Great Retreat, approximately 1 million Russians were taken prisoner and the Russians suffered half a million casualties.

The OTL collapse of the Russian front in 1915 greatly influenced the entry of Bulgaria into WW1. If Bulgaria enters the war in 1914 due to the earlier collapse of the Russian front, then Serbia's war is over.
 
I am answering the question on the title with yes since hindsight shows Russia to be a better target to focus first than France and that Austria-Hungary really needed the help but for the different question in the OP it would be no.

The problem is that Germany had spent the lead-up to WW1 preparing for the execution of Schlieffen Plan so it worked as well as one could reasonably expect but had given no real thought or preparation for starting on the Eastern Front. With an order arbitrarily coming from the top at July 28(or even worse later) there would be a lot of problems with people disagreeing, simply not knowing what to do and then failing to pull it off.

I suppose it is possible that in spite of all those issues it ends up being better but it is also possible the Schlieffen Plan could have worked better than it did and IMHO more likely at that point despite the odds being rather low.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
@Riain Then it seems I misinterpreted your notion "a quick victory" in your former post #3.

For your arguement about mobilisation schedule Plan G and the next mobilization plan 20 (scheduled for 1915) :
I interpreted the OP as abandoning the Schlieffen-Plan in terms of : "last minute 1914" or at least somewhere around that time, not giving Russia the time to implement Plan 20.
Taking this time would also start quite a flock of butterflies elswhere to fly ... i.e. in Germany.


But we've been on this merry go round before.
Let's waltz, matilda :biggrin::)
 

Thomas1195

Banned
I have my doubts that the British would have stayed out had the Germans not gone through Belgium and having the French still have their Industry intact and have the British attack is an even worse situation, I said nothing about abandoning AH, I said have them hold their own which means to handle things on their and not need bailing out to begin with
Well, first, Germany only has to stay defend behind their forts and mow down French offensives. The French totally lacked siege guns.

Next, you will have to wait for the next general election in Britain (well, if Irish civil war never breaks out). If Tories win, then they would go to war. If Lib wins, then no. The problem that by the time of the election, the news about bloody battle would already reach British readers. And this would be capitalized by Lib-Lab to campaign on the anti-war stance and condemn the Tories as a bunch of warmongers in 1915 election, thus discouraging the already anti-war public further from supporting going to war.
 
@Riain Then it seems I misinterpreted your notion "a quick victory" in your former post #3.

For your arguement about mobilisation schedule Plan G and the next mobilization plan 20 (scheduled for 1915) :
I interpreted the OP as abandoning the Schlieffen-Plan in terms of : "last minute 1914" or at least somewhere around that time, not giving Russia the time to implement Plan 20.
Taking this time would also start quite a flock of butterflies elswhere to fly ... i.e. in Germany.


Let's waltz, matilda :biggrin::)

Everyone seems to have a different notion of a quick victory, often without a lot of thought as to the context.

There is a lot of 'Germany abandoning their only war plan at the last minute' at the moment, which is so absurd as to border on ASB despite the Kaiser's last minute intrusion into diplomacy. A hell of a lot of thought was put into these plans by intelligent, well trained and highly dedicated people and their evolution took into account the changing military and alliance circumstances, they didn't just fall from the sky. Thus I can't take questions about them being dropped with no alternative seriously, so refer to the reality of war planning on both sides in WW1 to address the general issues these questions raise.
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
@Riain I will do my very best (, Miss Sophie) , to keep that in mind. ;)

Though ... what might be "absurd" and what not ... such borders look quite different from the luxury of hindsight we have, as well as the difference in determing such at all with the mindset of today compared to former times.
 
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