Would the Korean War Have Happened Under Tom Dewey?

Would the Korean War Have Happened Under Tom Dewey?

  • Yes

    Votes: 24 64.9%
  • No

    Votes: 6 16.2%
  • Unsure

    Votes: 7 18.9%

  • Total voters
    37
  • Poll closed .
One of my favorite POD's is Dewey actually defeating Truman in 1948, and I've often wondered how this would have impacted Korea. In OTL, Stalin at first didn't like the idea of North Korea invading the South, suspecting the US would intervene and win. However, from 1949-50 the US made it increasingly clear that it had little if any commitment to defending South Korea (the US withdrew troops, cut off aid, and Acheson declared it outside America's "strategic defense perimeter"). Soon, the Communists became convinced if they invaded South Korea the US wouldn't intervene. Stalin gave the greenlight, and the Korean War begun. Now, if a new Republican President enters office with the bellicose anti-Communist John Foster Dulles as SecState, would the same events have occurred? Dulles was an outspoken hardliner, believing in brinkmanship and rollback of Communism all around the world; presumably this would have included South Korea. Dewey wanted to pump billions into defense once inaugurated, and if his coattails included a more conservative, Republican Congress it might be less likely that South Korean aid is abandoned. Would the war have happened under Dewey? If you answered yes or no, how do you think his presidency would play out beyond there?
 
One of the reasons the US was withdrawing from S Korea were the defense policies characterized by Sec Def Louis Johnson. That is a drastic reduction of ground combat forces to 1939 levels, and a reduction of the Navy to far below 1930s strength. The US defense establishment Johnson was working towards simply did not have anything to keep in Korea. It was not so much a withdrawal as a dissolution.

Johnsons policy reflected Congressional policy in reducing defense costs to pre WWII levels. That in turn came from the voters who still have a residual isolationist faction, and who were all expecting a big peace dividend and very low taxes in the 1950s. Johnson promised he could enforce global peace cheaply by using the US Air Force and nuclear weapons.

For Dewey or anyone else to discourage a NKPA attack requires credible deference. Either a willingness to use a number of atomic bombs, or keeping a US Army corps and tactical air support present in Korea. The 8th Army and air wings stationed in Japan were no deterence. Providing all that requires a US electorate and a Congress will to keep defense budgets closer to 1941 levels than Depression era levels.

The alternative is to simply write off Korea. This was not done by Truman as previous communist nation actions had shown only active counter actions prevented further communist expansion. ie: The Berlin Airlift. ie: USN protection for Taiwan. ie: Military and finical support for the Greeks. ie: Highly proactive black ops in Iran, Austria, & elsewhere.
 
One of the reasons the US was withdrawing from S Korea were the defense policies characterized by Sec Def Louis Johnson.

Good historical evidence. With this in mind, it would be useful to consider who Dewey would have appointed to Defense. In OTL Ike (a Dewey Republican through and through) appointed former GM CEO Charles Wilson. Like Secretary Johnson did under Harry Truman, he actually decreased the Pentagon's budget as part of Ike's New Look: balance cuts in the armed forces with a stronger nuclear policy. At first I thought Dewey might appoint someone similar, however as both the US President and Columbia President Eisenhower had a reputation of appointing politically inexperienced business friends who became controversial for accusations of conflict of interest. (Not to say Ike was corrupt, he was a great man, but like Grant he could have benefited from better political instincts). Dewey in contrast was more favorable to professional lawyers and Wall Street men like himself, so it's less likely he'd appoint Wilson and more likely he would appoint a lawyer who shared his support for ramping up defense spending. Maybe Allen Dulles (John's brother), who Ike appointed to CIA?
 
There would have been a draw down anyways as at the end of WW II almost everything became obsolete.
One of the reasons that the Republicans won big in the 1946 Midterms was that the Truman Administration was thought by returning veterans to be too slow in discharging them and one of the Republicans promises was to speed up the discharge rate.
With Dewey as President the Republicans would not have been using the "Who Lost China?" issue to bash Democrats and Dewey would not be under pressure to save the Republic of Korea.
 
It seems to me, Dewey might have engaged in aid to the kmt. I do not foresee ground troops, perhaps an aid campaign.
 
There wouldn’t have been the draw down. No speech removing Korea from the defense framework.

You're probably right. However as Carl Schwarmberger pointed out, there were certain isolationist elements in the US despite the Cold War (Robert Taft was the most powerful Republican in Congress, and he and Dewey hated each other). These people would have opposed Dewey's military build up, as well as his centrist domestic programs. (Keep the New Deal in place but maintain a balanced budget and cut taxes). I could see a fight between Dewey and Taft to step it up in the fight against Communism, and support for South Korea could be a focal point. Not to mention that under Dewey, the Soviets will get the a-bomb and China will go Communist. Dewey will be under intense domestic pressure to demonstrate he is tough on the Commies, and as a new President he must prove his worth early (in contrast to Truman who already had the Truman Doctrine and Berlin Airlift under his belt), so like LBJ in Vietnam he just might pick a small corner of Southern Asia as the place. I think US aid to South Korea will increase and SecState Dulles will make sure to publically emphasize the American commitment to defending Southeast Asia. But would that truly be enough to deter the Communist Bloc? I'd love to hear more opinions on this.
 
With Dewey as President the Republicans would not have been using the "Who Lost China?" issue to bash Democrats and Dewey would not be under pressure to save the Republic of Korea.

But in this TL, it is the Democrats bashing Dewey for "losing China." They also would attack him for "allowing" the Soviets to get the a-bomb. After the Vienna fiasco, Kennedy deliberately increased US aid and advisors because he needed to make up for a Western defeat and prove American resolve to the world. Also, as a new President he needed to show he was not weak. Dewey would likely be under the same pressure, so a military "dissolution" in Korea as Carl Schwarmberger puts it would be political suicide.
 
There was no amount of aid that could have been given that would have saved the KMT.

Agreed. Chaing's China was a lost cause by 1949. Also, Douglas MacArthur went on record around this time saying that anyone wanting to put troops in China should have their head examined. If even Mac thinks the idea is too far gone, then it's really too far gone.
 
But in this TL, it is the Democrats bashing Dewey for "losing China." They also would attack him for "allowing" the Soviets to get the a-bomb. After the Vienna fiasco, Kennedy deliberately increased US aid and advisors because he needed to make up for a Western defeat and prove American resolve to the world. Also, as a new President he needed to show he was not weak. Dewey would likely be under the same pressure, so a military "dissolution" in Korea as Carl Schwarmberger puts it would be political suicide.
I doubt the Democrats could have gain traction with the American voters with a "Who Lost China" bashing campaign against Dewey and the Republicans, and without that Dewey would have been giving more leeway in sacrificing Korea in order to save Western Europe.
On the whole, the Anti-Communism Witch hunts was more about depicting the Democratic Party as not being able to defend America then actually finding Communists and there was more then the whiff of Anti-Semitism going on but that is another subject altogether.
 
For an argument that the importance of the "defensive perimeter" speech has been much overrated, see https://web.archive.org/web/2003040...ions/prologue/summer_2002_korean_myths_1.html

"To build political support for the Korean assistance package, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson delivered a speech before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, offering an optimistic assessment of the ROK's future. Later, critics perpetrated the myth that Acheson's exclusion of South Korea from the US 'defensive perimeter' gave the Kremlin a 'green light' to order an attack.13 Currently available declassified Soviet documents show, however, that Acheson's words had almost no effect on Communist planning for the invasion; only one even mentions the Press Club speech. In fact, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung at first thought that Acheson had placed South Korea *inside* the U.S. defensive perimeter.14...

"In January 1950, Stalin approved Kim's request to visit Moscow but, despite Acheson's speech, he was not ready to approve an invasion. At that time, he also approved a major expansion of North Korea's military capabilities, but his purpose was more to ensure its survival than to promote aggressive expansion. When they met during April, Kim persuaded Stalin that a military victory would be quick and easy, especially because of support from southern guerrillas and an expected popular uprising against Rhee. But Stalin still feared U.S. military intervention, advising Kim that he could stage an offensive only if China's Mao Zedong approved. During May, Kim IL Sung traveled to Beijing to secure Chinese consent for the invasion. Significantly, Mao also expressed concerns about U.S. military intervention. But after Kim disingenuously explained that Stalin had approved his plans, Mao gave his reluctant consent for the offensive as well. Kim IL Sung knew that time was running out and manipulated his patrons into supporting his desperate bid for reunification before Rhee could beat him to the punch..."

In short, the "defensive perimeter" speech does not seem to have convinced either Stalin or Mao or Kim that there was no chance that the US would fight; rather, what happened was that Kim managed to persuade both Stalin and Mao that the North would win before the US could do anything about it.
 

bguy

Donor
Good historical evidence. With this in mind, it would be useful to consider who Dewey would have appointed to Defense. In OTL Ike (a Dewey Republican through and through) appointed former GM CEO Charles Wilson. Like Secretary Johnson did under Harry Truman, he actually decreased the Pentagon's budget as part of Ike's New Look: balance cuts in the armed forces with a stronger nuclear policy. At first I thought Dewey might appoint someone similar, however as both the US President and Columbia President Eisenhower had a reputation of appointing politically inexperienced business friends who became controversial for accusations of conflict of interest. (Not to say Ike was corrupt, he was a great man, but like Grant he could have benefited from better political instincts). Dewey in contrast was more favorable to professional lawyers and Wall Street men like himself, so it's less likely he'd appoint Wilson and more likely he would appoint a lawyer who shared his support for ramping up defense spending. Maybe Allen Dulles (John's brother), who Ike appointed to CIA?

Dewey was reportedly going to nominate Robert Lovett for Secretary of Defense.

https://books.google.es/books?id=bqseBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA210&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false

And Lovett was indeed a former Wall Street man who favored ramping up defense spending.
 
For an argument that the importance of the "defensive perimeter" speech has been much overrated, see https://web.archive.org/web/2003040...ions/prologue/summer_2002_korean_myths_1.html

"To build political support for the Korean assistance package, Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson delivered a speech before the National Press Club on January 12, 1950, offering an optimistic assessment of the ROK's future. Later, critics perpetrated the myth that Acheson's exclusion of South Korea from the US 'defensive perimeter' gave the Kremlin a 'green light' to order an attack.13 Currently available declassified Soviet documents show, however, that Acheson's words had almost no effect on Communist planning for the invasion; only one even mentions the Press Club speech. In fact, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung at first thought that Acheson had placed South Korea *inside* the U.S. defensive perimeter.14...

"In January 1950, Stalin approved Kim's request to visit Moscow but, despite Acheson's speech, he was not ready to approve an invasion. At that time, he also approved a major expansion of North Korea's military capabilities, but his purpose was more to ensure its survival than to promote aggressive expansion. When they met during April, Kim persuaded Stalin that a military victory would be quick and easy, especially because of support from southern guerrillas and an expected popular uprising against Rhee. But Stalin still feared U.S. military intervention, advising Kim that he could stage an offensive only if China's Mao Zedong approved. During May, Kim IL Sung traveled to Beijing to secure Chinese consent for the invasion. Significantly, Mao also expressed concerns about U.S. military intervention. But after Kim disingenuously explained that Stalin had approved his plans, Mao gave his reluctant consent for the offensive as well. Kim IL Sung knew that time was running out and manipulated his patrons into supporting his desperate bid for reunification before Rhee could beat him to the punch..."

In short, the "defensive perimeter" speech does not seem to have convinced either Stalin or Mao or Kim that there was no chance that the US would fight; rather, what happened was that Kim managed to persuade both Stalin and Mao that the North would win before the US could do anything about it.

That's an awesome source, I'm really glad you brought it into this thread. Do you have any similar evidence about what Dewey's policy might have been towards Korea? As Ike's SecState, Dulles (who was assured to be the new SecState in 1949 if Dewey won) was publically adamant that everywhere in the world the US needed to be on the defensive against international Communist aggression. In 1953, during the tail end of the Korean War, he and Ike threatened China with atomic bombs if they didn't come to the bargaining table. Further, it has been said that Truman and Mac significantly underestimated China's willingness to intervene in Korea if provoked. This is what prevented a quick UN victory in 1950. (By the way, I should say that I don't necessarily condone or condemn using nukes or making such threats, but that is simply the historical record and it is important to consider for a Dewey-Korea scenario.)
 
I doubt the Democrats could have gain traction with the American voters with a "Who Lost China" bashing campaign against Dewey and the Republicans,

Why exactly? JFK did this masterfully in 1960; a big reason he won that year was charging Ike with allowing a "missile gap" to develop between the US and USSR, and he blamed the Republicans for allowing a Communist regime to set up shop in Cuba. It's safe to think that similar attacks would be equally effective in 1949 against Dewey. In fact as a young Represenative, JFK actually made a similar charge against Truman for losing China, as many Republicans did. Anti-Communism wasn't just about cynical politicking or bigotry (which was genuine as you are right to point out) it was also the result of a genuine fear of Communism that was shared in both parties.
 
Something to keep in mind is that the South was just as much gearing up for "violently uniting the peninsula" as the North and this was one of the arguments used to get Moscow and Bejing on-board. (The US was well aware of this which is why we weren't giving them as much of our equipment but were shipping a lot of it back to Japan or dumping it in the ocean)

Dewey himself, (and the Republican's in Congress) were getting concerned about Truman's 'draw-down' since it was heavily affecting the US ability to project power or defend ourselves. (The Navy's inability to any longer field a significant ASW force was a prime example) But in that vain it should be noted that Truman, (and a lot of the Washington politicians on both sides) were convinced that 'conventional' forces were on the way out and that between nuclear weapons and the Air Force ability to deliver them 'conventional' force levels could be significantly cut. Dewey was one of the few to buck this trend as even Eisenhower believed this and followed that belief when he was elected. (He also believed that the CIA could be used 'covertly' instead of conventional forces but we all know how wrong this was now... they didn't then)

Specifically, Truman's economics for defense was that the military got whatever was 'left-over' from the domestic budget once everything was paid and in general Congress went along. When he was re-elected he took that as a mandate and doubled down on military cuts, (and both his choices for office of SecDef and personal attitude towards the 'obsolete' conventional services significantly increased the already problematic inter-service rivalries) because Dewey had run on INCREASING military spending. For more of a view on what Dewey might have done I recommend this article:
https://books.google.com/books?id=3...48 Special Issue: What will Dewey Do?&f=false

In essence though if Dewey doesn't actually put more 'boots-on-the-ground' in Korea, (and MacArthur was dead set against such a move mind you, his 'expertise' in Asian developments was that North Korea was to weak to attack and any increase would lead the South to attack pulling America into a conflict it didn't want... (Take that for what it's worth but I don't see he was 'wrong' on the latter speculation)

I suspect as another factor if Dewey DID manage to get increased military spending, (again the Republican's were sorta behind him on that score) then it's quite possible that both Moscow and Bejing would have ridden closer herd on North Korea and he wouldn't have gotten away with the deception in getting their support for the war.

Randy
 
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